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coming from Tor nodes as "anonymous users," removing the ability of the
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abusers to blend in, the abusers moved back to using their open proxies
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and bot networks. </p>
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<p>Second, consider that hundreds of thousands of
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people use Tor every day simply for
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good data hygiene — for example, to protect against data-gathering
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people don't have a good measure of how many polite Tor users are
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connecting to their service — you never notice them until there's
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an impolite one.)</p>
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services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is
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not so different from AOL in this respect.</p>
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<p>Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have <a
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href="<page docs/faq>#ExitPolicies">individual exit policies</a>. Many
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exit policies and only block the ones that allow these connections;
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and you should keep in mind that exit policies can change (as well as
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the overall list of nodes in the network).</p>
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<p>If you really want to do this, we provide a
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exit relay list</a> or a
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<a href="<page projects/tordnsel>">DNS-based list you can query</a>.
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(Some system administrators block ranges of IP addresses because of
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official policy or some abuse pattern, but some have also asked about
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whitelisting Tor exit relays because they want to permit access to their
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systems only using Tor. These scripts are usable for whitelisting as well.)
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<a id="TracingUsers"></a>
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There is nothing the Tor developers can do to trace Tor users. The same
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protections that keep bad people from breaking Tor's anonymity also
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prevent us from figuring out what's going on.
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Some fans have suggested that we redesign Tor to include a <a
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href="<page docs/faq>#Backdoor">backdoor</a>.
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<a href="http://www.missingkids.com/">http://www.missingkids.com/</a>.
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We do not view links you report.</p>
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+ <a id="AbuseOpinion"></a>
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+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#AbuseOpinion">Where does Tor Project
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+stand on abusers using technology?</a>
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+
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+ <p>We take abuse seriously. Activists and law enforcement
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+use Tor to investigate abuse and help support survivors. We
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+work with them to help them understand how Tor can help their work.
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+In some cases, technological mistakes are being made and we help to
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+correct them. Because some people in survivors' communities embrace
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+stigma instead of compassion, seeking support from fellow victims
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+requires privacy-preserving technology.</p>
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+
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+ <p>Our refusal to build backdoors and censorship into Tor is not
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+ because of a lack of concern. We refuse to weaken Tor because it
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+would harm efforts to combat child abuse and human trafficking in the
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+physical world, while removing safe spaces for victims online.
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+Meanwhile, criminals would still have access to botnets, stolen
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+phones, hacked hosting accounts, the postal system, couriers, corrupt
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+officials, and whatever technology emerges to trade content. They are
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+early adopters of technology. In the face of this, it is dangerous or
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+policymakers to assume that blocking and filtering is sufficient. We
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+are more interested in helping efforts to halt and prevent child
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+abuse than helping politicians score points with constituents by
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+hiding it. The role of corruption is especially troubling, see this
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+United Nations report on <a
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+href="http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2011/
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+Issue_Paper_-_The_Role_of_Corruption_in_Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf">The
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+Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons</a>.</p>
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+
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+ <p>Finally, it is important to consider the world that children will
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+ encounter as adults when enacting policy in their name. Will they
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+ thank us if they are unable to voice their opinions safely as
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+adults? What if they are trying to expose a failure of the state to
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+protect other children?</p>
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+
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<a id="LegalQuestions"></a>
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- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions about Tor abuse.</a></h3>
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-
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+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions
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+about Tor abuse.</a></h3>
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+
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<p>We're only the developers. We can answer technical questions, but
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we're not the ones to talk to about legal questions or concerns. </p>
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+
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<p>Please take a look at the
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<a href="<page eff/tor-legal-faq>">Tor Legal FAQ</a>,
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and contact EFF directly if you have any further legal questions. </p>
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<!-- END SIDECOL -->
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</div>
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<!-- END CONTENT -->
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-#include <foot.wmi>
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+#include <foot.wmi>
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