import the KeyManagement faq entry
Roger Dingledine commited on 2008-11-23 07:32:39
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 48 Einfügungen und 3 Löschungen.
- en/faq.wml c57e9be7e..0723252ca
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<p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p> |
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+<p>Anonymity and Security:</p> |
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+<ul> |
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+<li><a href="#KeyManagement">What are all these keys used for?</a></li> |
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+</ul> |
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+ |
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<hr /> |
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<a id="General"></a> |
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@@ -444,14 +449,54 @@ to the project, or <a href="<page contact>">contact</a> our executive |
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director for information on making grants or major donations. |
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</p> |
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- |
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<hr /> |
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-<a id="question"></a> |
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-<h3><a class="anchor" href="#question">Question?</a></h3> |
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+<a id="KeyManagement"></a> |
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+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">What are all these keys |
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+used for?</a></h3> |
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+ |
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+<p> |
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+Every Tor relay has a public decryption key (rotated once a |
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+week). When the Tor clients establish circuits, at each step they <a |
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+href="<svnsandbox>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demand |
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+that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its private key</a>. That way |
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+the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path. |
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+</p> |
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+ |
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+<p> |
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+How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they |
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+have the right keys for them? The directory servers provide a signed list |
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+of all the approved relays, and in that list are a set of self-signed |
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+certificates from each relay, specifying their keys, locations, exit |
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+policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control a directory |
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+server (and starting in Tor 0.1.1.x, a threshold of the directory |
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+servers), he can't trick the Tor client into using other Tor relays. |
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+</p> |
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+ |
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+<p> |
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+How do clients know what the directory servers are? The list comes with |
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+the Tor distribution. It hard-codes their locations and their public |
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+keys. So the only way to trick the user into using a fake Tor network |
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+is to give them a specially modified version of the software. |
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+</p> |
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+<p> |
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+How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute |
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+the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a |
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+href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. Also see the <a |
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+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/VerifyingSignatures">instructions |
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+on how to check Tor's signatures</a>. |
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+</p> |
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+<p> |
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+In order to be absolutely certain that it's signed by the developers, |
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+you need to have met them in person and gotten a copy of their key |
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+fingerprint, or you need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned |
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+about an attack on this level, we recommend you get involved with the |
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+security community and start meeting people. |
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+</p> |
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+<hr /> |
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</div><!-- #main --> |
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