we sure could use some designs for defenses too (e30d76f81)

we sure could use some designs for defenses too

Roger Dingledine commited on 2010-04-29 05:24:27
Zeige 2 geänderte Dateien mit 53 Einfügungen und 14 Löschungen.

en/research.wml 3579f687a..1ef898fb2
en/volunteer.wml b9b0737f7..325f86845

en/research.wml

@@ -67,6 +67,19 @@ the code they used. Let us know if you have new tools we should list,
 or improvements to the existing ones. The more the better, at this stage.
 </li>
 
+<li>
+<b>We need defenses too &mdash; not just attacks.</b>
+Most researchers find it easy and fun to come up with novel attacks on
+anonymity systems. We've seen this result lately in terms of improved
+congestion attacks, attacks based on remotely measuring latency or
+throughput, and so on. Knowing how things can go wrong is important,
+and we recognize that the incentives in academia aren't aligned with
+spending energy on designing defenses, but it sure would be great to
+get more attention to how to address the attacks. We'd love to help
+brainstorm about how to make Tor better. As a bonus, your paper might
+even end up with a stronger "countermeasures" section.
+</li>
+
 <li>
 <b>In-person help.</b>
 If you're doing interesting and important Tor research and need help
@@ -116,8 +129,46 @@ href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">these papers</a> (especially the
 ones in boxes).</p>
 
 <p>We need people to attack the system, quantify defenses,
-etc. See the "Research" section of the
-<a href="<page volunteer>#Research">volunteer</a> page.</p>
+etc. Here are some example projects:
+
+<ul>
+
+<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
+hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
+"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
+you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
+(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
+this attack on the deployed Tor design? The problem with all the
+previous attack papers is that they look at timing and counting of
+IP packets on the wire. But OpenSSL's TLS records, plus Tor's use of
+TCP pushback to do rate limiting, means that tracing by IP packets
+produces very poor results. The right approach is to realize that
+Tor uses OpenSSL, look inside the TLS record at the TLS headers, and
+figure out how many 512-byte cells are being sent or received. Then
+start exploring defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell
+size from 512 bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques
+like <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive
+dropping</a>, or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do
+these have, and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric)
+is there from a successful defense in each case?</li>
+</li>
+
+<!--
+<li>
+Path selection algorithms, directory fetching schedules for Tor-on-mobile
+that are compatible anonymity-wise with our current approaches.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+Figure out how bad 10 minutes is for maxcircuitdirtiness.
+</li>
+-->
+
+<li>More coming soon. See also the "Research" section of the
+<a href="<page volunteer>#Research">volunteer</a> page for other topics.
+</li>
+
+</ul>
 
   </div><!-- #main -->
 

en/volunteer.wml

Zeige Datei @ e30d76f81

@@ -915,18 +915,6 @@ href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
 <a id="Research"></a>
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
 <ol>
-<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
-hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
-"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
-you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
-(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
-this attack on the deployed Tor codebase? Then start exploring
-defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 512
-bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a
-href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>,
-or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
-and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
-a successful defense in each case?</li>
 <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
 by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare


...	...	@@ -67,6 +67,19 @@ the code they used. Let us know if you have new tools we should list,
67	67	or improvements to the existing ones. The more the better, at this stage.
68	68	</li>
69	69
	70	+<li>
	71	+<b>We need defenses too — not just attacks.</b>
	72	+Most researchers find it easy and fun to come up with novel attacks on
	73	+anonymity systems. We've seen this result lately in terms of improved
	74	+congestion attacks, attacks based on remotely measuring latency or
	75	+throughput, and so on. Knowing how things can go wrong is important,
	76	+and we recognize that the incentives in academia aren't aligned with
	77	+spending energy on designing defenses, but it sure would be great to
	78	+get more attention to how to address the attacks. We'd love to help
	79	+brainstorm about how to make Tor better. As a bonus, your paper might
	80	+even end up with a stronger "countermeasures" section.
	81	+</li>
	82	+
70	83	<li>
71	84	<b>In-person help.</b>
72	85	If you're doing interesting and important Tor research and need help
...	...	@@ -116,8 +129,46 @@ href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">these papers</a> (especially the
116	129	ones in boxes).</p>
117	130
118	131	<p>We need people to attack the system, quantify defenses,
119		-etc. See the "Research" section of the
120		-<a href="<page volunteer>#Research">volunteer</a> page.</p>
	132	+etc. Here are some example projects:
	133	+
	134	+<ul>
	135	+
	136	+<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
	137	+hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
	138	+"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
	139	+you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
	140	+(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
	141	+this attack on the deployed Tor design? The problem with all the
	142	+previous attack papers is that they look at timing and counting of
	143	+IP packets on the wire. But OpenSSL's TLS records, plus Tor's use of
	144	+TCP pushback to do rate limiting, means that tracing by IP packets
	145	+produces very poor results. The right approach is to realize that
	146	+Tor uses OpenSSL, look inside the TLS record at the TLS headers, and
	147	+figure out how many 512-byte cells are being sent or received. Then
	148	+start exploring defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell
	149	+size from 512 bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques
	150	+like <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive
	151	+dropping</a>, or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do
	152	+these have, and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric)
	153	+is there from a successful defense in each case?</li>
	154	+</li>
	155	+
	156	+<!--
	157	+<li>
	158	+Path selection algorithms, directory fetching schedules for Tor-on-mobile
	159	+that are compatible anonymity-wise with our current approaches.
	160	+</li>
	161	+
	162	+<li>
	163	+Figure out how bad 10 minutes is for maxcircuitdirtiness.
	164	+</li>
	165	+-->
	166	+
	167	+<li>More coming soon. See also the "Research" section of the
	168	+<a href="<page volunteer>#Research">volunteer</a> page for other topics.
	169	+</li>
	170	+
	171	+</ul>
121	172
122	173	</div><!-- #main -->
123	174

...	...	@@ -915,18 +915,6 @@ href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
915	915	<a id="Research"></a>
916	916	<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
917	917	<ol>
918		-<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
919		-hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
920		-"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
921		-you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
922		-(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
923		-this attack on the deployed Tor codebase? Then start exploring
924		-defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 512
925		-bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a
926		-href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>,
927		-or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
928		-and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
929		-a successful defense in each case?</li>
930	918	<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
931	919	by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
932	920	href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
933	921

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