Browse code

Use English "singular they" where appropriate

Signed-off-by: hiro <hiro@torproject.org>

Ingo Blechschmidt authored on 10/12/2017 14:20:39 • hiro committed on 02/04/2018 19:10:20
Showing 3 changed files
... ...
@@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ using technology?</a></li>
204 204
 
205 205
     <p>But the real answer is to implement application-level auth systems,
206 206
     to let in well-behaving users and keep out badly-behaving users. This
207
-    needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password he
208
-    knows), not some property of the way his packets are transported. </p>
207
+    needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password they
208
+    know), not some property of the way their packets are transported. </p>
209 209
 
210 210
     <p>Of course, not all IRC networks are trying to ban Tor nodes. After
211 211
     all, quite a few people use Tor to IRC in privacy in order to carry
... ...
@@ -2453,8 +2453,8 @@ exit
2453 2453
     policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients
2454 2454
     will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
2455 2455
     exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
2456
-    the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,
2457
-    based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry
2456
+    the services, hosts, and networks it wants to allow connections to,
2457
+    based on abuse potential and its own situation. Read the FAQ entry
2458 2458
 on
2459 2459
     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might
2460 2460
 encounter</a>
... ...
@@ -2931,14 +2931,14 @@ Yes, you do get better anonymity against some attacks.
2931 2931
     </p>
2932 2932
     <p>
2933 2933
 The simplest example is an attacker who owns a small number of Tor relays.
2934
-He will see a connection from you, but he won't be able to know whether
2934
+They will see a connection from you, but they won't be able to know whether
2935 2935
 the connection originated at your computer or was relayed from somebody else.
2936 2936
     </p>
2937 2937
     <p>
2938 2938
 There are some cases where it doesn't seem to help: if an attacker can
2939
-watch all of your incoming and outgoing traffic, then it's easy for him
2939
+watch all of your incoming and outgoing traffic, then it's easy for them
2940 2940
 to learn which connections were relayed and which started at you. (In
2941
-this case he still doesn't know your destinations unless he is watching
2941
+this case they still don't know your destinations unless they are watching
2942 2942
 them too, but you're no better off than if you were an ordinary client.)
2943 2943
     </p>
2944 2944
     <p>
... ...
@@ -2948,7 +2948,7 @@ signal to an attacker that you place a high value on your anonymity.
2948 2948
 Second, there are some more esoteric attacks that are not as
2949 2949
 well-understood or well-tested that involve making use of the knowledge
2950 2950
 that you're running a relay -- for example, an attacker may be able to
2951
-"observe" whether you're sending traffic even if he can't actually watch
2951
+"observe" whether you're sending traffic even if they can't actually watch
2952 2952
 your network, by relaying traffic through your Tor relay and noticing
2953 2953
 changes in traffic timing.
2954 2954
     </p>
... ...
@@ -3475,7 +3475,7 @@ keys,
3475 3475
     locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can
3476 3476
 control
3477 3477
     a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8
3478
-    directory authorities), he can't trick the Tor client into using
3478
+    directory authorities), they can't trick the Tor client into using
3479 3479
     other Tor relays.
3480 3480
     </p>
3481 3481
 
... ...
@@ -4213,7 +4213,7 @@ only solution is to have no opinion.
4213 4213
     Like all anonymous communication networks that are fast enough for web
4214 4214
     browsing, Tor is vulnerable to statistical "traffic confirmation"
4215 4215
     attacks, where the adversary watches traffic at both ends of a circuit
4216
-    and confirms his guess that they're communicating. It would be really
4216
+    and confirms their guess that those endpoints are communicating. It would be really
4217 4217
     nice if we could use cover traffic to confuse this attack. But there
4218 4218
     are three problems here:
4219 4219
     </p>
... ...
@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@
107 107
     the same set of <a
108 108
     href="<wikifaq>#Whatsthisaboutentryguardformerlyknownashelpernodes">entry
109 109
     guards</a> when creating new circuits. Otherwise an attacker
110
-    could run his own relay and force an onion service to create an arbitrary
110
+    could run their own relay and force an onion service to create an arbitrary
111 111
     number of circuits in the hope that the corrupt relay is picked as entry
112
-    node and he learns the onion server's IP address via timing analysis. This
112
+    node and they learn the onion server's IP address via timing analysis. This
113 113
     attack was described by &Oslash;verlier and Syverson in their paper titled
114 114
     <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06">Locating Hidden
115 115
     Servers</a>.