be more accurate about guard probability (40ca9a48b) - tor-webwml.git

docs/en/faq.wml

@@ -3622,7 +3622,7 @@ information on the two sides.
 So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,
 <i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select
 new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker
-will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability
+will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around
 <i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad
 as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without
 an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the


...	...	@@ -3622,7 +3622,7 @@ information on the two sides.
3622	3622	So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,
3623	3623	<i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select
3624	3624	new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker
3625		-will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability
	3625	+will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around
3626	3626	<i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad
3627	3627	as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without
3628	3628	an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the
3629	3629