getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml (d1d690aef) - tor-webwml.git

volunteer.wml

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#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
<div id="content" class="clearfix">
 <div id="breadcrumbs">
 <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>
 <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
 </div>
 <div id="maincol"> 
 
 <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
 <ol>
 <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
 a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>
 <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
 services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
 <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
 to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
 for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
 or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
 security, let them know about us.</li>
 <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
 users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
 yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
 we'd love to hear from you.</li>
 </ol>
 
 Tor has <a href="<page getinvolved/open-positions>">two open positions</a>.
 Please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> if you are qualified!
 
 <a id="Documentation"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
 <ol>
 <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
 languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
 guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
 Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
 <li>Evaluate and document
 <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">our
 list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
 <li>We have a huge list of <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">potentially useful
 programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
 situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
 </ol>
 
 <a id="Advocacy"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
 <ol>
 <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
meetings around the world.</li>
 <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
 or how to use it. Some have already started on <a
 href="http://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,
 <a
 href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,
 and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li> 
 <li>Create a poster, or a set of posters, around a theme,
 such as "Tor for Freedom!".</li>
 <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "Congratulations!
 You are using Tor!" in any language.</li>
 </ol>
 
 <a id="Projects"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>
 
 
 Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
 maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
 of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a
 href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Don't be shy
 to ask questions, and don't hesitate to ask even if the main contributors
 aren't active at that moment.
 
 
 <table id="projects">
 <tr>
 <th>Name</th>
 <th>Category</th>
 <th>Language</th>
 <th>Activity</th>
 <th>Contributors</th>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
 <td>Core</td>
 <td>C</td>
 <td>Heavy</td>
 <td>nickm, arma, Sebastian</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td>*<a href="#project-jtor">JTor</a></td>
 <td>Core</td>
 <td>Java</td>
 <td>None</td>
 <td></td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-tbb">TBB</a></td>
 <td>Usability</td>
 <td>Sys Admin</td>
 <td>Moderate</td>
 <td>Erinn</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-tails">Tails</a></td>
 <td>Usability</td>
 <td>Sys Admin</td>
 <td>Heavy</td>
 <td><a href="https://tails.boum.org/chat/">#tails</a></td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
 <td>Usability</td>
 <td>C</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>mwenge</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td>*<a href="#project-torouter">Torouter</a></td>
 <td>Usability</td>
 <td>Sys Admin</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>ioerror, Runa</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a></td>
 <td>User Interface</td>
 <td>C++, Qt</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>chiiph</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
 <td>User Interface</td>
 <td>Python, Curses</td>
 <td>Heavy</td>
 <td>atagar</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
 <td>User Interface</td>
 <td>Java</td>
 <td>Moderate</td>
 <td>n8fr8</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-torbutton">Torbutton</a></td>
 <td>Browser Add-on</td>
 <td>Javascript</td>
 <td>Moderate</td>
 <td>mikeperry</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td>*<a href="#project-thandy">Thandy</a></td>
 <td>Updater</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>Sebastian, Erinn, nickm</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-torctl">TorCtl</a></td>
 <td>Library</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>mikeperry</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
 <td>Client Service</td>
 <td>Java</td>
 <td>Heavy</td>
 <td>karsten</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-torstatus">TorStatus</a></td>
 <td>Client Service</td>
 <td>PHP</td>
 <td>None</td>
 <td></td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
 <td>Client Service</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>kaner</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
 <td>Client Service</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>kaner</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
 <td>Client Service</td>
 <td>Python, Perl</td>
 <td>None</td>
 <td></td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
 <td>Backend Service</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Moderate</td>
 <td>kaner, nickm</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr>
 <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
 <td>Backend Service</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>Light</td>
 <td>mikeperry</td>
 </tr>
 
 <tr class="alt">
 <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
 <td>Backend Service</td>
 <td>Python</td>
 <td>None</td>
 <td>Sebastian</td>
 </tr>
 </table>
 
 
 * Project is still in an alpha state.
 
 
 
 
 <a id="project-tor"></a>
 <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Client&component=Tor+Relay&component=vidalia&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
 the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
 extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#resistCensorship">Improving Tor's ability to resist
 censorship</a> 
 <a href="#unitTesting">Improve our unit testing process</a>
 
 
 
 <a id="project-jtor"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://github.com/brl/JTor/wiki">JTor</a> (<a
 href="https://github.com/brl/JTor">code</a>, <a
 href="https://github.com/brl/JTor/issues">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Java implementation of Tor and successor to <a
 href="http://onioncoffee.sourceforge.net/">OnionCoffee</a>. This project
 isn't yet complete, and has been inactive since Fall 2010.
 
 
 <a id="project-tbb"></a>
 <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+bundles/installation&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 The Tor Browser Bundle is an easy-to-use portable package of Tor, Vidalia,
 and Firefox preconfigured to work together out of the box. This is actively
 being worked on by Erinn Clark.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#auditTBB">Audit Tor Browser Bundles for data leaks</a> 
 <a href="#usabilityTesting">Usability testing of Tor</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-tails"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> (<a
 href="http://git.immerda.ch/?p=amnesia.git;a=summary">code</a>, <a
 href="https://tails.boum.org/bugs/">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 The Amnesic Incognito Live System is a live CD/USB distribution
 preconfigured so that everything is safely routed through Tor and leaves no
 trace on the local system. This is a merger of the Amnesia and <a
 href="http://www.anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> projects,
 and still under very active development.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#tailsStartMenu">Custom GDM3 startup menu, aka.
 tails-greeter</a> 
 <a href="#tailsMetadataAnonymizing">Meta-data anonymizing toolkit for
 file publication</a> 
 <a href="#tailsDebianLive">Improve Debian Live support for
 persistence</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-torsocks"></a>
 <h3><a href="http://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
 slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
 otherwise feature complete.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#torsocksForOSX">Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-torouter"></a>
 <h3><a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/Torouter">Torouter</a> (<a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torouter&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Project to provide an easy-to-use, embedded Tor instance for routers. This
 had high activity in late 2010, but has since been rather quiet.
 
 
 <a id="project-vidalia"></a>
 <h3><a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/vidalia/vidalia/trunk/">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Vidalia&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
 project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development
 slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken a lead with
 pushing the project forward.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#vidaliaStatusEventInterface">Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia</a> 
 <a href="#vidaliaNetworkMap">An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-arm"></a>
 <h3><a href="http://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/arm/trunk/">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Command-line monitor for Tor. This has been under very active development
 by its author, Damian Johnson, since early 2009 to make it a better
 general-purpose controller for *nix environments.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#armClientMode">Client Mode Use Cases for Arm</a> 
 <a href="#armGui">GUI for Arm</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-orbot"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/Orbot/">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Provides Tor on the Android platform. This was under very active
 development up through Fall 2010, after which things have been quiet.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#orbot-torbutton">TorButton for Mobile Firefox 4 or Custom Browser on Android</a> 
 <a href="#orbot-userInterface">Build a better user interface for Orbot</a> 
 <a href="#orbot-optimisation">Core Tor mobile optimisation</a> 
 <a href="#orbot-orlibAndOutreach">Orbot integration library and community outreach</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-torbutton"></a>
 <h3><a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Firefox addon that addresses many of the client-side threats to browsing
 the Internet anonymously. Mike has since continued to adapt it to new
 threats, updated versions of Firefox, and possibly <a
 href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">Chrome
 as well</a>.
 
 
 
 Project Ideas: 
 <a href="#torbuttonForThunderbird">Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird</a>
 
 
 <a id="project-thandy"></a>
 <h3>Thandy (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/thandy.git">code</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Updater for Tor. The project began in the Summer of 2008 but wasn't
 completed. Recently interest in it has been rekindled and many aspects of
 its design (including the language it'll be in) are currently in flux.
 
 
 <a id="project-torctl"></a>
 <h3>TorCtl (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pytorctl.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torctl&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Python bindings and utilities for using the Tor control port. It has been
 stable for several years, with only minor revisions.
 
 
 <a id="project-metrics"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Metrics&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
 metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by
 Karsten Loesing.
 
 
 <a id="project-torstatus"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorStatus">TorStatus</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">code</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Portal providing an overview of the Tor network, and details on any of its
 current relays. Though very actively used, this project has been
 unmaintained for a long while.
 
 
 <a id="project-weather"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/Weather">Weather</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
 relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
 href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
 in early 2011.
 
 
 <a id="project-gettor"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/EmailAutoResponder">GetTor</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/gettor/">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
 relatively unchanged for quite a while.
 
 
 <a id="project-torcheck"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/check/trunk/">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Provides a simple site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.
 This has been relatively unchanged for quite a while.
 
 
 <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
 in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
 
 
 <a id="project-torflow"></a>
 <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
 These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
 SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
 actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
 months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
 has stopped.
 
 
 <a id="project-torbel"></a>
 <h3><a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorBulkExitlist">TorBEL</a> (<a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tordnsel.git">code</a>, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
 tracker</a>)</h3>
 
 
 The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
 exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
 (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
 version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
 been inactive.
 
 
 <a id="Coding"></a>
 <a id="Summer"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>
 
 
 You may find some of these projects to be good <a href="<page
 about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code 2011</a> ideas. We have labelled each idea
 with how useful it would be to the overall Tor project (priority), how
 much work we expect it would be (effort level), how much clue you should
 start with (skill level), and which of our <a href="<page
 about/corepeople>">core developers</a> would be good mentors.
 If one or more of these ideas looks promising to you, please <a
 href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your plans rather than
 sending blind applications. You may also want to propose your own project
 idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.
 
 
 <ol>
 
 <a id="auditTBB"></a>
 <li>
 Audit Tor Browser Bundles for data leaks
 
 Priority: High
 
 Effort Level: High
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Erinn, Jacob, Andrew
 The Tor Browser Bundle incorporates Tor, Firefox, Polipo, and the Vidalia
 user interface (and optionally the <a href="http://pidgin.im/">Pidgin</a>
 Instant Messaging client). Components are pre-configured to operate in a
 secure way, and it has very few dependencies on the installed operating
 system. It has therefore become one of the most easy to use, and popular,
 ways to use Tor on Windows.
 This project is to identify all of the traces left behind by
 using a Tor Browser Bundle on Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux. Developing
 ways to stop, counter, or remove these traces is a final step.
 Students should be familiar with operating system analysis,
 application development on one or preferably all of Windows, Linux,
 and Mac OS X, and be comfortable with C/C++ and shell scripting.
 If you would like to help extend or do security auditing for
 TBB, please contact Erinn.
 </li>
 
 <a id="firewallProbeTool"></a>
 <li>
 Develop a fully automatic firewall-probing system
 
 Priority: High
 
 Effort Level: Medium to High
 
 Skill Level: High
 
 Likely Mentors: Robert Ransom, Nick, Jacob
 We would like to have a fully automatic firewall-probing system for
 blocking systems with no long-term state (i.e. firewalls that can
 examine each connection, but do not change their behaviour for future
 connections based on the traffic they have seen).
 Ideally, volunteers would only need to set up one or more test servers,
 and run the probe client program on a publicly accessible computer
 behind the firewall.
 The test tool should:
 <ul>
 <li>generate packet captures on both ends (and send them out to the
 extent possible),</li>
 <li>cycle through all the SSL configurations we might want to test
 through a censorship device, and</li>
 <li>also test some other protocols to see whether they are allowed
 through the firewall (IMAP and other mail protocols, BitTorrent,
 DTLS, etc.).</li>
 </ul>
 </li>
 
 <a id="tailsStartMenu"></a>
 <li>
 Custom GDM3 startup menu, aka. tails-greeter
 
 Priority: High
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium to High
 
 Likely Mentors: intrigeri, anonym
 Several major upcoming Tails features need to gather user input at
 startup time: bridges support, persistence, MAC address anonymization,
 etc.
 Existing boot menus lack the graphical widgets and generally
 user-friendliness needed. Hence it was decided to implement Tails startup
 menu in GDM3: GDM3's default login/password prompt needs to be replaced
 with a custom GTK+ application hereby named tails-greeter that allows the
 user to provide any input necessary.
 Anyone undertaking this project should be familiar with GNU/Linux and
 application development; no other skill is required, apart of the ability
 to quickly find practical answers in APIs and documentation for many
 technologies she knows nothing about: this challenging coding project will
 indeed involve getting familiar with some modern GNU/Linux Desktop
 technologies such as D-Bus, GNOME and GConf. Python/GTK+ is probably the
 best suited language for the task.
 For more information see <a href="https://tails.boum.org/todo/boot_menu/">https://tails.boum.org/todo/boot_menu/</a>
 </li>

<a id="orbot-torbutton"></a>
 <li>
 TorButton for Mobile Firefox 4 or Custom Browser on Android
 
 Priority: High
 
 Effort Level: High
 
 Skill Level: High
 
 Likely Mentors: Nathan (n8fr8), Jake, Mike Perry
 Initial work has been done on implementing a proxy-setting add-on for
 Firefox on Android (see <a
 href="https://github.com/guardianproject/ProxyMob">ProxyMob</a>), but a
 full port of TorButton needs to be done (dependent upon Firefox 4 port of
 TorButton). The other approach is to implement a custom &quot;Tor
 Browser&quot; based on Firefox or Webkit browser. See <a
 href="http://code.google.com/p/torora/wiki/Android">Torora</a> for progress
 on this so far.
 </li>
 
 <a id="orbot-userInterface"></a>
 <li>
 Build a better user interface for Orbot
 
 Priority: High
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Nathan (n8fr8), Jake
 Improved home screen to show confirmation of connection (via a TorCheck
 API call), better statistics about data transferred (up/down), number of
 circuits connected, quality of connection and so on. The &quot;Tether
 Wifi&quot; Android application is a good model to follow in how it shows a
 realtime count of bytes transferred as well as notifications when wifi
 clients connect. In addition, better handling of Tor system and error
 messages would also be very helpful, include use of standard Android
 operating systems notifications. The addition of a wizard or tutorial
 walkthrough for novice users to explain to them exactly what is and what is
 not anonymized or protected would greatly improve the likelihood they will
 use Orbot correctly. All of this should work on the range of screens and
 device types now offered for Android, from 2&quot; phone to 10&quot;
 Tablet.
 </li>
 
 <a id="resistCensorship"></a>
 <li>
 Improving Tor's ability to resist censorship
 
 Priority: Medium to High
 
 Effort Level: Medium to High
 
 Skill Level: High
 
 Likely Mentors: Roger, Nick, Jake
 The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a
 href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.
 One huge category of work is adding features to our <a
 href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git?a=tree">BridgeDB</a>
 service (Python). Tor aims to give out <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge
 relay addresses</a> to users that can't reach the Tor network
 directly, but there's an arms race between algorithms for distributing
 addresses and algorithms for gathering and blocking them. See <a
 href="<blog>bridge-distribution-strategies">our
 blog post on the topic</a> as an overview, and then look at <a
 href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Dec-2009/msg00000.html">Roger's
 or-dev post</a> from December for more recent thoughts &mdash; lots of
 design work remains.
 If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem
 we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single
 address/port combination at a time. There's
 <a href="<specblob>proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a
 proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
 to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more
 work.
 This project could involve a lot of research and design. One of the big
 challenges will be identifying and crafting approaches that can still
 resist an adversary even after the adversary knows the design, and
 then trading off censorship resistance with usability and
 robustness.
 </li>
 
 <a id="geoIPUpgrade"></a>
 <li>
 Improve our GeoIP file format
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium to High
 
 Likely Mentors: Robert Ransom
 Currently, Tor bridges and relays read an entire IP->country database
 into memory from a text file during startup. We would like to
 distribute this database and store it on disk in a much more compact
 form, and perform IP->country lookups on it in its on-disk format if
 possible.
 We have <a href='https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2506'>a
 sketch of a design</a> for a moderately optimized format for IPv4 GeoIP
 data; this project will involve both implementing the IPv4 format and
 designing and implementing a format for IPv6 GeoIP data.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="armClientMode"></a>
 <li>
 Client Mode Use Cases for Arm
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: High
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Damian (atagar)
 <a href="<page projects/arm>">Arm</a> is a Tor command line status
 monitor on *nix environments (Linux, Mac, and BSD). It functions much like
 top does, giving a CLI overlay of Tor's bandwidth usage, connections,
 configuration, log, etc. Thus far its design has been geared for Tor relay
 operators. However, this doesn't need to be the case. This project would be
 to expand and simplify arm to make it useful for Tor's client users
 too.
 
 This would include UI design, experimenting, and a lot of python
 hacking. Here's some ideas for client functionality arm could provide:
 
 <ul>
 <li>A panel for client connections, showing each hop of the user's
 circuits with the ISP, country, and jurisdiction where those relays
 reside. Other interesting information would be the circuit's latency, how
 long its been around, and its possible exit ports. Some of this will be
 pretty tricky and require some experimentation to figure out what
 information can be fetched safely (for instance, scraping rdns and whois
 lookups could give hints about a relay's ISP, but we'd need to do it on
 all Tor relays to avoid leaking our connections to the resolver).</li>
 
 <li>Options to let the user request new circuits (the &quot;New
 Identity&quot; feature in Vidalia), select the exit country, etc.</li>
 
 <li>A panel showing Internet application and if their connections are
 being routed through Tor or not (giving a warning if there's leaks).</li>
 
 <li>The status of the bridges we're configured to use (ie, are they up?).
 This would include adding control port functionality to Tor for <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2068">ticket
 2068</a>.</li>
 
 <li>A one click option to set Tor to be a client, relay, or bridge. The
 goal would be to make it trivial for users to voluntarily contribute to
 the Tor network.</li>
 
 <li>Menus as an alternative to hotkeys to make the interface more
 intuitive and usable for beginners (<a
 href="http://gnosis.cx/publish/programming/charming_python_6.html">example</a>).</li>
 
 <li>Look at Vidalia and TorK for ideas and solicit input from the Tor community.</li>
 </ul>
 
 
 More information is available in the following sections of arm's dev notes: <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/arm#ConnectionListingExpansion">Connection Listing Expansion</a>, <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/arm#CircuitDetails">Circuit Details</a>, and <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/arm#ClientModeUseCases">Client Mode Use Cases</a>
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="unitTesting"></a>
 <li>
 Improve our unit testing process
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Nick, Erinn
 Tor needs to be tested far more thoroughly. This is a
 multi-part effort. To start with, our unit test coverage should
 rise substantially, especially in the areas outside the utility
 functions. This will require significant refactoring of some parts
 of Tor, in order to dissociate as much logic as possible from
 globals.
 Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing. We've got
 buildbot to automate our regular integration and compile testing already
 (though we need somebody to set it up on Windows),
 but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in <a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>)
 updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
 network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
 changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.
 </li>
 
 
 
 <a id="torbuttonForThunderbird"></a>
 <li>
 Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: High
 
 Skill Level: High
 
 Likely Mentors: Mike
 
 We're hearing from an increasing number of users that they want to use
 Thunderbird with Tor. However, there are plenty of application-level
 concerns, for example, by default Thunderbird will put your hostname in
 the outgoing mail that it sends. At some point we should start a new
 push to build a Thunderbird extension similar to Torbutton.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="usabilityTesting"></a>
 <li>
 Usability testing of Tor
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Low to Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Andrew
 
 Especially the browser bundle, ideally amongst our target demographic.
 That would help a lot in knowing what needs to be done in terms of bug
 fixes or new features. We get this informally at the moment, but a more
 structured process would be better.
 
 
 
 Please note that since this isn't a coding project, it isn't suitable for
 Google Summer of Code.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="tailsMetadataAnonymizing"></a>
 <li>
 Meta-data anonymizing toolkit for file publication
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Low to Medium
 
 Skill Level: Low to Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: intrigeri, anonym
 Tor helps greatly in publishing files anonymously. However, much personal
 information can be enclosed *inside* such published files' meta-data: GPS
 coordinates, author's name and so on. Anyone who wants to anonymously
 publish a file can thus far too easily de-anonymize herself.
 A set of tools allowing users to easily inspect and clean up meta-data in files
 would benefit Tor users, and would e.g. be shipped in Tails.
 A graphical user interface is a must, but library and command-line
 interfaces are most welcome so that future work can add support for
 cleaning published files to various publishing tools, such as desktop
 social networking clients and Web content management systems.
 This project mostly consists of writing glue between the many existing
 tools and libraries that provide read/write access to files' meta-data. An
 extensible program design would probably be the best bet, so that support
 for other kinds of files can easily be added later.
 The meta-data cleaning toolkit would run at least on GNU/Linux;
 additional Windows and/or Mac OS X support would be welcome. The tools used
 would be up to the students. The detailed specification is ready and will
 be published soon.
 </li> 
 
 <a id="tailsDebianLive"></a>
 <li>
 Improve Debian Live support for persistence
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Low to Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: intrigeri, anonym
 Data persistence is a somewhat tricky topic in a Live system context,
 especially one such as Tails, which is explicitly designed to avoid
 leaving any trace of its use.
 Some real-life use cases, however, require some kind of data
 persistence. To start with, Tails should (carefully) support persistence of
 application-specific configurations (e.g. GnuPG keyring) and of a user
 arbitrary data store. Note that persistence in Tails will always be opt-in
 and require encrypted storage.
 The backend work consists of improving Debian Live's existing
 persistence features to make them suit the specific context of Tails. A trust
 relationship is already established with upstream who is happy to merge our
 changes. The codebase is not that small and much refactoring is needed, so
 this really is a programming project rather than a fire'n'forget shell
 script hack contest.
 Anyone undertaking this project must be familiar with GNU/Linux, and
 preferably with Debian. Being able to (quickly learn to) write clean and
 safe programs in shell is also needed.
 For more information, see <a href="https://tails.boum.org/todo/persistence/">https://tails.boum.org/todo/persistence/</a>.
 </li>
 
 <a id="torsocksForOSX"></a>
 <li>
 Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Robert Hogan
 
 <a href="https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> and <a
 href="https://code.google.com/p/dsocks/">dsocks</a> are wrappers that will
 run applications, intercept their outgoing network connections, and push
 those connections through Tor. The goal is to handle applications that
 don't support proxies (or don't supporting them well). To get it right,
 they need to intercept many system calls. The syscalls you need to
 intercept on Linux differ dramatically from those on BSD. So Torsocks
 works fine on Linux, dsocks works ok on BSD (though it may be less
 maintained and thus might miss more syscalls), and nothing works well
 on both. First, we should patch dsocks to use Tor's mapaddress
 commands from the controller interface, so we don't waste a whole
 round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before connecting. Second,
 we should make our torify script detect which of torsocks or
 dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
 unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
 or discarding one entirely.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="vidaliaStatusEventInterface"></a>
 <li>
 Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Low to Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Tomás
 There are a number of status changes inside Tor of which the user may need
 to be informed. For example, if the user is trying to set up his Tor as a
 relay and Tor decides that its ports are not reachable from outside
 the user's network, we should alert the user. Currently, all the user
 gets is a couple of log messages in Vidalia's 'message log' window, which they
 likely never see since they don't receive a notification that something
 has gone wrong. Even if the user does actually look at the message log,
 most of the messages make little sense to the novice user.
 Tor has the ability to inform Vidalia of many such status
 changes, and we recently implemented support for a couple of these
 events. Still, there are many more status events which the user should
 be informed of, and we need a better UI for actually displaying them
 to the user.
 The goal of this project then is to design and implement a UI for
 displaying Tor status events to the user. For example, we might put a
 little badge on Vidalia's tray icon that alerts the user to new status
 events they should look at. Double-clicking the icon could bring up a
 dialog that summarizes recent status events in simple terms and maybe
 suggests a remedy for any negative events if they can be corrected by
 the user. Of course, this is just an example and one is free to
 suggest another approach.
 A person undertaking this project should have good UI design and layout
 skills and some C++ development experience. Previous experience with Qt and
 Qt's Designer will be very helpful, but are not required. Some
 English writing ability will also be useful, since this project will
 likely involve writing small amounts of help documentation that should
 be understandable by non-technical users. Bonus points for some graphic
 design/Photoshop fu, since we might want/need some shiny new icons too.
 </li>
 
 <a id="orbot-optimisation"></a>
 <li>
 Core Tor mobile optimisation
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: High
 
 Likely Mentors: Nathan (n8fr8), Jake
 
 The existing port of Tor to Android is basically a straight
 cross-compile to Linux ARM. There has been no work done in looking at
 possible optimizations of Tor within a mobile hardware environment or on
 mobile networks. In addition, a number of additional Android OS APIs are
 available (such as wireless network status) that could be taken
 advantage of.
 
 
 
 It should be noted, that even without optimisation, Tor is handling the
 mobile network environment very well, automatically detecting change in
 IP addresses, opening circuits, etc, as the device switches from no
 coverage to 2G, 3G or Wifi constantly as it changes position. However,
 this observation of &quot;very well&quot;, is just based on user
 experience, and not any detailed study of what exactly is happening, and
 what threats might exist because of this constantly changing network state.
 
 
 
 Finally, the build process needs to be moved to the Android NDK from the
 custom GCC toolchain we are now using, and compatibility with Android
 2.3 and 3.x Honeycomb OS need to be verified.
 
 
 
 For more information see the <a
 href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/Orbot/BUILD">Orbot
 build documentation</a>.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="orbot-orlibAndOutreach"></a>
 <li>
 Orbot integration library and community outreach
 
 Priority: Medium
 
 Effort Level: Low
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Nathan (n8fr8)
 
 We need additional work on <a
 href="https://github.com/guardianproject/orlib">ORLib</a>, our library for
 use with third-party application to easily enable them to support
 &quot;Torification&quot; on non-rooted devices (i.e. w/o transparent
 proxying). This library includes a SOCKS client, a wrapper for the Apache
 HTTPClient library, a utility class for detecting the state of Orbot
 connectivity, and other relevant/useful things an Android app might need to
 anonymize itself. This work would includes direct development of the
 library, documentation, and sample code. Outreach or effort to implement
 the library within other open-source apps is also needed.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="vidaliaNetworkMap"></a>
 <li>
 An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia
 
 Priority: Low to Medium
 
 Effort Level: Medium
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Tomás
 
 One of Vidalia's existing features is a network map that shows the user
 the approximate geographic location of relays in the Tor network and
 plots the paths the user's traffic takes as it is tunneled through the
 Tor network. The map is currently not very interactive and has rather
 poor graphics. Instead, we implemented KDE's Marble widget such
 that it gives us a better quality map and enables improved interactivity,
 such as allowing the user to click on individual relays or circuits to
 display additional information. We want to add the ability
 for users to click on a particular relay or a country containing one or
 more Tor exit relays and say, "I want my connections to exit
 from here."
 
 
 
 This project will first involve getting familiar with Vidalia
 and the Marble widget's API. One will then integrate the widget
 into Vidalia and customize Marble to be better suited for our application,
 such as making circuits clickable, storing cached map data in Vidalia's
 own data directory, and customizing some of the widget's dialogs.
 
 
 
 A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
 experience. Previous experience with Qt and CMake is helpful, but not
 required.
 
 </li>
 
 <a id="armGui"></a>
 <li>
 GUI for Arm
 
 Priority: Low
 
 Effort Level: High
 
 Skill Level: Medium
 
 Likely Mentors: Damian (atagar)
 
 Arm has several unique features, some of the most interesting being its
 connection listing (correlating netstat results against the Tor consensus)
 and configuration editor (a quick method for editing Tor's config, with
 information pulled from the control port and man page). However, since arm
 is a command line controller it's of limited appeal to certain sets of
 users. This project would be to build a GTK or Qt frontend for the
 controller, providing similar features set but with a windowed interface.
 
 
 
 The vast majority of arm's more interesting functionality lies in its
 backend <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/arm/trunk/src/util/">utilities</a>, so
 there should be little to no work decoupling the CLI from its backend.
 Instead, this project would mostly be UI hacking and experimentation,
 trying different interfaces to find something that's elegant and simple,
 but matches the information found in the current terminal application.
 
 </li>
 
 <li>
 Bring up new ideas!
 
 Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
 href="/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development
 roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
 and find out what you think needs fixing.
 Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>
 might also be short on developers.
 </li>
 
 </ol>
 
 <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
 <ol>
 <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
 Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
 call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
 that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a
 href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing
 havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
 instead. One solution would be to teach <a
 href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
 overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
 the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
 <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
 start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>
 
 <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
 docs/documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
 fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
 <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
 new features, and planning for deployment.</li>
 
 <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
 traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
 simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
 really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
 that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
 giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
 See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
 details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
 done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>
 
 <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
 accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
 possibly very buggy. We're looking for more rigorous testing,
 performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and
 Tor if needed.</li>
 
 <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a
 href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine
 if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by
 getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>
 
 <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
 encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
 on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
 it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a
 href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list
 of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
 be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a
 href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
 for Tor and
 UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>
 
 <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
 (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
 first place to start.</li>
 
 <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
 Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
 from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
 them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
 integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
 generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>
 
 <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
 to maintain, improve, and document? One example is <a
 href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live
 System</a>.
 </li>
 
 <li>
 Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
 more scanning-resistant. Right now, an adversary can identify <a
 href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
 and seeing if they respond. To solve this, bridges could <a
 href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
 href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
 </li>
 
 </ol>
 
 <a id="Research"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
 <ol>
 <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
 by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
 traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
 stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
 attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
 much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
 is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
 that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
 schemes work better than others?</li>
 <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
 protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
 see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
 Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
 client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
 that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
 look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
 timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
 href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
 but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
 client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
 strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
 asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
 natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
 symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
 <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
 href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
 Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
 works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
 fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
 then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
 options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
 attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
 attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
 actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
 much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
 or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
 orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
 sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
 Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
 <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
 the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
 exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
 though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
 that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
 Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
 exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
 routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
 approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
 <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
 the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
 circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
 href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
 paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
 anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
 thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
 <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
 (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
 each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
 bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
 don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
 Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
 and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
 a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
 slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
 need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
 solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
 degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
 <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
 current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
 we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
 than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
 href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh
 throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
 overhaul if the results are good.</li>
 <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
 an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
 href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
 it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
 steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
 block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
 the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
 bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
 How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
 wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
 a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
 <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
 ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
 third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
 streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
 the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
 the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
 tradeoff.</li>
 <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
 puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
 if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
 <li>Programs like <a
 href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide
 your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
 every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
 by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
 by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
 do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
 that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
 anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
 Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
 of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
 in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
 UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
 hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
 by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
 browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
 </li>
 <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
 reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
 lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
 connected?
 </li>
 </ol>
 
 
 <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
 of these!
 
 </div>
 
 <div id = "sidecol">
#include "side.wmi"
#include "info.wmi"
 </div>
 
</div>

#include <foot.wmi>

tor-webwml.git

Dropping Steven as a potential mentor (hasn't given an indication of wanting to take part this year) and hiding the "Simulator for slow Internet connections" idea