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make the faq work better on website mirrors too

Roger Dingledine authored on 24/03/2014 08:00:12
Showing 1 changed files
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@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ executive
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     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
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     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
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     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a
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-    href="https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning">Be
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+    href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be
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     careful and be smart.</a>
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     </p>
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@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>
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 You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
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 Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
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 out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a
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-href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en">man page</a>,
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+href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,
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 and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
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 doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
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 HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
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@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed
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     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the
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     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a
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-    href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en">
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+    href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">
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     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional
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     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as
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     the download.</p>
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@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed
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       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>
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       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other
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       developers' key IDs can be found on
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-      <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en">this
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+      <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this
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       page</a>.)</li>
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       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
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       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>
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@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@ Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
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     </pre>
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     <p>
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     If you've installed <a
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-    href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,
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+    href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,
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     you'll need to add one more line:
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     </p>
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     <pre>
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@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@ users
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     for most flaggings are documented on the <a
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     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays">bad
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     relays wiki</a>. Please <a
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-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">contact us</a> so
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+    href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> so
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     we can sort out the issue.</p>
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     <hr>
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@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ most users, we think it's a smart move.
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     <p><a href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/">
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     Exonerator</a> is a web service that can check if an IP address was a
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     relay at a given time. We can also <a
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-    href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en">provide a signed
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+    href="<page about/contact>">provide a signed
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     letter</a> if needed.</p>
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     <hr>
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@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ diversity,
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     hidden service?</a></h3>
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     <p>
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-    See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en">
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+    See the <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">
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     official hidden service configuration instructions</a>.
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     </p>
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@@ -3838,7 +3838,7 @@ diversity,
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     </p>
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     <p>
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     That's where the <a
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-    href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor Browser
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+    href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser
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     Bundle</a> comes in. We produce a web browser that is preconfigured to
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     help you control the risks to your privacy and anonymity while browsing
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     the Internet. Not only are the above technologies disabled to prevent
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@@ -4123,7 +4123,7 @@ interactive streams while still allowing good throughput for bulk streams.
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 But since we want to do a lot of work on quality-of-service and better
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 queuing approaches first, you shouldn't expect this change anytime soon
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 (if ever). However if you are keen, there are a couple of
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-<a href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Research">
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+<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">
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 research ideas</a> that may involve changing the cell size.
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     </p>
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@@ -4158,7 +4158,7 @@ government firewalls to access the Tor network.
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     </p>
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     <p>
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 We've made quite a bit of progress on this problem lately. You can read more
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-details on the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en">
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+details on the <a href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">
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 pluggable transports page</a>. You may also be interested in
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 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ">Roger and Jake's talk at
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 28C3</a>, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZg1nqs793M">Runa's
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@@ -4224,10 +4224,10 @@ ZKS's Freedom network could) -- but maybe that's a good thing at this stage.
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     minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely
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     dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor
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     users (assuming you did not <a
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-    href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning">identify
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+    href="<page download/download>#warning">identify
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     yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough
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     information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a
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-    href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution">encrypted
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+    href="<page about/overview>#thesolution">encrypted
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     three-hop circuit</a> design.
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     </p>
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