tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 3-low
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Abuse FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Abuse FAQ</a>
11)   </div>

12)   <div id="maincol">

13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Abuse FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>
16)     <h3>Questions</h3>
17)     <ul>
18)     <li><a href="#WhatAboutCriminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
19)     <li><a href="#DDoS">What about distributed denial of service attacks?</a></li>
20)     <li><a href="#WhatAboutSpammers">What about spammers?</a></li>
21)     <li><a href="#HowMuchAbuse">Does Tor get much abuse?</a></li>
22)     <li><a href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run an exit relay?</a></li>

23)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></li>

24)     <li><a href="#IrcBans">Tor is banned from the IRC network I want to use.</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#SMTPBans">Your nodes are banned from the mail server I want to use.</a></li>
26)     <li><a href="#Bans">I want to ban the Tor network from my service.</a></li>
27)     <li><a href="#TracingUsers">I have a compelling reason to trace a Tor user. Can you help?</a></li>

28)     <li><a href="#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></li>
29)     <li><a href="#AbuseOpinion">Where does Tor Project stand on abusers using technology?</a></li>

30)     <li><a href="#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions about Tor abuse.</a></li>

31)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

32)     </ul>

33) 
34)     <a id="abuse"></a>
35)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#abuse">Abuse:</a></h4>

36) 

37)     <a id="WhatAboutCriminals"></a>
38)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatAboutCriminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3>

39) 

40)     <p>Criminals can already do bad things. Since they're willing to
41)     break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide
42)     <em>better</em> privacy than Tor provides. They can steal cell phones,
43)     use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers
44)     in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they
45)     can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of
46)     literally millions of Windows machines around the world. </p>

47) 

48)     <p>Tor aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow
49)     the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that. </p>

50) 

51)     <p>Some advocates of anonymity explain that it's just a tradeoff &mdash;
52)     accepting the bad uses for the good ones &mdash; but there's more to it
53)     than that.
54)     Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to
55)     get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve
56)     it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims

57)     (identity theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand,

58)     don't have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get
59)     privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds. </p>

60) 

61)     <p>So yes, criminals can use Tor, but they already have

62)     better options, and it seems unlikely that taking Tor away from the
63)     world will stop them from doing their bad things. At the same time, Tor
64)     and other privacy measures can <em>fight</em> identity theft, physical
65)     crimes like stalking, and so on. </p>

66) 

67)     <a id="DDoS"></a>
68)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DDoS">What about distributed denial of service attacks?</a></h3>

69) 

70)     <p>Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks typically rely on having a group
71)     of thousands of computers all sending floods of traffic to a victim. Since
72)     the goal is to overpower the bandwidth of the victim, they typically send
73)     UDP packets since those don't require handshakes or coordination. </p>

74) 

75)     <p>But because Tor only transports correctly formed TCP streams, not
76)     all IP packets, you cannot send UDP packets over Tor. (You can't do
77)     specialized forms of this attack like SYN flooding either.) So ordinary
78)     DDoS attacks are not possible over Tor. Tor also doesn't allow bandwidth
79)     amplification attacks against external sites: you need to send in a byte
80)     for every byte that the Tor network will send to your destination. So
81)     in general, attackers who control enough bandwidth to launch an effective
82)     DDoS attack can do it just fine without Tor. </p>

83) 

84)     <a id="WhatAboutSpammers"></a>
85)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatAboutSpammers">What about spammers?</a></h3>

86) 

87)     <p>First of all, the default Tor exit policy rejects all outgoing
88)     port 25 (SMTP) traffic. So sending spam mail through Tor isn't going to
89)     work by default. It's possible that some relay operators will enable
90)     port 25 on their particular exit node, in which case that computer will
91)     allow outgoing mails; but that individual could just set up an open mail
92)     relay too, independent of Tor. In short, Tor isn't useful for spamming,
93)     because nearly all Tor relays refuse to deliver the mail. </p>

94) 

95)     <p>Of course, it's not all about delivering the mail. Spammers can use
96)     Tor to connect to open HTTP proxies (and from there to SMTP servers); to
97)     connect to badly written mail-sending CGI scripts; and to control their
98)     botnets &mdash; that is, to covertly communicate with armies of
99)     compromised computers that deliver the spam.
100)     </p>

101) 

102)     <p>
103)     This is a shame, but notice that spammers are already doing great
104)     without Tor. Also, remember that many of their more subtle communication
105)     mechanisms (like spoofed UDP packets) can't be used over Tor, because
106)     it only transports correctly-formed TCP connections.
107)     </p>

108) 

109)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
110)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">How do Tor exit policies work?</a></h3>

111) 

112)     <p><a href="<page docs/faq>#ExitPolicies">See the main FAQ</a></p>

113) 

114)     <a id="HowMuchAbuse"></a>
115)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowMuchAbuse">Does Tor get much abuse?</a></h3>

116) 

117)     <p>Not much, in the grand scheme of things. The network has been running

118)     since October 2003, and it's only generated a handful of complaints. Of

119)     course, like all privacy-oriented networks on the net, it attracts its

120)     share of jerks. Tor's exit policies help separate the role of "willing
121)     to donate resources to the network" from the role of "willing to deal
122)     with exit abuse complaints," so we hope our network is more sustainable
123)     than past attempts at anonymity networks. </p>

124) 

125)     <p>Since Tor has

126)     <a href="<page about/torusers>">many good uses as

127)     well</a>, we feel that we're doing pretty well at striking a balance
128)     currently. </p>

129) 

130)     <a id="TypicalAbuses"></a>
131)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run an exit relay?</a></h3>

132) 

133)     <p>If you run a Tor relay that allows exit connections (such as the
134)     default exit policy), it's probably safe to say that you will eventually
135)     hear from somebody. Abuse
136)     complaints may come in a variety of forms. For example: </p>
137)     <ul>
138)     <li>Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends a ransom note to a
139)     company. The
140)     FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor relay,
141)     and they say "oh well" and leave you alone. [Port 80]</li>
142)     <li>Somebody tries to get you shut down by using Tor to connect to Google
143)     groups and post spam to Usenet, and then sends an angry mail to
144)     your ISP about how you're destroying the world. [Port 80]</li>
145)     <li>Somebody connects to an IRC network and makes a nuisance of
146)     himself. Your ISP gets polite mail about how your computer has been
147)     compromised; and/or your computer gets DDoSed. [Port 6667]</li>
148)     <li>Somebody uses Tor to download a Vin Diesel movie, and
149)     your ISP gets a DMCA takedown notice. See EFF's
150)     <a href="<page eff/tor-dmca-response>">Tor DMCA Response
151)     Template</a>, which explains why your ISP can probably ignore
152)     the notice without any liability. [Arbitrary ports]</li>
153)     </ul>

154) 

155)     <p>Some hosting providers are friendlier than others when it comes to Tor

156)     exits. For a listing see the <a href="<wiki>doc/GoodBadISPs">good and bad

157)     ISPs wiki</a>.</p>

158) 

159)     <p>For a complete set of template responses to different abuse complaint
160)     types, see <a

161)     href="<wiki>doc/TorAbuseTemplates">the collection of templates

162)     on the Tor wiki</a>. You can also proactively reduce the amount of abuse you

163)     get by following <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node">these tips

164)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a> and <a

165)     href="<wiki>doc/ReducedExitPolicy">running a reduced exit policy</a>.</p>

166) 

167)     <p>You might also find that your Tor relay's IP is blocked from accessing
168)     some Internet sites/services. This might happen regardless of your exit
169)     policy, because some groups don't seem to know or care that Tor has

170)     exit policies. (If you have a spare IP not used for other activities, you
171)     might consider running your Tor relay on it.) In general, it's advisable
172)     not to use your home internet connection to provide a Tor relay.</p>

173) 

174)     <a id="RespondISP"></a>
175)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></h3>
176) 
177)     <p>A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a
178)     href="<wiki>doc/TorAbuseTemplates">collected here</a>.</p>
179) 

180)     <a id="IrcBans"></a>
181)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IrcBans">Tor is banned from the IRC network I want to use.</a></h3>

182) 

183)     <p>Sometimes jerks make use of Tor to troll IRC channels. This abuse
184)     results in IP-specific temporary bans ("klines" in IRC lingo), as the
185)     network operators try to keep the troll off of their network. </p>

186) 

187)     <p>This response underscores a fundamental flaw in IRC's security model:
188)     they assume that IP addresses equate to humans, and by banning the
189)     IP address they can ban the human. In reality this is not the case &mdash;
190)     many such trolls routinely make use of the literally millions of open
191)     proxies and compromised computers around the Internet. The IRC networks
192)     are fighting a losing battle of trying to block all these nodes,
193)     and an entire cottage industry of blacklists and counter-trolls has
194)     sprung up based on this flawed security model (not unlike the antivirus
195)     industry). The Tor network is just a drop in the bucket here. </p>

196) 

197)     <p>On the other hand, from the viewpoint of IRC server operators, security
198)     is not an all-or-nothing thing.  By responding quickly to trolls or
199)     any other social attack, it may be possible to make the attack scenario
200)     less attractive to the attacker.  And most individual IP addresses do
201)     equate to individual humans, on any given IRC network at any given time.
202)     The exceptions include NAT gateways which may be allocated access as
203)     special cases. While it's a losing battle to try to stop the use of open
204)     proxies, it's not generally a losing battle to keep klining a single
205)     ill-behaved IRC user until that user gets bored and goes away. </p>

206) 

207)     <p>But the real answer is to implement application-level auth systems,
208)     to let in well-behaving users and keep out badly-behaving users. This

209)     needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password they
210)     know), not some property of the way their packets are transported. </p>

211) 

212)     <p>Of course, not all IRC networks are trying to ban Tor nodes. After
213)     all, quite a few people use Tor to IRC in privacy in order to carry
214)     on legitimate communications without tying them to their real-world
215)     identity. Each IRC network needs to decide for itself if blocking a few
216)     more of the millions of IPs that bad people can use is worth losing the
217)     contributions from the well-behaved Tor users. </p>

218) 

219)     <p>If you're being blocked, have a discussion with the network operators
220)     and explain the issues to them. They may not be aware of the existence of
221)     Tor at all, or they may not be aware that the hostnames they're klining
222)     are Tor exit nodes.  If you explain the problem, and they conclude that
223)     Tor ought to be blocked, you may want to consider moving to a network that
224)     is more open to free speech.  Maybe inviting them to #tor on irc.oftc.net
225)     will help show them that we are not all evil people. </p>

226) 

227)     <p>Finally, if you become aware of an IRC network that seems to be
228)     blocking Tor, or a single Tor exit node, please put that information on <a

229)     href="<wiki>doc/BlockingIrc">The Tor

230)     IRC block tracker</a>
231)     so that others can share.  At least one IRC network consults that page
232)     to unblock exit nodes that have been blocked inadvertently. </p>

233) 

234)     <a id="SMTPBans"></a>
235)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SMTPBans">Your nodes are banned from the mail server I want to use.</a></h3>

236) 

237)     <p>Even though <a href="#WhatAboutSpammers">Tor isn't useful for
238)     spamming</a>, some over-zealous blacklisters seem to think that all
239)     open networks like Tor are evil &mdash; they attempt to strong-arm network
240)     administrators on policy, service, and routing issues, and then extract
241)     ransoms from victims. </p>

242) 

243)     <p>If your server administrators decide to make use of these
244)     blacklists to refuse incoming mail, you should have a conversation with
245)     them and explain about Tor and Tor's exit policies. </p>

246) 

247)     <a id="Bans"></a>
248)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Bans">I want to ban the Tor network from my service.</a></h3>

249) 

250)     <p>We're sorry to hear that. There are some situations where it makes
251)     sense to block anonymous users for an Internet service. But in many
252)     cases, there are easier solutions that can solve your problem while
253)     still allowing users to access your website securely.</p>

254) 

255)     <p>First, ask yourself if there's a way to do application-level decisions
256)     to separate the legitimate users from the jerks. For example, you might
257)     have certain areas of the site, or certain privileges like posting,
258)     available only to people who are registered. It's easy to build an
259)     up-to-date list of Tor IP addresses that allow connections to your
260)     service, so you could set up this distinction only for Tor users. This
261)     way you can have multi-tiered access and not have to ban every aspect
262)     of your service. </p>

263) 

264)     <p>For example, the <a
265)     href="http://freenode.net/policy.shtml#tor">Freenode IRC network</a>
266)     had a problem with a coordinated group of abusers joining channels and
267)     subtly taking over the conversation; but when they labelled all users
268)     coming from Tor nodes as "anonymous users," removing the ability of the
269)     abusers to blend in, the abusers moved back to using their open proxies
270)     and bot networks. </p>

271) 

272)     <p>Second, consider that hundreds of thousands of
273)     people use Tor every day simply for
274)     good data hygiene &mdash; for example, to protect against data-gathering
275)     advertising companies while going about their normal activities. Others
276)     use Tor because it's their only way to get past restrictive local
277)     firewalls. Some Tor users may be legitimately connecting
278)     to your service right now to carry on normal activities. You need to
279)     decide whether banning the Tor network is worth losing the contributions
280)     of these users, as well as potential future legitimate users. (Often
281)     people don't have a good measure of how many polite Tor users are
282)     connecting to their service &mdash; you never notice them until there's
283)     an impolite one.)</p>

284) 

285)     <p>At this point, you should also ask yourself what you do about other
286)     services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is
287)     not so different from AOL in this respect.</p>

288) 

289)     <p>Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have <a

290)     href="<page docs/faq>#ExitPolicies">individual exit policies</a>. Many
291)     Tor relays do

292)     not allow exiting connections at all. Many of those that do allow some
293)     exit connections might already disallow connections to
294)     your service. When you go about banning nodes, you should parse the
295)     exit policies and only block the ones that allow these connections;
296)     and you should keep in mind that exit policies can change (as well as
297)     the overall list of nodes in the network).</p>

298) 

299)     <p>If you really want to do this, we provide a
300)     <a href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">Tor
301)     exit relay list</a> or a
302)     <a href="<page projects/tordnsel>">DNS-based list you can query</a>.
303)     </p>

304) 

305)     <p>
306)     (Some system administrators block ranges of IP addresses because of
307)     official policy or some abuse pattern, but some have also asked about
308)     whitelisting Tor exit relays because they want to permit access to their
309)     systems only using Tor. These scripts are usable for whitelisting as well.)
310)     </p>

311) 

312)     <a id="TracingUsers"></a>
313)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TracingUsers">I have a compelling reason to trace a Tor user. Can you help?</a></h3>

314) 

315)     <p>
316)     There is nothing the Tor developers can do to trace Tor users. The same
317)     protections that keep bad people from breaking Tor's anonymity also
318)     prevent us from figuring out what's going on.
319)     </p>

320) 

321)     <p>
322)     Some fans have suggested that we redesign Tor to include a <a

323)     href="<page docs/faq>#Backdoor">backdoor</a>.

324)     There are two problems with this idea. First, it technically weakens the
325)     system too far. Having a central way to link users to their activities
326)     is a gaping hole for all sorts of attackers; and the policy mechanisms
327)     needed to ensure correct handling of this responsibility are enormous
328)     and unsolved. Second, the bad people <a href="#WhatAboutCriminals">aren't
329)     going to get caught by this anyway</a>, since they will use other means
330)     to ensure their anonymity (identity theft, compromising computers and
331)     using them as bounce points, etc).
332)     </p>

333) 
334)     <p>
335)     This ultimately means that it is the responsibility of site owners to protect
336)     themselves against compromise and security issues that can come from
337)     anywhere. This is just part of signing up for the benefits of the
338)     Internet. You must be prepared to secure yourself against the bad elements,
339)     wherever they may come from. Tracking and increased surveillance are not
340)     the answer to preventing abuse.
341)     </p>
342) 

343)     <p>
344)     But remember that this doesn't mean that Tor is invulnerable. Traditional
345)     police techniques can still be very effective against Tor, such as

346)     investigating means, motive, and opportunity, interviewing suspects,
347)     writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations,
348)     keyboard taps, and other physical investigations. The Tor Project is also happy to work with everyone
349)     including law enforcement groups to train them how to use the Tor software to safely conduct
350)     investigations or anonymized activities online.

351)     </p>

352) 
353) 

354)     <a id="RemoveContent"></a>
355)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></h3>
356)     <p>The Tor Project does not host, control, nor have the ability to
357)     discover the owner or location of a .onion address.  The .onion address is

358)     an address from <a href="<page docs/onion-services>">an onion

359)     service</a>.  The name you see ending in .onion is an onion service descriptor.

360)     It's an automatically generated name which can be located on any Tor

361)     relay or client anywhere on the Internet.  Onion services are designed

362)     to protect both the user and service provider from discovering who they

363)     are and where they are from.  The design of onion services means the

364)     owner and location of the .onion site is hidden even from us.</p>

365)     <p>But remember that this doesn't mean that onion services are

366)     invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective

367)     against them, such as interviewing suspects, writing style analysis,
368)     technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps,
369)     and other physical investigations.</p>
370) 

371)     <p>If you have a complaint about child abuse materials, you may wish to report

372)     it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which serves
373)     as a national coordination point for investigation of child pornography:
374)     <a href="http://www.missingkids.com/">http://www.missingkids.com/</a>.
375)     We do not view links you report.</p>

376) 

377)     <a id="AbuseOpinion"></a>
378)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#AbuseOpinion">Where does Tor Project

379) stand on abusers using technology?</a></h3>

380) 
381)     <p>We take abuse seriously. Activists and law enforcement
382) use Tor to investigate abuse and help support survivors. We
383) work with them to help them understand how Tor can help their work.
384) In some cases, technological mistakes are being made and we help to
385) correct them. Because some people in survivors' communities embrace
386) stigma instead of compassion, seeking support from fellow victims
387) requires privacy-preserving technology.</p>
388) 
389)     <p>Our refusal to build backdoors and censorship into Tor is not
390)   because of a lack of concern. We refuse to weaken Tor because it
391) would harm efforts to combat child abuse and human trafficking in the
392) physical world, while removing safe spaces for victims online.
393) Meanwhile, criminals would still have access to botnets, stolen
394) phones, hacked hosting accounts, the postal system, couriers, corrupt
395) officials, and whatever technology emerges to trade content. They are

396) early adopters of technology. In the face of this, it is dangerous for

397) policymakers to assume that blocking and filtering is sufficient. We
398) are more interested in helping efforts to halt and prevent child
399) abuse than helping politicians score points with constituents by

400) hiding it. The role of corruption is especially troubling; see this

401) United Nations report on <a
402) href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/
403) Issue_Paper_-_The_Role_of_Corruption_in_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf">The
404) Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons</a>.</p>
405) 
406)     <p>Finally, it is important to consider the world that children will
407)     encounter as adults when enacting policy in their name. Will they
408)     thank us if they are unable to voice their opinions safely as
409) adults? What if they are trying to expose a failure of the state to
410) protect other children?</p>
411) 

412)     <a id="LegalQuestions"></a>

413)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions
414) about Tor abuse.</a></h3>
415) 

416)     <p>We're only the developers. We can answer technical questions, but
417)     we're not the ones to talk to about legal questions or concerns. </p>

418) 

419)     <p>Please take a look at the
420)     <a href="<page eff/tor-legal-faq>">Tor Legal FAQ</a>,
421)     and contact EFF directly if you have any further legal questions. </p>

422) 
423)    <a id="HelpPoliceOrLawyers"></a>
424)    <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
425)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></h3>
426) 
427)    <p>
428)    Please read the <a
429)    href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq">legal FAQ written
430)    by EFF lawyers</a>. There's a growing <a
431)    href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/start-tor-legal-support-directory">legal
432)    directory</a> of people who may be able to help you.
433)    </p>
434) 
435)    <p>
436)    If you need to check if a certain IP address was acting as a Tor exit
437)    node at a certain date and time, you can use the <a
438)    href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/">ExoneraTor tool</a> to query the
439)    historic Tor relay lists and get an answer.
440)    </p>
441) 

442)   </div>
443)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
444)   <div id = "sidecol">
445) #include "side.wmi"
446) #include "info.wmi"
447)   </div>
448)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
449) </div>
450) <!-- END CONTENT -->