tor-webwml.git

@@ -227,14 +227,16 @@ href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>,

 or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,

 and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from

 a successful defense in each case?</li>

-<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack": by watching traffic at

-Alice and at Bob, we can compare traffic signatures and become convinced

-that we're watching the same stream. So far Tor accepts this as a fact

-of life and assumes this attack is trivial in all cases. First of all,

-is that actually true? How much traffic of what sort of distribution is

-needed before the adversary is confident he has won? Are there scenarios

-(e.g. not transmitting much) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic

-padding or traffic shaping schemes work better than others?</li>

+<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":

+by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a

+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare

+traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same

+stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this

+attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How

+much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary

+is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)

+that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping

+schemes work better than others?</li>

 <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of

 the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the

 exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,