Roger Dingledine commited on 2011-02-05 07:11:26
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 25 Einfügungen und 21 Löschungen.
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@@ -1372,8 +1372,8 @@ the same geographic location. |
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<p> |
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Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails |
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when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For |
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-example, suppose the attacker is watching the Tor relay you choose |
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-to enter the network, and is also watching the website you visit. In |
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+example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose |
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+to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In |
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this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design |
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that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing |
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information on the two sides. |
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@@ -1381,31 +1381,34 @@ information on the two sides. |
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<p> |
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So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, |
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-C relays. Suppose there are N relays total. If you select new entry and |
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-exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker will be able to |
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-correlate all traffic you send with probability (c/n)^2^. But profiling |
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-is, for most users, as bad as being traced all the time: they want to do |
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-something often without an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing |
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-once is as bad as the attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many |
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-random entries and exits gives the user no chance of escaping profiling |
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-by this kind of attacker. |
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+<i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select |
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+new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker |
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+will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability |
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+<i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad |
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+as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without |
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+an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the |
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+attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits |
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+gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker. |
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</p> |
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<p> |
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The solution is "entry guards": each user selects a few relays at random |
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-to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for entry. If those |
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-relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, ever, |
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-and the user is secure. If those relays *are* observed or controlled |
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-by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger _fraction_ of the user's |
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-traffic -- but still the user is no more profiled than before. Thus, |
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-the user has some chance (on the order of (n-c)/n) of avoiding profiling, |
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-whereas she had none before. |
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+to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If |
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+those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win, |
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+ever, and the user is secure. If those relays <i>are</i> observed or |
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+controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger <i>fraction</i> |
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+of the user's traffic — but still the user is no more profiled than |
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+before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of <i>(n-c)/n</i>) |
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+of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before. |
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</p> |
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<p> |
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-You can read a bit more at http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright02, |
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-http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright03, or |
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-http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06. |
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+You can read more at <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright02">An |
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+Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols</a>, <a |
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+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright03">Defending Anonymous |
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+Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks</a>, and especially |
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+<a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06">Locating Hidden |
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+Servers</a>. |
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</p> |
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<p> |
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@@ -1413,7 +1416,8 @@ Restricting your entry nodes may also help against attackers who want |
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to run a few Tor nodes and easily enumerate all of the Tor user IP |
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addresses. (Even though they can't learn what destinations the users |
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are talking to, they still might be able to do bad things with just a |
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-list of users.) |
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+list of users.) However, that feature won't really become useful until |
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+we move to a "directory guard" design as well. |
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</p> |
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<hr> |
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