tor-webwml.git

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@

 export TORGIT=/home/runa/tordev/tor/.git

 export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.2.32

-export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.2.32

+export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.3.2-alpha

 WMLBASE=.

 SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate torbutton

@@ -9,2314 +9,15 @@

   <div id="breadcrumbs">

     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>

-    <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a>

+    <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a>

   </div>

   <div id="maincol">  

-	<h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2>

-	<div class="sectionbody">

-			<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]&#8230;</p>

-			</div>

-	</div>

-		<h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2>

-		<div class="sectionbody">

-			<div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication

-			service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and

-			negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node 

-			knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down 

-			the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals

-			the downstream node.<br /></p></div>

-			

-			<div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").

-			Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the

-			routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have 

-			difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div>

-		</div>

-		<h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2>

-		<div class="sectionbody">

-			<div class="dlist"><dl>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Display a short help message and exit.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--hash-password</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Generates a hashed password for control port access.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--list-fingerprint</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--verify-config</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Verify the configuration file is valid.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--nt-service</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows

-					    NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at

-					    <a href="<wiki>doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a>

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--list-torrc-options</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    List all valid options.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--version</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Display Tor version and exit.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>--quiet</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.

-					    (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to

-					    the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				</dl>

-			</div>

-			<div class="paragraph">

-				<p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option

-    				value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").

-				Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside

-				quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over

-    				options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To

-    				split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before

-    				the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but

-    				they must start at the beginning of a line.</p>

-			</div>

-			<div class="dlist"><dl>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to

-					    the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing

-					    bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the

-					    public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is,

-					    20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given

-				    	    number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our

-					    BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients

-					    who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to

-					    advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server

-					    without impacting network performance.

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth

-					    usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes

-					    per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.

-					    Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory

-					    requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for

-					    _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.

-					    (Default: 0)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor

-					    process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file

-					    descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").

-					    If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br />

-					    <br />

-					    You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows

-					    since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)

-					</p>

-				</dd>

-				<dt class="hdlist1">

-					<strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-				</dt>

-				<dd>

-					<p>

-					    If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all

-					    sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for

-					    virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may

-					    be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error

-					    creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are

-					    likely experiencing this problem.<br />

-					    <br />

-					    The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for

-					    the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;

-					    this configuration option is a second-resort.<br />

-					    <br />

-					    The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The

-					    cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates

-					    the problem.<br />

-					    <br />

-					    You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer

-					    space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for

-					    the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip

-					    time on long paths. (Default: 0.)

-					</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for

-						    all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and

-						    262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>Port</em>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those

-						    connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol

-						    (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of

-						    <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>, setting this option will

-						    cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This

-						    option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind

-						    to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly

-						    recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing,

-						    since giving attackers access to your control listener is really

-						    dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple

-						    times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP

-						    socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    Don’t allow any connections on the control port except when the other

-						    process knows the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You

-						    can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password

-						    <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more

-						    than one HashedControlPassword line.

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections on the control port

-						    except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named

-						    "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This

-						    authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem

-						    security. (Default: 0)

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-						<strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em>

-					</dt>

-					<dd>

-						<p>

-						    If set, this option overrides the default location and file name

-						    for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)

-						</p>

-					</dd>

-					<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the

-    cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by

-    the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet

-    implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address

-    and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated

-    many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are

-    separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory

-    is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style

-    directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is

-    provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)

-    directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will

-    use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"

-    flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set.

-    Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the

-    "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the

-    given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a

-    flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority

-    whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br />

-<br />

-    If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory

-    servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor

-    network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be

-    distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same

-    authorities they do.

-</p>

-</dd>

-</dl></div>

-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>

-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>

-<div class="dlist"><dl>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using

-    AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but

-    leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.

-    Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service

-    authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other

-    directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching

-    early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the

-    rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor

-    controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server

-    descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if

-    you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.

-    (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the

-    authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless

-    descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is

-    useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor

-    nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80

-    if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory

-    servers.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy

-    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP

-    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you

-    want it to support others.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or

-    host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting

-    directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict

-    the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only

-    allows connecting to certain ports.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy

-    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS

-    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you

-    want it to support others.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell

-    every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection

-    has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of

-    idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard

-    output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The

-    "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are

-    debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,

-    since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an

-    attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all

-    messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The

-    "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.

-    Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity

-    level.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This

-    is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all

-    of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be

-    ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove

-    FILE.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not

-    following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity

-    'info'. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect

-    on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.

-    (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.

-    addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can

-    still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying

-    information about what sites a user might have visited.<br />

-<br />

-    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is

-    set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when

-    available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.

-    This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support

-    only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build

-    a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.

-    (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled

-    directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-</dl></div>

-</div>

-<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2>

-<div class="sectionbody">

-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if

-<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div>

-<div class="dlist"><dl>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>&#8230;</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory

-    authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not

-    recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You

-    can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is

-    "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with

-    the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set

-    to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at

-    higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally

-    included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,

-    so using these relays might make your client stand out.

-    (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at

-    "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"

-    is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that

-    the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use

-    fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if

-    it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't

-    open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then

-    close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all

-    of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up

-    making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re

-    receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1

-    hour.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve

-    directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is

-    configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at

-    figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a

-    useful server.) (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

-    patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:

-    ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

-    patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any

-    node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this

-    list.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address

-    patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are

-    treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address

-    patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These

-    are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>StrictEntryNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for

-    the first hop of a circuit.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>StrictExitNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for

-    the last hop of a circuit.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports

-    that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>).

-    This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with

-    restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such

-    a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use

-    ReachableAddresses instead.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when

-    <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses

-    instead. (Default: 80, 443)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16

-    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22

-    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal

-    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times

-    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and

-    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden

-    services can be configured to require authorization using the

-    <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows

-    you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except

-    that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For

-    example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept

-    *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net

-    99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port

-    80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey

-    these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP

-    GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of

-    <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these

-    connections will go through that proxy.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]&#8230;

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey

-    these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not

-    set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If

-    <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br />

-<br />

-    The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and

-    <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting

-    through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit

-    TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,

-    and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory

-    information) to port 80.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections

-    (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these

-    ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node

-    will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,

-    5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress

-    before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to

-    www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the

-    nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org

-    www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30

-    seconds)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,

-    but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10

-    minutes)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,

-    constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use

-    any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed

-    when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option

-    can be used multiple times.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on

-    the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in

-    the same /16 range. (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking

-    applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application

-    connections. (Default: 9050)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking

-    applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.

-    192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind

-    to multiple addresses/ports.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the

-    SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit

-    policies below.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds

-    unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:

-    2 minutes.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent

-    connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same

-    exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as

-    matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means

-    match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites

-    that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if

-    your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage

-    of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single

-    user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it

-    through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the

-    association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is

-    1800 seconds (30 minutes).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors

-    from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to

-    a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"

-    config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory

-    guards. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try

-    to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers

-    increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a

-    fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers

-    as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that

-    use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP

-    address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.

-    Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.

-    (Defaults to 0.)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for

-    each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a

-    safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This

-    helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking

-    DNS requests. (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS

-    command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor

-    picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:

-    127.192.0.0/10)<br />

-<br />

-    When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool

-    like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or

-    "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a

-    properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For

-    local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal

-    characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be

-    resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.

-    (Default: 0)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first

-    hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have

-    already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure

-    keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br />

-<br />

-    Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s

-    operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it

-    doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention,

-    9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or

-    Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for

-    a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the

-    default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for

-    the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:

-    127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an

-    entire network.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)

-    to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is

-    only for people who cannot use TransPort.

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address

-    that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an

-    unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.

-    This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that

-    resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>&#8230;</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>.

-    The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves

-    them anonymously. (Default: 0).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]

-</dt>

-<dd>

-<p>

-    Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).

-</p>

-</dd>

-<dt class="hdlist1">

-<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>

-</dt>