@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ executive

     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,

     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't

     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

-    href="https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning">Be

+    href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

     careful and be smart.</a>

     </p>

@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

 You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in

 Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check

 out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

-href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en">man page</a>,

+href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

 and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for

 doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an

 HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine

@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the

     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a

-    href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en">

+    href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">

     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional

     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as

     the download.</p>

@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>

       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other

       developers' key IDs can be found on

-      <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en">this

+      <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this

       page</a>.)</li>

       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:

       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>

@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@ Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1

     </pre>

     <p>

     If you've installed <a

-    href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

+    href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

     you'll need to add one more line:

     </p>

     <pre>

@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@ users

     for most flaggings are documented on the <a

     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays">bad

     relays wiki</a>. Please <a

-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">contact us</a> so

+    href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> so

     we can sort out the issue.</p>

     <hr>

@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ most users, we think it's a smart move.

     <p><a href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/">

     Exonerator</a> is a web service that can check if an IP address was a

     relay at a given time. We can also <a

-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">provide a signed

+    href="<page about/contact>">provide a signed

     letter</a> if needed.</p>

     <hr>

@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ diversity,

     hidden service?</a></h3>

     <p>

-    See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en">

+    See the <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">

     official hidden service configuration instructions</a>.

     </p>

@@ -3838,7 +3838,7 @@ diversity,

     </p>

     <p>

     That's where the <a

-    href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor Browser

+    href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

     Bundle</a> comes in. We produce a web browser that is preconfigured to

     help you control the risks to your privacy and anonymity while browsing

     the Internet. Not only are the above technologies disabled to prevent

@@ -4123,7 +4123,7 @@ interactive streams while still allowing good throughput for bulk streams.

 But since we want to do a lot of work on quality-of-service and better

 queuing approaches first, you shouldn't expect this change anytime soon

 (if ever). However if you are keen, there are a couple of

-<a href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Research">

+<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">

 research ideas</a> that may involve changing the cell size.

     </p>

@@ -4158,7 +4158,7 @@ government firewalls to access the Tor network.

     </p>

     <p>

 We've made quite a bit of progress on this problem lately. You can read more

-details on the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en">

+details on the <a href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">

 pluggable transports page</a>. You may also be interested in

 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ">Roger and Jake's talk at

 28C3</a>, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZg1nqs793M">Runa's

@@ -4224,10 +4224,10 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.

     minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely

     dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor

     users (assuming you did not <a

-    href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning">identify

+    href="<page download/download>#warning">identify

     yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough

     information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a

-    href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution">encrypted

+    href="<page about/overview>#thesolution">encrypted

     three-hop circuit</a> design.

     </p>