tor-webwml.git

@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@

     relay.</a></li>

     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets,

     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

+    <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,

+    so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

     </ul>

     <p>Abuse:</p>

@@ -1817,6 +1819,41 @@ a more complex interface between Tor and the local DNS resolver.

 <hr>

+<a id="HideExits"></a>

+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor

+relays, so people can't block the exits.</a></h3>

+

+<p>

+There are a few reasons we don't:

+</p>

+

+<ol>

+<li>We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients

+need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they

+can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the

+list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections

+through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.

+</li>

+

+<li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to

+do so.  Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to

+connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services

+should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users,

+they can.

+</li>

+

+<li>Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive

+response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving

+them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they

+really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not,

+what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have

+spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall

+approach to privacy and anonymity.

+</li>

+</ol>

+

+    <hr>

+

     <a id="Criminals"></a>

     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3>