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faq.wml
Update FAQ. Also, if I'm going to have to answer the hate mail, I might as well get top billing.
Mike Perry
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## translation metadata # Revision: $Revision$ # Translation-Priority: 3-low #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Torbutton FAQ" <div class="main-column"> <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG --> <h2>Torbutton FAQ</h2> <hr /> <strong>When I toggle Tor, my sites that use javascript stop working. Why?</strong> <p> Javascript can do things like wait until you have disabled Tor before trying to contact its source site, thus revealing your IP address. As such, Torbutton must disable Javascript, Meta-Refresh tags, and certain CSS behavior when Tor state changes from the state that was used to load a given page. These features are re-enabled when Torbutton goes back into the state that was used to load the page, but in some cases (particularly with Javascript and CSS) it is sometimes not possible to fully recover from the resulting errors, and the page is broken. Unfortunately, the only thing you can do (and still remain safe from having your IP address leak) is to reload the page when you toggle Tor, or just ensure you do all your work in a page before switching tor state. </p> <strong>I can't click on links or hit reload after I toggle Tor! Why?</strong> <p> Due to <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=409737">Firefox Bug 409737</a>, pages can still open popups and perform Javascript redirects and history access after Tor has been toggled. These popups and redirects can be blocked, but unfortunately they are indistinguishable from normal user interactions with the page (such as clicking on links, opening them in new tabs/windows, or using the history buttons), and so those are blocked as a side effect. Once that Firefox bug is fixed, this degree of isolation will become optional (for people who do not want to accidentally click on links and give away information via referrers). A workaround is to right click on the link, and open it in a new tab or window. The tab or window won't load automatically, but you can hit enter in the URL bar, and it will begin loading. Hitting enter in the URL bar will also reload the page without clicking the reload button. </p> <strong>I can't view videos on YouTube and other flash-based sites. Why?</strong> <p> Plugins are binary blobs that get inserted into Firefox and can perform arbitrary activity on your computer. This includes but is not limited to: <a href="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/">completely disregarding proxy settings</a>, querying your <a href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">local IP address</a>, and <a href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD or VMWare-based solution such as <a href="http://anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass, however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies potentially remain. </p> <strong>Torbutton sure seems to do a lot of things, some of which I find annoying. Can't I just use the old version?</strong> <p> <b>No.</b> Use of the old version, or any other vanilla proxy changer (including FoxyProxy -- see below) without Torbutton is actively discouraged. Seriously. Using a vanilla proxy switcher by itself is so insecure that you are not only just wasting your time, you are also actually endangering yourself. Simply do not use Tor and you will have the same (and in some cases, better) security. For more information on the types of attacks you are exposed to with a "homegrown" solution, please see <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/design/#adversary">The Torbutton Adversary Model</a>, in particular the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/design/#attacks">Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a> subsection. If there are any specific Torbutton behaviors that you do not like, please file a bug on <a href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&project=5">the bug tracker.</a> Most of Torbutton's security features can also be disabled via its preferences, if you think you have your own protection for those specific cases. </p> <strong>My browser is in some weird state where nothing works right!</strong> <p> Try to disable Tor by clicking on the button, and then open a new window. If that doesn't fix the issue, go to the preferences page and hit 'Restore Defaults'. This should reset the extension and Firefox to a known good configuration. If you can manage to reproduce whatever issue gets your Firefox wedged, please file details at <a href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&project=5">the bug tracker</a>. </p> <strong>When I use Tor, Firefox is no longer filling in logins/search boxes for me. Why?</strong> <p> Currently, this is tied to the "<b>Block history writes during Tor</b>" setting. If you have enabled that setting, all formfill functionality (both saving and reading) is disabled. If this bothers you, you can uncheck that option, but both history and forms will be saved. To prevent history disclosure attacks via Non-Tor usage, it is recommended you disable Non-Tor history reads if you allow history writing during Tor. </p> <strong>What about Thunderbird support? I see a page, but it is the wrong version?</strong> <p> Torbutton used to support basic proxy switching on Thunderbird back in the 1.0 days, but that support has been removed because it has not been analyzed for security. My developer tools page on addons.mozilla.org clearly lists Firefox support only, so I don't know why they didn't delete that Thunderbird listing. I am not a Thunderbird user and unfortunately, I don't have time to analyze the security issues involved with toggling proxy settings in that app. It likely suffers from similar (but not identical) state and proxy leak issues with html mail, embedded images, javascript, plugins and automatic network access. My recommendation is to create a completely separate Thunderbird profile for your Tor accounts and use that instead of trying to toggle proxy settings. But if you really like to roll fast and loose with your IP, you could try another proxy switcher like ProxyButton, SwitchProxy or FoxyProxy (if any of those happen to support thunderbird). </p> <strong>Which Firefox extensions should I avoid using?</strong> <p> This is a tough one. There are thousands of Firefox extensions: making a complete list of ones that are bad for anonymity is near impossible. However, here are a few examples that should get you started as to what sorts of behavior are dangerous. </p> <ol> <li>StumbleUpon, et al</li> These extensions will send all sorts of information about the websites you visit to the stumbleupon servers, and correlate this information with a unique identifier. This is obviously terrible for your anonymity. More generally, any sort of extension that requires registration, or even extensions that provide information about websites you visit should be suspect. <li>FoxyProxy</li> While FoxyProxy is a nice idea in theory, in practice it is impossible to configure securely for Tor usage without Torbutton. Like all vanilla third party proxy plugins, the main risks are <a href="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/">plugin leakage</a> and <a href="http://ha.ckers.org/weird/CSS-history.cgi">history disclosure</a>, followed closely by cookie theft by exit nodes and tracking by adservers (see the <a href="design/index.html#adversary">Torbutton Adversary Model</a> for more information). However, with Torbutton installed in tandem and always enabled, it is possible to configure FoxyProxy securely (though it is tricky). Since FoxyProxy's 'Patterns' mode only applies to specific urls, and not to an entire tab, setting FoxyProxy to only send specific sites through Tor will still allow adservers (whose hosts don't match your filters) to learn your real IP. Worse, when sites use offsite logging services such as Google Analytics, you will still end up in their logs with your real IP. Malicious exit nodes can also cooperate with sites to inject images into pages that bypass your filters. Setting FoxyProxy to only send certain URLs via Non-Tor is much more secure in this regard, but be very careful with the filters you allow. For example, something as simple as allowing *google* to go via Non-Tor will still cause you to end up in all the logs of all websites that use Google Analytics! See <a href="http://foxyproxy.mozdev.org/faq.html#privacy-01">this question</a> on the FoxyProxy FAQ for more information. <li>NoScript</li> Torbutton currently mitigates all known anonymity issues with Javascript. While it may be tempting to get better security by disabling Javascript for certain sites, you are far better off with an all-or-nothing approach. NoScript is exceedingly complicated, and has many subtleties that can surprise even advanced users. For example, addons.mozilla.org verifies extension integrity via Javascript over https, but downloads them in the clear. Not adding it to your whitelist effectively means you are pulling down unverified extensions. Worse still, using NoScript can actually disable protections that Torbutton itself provides via Javascript, yet still allow malicious exit nodes to compromise your anonymity via the default whitelist (which they can spoof to inject any script they want). </ol> <strong>Which Firefox extensions do you recommend?</strong> <ol> <li><a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/forcehttps/">ForceHTTPS</a></li> Many sites on the Internet are <a href="http://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-16/dc-16-speakers.html#Perry">sloppy about their use of HTTPS</a> and secure cookies. This addon can help you ensure that you always use HTTPS for sites that support it, and reduces the chances of your cookies being stolen for sites that do not secure them. <li><a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/953">RefControl</a></li> Mentioned above, this extension allows more fine-grained referrer spoofing than Torbutton currently provides. It should break less sites than Torbutton's referrer spoofing option. <li><a href="https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/1474">SafeCache</a></li> If you use Tor excessively, and rarely disable it, you probably want to install this extension to minimize the ability of sites to store long term identifiers in your cache. This extension applies same origin policy to the cache, so that elements are retrieved from the cache only if they are fetched from a document in the same origin domain as the cached element. </ol> <strong>Are there any other issues I should be concerned about?</strong> <p> There are a few known security issues with Torbutton (all of which are due to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/design/#FirefoxBugs">unfixed Firefox security bugs</a>). The most important for anonymity is that it is possible to unmask the javascript hooks that wrap the Date object to conceal your timezone in Firefox 2, and the timezone masking code does not work at all on Firefox 3. We are working with the Firefox team to fix one of <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=392274">Bug 399274</a> or <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=419598">Bug 419598</a> to address this. In the meantime, it is possible to set the <b>TZ</b> environment variable to <b>UTC</b> to cause the browser to use UTC as your timezone. Under Linux, you can add an <b>export TZ=UTC</b> to the /usr/bin/firefox script, or edit your system bashrc to do the same. Under Windows, you can set either a <a href="http://support.microsoft.com/kb/310519">User or System Environment Variable</a> for TZ via My Computer's properties. In MacOS, the situation is <a href="http://developer.apple.com/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPRuntimeConfig/Articles/EnvironmentVars.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/20002093-BCIJIJBH">a lot more complicated</a>, unfortunately. </p> <p> In addition, RSS readers such as Firefox Livemarks can perform periodic fetches. Due to <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=436250">Firefox Bug 436250</a>, there is no way to disable Livemark fetches during Tor. This can be a problem if you have a lot of custom Livemark urls that can give away information about your identity. </p> </div><!-- #main --> #include <foot.wmi>