Improve Panopticlick project description.
Mike Perry

Mike Perry commited on 2014-03-07 21:54:50
Zeige 1 geänderte Dateien mit 47 Einfügungen und 15 Löschungen.

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@@ -1716,21 +1716,53 @@ the codebase that you want to work on.
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     <br>
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     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
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     <br>
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-    Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>
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-    <p>
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-Tor Browser users are often complaining about their browser fingerprint
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-being not as good as it should according to the <a
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-href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick of the EFF</a>. To fix
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-that the student should develop an own <a
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-href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">Panopticlick</a>
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-instance which performs, in a first step, basic tests estimating the
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-uniformity among Tor Browser Bundle users. The user should get
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-feedback on how she performed and the test results should be available
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-in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON). In a second step one could
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-think about adding more sophisticated tests or <a
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-href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119#comment:1">supporting
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-other browser vendors</a> that might want to test the uniformity amongst
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-their userbase as well.
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+    Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>, <i>Mike Perry</i>, <i>Nicolas Vigier</i>
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+    <p>
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+
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+The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a>
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+revolutionized how people think about <a
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+href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">browser
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+fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser
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+fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of
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+individual browser features to overall fingerprintability.
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+
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+    </p>
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+    <p>
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+
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+Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a
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+href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton">makes
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+it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially
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+for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is
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+because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our
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+users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint
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+data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of
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+one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser
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+(Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example,
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+based on feature set alone).
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+
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+   </p>
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+   <p>
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+
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+To address this, we would like to have <a
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+href=">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119">our own
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+fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser
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+feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a
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+href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting">additional
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+fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick.
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+   </p>
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+   <p>
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+
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+For this project, the student would develop a website that users can
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+voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint.  The user
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+should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be
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+available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser
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+version.  In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated
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+tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the
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+uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each
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+browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and
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+version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific
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+implementation.
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+
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     </p>
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     </li>
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