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torbutton
design
FF35_AUDIT
Copy old design docs back. We'll just maintain two copies for now. See: "Cool URIs don't change" http://www.w3.org/Provider/Style/URI
Mike Perry
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6088ff2c8
at 2010-10-15 05:39:41
FF35_AUDIT
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First pass: Quick Review of Firefox Features - Video Tag - Docs: - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/HTML/Element/Audio - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/HTML/Element/Video - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/HTML/Element/Source - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Manipulating_video_using_canvas - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/nsIDOMHTMLMediaElement - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Media_formats_supported_by_the_audio_and_video_elements - http://en.flossmanuals.net/TheoraCookbook - nsIContentPolicy is checked on load - Uses NSIChannels for initial load - Wrapped in nsHTMLMediaElement::mDecoder - is nsOggDecoder() or nsWaveDecoder() - liboggplay - Governed by media.* prefs - Preliminary audit shows they do not use the liboggplay tcp functions - Geolocation - Wifi: - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Monitoring_WiFi_access_points - Requires security policy to allow. Then still prompted - navigator.geolocation - Governed by geo.enabled - "2 week access token" is set - geo.wifi.access_token.. Clearing is prob a good idea - http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla1.9.1/source/dom/src/geolocation/NetworkGeolocationProvider.js - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Using_geolocation - DNS prefetching after toggle - prefetch pref? Always disable for now? - network.dns.disablePrefetch - Also disabled in netwerk/dns/src/nsDNSService2.cpp when manual proxies are set.. - This should prevent prefetching of non-tor urls in tor mode.. - But the reverse is unclear. - DocShell attribute!!1 YAY - http://www.oxymoronical.com/experiments/apidocs/interface/nsIDocShell - "Takes effect for the NEXT document loaded...." - Do we win this race? hrmm.. If we do, the tor->nontor direction should also be safe. - Content policy called? - No. See content/html/content/src/nsHTMLDNSPrefetch.cpp - Storage - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Storage - "It is available to trusted callers, meaning extensions and Firefox components only." - New content policy - Content Security Policy. Addon-only - "Offline resources" - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Offline_resources_in_Firefox - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/nsIApplicationCache - browser.cache.offline.enable toggles - browser.cache.disk.enable does not apply. Seperate "device". - Does our normal cache clearing mechanism apply? - We call nsICacheService.evictEntries() - May need: nsOfflineCacheDevice::EvictEntries(NULL) - Code is smart enough to behave cleanly if we simply set browser.cache.offline.enable or enable private browsing. - Mouse gesture and other new DOM events - Fonts - Remote fonts obey content policy. Good. - XXX: Are they cached independent of regular cache? Prob not. - Hrmm can probe for installed fonts: http://remysharp.com/2008/07/08/how-to-detect-if-a-font-is-installed-only-using-javascript/ http://www.lalit.org/lab/javascript-css-font-detect http://www.ajaxupdates.com/cssjavascript-font-detector/ http://code.google.com/p/jquery-fontavailable/ - Drag and drop - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DragDrop/Drag_and_Drop - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DragDrop/Drag_Operations - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DragDrop/Dragging_and_Dropping_Multiple_Items - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DragDrop/Recommended_Drag_Types - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DragDrop/DataTransfer - Should be no different than normal url handling.. - Local Storage - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/DOM/Storage#localStorage - Disabled by dom storage pref.. - Private browsing mode has its own DB - Memory only? - Disk Avoidance of gStorage and local storage: - mSessionOnly set via nsDOMStorage::CanUseStorage() - Seems to be set to true if cookies are session-only or private browsing mode - Our cookies are NOT session-only with dual cookie jars - but this is ok if we clear the session storage.. - XXX: Technically clearing session storage may break sites if cookies remain though - nsDOMStoragePersistentDB not used if mSessionOnly - Can clear with nsDOMStorage::ClearAll() or nsIDOMStorage2::clear()? - These only work for a particular storage. There's both global now and per-origin storage instances - Each docshell has tons of storages for each origin contained in it - Toggling dom.storage.enabled does not clear existing storage - Oh HOT! cookie-changed to clear cookies clears all storages! - happens for both ff3.0 and 3.5 in dom/src/storage/nsDOMStorage.cpp - Conclusion: - can safely enable dom storage - May have minor buggy usability issues unless we preserve it when user is preserving cookies.. Second Pass: Verification of all Torbutton Assumptions - "Better privacy controls" - Basically UI stuff for prefs we set already - address bar search disable option is interesting, but not torbutton's job to toggle. Users will hate us. - Private browsing - https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Supporting_private_browsing_mode - We should consider an option (off by default) to enable PBM during toggle - It is a good idea because it will let our users use DOM storage safely and also may cause their plugins and other addons to be safe - Doing it always will cause the user to lose fine-grained control of many settings - Also we'll need to prevent them from leaving without toggling tor - Stuff the emit does (grep for NS_PRIVATE_BROWSING_SWITCH_TOPIC and "private-browsing") - XXX: clear mozilla.org/security/sdr;1. We should too! Wtf is it?? - Neg. Best to let them handle this. Users will be annoyed at having to re-enter their passwords.. - They also clear the console service.. - Recommend watching private-browsing-cancel-vote and blocking if we are performing a db operation - Maybe we want to block transitions during our toggle for safety - XXX: They also clear general.open_location.last_url - XXX: mozilla.org/permissionmanager - XXX: mozilla.org/content-pref/service - XXX: Sets browser.zoom.siteSpecific to false - Interesting.. They clear their titles.. I wonder if some window managers log titles.. But that level of surveillance is unbeatable.. - XXX: Unless there is some way for flash or script to read titles? - They empty the clipboard.. - Can js access the clipboard?? ... - Yes, but needs special pref+confirmation box - http://www.dynamic-tools.net/toolbox/copyToClipboard/ - They clear cache.. - Cookies: - Use in-memory table that is different than their default - This could fuck up our cookie storage options - We could maybe prevent them from getting this event by wrapping nsCookieService::Observe(). Lullz.. - NavHistory: - XXX: nsNavHistory::AutoCompleteFeedback() doesn't track awesomebar choices for feedback.. Is this done on disk? - Don't add history entries - We should block this observe event too if we can.. - The session store stops storing tabs - We could block this observe - XXX: They expunge private temporary files on exit from PMB - This is not done normally until browser exit or "on-profile-change" - emits browser:purge-domain-data.. Mostly just for session editing it appears - Direct component query for pbs.privateBrowsingEnabled - This is where we have no ability to provide certain option control - browser.js seems to prevent user from allowing blocked popups? - Some items in some places context menu get blocked: - Can't delete items from history? placesContext_deleteHost - nsCookiePermission::InPrivateBrowsing() calls direct - but is irellevant - Form history cannot be saved while in PBM.. :( - User won't be prompted for adding login passwords.. - Can't remember prefs on content types - Many components read this value upon init: - This fucks up our observer game if tor starts enabled - NavHistory and cookie and dl manager - We could just wrap the bool on startup and lie and emit later... :/ - Or! emit an exit and an enter always at startup if tor is enabled. - Read iSec report - Compare to Chrome - API use cases - SessionStore - Has been reworked with observers and write methods. Should use those. - security.enable_ssl2 to clear session id - Still cleared - browser.sessionstore.max_tabs_undo - Yep. - SafeBrowsing Update Key removed on cookie clear still? - Yep. - Livemark updates have kill events now - Test if nsICertStore is still buggy... Third Pass: Exploit Auditing - Remote fonts - SVG with HTML - Javascript threads+locking - Ogg theora and vorbis codecs - SQLite - https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Firefox_3_for_developers
