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import the "you should hide exits" faq

Roger Dingledine authored on 06/02/2012 23:37:30
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     relay.</a></li>
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     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets,
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     not just TCP packets.</a></li>
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+    <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
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+    so people can't block the exits.</a></li>
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     </ul>
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     <p>Abuse:</p>
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 they are passed to the Tor client. Doing so at the IP level will require
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 a more complex interface between Tor and the local DNS resolver.
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 </li>
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+</ol>
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+
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+<hr>
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+
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+<a id="HideExits"></a>
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+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor
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+relays, so people can't block the exits.</a></h3>
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+
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+<p>
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+There are a few reasons we don't:
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+</p>
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+
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+<ol>
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+<li>We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
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+need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they
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+can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the
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+list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
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+through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
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+</li>
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+
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+<li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to
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+do so.  Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to
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+connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services
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+should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users,
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+they can.
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+</li>
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+
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+<li>Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive
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+response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving
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+them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they
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+really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not,
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+what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have
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+spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall
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+approach to privacy and anonymity.
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+</li>
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 </ol>
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     <hr>