tor-webwml.git

@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ uses.</a></li>

     </a></li>

     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist 

     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

+    <li><a href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></li>

+    <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than 

+    Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion 

     routing?</a></li>

     </ul>

@@ -3170,6 +3173,47 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.

     <hr>

+    <a id="VPN"></a>

+    <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></h3>

+    

+    <p>

+    Some people use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) as a privacy solution. 

+    VPNs encrypt the traffic between the user and the VPN provider, 

+    and they can act as a proxy between a user and an online destination. 

+    However, VPNs have a single point of failure: the VPN provider. 

+    A technically proficient attacker or a number of employees could 

+    retrieve the full identity information associated with a VPN user. 

+    It is also possible to use coercion or other means to convince a 

+    VPN provider to reveal their users' identities. Identities can be 

+    discovered by following a money trail (using Bitcoin does not solve 

+    this problem because Bitcoin is not anonymous), or by persuading the 

+    VPN provider to hand over logs. Even 

+    if a VPN provider says they don't keep logs, users have to take their 

+    word for it---and trust that the VPN provider won't buckle to outside 

+    pressures that might want them to start keeping logs. 

+    </p>

+

+    <p>

+    When you use a VPN, websites can still build up a persistent profile of 

+    your usage over time. Even though sites you visit won't automatically 

+    get your originating IP address, they still know how to profile you 

+    based on your browsing history. 

+    </p>

+

+    <p>

+    When you use Tor the IP address you connect to changes at most every 10 

+    minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely 

+    dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor 

+    users (assuming you did not <a 

+    href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning">identify 

+    yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough 

+    information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a 

+    href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution">encrypted 

+    three-hop circuit</a> design.

+    </p>

+    

+    <hr>

+

     <a id="Proxychains"></a>

     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies 

     (proxychains) better than Tor with only 3 hops?</a></h3>

@@ -3178,10 +3222,10 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.

     Proxychains is a program that sends your traffic through a series of 

     open web proxies that you supply before sending it on to your final 

     destination. <a href="#KeyManagement">Unlike Tor</a>, proxychains 

-    does not encrypt the connections between each proxy. An open proxy 

-    that wanted to monitor your connection can see all the other proxy 

+    does not encrypt the connections between each proxy server. An open proxy 

+    that wanted to monitor your connection could see all the other proxy 

     servers you wanted to use between itself and your final destination, 

-    as well as the IP address that proxy hop receives traffic from. 

+    as well as the IP address that proxy hop received traffic from. 

     </p>

     <p>

     Because the <a 

@@ -3192,7 +3236,7 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.

     <p>

     While Tor relays are run by volunteers and checked periodically for 

     suspicious behavior, many open proxies that can be found with a search 

-    engine are worm-compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies 

+    engine are compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies 

     not intended for public use, or honeypots set up to exploit users. 

     </p>