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@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@ uses.</a></li>
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</a></li>
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<li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist
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"remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>
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+ <li><a href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></li>
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+ <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than
|
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+ Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion
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routing?</a></li>
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</ul>
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@@ -3170,6 +3173,47 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.
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<hr>
|
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+ <a id="VPN"></a>
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+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VPN">What's safer, Tor or a VPN?</a></h3>
|
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+
|
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|
+ <p>
|
|
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|
+ Some people use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) as a privacy solution.
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|
+ VPNs encrypt the traffic between the user and the VPN provider,
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|
+ and they can act as a proxy between a user and an online destination.
|
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|
+ However, VPNs have a single point of failure: the VPN provider.
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+ A technically proficient attacker or a number of employees could
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|
+ retrieve the full identity information associated with a VPN user.
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|
+ It is also possible to use coercion or other means to convince a
|
|
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|
+ VPN provider to reveal their users' identities. Identities can be
|
|
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|
+ discovered by following a money trail (using Bitcoin does not solve
|
|
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|
+ this problem because Bitcoin is not anonymous), or by persuading the
|
|
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|
+ VPN provider to hand over logs. Even
|
|
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|
+ if a VPN provider says they don't keep logs, users have to take their
|
|
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|
+ word for it---and trust that the VPN provider won't buckle to outside
|
|
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|
+ pressures that might want them to start keeping logs.
|
|
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|
+ </p>
|
|
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|
+
|
|
3196
|
+ <p>
|
|
3197
|
+ When you use a VPN, websites can still build up a persistent profile of
|
|
3198
|
+ your usage over time. Even though sites you visit won't automatically
|
|
3199
|
+ get your originating IP address, they still know how to profile you
|
|
3200
|
+ based on your browsing history.
|
|
3201
|
+ </p>
|
|
3202
|
+
|
|
3203
|
+ <p>
|
|
3204
|
+ When you use Tor the IP address you connect to changes at most every 10
|
|
3205
|
+ minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely
|
|
3206
|
+ dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor
|
|
3207
|
+ users (assuming you did not <a
|
|
3208
|
+ href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning">identify
|
|
3209
|
+ yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough
|
|
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|
+ information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a
|
|
3211
|
+ href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution">encrypted
|
|
3212
|
+ three-hop circuit</a> design.
|
|
3213
|
+ </p>
|
|
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|
+
|
|
3215
|
+ <hr>
|
|
3216
|
+
|
3173
|
3217
|
<a id="Proxychains"></a>
|
3174
|
3218
|
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies
|
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|
3219
|
(proxychains) better than Tor with only 3 hops?</a></h3>
|
...
|
...
|
@@ -3178,10 +3222,10 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.
|
3178
|
3222
|
Proxychains is a program that sends your traffic through a series of
|
3179
|
3223
|
open web proxies that you supply before sending it on to your final
|
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|
3224
|
destination. <a href="#KeyManagement">Unlike Tor</a>, proxychains
|
3181
|
|
- does not encrypt the connections between each proxy. An open proxy
|
3182
|
|
- that wanted to monitor your connection can see all the other proxy
|
|
3225
|
+ does not encrypt the connections between each proxy server. An open proxy
|
|
3226
|
+ that wanted to monitor your connection could see all the other proxy
|
3183
|
3227
|
servers you wanted to use between itself and your final destination,
|
3184
|
|
- as well as the IP address that proxy hop receives traffic from.
|
|
3228
|
+ as well as the IP address that proxy hop received traffic from.
|
3185
|
3229
|
</p>
|
3186
|
3230
|
<p>
|
3187
|
3231
|
Because the <a
|
...
|
...
|
@@ -3192,7 +3236,7 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.
|
3192
|
3236
|
<p>
|
3193
|
3237
|
While Tor relays are run by volunteers and checked periodically for
|
3194
|
3238
|
suspicious behavior, many open proxies that can be found with a search
|
3195
|
|
- engine are worm-compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies
|
|
3239
|
+ engine are compromised machines, misconfigured private proxies
|
3196
|
3240
|
not intended for public use, or honeypots set up to exploit users.
|
3197
|
3241
|
</p>
|
3198
|
3242
|
|