volunteer.html (f782ad695) - tor-webwml.git

f782ad6951cc1326b0e3d35cf7e4d5e852962ef9

renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`1) <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml11/DTD/xhtml11.dtd"> 2) 3) <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en"> 4) <head>`
call it Volunteer in the na... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`5) <title>Tor: Volunteer</title>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`6) <meta name="Author" content="Roger Dingledine" /> 7) <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" /> 8) <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="stylesheet.css" /> 9) <link rel="shortcut icon" type="image/x-icon" href="/favicon.ico" /> 10) </head> 11) <body> 12) 13) <!-- TITLE BAR & NAVIGATION --> 14)`
made a simple change to the... le@svn.torproject.org authored 19 years ago	`15) <div class="center"> 16)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`17) <table class="banner" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> 18) <tr> 19) <td class="banner-left"></td> 20) <td class="banner-middle"> 21) <a href="index.html">Home</a>`
howitworks is now obsolete... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`22) \| <a href="overview.html">Overview</a>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`23) \| <a href="download.html">Download</a> 24) \| <a href="documentation.html">Docs</a>`
howitworks is now obsolete... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`25) \| <a href="support.html">Support</a>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`26) \| <a href="faq.html">FAQs</a>`
call it Volunteer in the na... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`27) \| <a class="current">Volunteer</a>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`28) \| <a href="developers.html">Developers</a> 29) \| <a href="research.html">Research</a> 30) \| <a href="people.html">People</a> 31) </td>`
Updated the banner to inclu... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`32) <td class="banner-right">`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`33) <a href="/"><img src="/images/en.png" alt="English" /></a> 34) <a href="/index.it.html"><img src="/images/it.png" alt="Italiano" /></a> 35) <a href="/index.de.html"><img src="/images/de.png" alt="Deutsch" /></a>`
Updated the banner to inclu... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`36) </td>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`37) </tr> 38) </table> 39) 40) <!-- END TITLE BAR & NAVIGATION --> 41) 42) <div class="main-column"> 43) 44) <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	45) <h2>Seven things everyone can do now:</h2> 46) <ol> 47) <li> We need users like you to try Tor out, and let the Tor developers know about bugs you find or features you don't find.</li> 48) <li> Please consider <a href="/cvs/tor/doc/tor-doc-server.html">running a server</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li> 49) <li> We especially need people with Windows programming skills to run an exit server on Windows, to help us debug.</li> 50) <li> Run a <a href="/cvs/tor/doc/tor-hidden-service.html">Tor hidden service</a> and put interesting content on it.</li> 51) <li> Take a look at the <a href="/gui/">Tor GUI Competition</a>, and come up with ideas or designs to contribute to making the Tor interface better. Free T-shirt for each submission!</li> 52) <li> Tell your friends! Get them to run servers. Get them to run hidden services. Get them to tell their friends.</li> 53) <li> Consider joining the <a href="http://secure.eff.org/tor">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a>. More EFF donations means more freedom in the world, including more Tor development.</li> 54) </ol> 55) 56) <h2>Usability and Installers</h2> 57) <ol> 58) <li>Make an entry to the <a href="/gui/">GUI competition</a>. This 59) requires looking at how Tor interacts with the operating system and 60) other applications, deciding where the critical usability issues are, 61) and trying to make an application (or applet or plugin) that helps the 62) user experience.</li> 63) <li>Extend our NSIS-based windows installer to include FreeCap and/or 64) Privoxy. When we ship Privoxy, include a config file that's preconfigured 65) to work well with Tor.</li> 66) <li>Develop a way to handle OS X installation and uninstallation.</li> 67) <li>Choosing exit node by meta-data, e.g. country.</li> 68) <li>Tor provides anonymous connections, but if you want to keep multiple 69) pseudonyms in practice (say, in case you frequently go to two websites 70) and if anybody knew about both of them they would conclude it's you), we 71) don't support that well yet. We should find a good approach and 72) interface for handling pseudonymous profiles in Tor. See <a 73) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Dec-2004/msg00086.html">this 74) post</a> and <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2005/msg00007.html">followup</a> for details.</li> 75) </ol> 76) 77) <h2>Coding, Design, and Software Development</h2> 78) <ol> 79) <li>We need a better option for a scrubbing web proxy than 80) just Privoxy, since it's unmaintained and still has bugs, especially 81) on Windows. While we're at it, what sensitive information is not 82) kept safe by Privoxy? Are there other scrubbing web proxies that are 83) more secure?</li> 84) <li>We need better applications for dynamically intercepting 85) connections and sending them through Tor. tsocks (Linux) and freecap 86) (Windows) seem to be good candidates, and there are a variety of other 87) possibilities listed at the bottom of <a href="/support.html">our support 88) page</a>.</li> 89) <li>Speaking of tsocks, it appears to be unmaintained: we have submitted 90) several patches with no response. Can somebody volunteer to start 91) maintaining a new tsocks branch? We'll help.</li> 92) <li>We need a way to intercept DNS requests so they don't "leak" while 93) we're trying to be anonymous. One option is to use Tor's built-in 94) support for doing DNS resolves; but you need to ask via our new socks 95) extension for that, and so no applications do this yet. Another option 96) is to use Tor's controller interface: the application connects to Tor, 97) hands it the DNS query, and Tor replies with a dummy IP address. Then 98) the application makes a connection through Tor to that dummy IP address, 99) and Tor automatically maps it back to the original query.</li> 100) <li>Right now the hidden service descriptors are being stored on just a few 101) directory servers. This is bad for privacy and bad for robustness. To get 102) more robustness, we're going to need to make hidden service descriptors 103) even less private because we're going to have to mirror them onto many 104) places. Ideally we'd like to separate the storage/lookup system from the 105) Tor directory servers entirely. Any reliable distributed storage system 106) will do, as long as it allows authenticated updates. As far as we know, 107) no implemented DHT code supports authenticated updates. What's the right 108) next step?</li> 109) <li>Tor exit servers need to do many DNS resolves in parallel. But 110) gethostbyname() is poorly designed --- it blocks until it has finished 111) resolving a query --- so it requires its own thread or process. So 112) Tor is forced to spawn many separate DNS "worker" threads. There are 113) some asynchronous DNS libraries out there, but traditionally they are 114) buggy and abandoned. There are rumors that some of them are becoming 115) better. Are any of them stable, fast, clean, and free software? If 116) so (or if we can make that so), we should integrate them into Tor 117) so we don't need to spawn dozens of dns resolver threads. See <a 118) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Sep-2005/msg00001.html">Agl's 119) post</a> for a potential start.</li>
start to rewrite the volunt... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	120) <li>Currently Tor ships with its own AES, since when we started OpenSSL 121) had missing/broken AES support. But now that it's gotten more mainstream, 122) we should change things so we only use our bundled AES if OpenSSL doesn't 123) support it natively.</li> 124) <li>Because Tor servers need to store-and-forward each cell they handle, 125) high-bandwidth Tor servers end up using dozens of megabytes of memory 126) just for buffers. We need better heuristics for when to shrink/expand 127) buffers. Maybe this should be modelled after the Linux kernel buffer 128) design, where you have many smaller buffers that link to each other, 129) rather than monolithic buffers?</li> 130) <li>How do ulimits work on Win32, anyway? We're having problems 131) especially on older Windowses with people running out of file 132) descriptors, connection buffer space, etc. (We should handle 133) WSAENOBUFS as needed, look at the MaxConnections registry entry, 134) look at the MaxUserPort entry, and look at the TcpTimedWaitDelay 135) entry. We may also want to provide a way to set them as needed. See <a
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`136) href="http://bugs.noreply.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&id=98">bug`
start to rewrite the volunt... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`137) 98</a>.)</li> 138) <li>Encrypt identity keys on disk, and implement passphrase protection 139) for them. Right now they're just stored in plaintext.</li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	140) <li>Periodically people running servers tell us they want to have one 141) BandwidthRate during some part of the day, and a different BandwidthRate 142) at other parts of the day. Rather than coding this inside Tor, we 143) should have a little script that speaks via the <a href="/gui/">Tor 144) Controller Interface</a>, and does a setconf to change the bandwidth 145) rate. Perhaps it would run out of cron, or perhaps it would sleep 146) until appropriate times and then do its tweak (that's probably more 147) portable). Can somebody write one for us and we'll put it into <a 148) href="/cvs/tor/contrib/">tor/contrib/</a>?</li> 149) <li>Patches to Tor's autoconf scripts. First, we'd like our configure.in 150) to handle cross-compilation, e.g. so we can build Tor for obscure 151) platforms like the Linksys WRTG54. Second, we'd like to make with-ssl-dir 152) disable the search for ssl's libraries.</li> 153) <li>Implement reverse DNS requests inside Tor (already specified in 154) Section 5.4 of <a href="/cvs/tor/doc/tor-spec.txt">tor-spec.txt</a>).</li> 155) <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a 156) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine 157) if there good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by 158) getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li> 159) <li>How hard is it to patch bind or a DNS proxy to redirect requests to 160) Tor via our tor-resolve socks extension? What about to convert UDP DNS 161) requests to TCP requests and send them through Tor?</li> 162) </ol> 163) 164) <h2>Documentation</h2> 165) <ol> 166) <li>Volunteer to help maintain this website: code, content, css, 167) layout.</li> 168) <li>We have too much documentation --- it's spread out too much and 169) duplicates itself in places.</li> 170) <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other 171) languages. See the <a href="translation.html">translation 172) guidelines</a> if you want to help out.</li> 173) <li>Investigate privoxy vs. freecap vs. sockscap for win32 clients. Are 174) there usability or stability issues that we can track down and 175) resolve?</li> 176) <li>Evaluate, create, and <a 177) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">document 178) a list of programs</a> that can be routed through Tor.</li> 179) <li>We have a huge list of <a href="/support.html"> potentially useful 180) programs to interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which 181) situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li> 182) </ol> 183) 184) <h2>Research</h2> 185) <ol> 186) <li>To let dissidents in remote countries use Tor without being blocked 187) at their country's firewall, we need a way to get tens of thousands of 188) relays, not just a few hundred. We can imagine a Tor client GUI that 189) has a "help China" button at the top that opens a port and relays a 190) few KB/s of traffic into the Tor network. (A few KB/s shouldn't be too 191) much hassle, and there are few abuse issues since they're not being exit 192) nodes.) But how do we distribute a list of these volunteer clients to the 193) good dissidents in an automated way that doesn't let the country-level 194) firewalls intercept and enumerate them? Probably needs to work on a 195) human-trust level.</li> 196) <li>Tor doesn't work very well when servers have asymmetric bandwidth 197) (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between 198) each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing 199) bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms 200) don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams. 201) Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets, 202) and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine 203) a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit, 204) slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We 205) need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design 206) solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance 207) degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li> 208) <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our 209) current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe 210) we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather 211) than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a 212) href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh 213) throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe 214) overhaul if the results are good.</li> 215) <li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few 216) hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of 217) "signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As 218) you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about 219) which (if any) of those sites he is visiting. Do this attack on the 220) deployed Tor network, and find out how effective it is. Then start 221) exploring defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 222) 512 bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a 223) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>, 224) or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have, 225) and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from 226) a successful defense in each case?</li> 227) <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack": by watching traffic at 228) Alice and at Bob, we can compare traffic signatures and become convinced 229) that we're watching the same stream. So far Tor accepts this as a fact 230) of life and assumes this attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, 231) is that actually true? How much traffic of what sort of distribution is 232) needed before the adversary is confident he has won? Are there scenarios 233) (e.g. not transmitting much) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic 234) padding or traffic shaping schemes work better than others? 235) </li> 236) 237) <li>Come up with practical approximations to picking entry and exit in 238) different routing zones.</li> 239) <li>Find ideal churn rate for helper nodes; how safe is it?</li> 240) <li>Is exiting from the middle of the circuit always a bad idea?</li> 241) <li>IPv6 support (For exit addresses) 242) <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor servers or dirservers. Are puzzles the 243) right answer? What other practical approaches are there?</li> 244) </ol> 245) 246) Drop by the #tor IRC channel at irc.oftc.net or email tor-volunteer@freehaven.net if you want to help out! 247) 248) </div><!-- #main --> 249) </div> 250) <div class="bottom" id="bottom"> 251) <i><a href="mailto:tor-webmaster@freehaven.net" class="smalllink">Webmaster</a></i> - 252) $Id$ 253) </div> 254) </body> 255) </html> 256)
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`257) <li>Have NULL_REP_IS_ZERO_BYTES default to 1.</li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`258) <li>Implement preservation of reputation through reboots for clients 259) and dirservers.</li>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`260) <li>Add in support egd or other non-OS-integrated strong entropy sources.</li> 261) <li>Implement a way to get autoconf to install things into ~/.tor.</li> 262) <li>Change server descriptors to declare log level.</li> 263) <li>Add in support for clients to avoid servers that are too loggy based upon user configuration of acceptable log level.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`264) <li>Separate node discovery from routing to allow neat extensions. [Goodell?] 265)`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`266) <ul>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`267) <li>Add SetServerStatus control event to adjust verified/running status of nodes.</li> 268) <li>Add NoDownload config option to prevent regular directory downloads from happening.</li>`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`269) </ul>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`270) </li> 271)`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`272) <li>Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.</li>`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`273) <ul>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`274) <li>Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors</li> 275) <li>Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests</li> 276) <li>Signing (and verifying) router descriptors</li> 277) <li>Signing (and verifying) directories</li> 278) <li>Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)</li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`279) </ul>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`280)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`281) <li>Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not a maximum size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as quickly (and kill the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.</li> 282) <li>Add alternative versions of crypto.c and tortls.c to use libnss or libgcrypt+gnutls.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`283)`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`284) Translation Examples: <a 285) href="http://membres.lycos.fr/geolemalin/anonymat_garantit.htm">French</a>, 286) <a href="http://tor.freesuperhost.com/">Persian</a>, and <a 287) href="http://www.gamevn.com/forum/showthread.php?t=103346">Vietnamese</a>.)</li>`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`288) <li>If you know a question that should go on <a 289) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ">the FAQ Wiki</a>, please 290) add it and answer it.</li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`291) <li>Document how to do exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching 292) web proxy.</li>`
merged changes so far, stil... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`293) <li>Take a look at <a 294) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SquidProxy">Martin's 295) Squid and Tor page</a>, and update it to reflect Tor's <a 296) href="http://tor.eff.org/tor-manual.html">RedirectExit</a> config option. </li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`297) <li>Improve and clarify the wiki entry on <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerForFirewalledClients">port forwarding</a>.</li>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`298) </ul> 299) 300) <h2>Testing Challenges</h2> 301) <ul> 302) <li>Test out why some of our tor servers have dns resolvers that resolve`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`303) unknown addresses to 127.0.0.1. 304)`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`305) <ul>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`306) <li>Identify the servers that experience this issue. </li> 307) <li>Identify how to cause and repair the issue in BIND, DJBDNS, or 308) whatever daemon the misconfigured servers use.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`309) </ul></li> 310)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`311) <li>Figure out how to setup web proxy gateways to let normal people 312) browse hidden services. (This has been done a few times, but nobody has 313) sent us code.)</li>`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`314) 315) <h2>Misc</h2> 316) <ul> 317) <li> </li>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`318) </ul> 319)`
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`320) 321)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`322) <h2>Research Challenges</h2> 323) <ul>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`324) <li>Arranging membership management for independence. 325)`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`326) <ul>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`327) <li>Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.</li> 328) <li>How to gather random sample of nodes.</li> 329) <li>How to handle nodelist recommendations.</li> 330) <li>Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has 331) different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should be 332) treated differently.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`333) </ul></li> 334)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`335) <li>Incentives to relay; incentives to exit.</li> 336) <li>Allowing dissidents to relay through Tor clients.</li> 337) <li>Experiment with mid-latency systems. How do they impact usability, 338) how do they impact safety?</li> 339) <li>Understand how powerful fingerprinting attacks are, and experiment 340) with ways to foil them (long-range padding?).</li> 341) <li>Attacking freenet-gnunet/timing-delay-randomness-arguments.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`342)`
clean up volunteer page Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`343) <ul>`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	`344) <li>Spec issue: if a resolve returns an IP4 and an IP6 address, 345) which to use?</li> 346) <li>Add to exit policy code</li> 347) <li>Make tor_gethostbyname into tor_getaddrinfo</li> 348) <li>Make everything that uses uint32_t as an IP address change to use 349) a generalize address struct.</li> 350) <li>Change relay cell types to accept new addresses.</li> 351) <li>Add flag to serverdescs to tell whether IPv6 is supported.</li>`
Make website valid xhtml (t... Thomas Sjögren authored 19 years ago	`352) </ul></li> 353)`
renamed contribute to volun... Andrew Lewman authored 19 years ago	354) <li>make freecap (or whichever) do what we want.</li> 355) <li>scrubbing proxies for protocols other than http.</li> 356) <li>We need better default privoxy configs to ship.</li> 357) <li>We need a good scrubbing HTTP proxy; privoxy is unmaintained and 358) sucky.</li> 359) <li>A DNS proxy would let unmodified socks4/socks5 apps to work 360) well.</li> 361) <li>Add SOCKS support to more applications</li> 362) <li>store hidden service information to disk: dirservers forget service 363) descriptors when they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget 364) their chosen intro points when they restart.</li> 365) <li>Server CPU load is high because clients keep asking to make new 366) circuits, which uses public key crypto. Possible defenses include: using 367) helper nodes (fixed entry nodes); rate limiting the number of create 368) cells handled per second; having clients retry failed extensions a few 369) times; implementing ssl sessions; and using hardware crypto when 370) available.</li> 371) <li>We fear we might not work very well when servers have asymmetric 372) bandwidth. Because Tor has separate TCP connections between each hop, if 373) the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing bytes are all 374) getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms don't really 375) transmit this information back to the incoming streams. Perhaps Tor 376) should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets, and 377) rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? We need somebody 378) who's good with networks to simulate this and help design 379) solutions.</li> 380) <li>Right now the hidden service descriptors are being stored on the 381) dirservers, but any reliable distributed storage system would do (for 382) example, a DHT that allows authenticated updates). Can somebody figure 383) out our best options and decide if they're good enough?</li>
revamp the volunteer page.... Roger Dingledine authored 19 years ago	`384)`