Incorporated two corrections by Jan Reister and changed a few other inaccuracies (server != service)
Karsten Loesing

Karsten Loesing commited on 2008-04-29 16:44:04
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 7 Einfügungen und 6 Löschungen.

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@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ some relays, builds circuits to them, and asks them to act as introduction
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 points telling them its public key. Note that in the following figures the
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 green links are circuits rather than direct connections. This makes it
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 impossible for anyone to associate the introduction points with the hidden
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-service's IP address. This is important, because although the introduction
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+server's IP address. This is important, because although the introduction
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 points and others are told the hidden service's identity (public key), they
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-must not learn about the hidden server's identity (IP address).
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+must not learn about the hidden server's location (IP address).
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 </p>
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 <img alt="Tor hidden service step one" src="$(IMGROOT)/THS-1.png" />
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@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ must not learn about the hidden server's identity (IP address).
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 In a second step, the hidden service assembles a hidden service descriptor
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 containing the introduction points' addresses and its public key and signs
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 it with its private key. It stores that descriptor on a set of directory
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-servers, again using a circuit that hides the link between storing the
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-descriptor with the hidden service's IP address. The descriptor will be
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+servers, again using a circuit that hides the link between the directory
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+server storing the
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+descriptor with the hidden server's IP address. The descriptor will be
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 found by clients requesting XYZ.onion where XYZ is a 16 characters long
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 name that can be uniquely derived from the service's public key. Although
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 it might seem impractical to use an automatically-generated service name,
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@@ -83,9 +84,9 @@ At this point it is of special importance that the hidden service sticks to
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 the same set of guard nodes for creating new circuits. Otherwise an attacker
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 could run an own relay and force a hidden service to create an arbitrary
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 number of circuits in the hope of the corrupt relay to be picked as entry
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-node and learn the hidden service's IP address via timing analysis. This
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+node and learn the hidden server's IP address via timing analysis. This
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 attack was described by &Oslash;verlier and Syverson in their paper titled
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-Locating Hidden Services.
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+Locating Hidden Servers.
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 </p>
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 <img alt="Tor hidden service step five" src="$(IMGROOT)/THS-5.png" />
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