tor-webwml.git

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@

 <b>Note that these are the installation instructions for running a Tor client on

   Mac OS X. If you want to relay traffic for others to help the network

   grow (please do), read the <a

-  href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a> guide.</b>

+  href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a> guide.</b>

 </p>

 <hr />

@@ -174,25 +174,26 @@ FAQ entry</a> for hints.</p>

 <hr />

 <a id="server"></a>

-<h2><a class="anchor" href="#server">Step Four: Configure it as a server</a></h2>

+<a id="relay"></a>

+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#relay">Step Four: Configure it as a relay</a></h2>

 <br />

 <p>The Tor network relies on volunteers to donate bandwidth. The more

-people who run servers, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

+people who run relays, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

 at least 20 kilobytes/s each way, please help out Tor by configuring your

-Tor to be a server too. We have many features that make Tor servers easy

+Tor to be a relay too. We have many features that make Tor relays easy

 and convenient, including rate limiting for bandwidth, exit policies so

 you can limit your exposure to abuse complaints, and support for dynamic

 IP addresses.</p>

-<p>Having servers in many different places on the Internet is what

+<p>Having relays in many different places on the Internet is what

 makes Tor users secure. <a

 href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerAnonymity">You

 may also get stronger anonymity yourself</a>,

 since remote sites can't know whether connections originated at your

 computer or were relayed from others.</p>

-<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a>

+<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a>

 guide.</p>

 <hr />

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@

 <b>Note that these are the installation instructions for running a Tor

 client. If you want to relay traffic for others to help the network grow

 (please do), read the <a

-href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a> guide.</b>

+href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a> guide.</b>

 </p>

 <hr />

@@ -171,25 +171,26 @@ FAQ entry</a> for hints.</p>

 <hr />

 <a id="server"></a>

-<h2><a class="anchor" href="#server">Step Five: Configure it as a server</a></h2>

+<a id="relay"></a>

+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#relay">Step Five: Configure it as a relay</a></h2>

 <br />

 <p>The Tor network relies on volunteers to donate bandwidth. The more

-people who run servers, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

+people who run relays, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

 at least 20 kilobytes/s each way, please help out Tor by configuring your

-Tor to be a server too. We have many features that make Tor servers easy

+Tor to be a relay too. We have many features that make Tor relays easy

 and convenient, including rate limiting for bandwidth, exit policies so

 you can limit your exposure to abuse complaints, and support for dynamic

 IP addresses.</p>

-<p>Having servers in many different places on the Internet is what

+<p>Having relays in many different places on the Internet is what

 makes Tor users secure. <a

 href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerAnonymity">You

 may also get stronger anonymity yourself</a>,

 since remote sites can't know whether connections originated at your

 computer or were relayed from others.</p>

-<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a>

+<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a>

 guide.</p>

 <hr />

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@

 <b>Note that these are the installation instructions for running a Tor

 client on MS Windows (98, 98SE, NT4, 2000, XP, Server).

 If you want to relay traffic for others to help the network grow (please

-do), read the <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a>

+do), read the <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a>

 guide.</b>

 </p>

@@ -157,25 +157,26 @@ FAQ entry</a> for hints.</p>

 <hr />

 <a id="server"></a>

-<h2><a class="anchor" href="#server">Step Four: Configure it as a server</a></h2>

+<a id="relay"></a>

+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#relay">Step Four: Configure it as a relay</a></h2>

 <br />

 <p>The Tor network relies on volunteers to donate bandwidth. The more

-people who run servers, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

+people who run relays, the faster the Tor network will be. If you have

 at least 20 kilobytes/s each way, please help out Tor by configuring your

-Tor to be a server too. We have many features that make Tor servers easy

+Tor to be a relay too. We have many features that make Tor relays easy

 and convenient, including rate limiting for bandwidth, exit policies so

 you can limit your exposure to abuse complaints, and support for dynamic

 IP addresses.</p>

-<p>Having servers in many different places on the Internet is what

+<p>Having relays in many different places on the Internet is what

 makes Tor users secure. <a

 href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerAnonymity">You

 may also get stronger anonymity yourself</a>,

 since remote sites can't know whether connections originated at your

 computer or were relayed from others.</p>

-<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a server</a>

+<p>Read more at our <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a relay</a>

 guide.</p>

 <hr />

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@

 <h1>Configuring Hidden Services for <a href="<page index>">Tor</a></h1>

 <hr />

-<p>Tor allows clients and servers to offer hidden services. That is,

+<p>Tor allows clients and relays to offer hidden services. That is,

 you can offer a web server, SSH server, etc., without revealing your

 IP address to its users. In fact, because you don't use any public address,

 you can run a hidden service from behind your firewall.

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@

 ## translation metadata

 # Revision: $Revision$

-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Response template for Tor server operator to ISP"

+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Response template for Tor relay operator to ISP"

 <div class="main-column">

 <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

-<h2>Response template for Tor node maintainer to ISP</h2>

+<h2>Response template for Tor relay maintainer to ISP</h2>

 <hr />

 <p>Written by the Electronic Frontier

 Foundation (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>). Last updated 19 Feb 2005.</p>

-<p>Note to Tor server operators:   In this litigous era, anyone

+<p>Note to Tor relay operators:   In this litigous era, anyone

 providing routing services may face copyright complaints under the

 Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Thankfully, the DMCA safe harbors

 provide immunity from many of them -- both to you and to your

 upstream provider.  If your Internet host forwards a DMCA complaint

 to you, here's a template you can use to write a response.  You can

 tailor this to your own circumstances: if you think your host would

-be disturbed to hear you're running a server on the network, you may

+be disturbed to hear you're running a relay on the network, you may

 want to take that part out.  Of course it's up to you to comply with

 your ISP's terms of service.  If you're not comfortable including so

 much legal explanation, feel free to invite the ISP to contact EFF

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@

 ## translation metadata

 # Revision: $Revision$

-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Legal FAQ for Tor Server Operators"

+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators"

 <div class="main-column">

 <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

-<h2>Legal FAQ for Tor Server Operators</h2>

+<h2>Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators</h2>

 <hr />

 <p>FAQ written by the Electronic Frontier

 Foundation (<a href="http://www.eff.org/">EFF</a>). Last updated 25 Apr 2005.</p>

@@ -46,34 +46,34 @@ infringement?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>No.</strong> Tor has been developed to be a tool for free

 speech, privacy, and human rights.  It is not a tool designed or intended

-to be used to break the law, either by Tor users or Tor server

+to be used to break the law, either by Tor users or Tor relay

 operators.</p>

 <p>We further recommend that you not keep any potentially illegal files

 on the same machine you use for Tor, nor use that machine for any illegal

-purpose.  Although no Tor server in the US has ever been seized, nor any server

+purpose.  Although no Tor relay in the US has ever been seized, nor any relay

 operator sued, the future possibility cannot be ruled out. If that

 happens, you will want your machine to be clean.</p>

 <a id="Promise"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Promise">Can EFF promise that I won't get

-in trouble for running a Tor server?</a></h3>

+in trouble for running a Tor relay?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>No.</strong> All new technologies create legal uncertainties,

 and Tor is no exception to the rule. Presently, no court has ever considered any

 case involving the Tor technology, and we therefore cannot guarantee

 that you will never face any legal liability as a result of running a

-Tor server. However, EFF believes so strongly that those running Tor

-servers shouldn't be liable for traffic that passes through the server

-that we're running our own Tor server.

+Tor relay. However, EFF believes so strongly that those running Tor

+relays shouldn't be liable for traffic that passes through the relay

+that we're running our own Tor relay.

 </p>

 <a id="Represent"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Represent">Will EFF represent me if I get

-in trouble for running a Tor server?</a></h3>

+in trouble for running a Tor relay?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>Maybe.</strong> While EFF cannot promise legal representation

-of all Tor server operators, it will assist server operators in

+of all Tor relay operators, it will assist relay operators in

 assessing the situation and will try to locate qualified legal counsel

 when necessary.  Inquiries to EFF for the purpose of securing legal

 representation or referrals should be directed to staff attorney Kevin

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Bankston (bankston at eff.org or US +1 (415) 436-9333 x 126). Such

 inquiries will be kept

 confidential subject to the limits of the attorney/client privilege.

 Note that although EFF cannot practice law outside of the U.S., it will

-still try to assist non-U.S. server operators in finding local

+still try to assist non-U.S. relay operators in finding local

 representation.</p>

 <a id="DevelopersAreNotLawyers"></a>

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ them if I suspect Tor is being used for illegal purposes?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>No.</strong> Tor's core developers, Roger Dingledine

 and Nick Mathewson, are available to answer technical questions, but

 they are not lawyers and cannot give legal advice.  Nor do they have any

-ability to prevent illegal activity that may occur through Tor servers.

+ability to prevent illegal activity that may occur through Tor relays.

 Furthermore, your communications with Tor's core developers are

 not protected by any legal privilege, so law enforcement or civil

 litigants could subpoena and obtain any information you give to

@@ -100,15 +100,15 @@ them.</p>

 <a id="RequestForLogs"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RequestForLogs">If I receive a request from

-law enforcement or anyone else for my Tor server's logs, what should

+law enforcement or anyone else for my Tor relay's logs, what should

 I do?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>Educate them about Tor.</strong> In most instances, properly

-configured Tor servers will have no useful data for inquiring parties,

+configured Tor relays will have no useful data for inquiring parties,

 and you should feel free to educate them on this point.  To the extent

 you do maintain logs, however, you should not disclose them to any third

 party without first consulting a lawyer.  In the U.S., such a disclosure

-may violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and server

+may violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and relay

 operators outside of the U.S. may be subject to similar data protection

 laws.</p>

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ will help us recognize trends and issues that the lawyers might want to

 focus on. Chilling Effects encourages submissions from people outside

 the United States too.</p>

-<p>EFF is actively seeking Tor server operators willing to stand up

+<p>EFF is actively seeking Tor relay operators willing to stand up

 and help set a clear legal precedent establishing that merely running

 a node does not create copyright liability for either node operators

 or their bandwidth providers. If you want to be the EFF's test case,

@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ more here</a>.</p>

 <a id="ExitSnooping"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitSnooping">Should I snoop on the plaintext

-that exits through my Tor server?</a></h3>

+that exits through my Tor relay?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>No.</strong> You may be technically capable of modifying

 the Tor source code or installing additional software to monitor

 or log plaintext that exits your node. However,

-Tor server operators in the U.S. can create legal and possibly even

+Tor relay operators in the U.S. can create legal and possibly even

 criminal liability for themselves under state or federal wiretap laws if

 they affirmatively monitor, log, or disclose Tor users'

 communications, while non-U.S. operators may be subject to similar laws.

@@ -165,16 +165,16 @@ first talking to a lawyer.</p>

 <a id="DirectoryWarranty"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DirectoryWarranty">Do Tor's core developers

-make any promises about the trustworthiness or reliability of Tor servers

+make any promises about the trustworthiness or reliability of Tor relays

 that are listed in their directory?</a></h3>

 <p><strong>No.</strong> Although the developers attempt to verify that

-Tor servers listed in the directory the core developers maintain are

+Tor relays listed in the directory the core developers maintain are

 stable and have adequate bandwidth, neither they nor EFF can guarantee

 the personal trustworthiness or reliability of the individuals who run

-those servers.  Tor's core developers further reserve the right to

-refuse a Tor server operator's request to be listed in their

-directory or to remove any server from their directory for any

+those relays.  Tor's core developers further reserve the right to

+refuse a Tor relay operator's request to be listed in their

+directory or to remove any relay from their directory for any

 reason.</p>

 <a id="License"></a>

@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ href="http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html">helpful</a>.</p>

 #

 <ul>

 <li><tt>tor-ops</tt> gets to the people who manage the directory

-authorities. Use this if you run a Tor server and have a question or

-problem with your server.</li>

+authorities. Use this if you run a Tor relay and have a question or

+problem with your relay.</li>

 <li><tt>tor-webmaster</tt> can fix typos on the website, change wrong

 statements or directions on the website, and add new sections and

 paragraphs that you send us. You might want to make a draft of your new

@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ Mac OS X</a></li>

 Linux/BSD/Unix</a></li>

 <li><a href="<page docs/tor-switchproxy>">Installing

 SwitchProxy for Tor</a></li>

-<li><a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Configuring a

-Tor server</a></li>

+<li><a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configuring a

+Tor relay</a></li>

 <li><a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">Configuring

 a Tor hidden service</a></li>

 </ul>

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ to Torifying various applications</a> is also popular. (While we

 monitor the Wiki page to help ensure accuracy, the Tor developers are

 not responsible for the content.)</li>

 <li>The <a href="<page faq-abuse>">Abuse FAQ</a> is a collection of

-common questions and issues discussed when running a Tor server.</li>

+common questions and issues discussed when running a Tor relay.</li>

 <li>The <a href="<page eff/tor-legal-faq>">Tor Legal FAQ</a> is written by

 EFF lawyers. It aims to give you an overview of some of the legal issues

 that arise from the Tor project in the US.</li>

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ the development version of Tor</a>.</li>

 <li>The <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter">Tor

 wiki</a> provides a plethora of helpful contributions from Tor

 users. Check it out!</li>

-<li>The Tor IRC channel (for users, server operators, and developers)

+<li>The Tor IRC channel (for users, relay operators, and developers)

 is <a href="irc://irc.oftc.net/tor">#tor on irc.oftc.net</a>.</li>

 <li>We have a <a

 href="http://bugs.torproject.org/tor">bugtracker</a>.

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">A

 list of supporting programs you might want to use in association with

 Tor</a>.</li>

 <li><a href="http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/">Weasel's graph

-of the number of Tor servers over time</a>.</li>

+of the number of Tor relays over time</a>.</li>

 <li><a href="http://check.torproject.org/">The

 Tor detector</a> or <a href="http://torcheck.xenobite.eu/">the other

 Tor detector</a> try to guess if you're using Tor or not.</li>

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@

 ## translation metadata

 # Revision: $Revision$

-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Abuse FAQ for Server Operators"

+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Abuse FAQ for Relay Operators"

 <div class="main-column">

 <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

-<h2>Abuse FAQ for Tor Server Operators</h2>

+<h2>Abuse FAQ for Tor Relay Operators</h2>

 <hr />

 <a id="WhatAboutCriminals"></a>

@@ -68,11 +68,11 @@ DDoS attack can do it just fine without Tor. </p>

 <p>First of all, the default Tor exit policy rejects all outgoing

 port 25 (SMTP) traffic. So sending spam mail through Tor isn't going to

-work by default. It's possible that some server operators will enable

+work by default. It's possible that some relay operators will enable

 port 25 on their particular exit node, in which case that computer will

 allow outgoing mails; but that individual could just set up an open mail

 relay too, independent of Tor. In short, Tor isn't useful for spamming,

-because nearly all Tor servers refuse to deliver the mail. </p>

+because nearly all Tor relays refuse to deliver the mail. </p>

 <p>Of course, it's not all about delivering the mail. Spammers can use

 Tor to connect to open HTTP proxies (and from there to SMTP servers); to

@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ it only transports correctly-formed TCP connections.

 <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>

 <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">How do Tor exit policies work?</a></h3>

-<p>Each Tor server has an exit policy that specifies what sort of

-outbound connections are allowed or refused from that server. The exit

+<p>Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of

+outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit

 policies are propagated to the client via the directory, so clients

 will automatically avoid picking exit nodes that would refuse to exit

 to their intended destination. </p>

-<p>This way each server can decide the services, hosts, and networks

+<p>This way each relay can decide the services, hosts, and networks

 he wants to allow connections to, based on abuse potential and his own

 situation. </p>

@@ -118,16 +118,16 @@ well</a>, we feel that we're doing pretty well at striking a balance

 currently. </p>

 <a id="TypicalAbuses"></a>

-<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run a server?</a></h3>

+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run a relay?</a></h3>

-<p>If you run a Tor server that allows exit connections (such as the

+<p>If you run a Tor relay that allows exit connections (such as the

 default exit policy), it's probably safe to say that you will eventually

 hear from somebody. Abuse

 complaints may come in a variety of forms. For example: </p>

 <ul>

 <li>Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends a ransom note to a

 company. The

-FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor server,

+FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor relay,

 and they say "oh well" and leave you alone. [Port 80]</li>

 <li>Somebody tries to get you shut down by using Tor to connect to Google

 groups and post spam to Usenet, and then sends an angry mail to

@@ -142,15 +142,15 @@ Template</a>, which explains why your ISP can probably ignore

 the notice without any liability. [Arbitrary ports]</li>

 </ul>

-<p>You might also find that your Tor server's IP is blocked from accessing

+<p>You might also find that your Tor relay's IP is blocked from accessing

 some Internet sites/services. This might happen regardless of your exit

 policy, because some groups don't seem to know or care that Tor has

 exit policies. (If you have a spare IP not used for other activities,

-you might consider running your Tor server on it.) For example, </p>

+you might consider running your Tor relay on it.) For example, </p>

 <ul>

 <li>Because of a few cases of anonymous jerks messing with its web

-pages, Wikipedia is currently blocking many Tor server IPs from writing

+pages, Wikipedia is currently blocking many Tor relay IPs from writing

 (reading still works). We're talking to Wikipedia about how they might

 control abuse while still providing access to anonymous contributors,

 who often have hot news or inside info on a topic but don't want to risk

@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ revealing their identities when publishing it (or don't want to reveal

 to local observers that they're accessing Wikipedia). Slashdot is also

 in the same boat.</li>

-<li>SORBS is putting some Tor server IPs on their email

+<li>SORBS is putting some Tor relay IPs on their email

 blacklist as well. They do this because they passively detect whether your

-server connects to certain IRC networks, and they conclude from this that

-your server is capable of spamming. We tried to work with

+relay connects to certain IRC networks, and they conclude from this that

+your relay is capable of spamming. We tried to work with

 them to teach them that not all software works this way,

 but we have given up. We recommend you avoid them, and <a

 href="http://paulgraham.com/spamhausblacklist.html">teach your friends

@@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ an impolite one.)</p>

 services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is

 not so different from AOL in this respect.</p>

-<p>Lastly, please remember that Tor servers have <a

-href="#ExitPolicies">individual exit policies</a>. Many Tor servers do

+<p>Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have <a

+href="#ExitPolicies">individual exit policies</a>. Many Tor relays do

 not allow exiting connections at all. Many of those that do allow some

 exit connections might already disallow connections to

 your service. When you go about banning nodes, you should parse the

@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ the overall list of nodes in the network). </p>

 <a href="<svnsandbox>contrib/exitlist">Python script to parse the Tor

 directory</a>. (Note that this script won't give you a perfect list

 of IP addresses that might connect to you using Tor, since some Tor

-servers might exit from other addresses than the one they publish.)

+relays might exit from other addresses than the one they publish.)

 </p>

 <a id="TracingUsers"></a>

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ is similar to using a twisty, hard-to-follow route in order to throw off

 somebody who is tailing you—and then periodically erasing your

 footprints.  Instead of taking a direct route from source to

 destination, data packets on the Tor network take a random pathway

-through several servers that cover your tracks so no observer at any

+through several relays that cover your tracks so no observer at any

 single point can tell where the data came from or where it's going.

 </p>

@@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ single point can tell where the data came from or where it's going.

 <p>

 To create a private network pathway with Tor, the user's software or

 client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections through

-servers on the network.  The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and

-each server along the way knows only which server gave it data and which

-server it is giving data to.  No individual server ever knows the

+relays on the network.  The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and

+each relay along the way knows only which relay gave it data and which

+relay it is giving data to.  No individual relay ever knows the

 complete path that a data packet has taken.  The client negotiates a

 separate set of encryption keys for each hop along the circuit to ensure

 that each hop can't trace these connections as they pass through.

@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ that each hop can't trace these connections as they pass through.

 <p>

 Once a circuit has been established, many kinds of data can be exchanged

 and several different sorts of software applications can be deployed

-over the Tor network.  Because each server sees no more than one hop in

-the circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised server can use

+over the Tor network.  Because each relay sees no more than one hop in

+the circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised relay can use

 traffic analysis to link the connection's source and destination.  Tor

 only works for TCP streams and can be used by any application with SOCKS

 support.

@@ -206,9 +206,9 @@ As Tor's usability increases, it will attract more users, which will

 increase the possible sources and destinations of each communication,

 thus increasing security for everyone.

 We're making progress, but we need your help.  Please consider

-<a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">running a server</a>

+<a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running a relay</a>

 or <a href="<page volunteer>">volunteering</a> as a

-<a href="<page developers>">developer</a>.

+<a href="<page documentation>#Developers">developer</a>.

 </p>

 <p>

@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ Ongoing trends in law, policy, and technology threaten anonymity as never

 before, undermining our ability to speak and read freely online. These

 trends also undermine national security and critical infrastructure by

 making communication among individuals, organizations, corporations,

-and governments more vulnerable to analysis. Each new user and server

+and governments more vulnerable to analysis. Each new user and relay

 provides additional diversity, enhancing Tor's ability to put control

 over your security and privacy back into your hands.

 </p>

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Coders:</a></h3>

 <dt>Benedikt Boss</dt><dd>Worked on <a

 href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/topf/README">TOPF</a>, a fuzzer for Tor;

 mentored by Roger.</dd>

-<dt>Christian King</dt><dd> Worked on making Tor servers stable on

+<dt>Christian King</dt><dd> Worked on making Tor relays stable on

 Windows; mentored by Nick.</dd>

 <dt>Karsten Loesing</dt><dd> Worked on distributing and securing

 the publishing and fetching of hidden service descriptors; mentored

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ question about Tor.</dd>

 <dt>Geoff Goodell</dt><dd>Runs one of the directory authorities, used to

 run the Blossom project which uses Tor as its overlay network, and runs

 the <a href="http://lefkada.eecs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/exit.py">exit.py</a>

-Tor server list.</dd>

+Tor relay list.</dd>

 <dt>Fabian Keil</dt><dd>One of the core Privoxy developers, and also a

 Tor fan. He's the reason Tor and Privoxy still work well together.</dd>

 <dt>Justin Hipple</dt><dd>The other developer for Vidalia.</dd>

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ href="http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/">TorDNSEL code</a>.</dd>

 <a href="http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/tools/guide/">tutorials</a>

 for how, when, and whether to use Tor. He also teaches activists around

 the world about Tor and related tools.</dd>

-<dt>All our server operators, people who write <a

+<dt>All our relay operators, people who write <a

 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">research papers</a> about Tor,

 people who teach others about Tor, etc.</dt>

 </dl>

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Tor project. There are three primary ways of contributing:</p>

 <ul>

 <li>A large enough <a href="<page donate>">donation</a> to the Tor

 Project.</li>

-<li>Operate a fast <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">Tor server</a>

+<li>Operate a fast <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relay</a>

 that's been running for the past two months: you are eligible if you

 allow exits to port 80 and you average 100 KB/s traffic, or if you're

 not an exit but you average 500 KB/s traffic.</li>

@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@

 <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

 <h2>Three things everyone can do now:</h2>

 <ol>

-<li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">running

-a server</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

-<li>Tell your friends! Get them to run servers. Get them to run hidden

+<li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running

+a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

+<li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden

 services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>

 <li>We are looking for funding and sponsors. If you like Tor's goals, please

   <a href="<page donate>">take a moment to donate to support further

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them

 or discarding one entirely.</li>

 </ul>

 </li>

-<li>People running servers tell us they want to have one BandwidthRate

+<li>People running relays tell us they want to have one BandwidthRate

 during some part of the day, and a different BandwidthRate at other

 parts of the day. Rather than coding this inside Tor, we should have a

 little script that speaks via the <a href="<page gui/index>">Tor

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ client that fetches this directory securely (via Tor and checking its

 signature), intercepts <tt>.country.blossom</tt> hostnames, and does

 the right thing.</li>

 <li>Speaking of geolocation data, somebody should draw a map of the Earth

-with a pin-point for each Tor server. Bonus points if it updates as the

+with a pin-point for each Tor relay. Bonus points if it updates as the

 network grows and changes. Unfortunately, the easy ways to do this involve

 sending all the data to Google and having them draw the map for you. How

 much does this impact privacy, and do we have any other good options?</li>

@@ -97,37 +97,37 @@ Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>

 <a id="Coding"></a>

 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Coding and Design</a></h2>

 <ol>

-<li>Tor servers don't work well on Windows XP. On

+<li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On

 Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system

 call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means

-that a medium sized Tor server will empty the non-page pool, <a

+that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

 href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

 havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO

 instead. One solution would be to teach <a

 href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use

 overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to

 the new libevent interface.</li>

-<li>Because Tor servers need to store-and-forward each cell they handle,

-high-bandwidth Tor servers end up using dozens of megabytes of memory

+<li>Because Tor relays need to store-and-forward each cell they handle,

+high-bandwidth Tor relays end up using dozens of megabytes of memory

 just for buffers. We need better heuristics for when to shrink/expand

 buffers. Maybe this should be modelled after the Linux kernel buffer

 design, where we have many smaller buffers that link to each other,

 rather than monolithic buffers?</li>

 <li>We need an official central site to answer "Is this IP address a Tor

-exit server?" questions. This should provide several interfaces, including

+exit relay?" questions. This should provide several interfaces, including

 a web interface and a DNSBL-style interface. It can provide the most

 up-to-date answers by keeping a local mirror of the Tor directory

-information. The tricky point is that being an exit server is not a

+information. The tricky point is that being an exit relay is not a

 boolean: so the question is actually "Is this IP address a Tor exit

-server that can exit to my IP address:port?" The DNSBL interface

+relay that can exit to my IP address:port?" The DNSBL interface

 will probably receive hundreds of queries a minute, so some smart

 algorithms are in order. Bonus points if it does active testing through

 each exit node to find out what IP address it's really exiting from.

 <a href="<svnsandbox>doc/contrib/torbl-design.txt">Read more here</a>.</li>

-<li>Sometimes Tor servers crash, or the computers they're on fall off the

+<li>Sometimes Tor relays crash, or the computers they're on fall off the

 network, or other accidents happen. Some Tor operators have expressed

 an interest in signing up to a "notifying" service that periodically

-checks whether their Tor server is healthy and sends them a reminder mail

+checks whether their Tor relay is healthy and sends them a reminder mail

 when it's not. Anybody want to write a few cgi scripts, a few web pages,

 and set up some sort of wget hack and/or something more complex like <a

 href="http://nagios.org/">Nagios</a> to do the monitoring? The first

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">pos

 paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting

 anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more

 thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>

-<li>Tor doesn't work very well when servers have asymmetric bandwidth

+<li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth

 (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between

 each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing

 bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms

@@ -307,11 +307,11 @@ resistance section of anonbib</a>.</li>

 <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the

 ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the

 third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting

-streams that a given server can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,

+streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,

 the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so

 the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security

 tradeoff.</li>

-<li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor servers or dirservers. Are client

+<li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client

 puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus

 if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>

 </ol>

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ security authorities are going to think you are a terrorist? </p>

 <p>Tor, in combination with Blossom, allows you to see the World Wide

 Web from a specific perspective.  Want to see Google come up in Polish?

-If you ask to leave the Tor cloud at a Polish Tor server, you'll see what

+If you ask to leave the Tor cloud at a Polish Tor relay, you'll see what

 Poland sees online.  Want to check the differential pricing offered by

 an online retailer or wholesaler to folks in another country, compared

 to the pricing offered to you or your company?  Tor and Blossom can