tor-webwml.git

@@ -272,7 +272,11 @@ much hassle, and there are few abuse issues since they're not being exit

 nodes.) But how do we distribute a list of these volunteer clients to the

 good dissidents in an automated way that doesn't let the country-level

 firewalls intercept and enumerate them? Probably needs to work on a

-human-trust level.</li>

+human-trust level. See our <a

+href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#China">FAQ

+entry</a> on this, and then read the <a

+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/topic.html#Communications_20Censorship">censorship

+resistance section of anonbib</a>.</li>

 <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the

 ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the

 third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting