Roger Dingledine commited on 2005-09-22 04:37:39
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 0 Einfügungen und 131 Löschungen.
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@@ -254,134 +254,3 @@ Drop by the #tor IRC channel at irc.oftc.net or email tor-volunteer@freehaven.ne |
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-<li>Have NULL_REP_IS_ZERO_BYTES default to 1.</li> |
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-<li>Implement preservation of reputation through reboots for clients |
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-and dirservers.</li> |
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-<li>Add in support egd or other non-OS-integrated strong entropy sources.</li> |
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-<li>Implement a way to get autoconf to install things into ~/.tor.</li> |
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-<li>Change server descriptors to declare log level.</li> |
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-<li>Add in support for clients to avoid servers that are too loggy based upon user configuration of acceptable log level.</li> |
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-<li>Separate node discovery from routing to allow neat extensions. [Goodell?] |
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- |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Add SetServerStatus control event to adjust verified/running status of nodes.</li> |
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-<li>Add NoDownload config option to prevent regular directory downloads from happening.</li> |
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-</ul> |
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-</li> |
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- |
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-<li>Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.</li> |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors</li> |
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-<li>Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests</li> |
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-<li>Signing (and verifying) router descriptors</li> |
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-<li>Signing (and verifying) directories</li> |
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-<li>Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)</li> |
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-</ul> |
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- |
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-<li>Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not a maximum size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as quickly (and kill the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.</li> |
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-<li>Add alternative versions of crypto.c and tortls.c to use libnss or libgcrypt+gnutls.</li> |
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- |
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-Translation Examples: <a |
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-href="http://membres.lycos.fr/geolemalin/anonymat_garantit.htm">French</a>, |
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-<a href="http://tor.freesuperhost.com/">Persian</a>, and <a |
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-href="http://www.gamevn.com/forum/showthread.php?t=103346">Vietnamese</a>.)</li> |
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-<li>If you know a question that should go on <a |
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-href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ">the FAQ Wiki</a>, please |
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-add it and answer it.</li> |
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-<li>Document how to do exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching |
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-web proxy.</li> |
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-<li>Take a look at <a |
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-href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SquidProxy">Martin's |
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-Squid and Tor page</a>, and update it to reflect Tor's <a |
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-href="http://tor.eff.org/tor-manual.html">RedirectExit</a> config option. </li> |
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-<li>Improve and clarify the wiki entry on <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerForFirewalledClients">port forwarding</a>.</li> |
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-</ul> |
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- |
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-<h2>Testing Challenges</h2> |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Test out why some of our tor servers have dns resolvers that resolve |
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-unknown addresses to 127.0.0.1. |
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- |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Identify the servers that experience this issue. </li> |
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-<li>Identify how to cause and repair the issue in BIND, DJBDNS, or |
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-whatever daemon the misconfigured servers use.</li> |
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-</ul></li> |
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- |
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-<li>Figure out how to setup web proxy gateways to let normal people |
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-browse hidden services. (This has been done a few times, but nobody has |
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-sent us code.)</li> |
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- |
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-<h2>Misc</h2> |
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-<ul> |
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-<li> </li> |
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-</ul> |
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- |
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- |
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- |
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-<h2>Research Challenges</h2> |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Arranging membership management for independence. |
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- |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.</li> |
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-<li>How to gather random sample of nodes.</li> |
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-<li>How to handle nodelist recommendations.</li> |
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-<li>Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has |
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-different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should be |
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-treated differently.</li> |
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-</ul></li> |
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- |
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-<li>Incentives to relay; incentives to exit.</li> |
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-<li>Allowing dissidents to relay through Tor clients.</li> |
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-<li>Experiment with mid-latency systems. How do they impact usability, |
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- how do they impact safety?</li> |
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-<li>Understand how powerful fingerprinting attacks are, and experiment |
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- with ways to foil them (long-range padding?).</li> |
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-<li>Attacking freenet-gnunet/timing-delay-randomness-arguments.</li> |
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- |
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-<ul> |
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-<li>Spec issue: if a resolve returns an IP4 and an IP6 address, |
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- which to use?</li> |
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-<li>Add to exit policy code</li> |
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-<li>Make tor_gethostbyname into tor_getaddrinfo</li> |
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-<li>Make everything that uses uint32_t as an IP address change to use |
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- a generalize address struct.</li> |
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-<li>Change relay cell types to accept new addresses.</li> |
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-<li>Add flag to serverdescs to tell whether IPv6 is supported.</li> |
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-</ul></li> |
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- |
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-<li>make freecap (or whichever) do what we want.</li> |
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-<li>scrubbing proxies for protocols other than http.</li> |
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-<li>We need better default privoxy configs to ship.</li> |
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-<li>We need a good scrubbing HTTP proxy; privoxy is unmaintained and |
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-sucky.</li> |
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-<li>A DNS proxy would let unmodified socks4/socks5 apps to work |
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-well.</li> |
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-<li>Add SOCKS support to more applications</li> |
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-<li>store hidden service information to disk: dirservers forget service |
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-descriptors when they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget |
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-their chosen intro points when they restart.</li> |
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-<li>Server CPU load is high because clients keep asking to make new |
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-circuits, which uses public key crypto. Possible defenses include: using |
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-helper nodes (fixed entry nodes); rate limiting the number of create |
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-cells handled per second; having clients retry failed extensions a few |
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-times; implementing ssl sessions; and using hardware crypto when |
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-available.</li> |
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-<li>We fear we might not work very well when servers have asymmetric |
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-bandwidth. Because Tor has separate TCP connections between each hop, if |
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-the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing bytes are all |
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-getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms don't really |
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-transmit this information back to the incoming streams. Perhaps Tor |
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-should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets, and |
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-rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? We need somebody |
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-who's good with networks to simulate this and help design |
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-solutions.</li> |
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-<li>Right now the hidden service descriptors are being stored on the |
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-dirservers, but any reliable distributed storage system would do (for |
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-example, a DHT that allows authenticated updates). Can somebody figure |
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-out our best options and decide if they're good enough?</li> |
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- |
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-</ul> |
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