Name change.
Jacob Appelbaum authored 16 years ago
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torbutton/index.wml 96) <strong>Developer Documentation:</strong> <a href="design/">Torbutton Design Document</a> and <a href="design/MozillaBrownBag.pdf">Slides (Not actively updated)</a><br/>
torbutton/index.wml 97) <strong>Extras:</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 98)
torbutton/index.wml 99) Google search plugins for
torbutton/index.wml 100)
torbutton/index.wml 101) <a href="/jsreq.html" title="Ref: 14938 (googleCA)"
torbutton/index.wml 102) onClick="addOpenSearch('GoogleCanada','ico','General','14937','g');return false">Google CA</a>, and
torbutton/index.wml 103)
torbutton/index.wml 104) <a href="/jsreq.html" title="Ref: 14938 (googleCA)"
torbutton/index.wml 105) onClick="addOpenSearch('googleuk_web','png','General','14445','g');return false">Google UK</a>.
torbutton/index.wml 106) <br/>
torbutton/index.wml 107) <!--
torbutton/index.wml 108) <strong>Install:</strong> <a href="torbutton-1.0.4.xpi">torbutton-1.0.4.xpi</a><br/>
torbutton/index.wml 109) -->
torbutton/index.wml 110) <strong>Source:</strong> You can <a href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/">browse the repository</a> or simply unzip the xpi.
torbutton/index.wml 111) <br/>
torbutton/index.wml 112) <strong>Bug Reports:</strong> <a href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&project=5">Torproject flyspray</a><br/>
torbutton/index.wml 113) <strong>Documents:</strong> <b>[</b> <a href="#FAQ">FAQ</a> <b>|</b> <a href="CHANGELOG">changelog</a> <b>|</b> <a href="LICENSE">license</a> <b>|</b> <a href="CREDITS">credits</a> <b>]</b><br/>
torbutton/index.wml 114) <h2>About</h2>
torbutton/index.wml 115) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 116) Torbutton is a 1-click way for Firefox users to enable or disable the browser's use of <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor</a>. It adds a panel to the statusbar that says "Tor Enabled" (in green) or "Tor Disabled" (in red). The user may click on the panel to toggle the status. If the user (or some other extension) changes the proxy settings, the change is automatically reflected in the statusbar.
torbutton/index.wml 117) </p><p>
torbutton/index.wml 118) Some users may prefer a toolbar button instead of a statusbar panel. Such a button is included, and one adds it to the toolbar by right-clicking on the desired toolbar, selecting "Customize...", and then dragging the Torbutton icon onto the toolbar. There is an option in the preferences to hide the statusbar panel (Tools->Extensions, select Torbutton, and click on Preferences).
torbutton/index.wml 119) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 120) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 121) Newer Firefoxes have the ability to send DNS resolves through the socks proxy, and Torbutton will make use of this feature if it is available in your version of Firefox.
torbutton/index.wml 122) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 123)
torbutton/index.wml 124) <a id="FAQ"></a><h2>FAQ</h2>
torbutton/index.wml 125)
torbutton/index.wml 126) <strong>I can't click on links or hit reload after I toggle Tor! Why?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 127) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 128)
torbutton/index.wml 129) Due to <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=409737">Firefox
torbutton/index.wml 130) Bug 409737</a>, pages can still open popups and perform Javascript redirects
torbutton/index.wml 131) and history access after Tor has been toggled. These popups and redirects can
torbutton/index.wml 132) be blocked, but unfortunately they are indistinguishable from normal user
torbutton/index.wml 133) interactions with the page (such as clicking on links, opening them in new
torbutton/index.wml 134) tabs/windows, or using the history buttons), and so those are blocked as a
torbutton/index.wml 135) side effect. Once that Firefox bug is fixed, this degree of isolation will
torbutton/index.wml 136) become optional (for people who do not want to accidentally click on links and
torbutton/index.wml 137) give away information via referrers). A workaround is to right click on the
torbutton/index.wml 138) link, and open it in a new tab or window. The tab or window won't load
torbutton/index.wml 139) automatically, but you can hit enter in the URL bar, and it will begin
torbutton/index.wml 140) loading. Hitting enter in the URL bar will also reload the page without
torbutton/index.wml 141) clicking the reload button.
torbutton/index.wml 142)
torbutton/index.wml 143) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 144)
torbutton/index.wml 145) <strong>My browser is in some weird state where nothing works right!</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 146) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 147)
torbutton/index.wml 148) Try to disable Tor by clicking on the button, and then open a new window. If
torbutton/index.wml 149) that doesn't fix the issue, go to the preferences page and hit 'Restore
torbutton/index.wml 150) Defaults'. This should reset the extension and Firefox to a known good
torbutton/index.wml 151) configuration. If you can manage to reproduce whatever issue gets your
torbutton/index.wml 152) Firefox wedged, please file details at <a
torbutton/index.wml 153) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&project=5">the
torbutton/index.wml 154) bug tracker</a>.
torbutton/index.wml 155)
torbutton/index.wml 156) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 157)
torbutton/index.wml 158) <strong>When I toggle Tor, my sites that use javascript stop working. Why?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 159) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 160)
torbutton/index.wml 161) Javascript can do things like wait until you have disabled Tor before trying
torbutton/index.wml 162) to contact its source site, thus revealing your IP address. As such, Torbutton
torbutton/index.wml 163) must disable Javascript, Meta-Refresh tags, and certain CSS behavior when Tor
torbutton/index.wml 164) state changes from the state that was used to load a given page. These features
torbutton/index.wml 165) are re-enabled when Torbutton goes back into the state that was used to load
torbutton/index.wml 166) the page, but in some cases (particularly with Javascript and CSS) it is
torbutton/index.wml 167) sometimes not possible to fully recover from the resulting errors, and the
torbutton/index.wml 168) page is broken. Unfortunately, the only thing you can do (and still remain
torbutton/index.wml 169) safe from having your IP address leak) is to reload the page when you toggle
torbutton/index.wml 170) Tor, or just ensure you do all your work in a page before switching tor state.
torbutton/index.wml 171)
torbutton/index.wml 172) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 173)
torbutton/index.wml 174)
torbutton/index.wml 175) <strong>When I use Tor, Firefox is no longer filling in logins/search boxes
torbutton/index.wml 176) for me. Why?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 177) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 178)
torbutton/index.wml 179) Currently, this is tied to the "<b>Block history writes during Tor</b>"
torbutton/index.wml 180) setting. If you have enabled that setting, all formfill functionality (both
torbutton/index.wml 181) saving and reading) is disabled. If this bothers you, you can uncheck that
torbutton/index.wml 182) option, but both history and forms will be saved. To prevent history
torbutton/index.wml 183) disclosure attacks via Non-Tor usage, it is recommended you disable Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 184) history reads if you allow history writing during Tor.
torbutton/index.wml 185)
torbutton/index.wml 186) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 187)
torbutton/index.wml 188)
torbutton/index.wml 189) <strong>Which Firefox extensions should I avoid using?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 190) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 191)
torbutton/index.wml 192) This is a tough one. There are thousands of Firefox extensions: making a
torbutton/index.wml 193) complete list of ones that are bad for anonymity is near impossible. However,
torbutton/index.wml 194) here are a few examples that should get you started as to what sorts of
torbutton/index.wml 195) behavior are dangerous.
torbutton/index.wml 196)
torbutton/index.wml 197) <ol>
torbutton/index.wml 198) <li>StumbleUpon, et al</li>
torbutton/index.wml 199) These extensions will send all sorts of information about the websites you
torbutton/index.wml 200) visit to the stumbleupon servers, and correlate this information with a
torbutton/index.wml 201) unique identifier. This is obviously terrible for your anonymity.
torbutton/index.wml 202) More generally, any sort of extension that requires registration, or even
torbutton/index.wml 203) extensions that provide information about websites you visit should be
torbutton/index.wml 204) suspect.
torbutton/index.wml 205)
torbutton/index.wml 206) <li>FoxyProxy</li>
torbutton/index.wml 207)
torbutton/index.wml 208) While FoxyProxy is a nice idea in theory, in practice it is impossible to
torbutton/index.wml 209) configure securely for Tor usage without Torbutton. Like all vanilla third
torbutton/index.wml 210) party proxy plugins, the main risks are <a
torbutton/index.wml 211) href="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/">plugin leakage</a>
torbutton/index.wml 212) and <a href="http://ha.ckers.org/weird/CSS-history.cgi">history
torbutton/index.wml 213) disclosure</a>, followed closely by cookie theft by exit nodes and tracking by
torbutton/index.wml 214) adservers (see the <a href="design/index.html#adversary">Torbutton Adversary
torbutton/index.wml 215) Model</a> for more information). However, even with Torbutton installed in
torbutton/index.wml 216) tandem and always enabled, it is still very difficult (though not impossible)
torbutton/index.wml 217) to configure FoxyProxy securely. Since FoxyProxy's 'Patterns' mode only
torbutton/index.wml 218) applies to specific urls, and not to an entire tab, setting FoxyProxy to only
torbutton/index.wml 219) send specific sites through Tor will still allow adservers to still learn your
torbutton/index.wml 220) real IP. Worse, if those sites use offsite logging services such as Google
torbutton/index.wml 221) Analytics, you may still end up in their logs with your real IP. Malicious
torbutton/index.wml 222) exit nodes can also cooperate with sites to inject images into pages that
torbutton/index.wml 223) bypass your filters. Setting FoxyProxy to only send certain URLs via Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 224) is much more viable, but be very careful with the filters you allow. For
torbutton/index.wml 225) example, something as simple as allowing *google* to go via Non-Tor will still
torbutton/index.wml 226) cause you to end up in all the logs of all websites that use Google Analytics!
torbutton/index.wml 227) See <a href="http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/faq.html#privacy-01">this
torbutton/index.wml 228) question</a> on the FoxyProxy FAQ for more information.
torbutton/index.wml 229)
torbutton/index.wml 230) <li>NoScript</li>
torbutton/index.wml 231) Torbutton currently mitigates all known anonymity issues with Javascript.
torbutton/index.wml 232) While it may be tempting to get better security by disabling Javascript for
torbutton/index.wml 233) certain sites, you are far better off with an all-or-nothing approach.
torbutton/index.wml 234) NoScript is exceedingly complicated, and has many subtleties that can surprise
torbutton/index.wml 235) even advanced users. For example, addons.mozilla.org verifies extension
torbutton/index.wml 236) integrity via Javascript over https, but downloads them in the clear. Not
torbutton/index.wml 237) adding it to your whitelist effectively
torbutton/index.wml 238) means you are pulling down unverified extensions. Worse still, using NoScript
torbutton/index.wml 239) can actually disable protections that Torbutton itself provides via
torbutton/index.wml 240) Javascript, yet still allow malicious exit nodes to compromise your
torbutton/index.wml 241) anonymity via the default whitelist (which they can spoof to inject any script they want).
torbutton/index.wml 242)
torbutton/index.wml 243) </ol>
torbutton/index.wml 244)
torbutton/index.wml 245) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 246)
torbutton/index.wml 247) <strong>Which Firefox extensions do you recommend?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 248) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 249) <ol>
torbutton/index.wml 250) <li><a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/953">RefControl</a></li>
torbutton/index.wml 251) Mentioned above, this extension allows more fine-grained referrer spoofing
torbutton/index.wml 252) than Torbutton currently provides. It should break less sites than Torbutton's
torbutton/index.wml 253) referrer spoofing option.
torbutton/index.wml 254) <li><a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/1474">SafeCache</a></li>
torbutton/index.wml 255) If you use Tor excessively, and rarely disable it, you probably want to
torbutton/index.wml 256) install this extension to minimize the ability of sites to store long term
torbutton/index.wml 257) identifiers in your cache. This extension applies same origin policy to the
torbutton/index.wml 258) cache, so that elements are retrieved from the cache only if they are fetched
torbutton/index.wml 259) from a document in the same origin domain as the cached element.
torbutton/index.wml 260) </ol>
torbutton/index.wml 261)
torbutton/index.wml 262) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 263)
torbutton/index.wml 264) <strong>Are there any other issues I should be concerned about?</strong>
torbutton/index.wml 265) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 266)
torbutton/index.wml 267) There is currently one known unfixed security issue with Torbutton: it is
torbutton/index.wml 268) possible to unmask the javascript hooks that wrap the Date object to conceal
torbutton/index.wml 269) your timezone in Firefox 2, and the timezone masking code does not work at all
torbutton/index.wml 270) on Firefox 3. We are working with the Firefox team to fix one of <a
torbutton/index.wml 271) href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=392274">Bug 399274</a> or
torbutton/index.wml 272) <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419598">Bug 419598</a>
torbutton/index.wml 273) to address this. In the meantime, it is possible to set the <b>TZ</b>
torbutton/index.wml 274) environment variable to <b>UTC</b> to cause the browser to use UTC as your
torbutton/index.wml 275) timezone. Under Linux, you can add an <b>export TZ=UTC</b> to the
torbutton/index.wml 276) /usr/bin/firefox script, or edit your system bashrc to do the same. Under
torbutton/index.wml 277) Windows, you can set either a <a
torbutton/index.wml 278) href="http://support.microsoft.com/kb/310519">User or System Environment
torbutton/index.wml 279) Variable</a> for TZ via My Computer's properties. In MacOS, the situation is
torbutton/index.wml 280) <a
torbutton/index.wml 281) href="http://developer.apple.com/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPRuntimeConfig/Articles/EnvironmentVars.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/20002093-BCIJIJBH">a
torbutton/index.wml 282) lot more complicated</a>, unfortunately.
torbutton/index.wml 283)
torbutton/index.wml 284) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 285)
torbutton/index.wml 286) <p>
torbutton/index.wml 287)
torbutton/index.wml 288) In addition, RSS readers such as Firefox Livemarks can perform
torbutton/index.wml 289) periodic fetches. Due to <a
torbutton/index.wml 290) href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=436250">Firefox Bug
torbutton/index.wml 291) 436250</a>, there is no way to disable Livemark fetches during Tor. This can
torbutton/index.wml 292) be a problem if you have a lot of custom Livemark urls that can give away
torbutton/index.wml 293) information about your identity.
torbutton/index.wml 294)
torbutton/index.wml 295) </p>
torbutton/index.wml 296)
torbutton/index.wml 297) <h2>Description of Options</h2>
torbutton/index.wml 298)
torbutton/index.wml 299) <p>The development branch of Torbutton adds several new security features to
torbutton/index.wml 300) protect your anonymity from all the major threats the author is aware of. The
torbutton/index.wml 301) defaults should be fine for most people, but in case you are the tweaker type,
torbutton/index.wml 302) or if you prefer to try to outsource some options to more flexible extensions,
torbutton/index.wml 303) here is the complete list. (In an ideal world, these descriptions should all be
torbutton/index.wml 304) tooltips in the extension itself, but Firefox bugs <a
torbutton/index.wml 305) href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45375">45375</a> and <a
torbutton/index.wml 306) href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218223">218223</a> currently
torbutton/index.wml 307) prevent this).</p>
torbutton/index.wml 308)
torbutton/index.wml 309) <ul>
torbutton/index.wml 310) <li>Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 311)
torbutton/index.wml 312) This option is key to Tor security. Plugins perform their own networking
torbutton/index.wml 313) independent of the browser, and many plugins only partially obey even their own
torbutton/index.wml 314) proxy settings.
torbutton/index.wml 315)
torbutton/index.wml 316) <li>Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 317)
torbutton/index.wml 318) Another crucial option, this setting causes the plugin to disable Javascript
torbutton/index.wml 319) on tabs that are loaded during a Tor state different than the current one,
torbutton/index.wml 320) to prevent delayed fetches of injected URLs that contain unique identifiers,
torbutton/index.wml 321) and to prevent meta-refresh tags from revealing your IP when you turn off
torbutton/index.wml 322) Tor. It also prevents all fetches from tabs loaded with an opposite Tor
torbutton/index.wml 323) state. This serves to block non-Javascript dynamic content such as CSS
torbutton/index.wml 324) popups from revealing your IP address if you disable Tor.
torbutton/index.wml 325)
torbutton/index.wml 326) <li>Hook Dangerous Javascript (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 327)
torbutton/index.wml 328) This setting enables the Javascript hooking code. Javascript is injected into
torbutton/index.wml 329) pages to hook the Date object to mask your timezone, and to hook the navigator
torbutton/index.wml 330) object to mask OS and user agent properties not handled by the standard
torbutton/index.wml 331) Firefox user agent override settings.
torbutton/index.wml 332)
torbutton/index.wml 333) <li>Resize window dimensions to multiples of 50px on toggle (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 334)
torbutton/index.wml 335) To cut down on the amount of state available to fingerprint users uniquely,
torbutton/index.wml 336) this pref causes windows to be resized to a multiple of 50 pixels on each
torbutton/index.wml 337) side when Tor is enabled and pages are loaded.
torbutton/index.wml 338)
torbutton/index.wml 339) <li>Disable Updates During Tor (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 340)
torbutton/index.wml 341) Under Firefox 2, many extension authors did not update their extensions from
torbutton/index.wml 342) SSL-enabled websites. It is possible for malicious Tor nodes to hijack these extensions and replace them with malicious ones, or add malicious code to
torbutton/index.wml 343) existing extensions. Since Firefox 3 now enforces encrypted and/or
torbutton/index.wml 344) authenticated updates, this setting is no longer as important as it once
torbutton/index.wml 345) was (though updates do leak information about which extensions you have, it is
torbutton/index.wml 346) fairly infrequent).
torbutton/index.wml 347)
torbutton/index.wml 348) <li>Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (optional)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 349)
torbutton/index.wml 350) This optional setting governs if you get Google search suggestions during Tor
torbutton/index.wml 351) usage. Since no cookie is transmitted during search suggestions, this is a
torbutton/index.wml 352) relatively benign behavior.
torbutton/index.wml 353)
torbutton/index.wml 354) <li>Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 355)
torbutton/index.wml 356) These settings prevent local html documents from transmitting local files to
torbutton/index.wml 357) arbitrary websites <a href="http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/content-disposition-hacking/">under Firefox 2</a>. Since exit nodes can insert headers that
torbutton/index.wml 358) force the browser to save arbitrary pages locally (and also inject script into
torbutton/index.wml 359) arbitrary html files you save to disk via Tor), it is probably a good idea to
torbutton/index.wml 360) leave this setting on.
torbutton/index.wml 361)
torbutton/index.wml 362) <li>Close all Non-Tor/Tor windows and tabs on toggle (optional)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 363)
torbutton/index.wml 364) These two settings allow you to obtain a greater degree of assurance that
torbutton/index.wml 365) after you toggle out of Tor, the pages are really gone and can't perform any
torbutton/index.wml 366) extra network activity. Currently, there is no known way that pages can still
torbutton/index.wml 367) perform activity after toggle, but these options exist as a backup measure
torbutton/index.wml 368) just in case a flaw is discovered. They can also serve as a handy 'Boss
torbutton/index.wml 369) Button' feature for clearing all Tor browsing off your screen in a hurry.
torbutton/index.wml 370)
torbutton/index.wml 371) <li>Isolate access to history navigation to Tor state (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 372)
torbutton/index.wml 373) This setting prevents both Javascript and accidental user clicks from causing
torbutton/index.wml 374) the session history to load pages that were fetched in a different Tor state
torbutton/index.wml 375) than the current one. Since this can be used to correlate Tor and Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 376) activity and thus determine your IP address, it is marked as a crucial
torbutton/index.wml 377) setting.
torbutton/index.wml 378)
torbutton/index.wml 379) <li>Block History Reads during Tor (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 380)
torbutton/index.wml 381) Based on code contributed by <a href="http://www.collinjackson.com/">Collin
torbutton/index.wml 382) Jackson</a>, when enabled and Tor is enabled, this setting prevents the
torbutton/index.wml 383) rendering engine from knowing if certain links were visited. This mechanism
torbutton/index.wml 384) defeats all document-based history disclosure attacks, including CSS-only
torbutton/index.wml 385) attacks.
torbutton/index.wml 386)
torbutton/index.wml 387) <li>Block History Reads during Non-Tor (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 388)
torbutton/index.wml 389) This setting accomplishes the same but for your Non-Tor activity.
torbutton/index.wml 390)
torbutton/index.wml 391) <li>Block History Writes during Tor (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 392)
torbutton/index.wml 393) This setting prevents the rendering engine from recording visited URLs, and
torbutton/index.wml 394) also disables download manager history. Note that if you allow writing of Tor history,
torbutton/index.wml 395) it is recommended that you disable non-Tor history reads, since malicious
torbutton/index.wml 396) websites you visit without Tor can query your history for .onion sites and
torbutton/index.wml 397) other history recorded during Tor usage (such as Google queries).
torbutton/index.wml 398)
torbutton/index.wml 399) <li>Block History Writes during Non-Tor (optional)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 400)
torbutton/index.wml 401) This setting also disables recording any history information during Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 402) usage.
torbutton/index.wml 403)
torbutton/index.wml 404) <li>Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 405)
torbutton/index.wml 406) This is an alternate setting to use instead of (or in addition to) blocking
torbutton/index.wml 407) history reads or writes.
torbutton/index.wml 408)
torbutton/index.wml 409) <li>Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</li>
torbutton/index.wml 410)
torbutton/index.wml 411) These options govern if the browser writes your passwords and search
torbutton/index.wml 412) submissions to disk for the given state.
torbutton/index.wml 413)
torbutton/index.wml 414) <li>Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</li>
torbutton/index.wml 415)
torbutton/index.wml 416) Since the browser cache can be leveraged to store unique identifiers, cache
torbutton/index.wml 417) must not persist across Tor sessions. This option keeps the memory cache active
torbutton/index.wml 418) during Tor usage for performance, but blocks disk access for caching.
torbutton/index.wml 419)
torbutton/index.wml 420) <li>Block disk and memory cache during Tor</li>
torbutton/index.wml 421)
torbutton/index.wml 422) This setting entirely blocks the cache during Tor, but preserves it for
torbutton/index.wml 423) Non-Tor usage.
torbutton/index.wml 424)
torbutton/index.wml 425) <li>Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</li>
torbutton/index.wml 426)
torbutton/index.wml 427) Fully clears all cookies on Tor toggle.
torbutton/index.wml 428)
torbutton/index.wml 429) <li>Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</li>
torbutton/index.wml 430)
torbutton/index.wml 431) This option stores your persistent Non-Tor cookies in a special cookie jar
torbutton/index.wml 432) file, in case you wish to preserve some cookies. Based on code contributed
torbutton/index.wml 433) by <a href="http://www.collinjackson.com/">Collin Jackson</a>. It is
torbutton/index.wml 434) compatible with third party extensions that you use to manage your Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 435) cookies. Your Tor cookies will be cleared on toggle, of course.
torbutton/index.wml 436)
torbutton/index.wml 437) <li>Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 438)
torbutton/index.wml 439) This option stores your persistent Tor and Non-Tor cookies
torbutton/index.wml 440) separate cookie jar files. Note that it is a bad idea to keep Tor
torbutton/index.wml 441) cookies around for any length of time, as they can be retrieved by exit
torbutton/index.wml 442) nodes that inject spoofed forms into plaintext pages you fetch.
torbutton/index.wml 443)
torbutton/index.wml 444) <li>Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 445)
torbutton/index.wml 446) This setting allows you to manage your own cookies with an alternate
torbutton/index.wml 447) extension, such as <a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/82">CookieCuller</a>. Note that this is particularly dangerous,
torbutton/index.wml 448) since malicious exit nodes can spoof document elements that appear to be from
torbutton/index.wml 449) sites you have preserved cookies for (and can then do things like fetch your
torbutton/index.wml 450) entire gmail inbox, even if you were not using gmail or visiting any google
torbutton/index.wml 451) pages at the time!).
torbutton/index.wml 452)
torbutton/index.wml 453) <li>Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</li>
torbutton/index.wml 454)
torbutton/index.wml 455) These settings prevent Firefox from writing any cookies to disk during the
torbutton/index.wml 456) corresponding Tor state. If cookie jars are enabled, those jars will
torbutton/index.wml 457) exist in memory only, and will be cleared when Firefox exits.
torbutton/index.wml 458)
torbutton/index.wml 459) <li>Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 460)
torbutton/index.wml 461) Firefox has recently added the ability to store additional state and
torbutton/index.wml 462) identifiers in persistent tables, called <a
torbutton/index.wml 463) href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:Storage">DOM Storage</a>.
torbutton/index.wml 464) Obviously this can compromise your anonymity if stored content can be
torbutton/index.wml 465) fetched across Tor-state.
torbutton/index.wml 466)
torbutton/index.wml 467) <li>Clear HTTP auth sessions (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 468)
torbutton/index.wml 469) HTTP authentication credentials can be probed by exit nodes and used to both confirm that you visit a certain site that uses HTTP auth, and also impersonate you on this site.
torbutton/index.wml 470)
torbutton/index.wml 471) <li>Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</li>
torbutton/index.wml 472)
torbutton/index.wml 473) These settings install a shutdown handler to clear cookies on Tor
torbutton/index.wml 474) and/or Non-Tor browser shutdown. It is independent of your Clear Private Data
torbutton/index.wml 475) settings, and does in fact clear the corresponding cookie jars.
torbutton/index.wml 476)
torbutton/index.wml 477) <li>Prevent session store from saving Tor-loaded tabs (recommended)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 478)
torbutton/index.wml 479) This option augments the session store to prevent it from writing out
torbutton/index.wml 480) Tor-loaded tabs to disk. Unfortunately, this also disables your ability to
torbutton/index.wml 481) undo closed tabs. The reason why this setting is recommended is because
torbutton/index.wml 482) after a session crash, your browser will be in an undefined Tor state, and
torbutton/index.wml 483) can potentially load a bunch of Tor tabs without Tor. The following option
torbutton/index.wml 484) is another alternative to protect against this.
torbutton/index.wml 485)
torbutton/index.wml 486) <li>On normal startup, set state to: Tor, Non-Tor, Shutdown State</li>
torbutton/index.wml 487)
torbutton/index.wml 488) This setting allows you to choose which Tor state you want the browser to
torbutton/index.wml 489) start in normally: Tor, Non-Tor, or whatever state the browser shut down in.
torbutton/index.wml 490)
torbutton/index.wml 491) <li>On crash recovery or session restored startup, restore via: Tor, Non-Tor</li>
torbutton/index.wml 492)
torbutton/index.wml 493) When Firefox crashes, the Tor state upon restart usually is completely
torbutton/index.wml 494) random, and depending on your choice for the above option, may load
torbutton/index.wml 495) a bunch of tabs in the wrong state. This setting allows you to choose
torbutton/index.wml 496) which state the crashed session should always be restored in to.
torbutton/index.wml 497)
torbutton/index.wml 498) <li>Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</li>
torbutton/index.wml 499)
torbutton/index.wml 500) These two settings allow you to control what the Firefox Session Store
torbutton/index.wml 501) writes to disk. Since the session store state is used to automatically
torbutton/index.wml 502) load websites after a crash or upgrade, it is advisable not to allow
torbutton/index.wml 503) Tor tabs to be written to disk, or they may get loaded in Non-Tor
torbutton/index.wml 504) after a crash (or the reverse, depending upon the crash recovery setting,
torbutton/index.wml 505) of course).
torbutton/index.wml 506)
torbutton/index.wml 507) <li>Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</li>
torbutton/index.wml 508)
torbutton/index.wml 509) User agent masking is done with the idea of making all Tor users appear
torbutton/index.wml 510) uniform. A recent Firefox 2.0.0.4 Windows build was chosen to mimic for this
torbutton/index.wml 511) string and supporting navigator.* properties, and this version will remain the
torbutton/index.wml 512) same for all TorButton versions until such time as specific incompatibility
torbutton/index.wml 513) issues are demonstrated. Uniformity of this value is obviously very important
torbutton/index.wml 514) to anonymity. Note that for this option to have full effectiveness, the user
torbutton/index.wml 515) must also allow Hook Dangerous Javascript ensure that the navigator.*
torbutton/index.wml 516) properties are reset correctly. The browser does not set some of them via the
torbutton/index.wml 517) exposed user agent override preferences.
torbutton/index.wml 518)
torbutton/index.wml 519) <li>Spoof US English Browser</li>
torbutton/index.wml 520)
torbutton/index.wml 521) This option causes Firefox to send http headers as if it were an English
torbutton/index.wml 522) browser. Useful for internationalized users.
torbutton/index.wml 523)
torbutton/index.wml 524) <li>Don't send referrer during Tor Usage</li>
torbutton/index.wml 525)
torbutton/index.wml 526) This option disables the referrer header, preventing sites from determining
torbutton/index.wml 527) where you came from to visit them. This can break some sites, however. <a
torbutton/index.wml 528) href="http://www.digg.com">Digg</a> in particular seemed to be broken by this.
torbutton/index.wml 529) A more streamlined, less intrusive version of this option should be available
torbutton/index.wml 530) eventually. In the meantime, <a
torbutton/index.wml 531) href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/953">RefControl</a> can
torbutton/index.wml 532) provide this functionality via a default option of <b>Forge</b>.
torbutton/index.wml 533) </ul>
torbutton/index.wml 534)
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First stab at proper wml file.
getting closer to being abl...
Fix install url.
Move version hash in versio...