Dropping the panopticlick project from the volunteer page
Damian Johnson

Damian Johnson commited on 2015-02-15 22:13:14
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 0 Einfügungen und 63 Löschungen.


Tried to get ahold of Georg to see if he's interested in mentoring this but no
luck, so dropping the project.
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@@ -422,11 +422,6 @@ meetings around the world.</li>
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     privacy and security issues in mainline version.
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     </p>
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-    <p>
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-    <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
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-    <i><a href="#panopticlick">Panopticlick</a></i><br />
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-    </p>
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-
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     <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a>
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     <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a
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     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a
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@@ -1432,64 +1427,6 @@ the codebase that you want to work on.
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     </p>
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     </li>
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-    <a id="panopticlick"></a>
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-    <li>
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-    <b>Panopticlick</b>
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-    <br>
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-    Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
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-    <br>
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-    Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
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-    <br>
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-    Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>
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-    <p>
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-
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-The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a>
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-revolutionized how people think about <a
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-href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">browser
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-fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser
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-fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of
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-individual browser features to overall fingerprintability.
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-
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-    </p>
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-    <p>
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-
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-Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a
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-href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton">makes
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-it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially
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-for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is
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-because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our
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-users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint
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-data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of
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-one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser
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-(Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example,
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-based on feature set alone).
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-
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-   </p>
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-   <p>
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-
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-To address this, we would like to have <a
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-href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119">our own
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-fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser
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-feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a
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-href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting">additional
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-fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick.
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-   </p>
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-   <p>
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-
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-For this project, the student would develop a website that users can
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-voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint.  The user
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-should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be
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-available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser
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-version.  In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated
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-tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the
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-uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each
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-browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and
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-version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific
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-implementation.
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-
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-    </p>
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-    </li>
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-
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     <a id="ahmiaSearch"></a>
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     <li>
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     <b>Ahmia - Hidden Service Search</b>
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