tor-webwml.git

@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@

 <p>Ongoing needs:</p>

 <ul>

-<li>Try Tor out, and let the Tor developers know about bugs you find or

-features you don't find.</li>

+<li>We need users like you to try Tor out, and let the Tor developers

+know about bugs you find or features you don't find.</li>

 <li>Please consider <a

 href="cvs/tor/doc/tor-doc.html#server">running a

 server</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ focusing on Tor.</p>

 <ul>

 <li>Does somebody want to help maintain this website, or help with

 documentation, or help with managing our TODO and handling bug reports?</li>

+<li>We may have too <i>much</i> documentation. It's spread out too far

+and duplicates itself in places. Can you help us consolidate?</li>

 <li>Please help translate the web page and documentation

 into other languages. See the <a href="translation.html">translation guidelines</a> 

 if you want to help out. (Examples:

@@ -142,12 +144,6 @@ defenses.</p>

 href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzz</a> Tor. Are there

 good libraries out there for what we want? What are the first steps? Win

 fame by getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

-<li>Server CPU load is high because clients keep asking to make new

-circuits, which uses public key crypto. Possible defenses include:

-using helper nodes (fixed entry nodes); rate limiting the number of

-create cells handled per second; having clients retry failed extensions

-a few times; implementing ssl sessions; and using hardware crypto when

-available.</li>

 <li>Website volume fingerprinting attacks (<a

 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Back et al</a>, <a

 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hintz02">Hintz</a>).

@@ -166,6 +162,20 @@ better?</li>

 <p>Designer project-lets:</p>

 <ul>

+<li>Server CPU load is high because clients keep asking to make new

+circuits, which uses public key crypto. Possible defenses include:

+using helper nodes (fixed entry nodes); rate limiting the number of

+create cells handled per second; having clients retry failed extensions

+a few times; implementing ssl sessions; and using hardware crypto when

+available.</li>

+<li>We fear we might not work very well when servers have asymmetric

+bandwidth. Because Tor has separate TCP connections between each hop,

+if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing bytes

+are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms

+don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.

+Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,

+and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? We need somebody

+who's good with networks to simulate this and help design solutions.</li>

 <li>Right now the hidden service descriptors are being stored on the

 dirservers, but any reliable distributed storage system would do (for

 example, a DHT that allows authenticated updates). Can somebody figure