tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 4-optional
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
10)   </div>
11)   <div id="maincol"> 
12)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
13)     <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
14)     <ol>
15)     <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
16)     a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>
17)     <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
18)     services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
19)     <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
20)     to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
21)     for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
22)     or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
23)     security, let them know about us.</li>
24)     <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
25)     users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
26)     yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
27)     we'd love to hear from you.</li>
28)     </ol>
29)     
30)     <p>Tor has <a href="<page getinvolved/open-positions>">two open positions</a>.
31)     Please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> if you are qualified!</p>
32)     
33)     <a id="Documentation"></a>
34)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
35)     <ol>
36)     <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
37)     languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
38)     guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
39)     Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
40)     <li>Evaluate and document
41)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">our
42)     list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
43)     <li>We have a huge list of <a
44)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">potentially useful
45)     programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
46)     situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
47)     </ol>
48)     
49)     <a id="Advocacy"></a>
50)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
51)     <ol>

52)     <li>Create a <a
53) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/CommunityLogos">community
54) logo</a> under a Creative Commons license that all can use and modify.</li>
55)     <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
56) meetings around the world.</li>

57)     <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
58)     or how to use it.  Some have already started on <a
59)     href="http://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,
60)     <a

61)     href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

62)     and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li> 

63)     <li>Create a poster, or a set of posters, around a theme,

64)     such as "Tor for Freedom!".</li>

65)     <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "Congratulations!
66)     You are using Tor!" in any language.</li>

67)     </ol>
68)     

69)     <a id="Projects"></a>
70)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>
71)     
72)     <p>
73)     Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
74)     maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
75)     of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a
76)     href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Project
77)     contributors are listed by their IRC nicks.
78)     </p>
79)     
80)     <table id="projects">
81)       <tr>
82)         <th>Name</th>
83)         <th>Category</th>
84)         <th>Language</th>
85)         <th>Activity</th>
86)         <th>Contributors</th>
87)       </tr>
88)       
89)       <tr>
90)         <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
91)         <td>Core</td>
92)         <td>C</td>
93)         <td>Heavy</td>
94)         <td>nickm, arma, etc</td>
95)       </tr>
96)       
97)       <tr class="alt">
98)         <td><a href="#project-tbb">TBB</a></td>
99)         <td>Usability</td>
100)         <td>Multiple</td>
101)         <td>Heavy</td>
102)         <td>helix</td>
103)       </tr>
104)       
105)       <tr>
106)         <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
107)         <td>Usability</td>
108)         <td>C</td>
109)         <td>Light</td>
110)         <td>mwenge</td>
111)       </tr>
112)       
113)       <tr class="alt">
114)         <td>*<a href="#project-torouter">Torouter</a></td>
115)         <td>Usability</td>
116)         <td>None</td>
117)         <td>Light</td>
118)         <td>ioerror, Runa</td>
119)       </tr>
120)       
121)       <tr>
122)         <td><a href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a></td>
123)         <td>User Interface</td>
124)         <td>C++, Qt</td>
125)         <td>Light</td>
126)         <td>chiiph</td>
127)       </tr>
128)       
129)       <tr class="alt">
130)         <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
131)         <td>User Interface</td>
132)         <td>Python, Curses</td>
133)         <td>Heavy</td>
134)         <td>atagar</td>
135)       </tr>
136)       
137)       <tr>
138)         <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
139)         <td>User Interface</td>
140)         <td>Java</td>
141)         <td>None</td>
142)         <td>n8fr8</td>
143)       </tr>
144)       
145)       <tr class="alt">
146)         <td><a href="#project-torbutton">Torbutton</a></td>
147)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
148)         <td>Javascript</td>
149)         <td>Moderate</td>
150)         <td>mikeperry</td>
151)       </tr>
152)       
153)       <tr>
154)         <td>*<a href="#project-thandy">Thandy</a></td>
155)         <td>Updater</td>
156)         <td>Python</td>
157)         <td>Light</td>
158)         <td>Sebastian, helix</td>
159)       </tr>
160)       
161)       <tr class="alt">
162)         <td><a href="#project-torctl">TorCtl</a></td>
163)         <td>Library</td>
164)         <td>Python</td>
165)         <td>Light</td>
166)         <td>mikeperry</td>
167)       </tr>
168)       
169)       <tr>
170)         <td>*<a href="#project-jtor">JTor</a></td>
171)         <td>Library</td>
172)         <td>Java</td>
173)         <td>None</td>
174)         <td></td>
175)       </tr>
176)       
177)       <tr class="alt">
178)         <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
179)         <td>Client Service</td>
180)         <td>Java</td>
181)         <td>Heavy</td>
182)         <td>karsten</td>
183)       </tr>
184)       
185)       <tr>
186)         <td><a href="#project-torstatus">TorStatus</a></td>
187)         <td>Client Service</td>
188)         <td>PHP</td>
189)         <td>None</td>
190)         <td></td>
191)       </tr>
192)       
193)       <tr class="alt">
194)         <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
195)         <td>Client Service</td>
196)         <td>Python</td>
197)         <td>Light</td>
198)         <td>kaner</td>
199)       </tr>
200)       
201)       <tr>
202)         <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
203)         <td>Client Service</td>
204)         <td>Python</td>
205)         <td>None</td>
206)         <td></td>
207)       </tr>
208)       
209)       <tr class="alt">
210)         <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
211)         <td>Client Service</td>
212)         <td>Python, Perl</td>
213)         <td>None</td>
214)         <td></td>
215)       </tr>
216)       
217)       <tr>
218)         <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
219)         <td>Backend Service</td>
220)         <td>Python</td>
221)         <td>None</td>
222)         <td>kaner</td>
223)       </tr>
224)       
225)       <tr class="alt">
226)         <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
227)         <td>Backend Service</td>
228)         <td>Python</td>
229)         <td>None</td>
230)         <td>mikeperry</td>
231)       </tr>
232)       
233)       <tr>
234)         <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
235)         <td>Backend Service</td>
236)         <td>Python</td>
237)         <td>None</td>
238)         <td>Sebastian</td>
239)       </tr>
240)     </table>
241)     
242)     <sub>
243)     * Project is still in an alpha state.
244)     </sub>
245)     
246)     <br /><br />
247)     
248)     <a id="project-tor"></a>
249)     <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a
250)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Client&component=Tor+Relay&component=vidalia&order=priority">bug
251)     tracker</a>)</h3>
252)     
253)     <p>
254)     Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
255)     the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
256)     extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
257)     </p>
258)     
259)     <p>
260)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
261)     <i><a href="#resistCensorship">Improving Tor's ability to resist
262)     censorship</a></i><br />
263)     <i><a href="#unitTesting">Improve our unit testing process</a></i><br />
264)     <i><a href="#simulateSlowConnections">Simulator for slow Internet connections</a></i>
265)     </p>
266)     
267)     <a id="project-tbb"></a>
268)     <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a> (<a
269)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git">code</a>, <a
270)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+bundles/installation&order=priority">bug
271)     tracker</a>)</h3>
272)     
273)     <p>
274)     The Tor Browser Bundle is an easy-to-use portable package of Tor, Vidalia,
275)     and Firefox preconfigured to work together out of the box. This is actively
276)     being worked on by Erinn Clark.
277)     </p>
278)     
279)     <p>
280)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
281)     <i><a href="#auditTBB">Audit Tor Browser Bundles for data leaks</a></i><br />
282)     <i><a href="#usabilityTesting">Usability testing of Tor</a></i>
283)     </p>
284)     
285)     <a id="project-torsocks"></a>
286)     <h3><a href="http://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> (<a
287)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
288)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
289)     tracker</a>)</h3>
290)     
291)     <p>
292)     Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
293)     slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
294)     otherwise feature complete.
295)     </p>
296)     
297)     <p>
298)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
299)     <i><a href="#torsocksForOSX">Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X</a></i>
300)     </p>
301)     
302)     <a id="project-torouter"></a>
303)     <h3><a
304)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/Torouter">Torouter</a> (<a
305)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torouter&order=priority">bug
306)     tracker</a>)</h3>
307)     
308)     <p>
309)     Project to provide an easy-to-use, embedded Tor instance for routers. This
310)     had a couple months of high activity, but has since been rather quiet.
311)     </p>
312)     
313)     <a id="project-vidalia"></a>
314)     <h3><a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> (<a
315)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/vidalia/vidalia/trunk/">code</a>, <a
316)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Vidalia&order=priority">bug
317)     tracker</a>)</h3>
318)     
319)     <p>
320)     The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
321)     project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development
322)     slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken a lead with
323)     pushing the project forward.
324)     </p>
325)     
326)     <p>
327)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
328)     <i><a href="#vidaliaStatusEventInterface">Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia</a></i><br />
329)     <i><a href="#vidaliaNetworkMap">An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</a></i>
330)     </p>
331)     
332)     <a id="project-arm"></a>
333)     <h3><a href="http://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a
334)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/arm/trunk/">code</a>, <a
335)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
336)     tracker</a>)</h3>
337)     
338)     <p>
339)     Command-line monitor for Tor. This has been under very active development
340)     by its author, Damian Johnson, since early 2009 to make it a better
341)     general-purpose controller for *nix environments.
342)     </p>
343)     
344)     <p>
345)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
346)     <i><a href="#armClientMode">Client Mode Use Cases for Arm</a></i>
347)     </p>
348)     
349)     <a id="project-orbot"></a>
350)     <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a
351)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/Orbot/">code</a>, <a
352)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
353)     tracker</a>)</h3>
354)     
355)     <p>
356)     Provides Tor on the Android platform. This was under very active
357)     development up through Fall 2010, after which things have been quiet.
358)     </p>
359)     
360)     <p>
361)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
362)     <i><a href="#orbotDevelopment">More on Orbot & Android OS-specific development</a></i>
363)     </p>
364)     
365)     <a id="project-torbutton"></a>
366)     <h3><a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> (<a
367)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
368)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&order=priority">bug
369)     tracker</a>)</h3>
370)     
371)     <p>
372)     Firefox addon that addresses many of the client-side threats to browsing
373)     the Internet anonymously. Mike has since continued to adapt it to new
374)     threats, updated versions of Firefox, and possibly <a
375)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">Chrome
376)     as well</a>.
377)     </p>
378)     
379)     <p>
380)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
381)     <i><a href="#torbuttonForThunderbird">Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird</a></i>
382)     </p>
383)     
384)     <a id="project-thandy"></a>
385)     <h3>Thandy (<a
386)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/thandy.git">code</a>)</h3>
387)     
388)     <p>
389)     Updater for Tor. The project began in the Summer of 2008 but wasn't
390)     completed. Recently interest in it has been rekindled and many aspects of
391)     its design (including the language it'll be in) are currently in flux.
392)     </p>
393)     
394)     <a id="project-torctl"></a>
395)     <h3>TorCtl (<a
396)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pytorctl.git">code</a>, <a
397)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torctl&order=priority">bug
398)     tracker</a>)</h3>
399)     
400)     <p>
401)     Python bindings and utilities for using the Tor control port. It has been
402)     stable for several years, with only minor revisions.
403)     </p>
404)     
405)     <a id="project-jtor"></a>
406)     <h3><a href="https://github.com/brl/JTor/wiki">JTor</a> (<a
407)     href="https://github.com/brl/JTor">code</a>, <a
408)     href="https://github.com/brl/JTor/issues">bug
409)     tracker</a>)</h3>
410)     
411)     <p>
412)     Java implementation of Tor. This project isn't yet complete, and has been
413)     inactive since Fall 2010.
414)     </p>
415)     
416)     <a id="project-metrics"></a>
417)     <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
418)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
419)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a
420)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>, <a
421)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics.git">general</a>, <a
422)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Metrics&order=priority">bug
423)     tracker</a>)</h3>
424)     
425)     <p>
426)     Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
427)     metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by
428)     Karsten Loesing.
429)     </p>
430)     
431)     <p>
432)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
433)     <i><a href="#trackNetworkStatus">Help track the overall Tor Network status</a></i>
434)     </p>
435)     
436)     <a id="project-torstatus"></a>
437)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorStatus">TorStatus</a> (<a
438)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">code</a>)</h3>
439)     
440)     <p>
441)     Portal providing an overview of the Tor network, and details on any of its
442)     current relays. Though very actively used, this project has been
443)     unmaintained for a long while.
444)     </p>
445)     
446)     <a id="project-weather"></a>
447)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/Weather">Weather</a> (<a
448)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
449)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
450)     tracker</a>)</h3>
451)     
452)     <p>
453)     Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
454)     relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
455)     href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
456)     in early 2011.
457)     </p>
458)     
459)     <a id="project-gettor"></a>
460)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/EmailAutoResponder">GetTor</a> (<a
461)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/gettor/">code</a>, <a
462)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
463)     tracker</a>)</h3>
464)     
465)     <p>
466)     E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
467)     relatively unchanged for quite a while.
468)     </p>
469)     
470)     <a id="project-torcheck"></a>
471)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a
472)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/check/trunk/">code</a>, <a
473)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
474)     tracker</a>)</h3>
475)     
476)     <p>
477)     Provides a simple site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.
478)     This has been relatively unchanged for quite a while.
479)     </p>
480)     
481)     <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>
482)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a
483)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
484)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
485)     tracker</a>)</h3>
486)     
487)     <p>
488)     Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
489)     in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
490)     </p>
491)     
492)     <a id="project-torflow"></a>
493)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a
494)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
495)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
496)     tracker</a>)</h3>
497)     
498)     <p>
499)     Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
500)     These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
501)     SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
502)     actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
503)     months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
504)     has stopped.
505)     </p>
506)     
507)     <a id="project-torbel"></a>
508)     <h3><a
509)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/projects/TorBulkExitlist">TorBEL</a> (<a
510)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tordnsel.git">code</a>, <a
511)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
512)     tracker</a>)</h3>
513)     
514)     <p>
515)     The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
516)     exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
517)     (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
518)     version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
519)     been inactive.
520)     </p>
521)     
522)     <!--
523)     Copy and fill out the following for new projects:
524)     
525)     <a id="project-"></a>
526)     <h3><a href=""></a> (<a
527)     href="">code</a>, <a
528)     href="">bug
529)     tracker</a>)</h3>
530)     
531)     <p>
532)     </p>
533)     
534)     -->
535)     

536)     <a id="Coding"></a>
537)     <a id="Summer"></a>

538)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>

539)     
540)     <p>
541)     You may find some of these projects to be good <a href="<page

542)     about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code 2011</a> ideas. We have labelled each idea

543)     with how useful it would be to the overall Tor project (priority), how
544)     much work we expect it would be (effort level), how much clue you should
545)     start with (skill level), and which of our <a href="<page

546)     about/corepeople>">core developers</a> would be good mentors.

547)     If one or more of these ideas looks promising to you, please <a
548)     href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your plans rather than
549)     sending blind applications. You may also want to propose your own project
550)     idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.
551)     </p>
552)     
553)     <ol>
554)     

555)     <a id="auditTBB"></a>

556)     <li>

557)     <b>Audit Tor Browser Bundles for data leaks</b>

558)     <br>

559)     Priority: <i>High</i>

560)     <br>

561)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>

562)     <br>

563)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>

564)     <br>

565)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven, Erinn, Jacob, Andrew</i>

566)     <p>The Tor Browser Bundle incorporates Tor, Firefox, Polipo, and the Vidalia

567)     user interface (and optionally the <a href="http://pidgin.im/">Pidgin</a>
568)     Instant Messaging client). Components are pre-configured to operate in a
569)     secure way, and it has very few dependencies on the installed operating
570)     system. It has therefore become one of the most easy to use, and popular,

571)     ways to use Tor on Windows.</p>
572)     <p>This project is to identify all of the traces left behind by
573)     using a Tor Browser Bundle on Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux.  Developing
574)     ways to stop, counter, or remove these traces is a final step.</p>
575)     <p>Students should be familiar with operating system analysis,

576)     application development on one or preferably all of Windows, Linux,

577)     and Mac OS X, and be comfortable with C/C++ and shell scripting.</p>
578)     <p>If you would like to help extend or do security auditing for
579)     TBB, please contact Erinn.</p>

580)     </li>
581)     

582)     <a id="trackNetworkStatus"></a>

583)     <li>
584)     <b>Help track the overall Tor Network status</b>

585)     <br>

586)     Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

587)     <br>

588)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

589)     <br>

590)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>

591)     <br>

592)     Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Roger</i>

593)     <p>It would be great to set up an automated system for tracking network

594)     health over time, graphing it, etc. Part of this project would involve
595)     inventing better metrics for assessing network health and growth. Is the
596)     average uptime of the network increasing? How many relays are qualifying
597)     for Guard status this month compared to last month? What's the turnover
598)     in terms of new relays showing up and relays shutting off? Periodically
599)     people collect brief snapshots, but where it gets really interesting is

600)     when we start tracking data points over time.</p>
601)     <p>Data could be collected from the Tor Network Scanners in <a

602)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>, from
603)     the server descriptors that each relay publishes, and from other
604)     sources. Results over time could be integrated into one of the <a
605)     href="https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/">Tor Status</a> web pages, or be
606)     kept separate. Speaking of the Tor Status pages, take a look at Roger's
607)     <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2008/msg00300.html">Tor

608)     Status wish list</a>.</p>

609)     </li>
610)     

611)     <a id="resistCensorship"></a>

612)     <li>
613)     <b>Improving Tor's ability to resist censorship</b>

614)     <br>

615)     Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

616)     <br>

617)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

618)     <br>

619)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>

620)     <br>

621)     Likely Mentors: <i>Roger, Nick, Steven, Jake</i>

622)     <p>The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a

623)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
624)     improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
625)     But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its

626)     anti-censorship design.</p>
627)     <p>One huge category of work is adding features to our <a

628)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git?a=tree">BridgeDB</a>

629)     service (Python). Tor aims to give out <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge
630)     relay addresses</a> to users that can't reach the Tor network
631)     directly, but there's an arms race between algorithms for distributing
632)     addresses and algorithms for gathering and blocking them. See <a

633)     href="<blog>bridge-distribution-strategies">our

634)     blog post on the topic</a> as an overview, and then look at <a
635)     href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Dec-2009/msg00000.html">Roger's
636)     or-dev post</a> from December for more recent thoughts &mdash; lots of

637)     design work remains.</p>
638)     <p>If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem

639)     we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single
640)     address/port combination at a time. There's
641)     <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a
642)     proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
643)     to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more

644)     work.</p>
645)     <p>This project could involve a lot of research and design. One of the big

646)     challenges will be identifying and crafting approaches that can still
647)     resist an adversary even after the adversary knows the design, and

648)     then trading off censorship resistance with usability and
649)     robustness.</p>

650)     </li>
651)     

652)     <a id="armClientMode"></a>

653)     <li>
654)     <b>Client Mode Use Cases for Arm</b>
655)     <br>
656)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>
657)     <br>
658)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
659)     <br>
660)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
661)     <br>
662)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian</i>
663)     <p><a href="<page projects/arm>">Arm</a> is a Tor command line status
664)     monitor on *nix environments (Linux, Mac, and BSD). It functions much like
665)     top does, giving a CLI overlay of Tor's bandwidth usage, connections,
666)     configuration, log, etc. Thus far its design has been geared for Tor relay
667)     operators. However, this doesn't need to be the case. This project would be
668)     to expand and simplify arm to make it useful for Tor's client users
669)     too.</p>
670)     
671)     <p>This would include UI design, experimenting, and a lot of python
672)     hacking. Here's some ideas for client functionality arm could provide:</p>
673)     
674)     <ul>
675)       <li>A panel for client connections, showing each hop of the user's
676)       circuits with the ISP, country, and jurisdiction where those relays
677)       reside. Other interesting information would be the circuit's latency, how
678)       long its been around, and its possible exit ports. Some of this will be
679)       pretty tricky and require some experimentation to figure out what
680)       information can be fetched safely (for instance, scraping rdns and whois
681)       lookups could give hints about a relay's ISP, but we'd need to do it on
682)       all Tor relays to avoid leaking our connections to the resolver).</li>
683)       
684)       <li>Options to let the user request new circuits (the &quot;New
685)       Identity&quot; feature in Vidalia), select the exit country, etc.</li>
686)       
687)       <li>A panel showing Internet application and if their connections are
688)       being routed through Tor or not (giving a warning if there's leaks).</li>
689)       
690)       <li>The status of the bridges we're configured to use (ie, are they up?).
691)       This would include adding control port functionality to Tor for <a
692)       href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2068">ticket
693)       2068</a>.</li>
694)       
695)       <li>A one click option to set Tor to be a client, relay, or bridge. The
696)       goal would be to make it trivial for users to voluntarily contribute to
697)       the Tor network.</li>
698)       
699)       <li>Menus as an alternative to hotkeys to make the interface more
700)       intuitive and usable for beginners (<a
701)       href="http://gnosis.cx/publish/programming/charming_python_6.html">example</a>).</li>
702)       
703)       <li>Look at Vidalia and TorK for ideas and solicit input from the Tor community.</li>
704)       
705)       <li>Make it easier for users to install arm by <a
706)       href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Opkg">packaging for
707)       OpenWrt</a> (as a UI for the <a
708)       href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/Torouter">Torouter
709)       project</a>) and Macs.</li>
710)     </ul>
711)     
712)     <p>For more project ideas see arm's <a
713)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/arm/trunk/TODO">TODO</a>.</p>
714)     </li>
715)     

716)     <a id="unitTesting"></a>

717)     <li>
718)     <b>Improve our unit testing process</b>

719)     <br>

720)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

721)     <br>

722)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

723)     <br>

724)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>

725)     <br>

726)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Erinn</i>

727)     <p>Tor needs to be tested far more thoroughly. This is a
728)     multi-part effort. To start with, our unit test coverage should
729)     rise substantially, especially in the areas outside the utility
730)     functions. This will require significant refactoring of some parts
731)     of Tor, in order to dissociate as much logic as possible from
732)     globals.</p>

733)     <p>Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing. We've got

734)     buildbot to automate our regular integration and compile testing already
735)     (though we need somebody to set it up on Windows),
736)     but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in <a
737)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>)
738)     updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
739)     network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test

740)     changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.</p>

741)     </li>
742)     

743)     <a id="orbotDevelopment"></a>

744)     <li>
745)     <b>More on Orbot &amp; Android OS-specific development</b>
746)     <br/>

747)     <br>

748)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

749)     <br>

750)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>

751)     <br>

752)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

753)     <br>

754)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan, Jake</i>

755)     <p><b>Android Java UI work:</b> Improved home screen to show better
756)     statistics about data transferred (up/down), number of circuits
757)     connected, quality of connection and so on. The "Tether Wifi"
758)     Android application is a good model to follow in how it shows
759)     a realtime count of bytes transferred as well as notifications

760)     when wifi clients connect. In addition, better display/handling

761)     of Tor system/error messages would also be very helpful. Finally,
762)     the addition of a wizard or tutorial walkthrough for novice

763)     users to explain to them exactly what is and what is not anonymized

764)     or protected would greatly improve the likelihood they will use
765)     Orbot correctly.</p>
766)     
767)     <p><b>Android Java OS/Core app work:</b> Better system-wide

768)     indication, either via the notification bar, "Toast" pop-up dialogs
769)     or some other indicator, that an application's traffic is indeed

770)     moving through Orbot/Tor. For instance, right now you need to
771)     first go to a torcheck web service to ensure your browser is
772)     routing via Tor. Orbot should be able to notify you that circuits
773)     are being opened, used, etc. The aforementioned data transfer
774)     tracker might provide this type of awareness as well.</p>
775)     
776)     <p><b>Android Java Library/Community Outreach work:</b> We need
777)     to package a simple library for use with third-party application

778)     to easily enable them to support "Torification" on non-rooted
779)     devices (i.e. w/o transparent proxying). This library should

780)     include a wrapper for the Apache HTTPClient library, a utility
781)     class for detecting the state of Orbot connectivity, and other
782)     relevant/useful things an Android app might need to anonymize
783)     itself. This work would include the creation of the library,
784)     documentation, and sample code. Outreach or effort to implement
785)     the library within other open-source apps would follow.</p>
786)     
787)     <p><b>Android OS/C/Linux work:</b> The port of Tor to Android
788)     is basically a straight cross-compile to Linux ARM. There has
789)     been no work done in looking the optimization of Tor within a
790)     mobile hardware environment, on the ARM processor or other
791)     Android hardware, or on mobile networks. It should be noted,
792)     that even without optimization, Tor is handling the mobile
793)     network environment very well, automatically detecting change

794)     in IP addresses, reconnecting circuits, etc. across switching

795)     from 2G to 3G to Wifi, and so forth.</p>

796)     </li>
797)     

798)     <a id="simulateSlowConnections"></a>

799)     <li>
800)     <b>Simulator for slow Internet connections</b>

801)     <br>

802)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

803)     <br>

804)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

805)     <br>

806)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>

807)     <br>

808)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven</i>

809)     <p>

810)     Many users of Tor have poor-quality Internet connections, giving low
811)     bandwidth, high latency, and high packet loss/re-ordering. User
812)     experience is that Tor reacts badly to these conditions, but it is
813)     difficult to improve the situation without being able to repeat the
814)     problems in the lab.

815)     </p>
816)     
817)     <p>

818)     This project would be to build a simulation environment which
819)     replicates the poor connectivity so that the effect on Tor performance
820)     can be measured. Other components would be a testing utility to
821)     establish what are the properties of connections available, and to
822)     measure the effect of performance-improving modifications to Tor.

823)     </p>
824)     
825)     <p>

826)     The tools used would be up to the student, but dummynet (for FreeBSD)
827)     and nistnet (for Linux) are two potential components on which this
828)     project could be built. Students should be experienced with network
829)     programming/debugging and TCP/IP, and preferably familiar with C and a
830)     scripting language.

831)     </p>

832)     </li>
833)     

834)     <a id="torbuttonForThunderbird"></a>

835)     <li>
836)     <b>Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird</b>

837)     <br>

838)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

839)     <br>

840)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>

841)     <br>

842)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>

843)     <br>

844)     Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>

845)     <p>

846)     We're hearing from an increasing number of users that they want to use
847)     Thunderbird with Tor. However, there are plenty of application-level
848)     concerns, for example, by default Thunderbird will put your hostname in
849)     the outgoing mail that it sends. At some point we should start a new
850)     push to build a Thunderbird extension similar to Torbutton.

851)     </p>

852)     </li>
853)     

854)     <a id="usabilityTesting"></a>

855)     <li>
856)     <b>Usability testing of Tor</b>

857)     <br>

858)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

859)     <br>

860)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

861)     <br>

862)     Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>

863)     <br>

864)     Likely Mentors: <i>Andrew</i>

865)     <p>

866)     Especially the browser bundle, ideally amongst our target demographic.
867)     That would help a lot in knowing what needs to be done in terms of bug
868)     fixes or new features. We get this informally at the moment, but a more
869)     structured process would be better.

870)     </p>

871)     
872)     <p>
873)     Please note that since this isn't a coding project, it isn't suitable for
874)     Google Summer of Code.
875)     </p>

876)     </li>

877)     

878)     <a id="authenticatingIrcProxy"></a>

879)     <li>
880)     <b>An authenticating IRC proxy</b>

881)     <br>

882)     Priority: <i>Low</i>

883)     <br>

884)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

885)     <br>

886)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

887)     <br>

888)     Likely Mentors: <i>Sebastian, Peter, Roger</i>
889)     <p>

890)     The world needs an authenticating irc proxy. As we're periodically
891)     reminded from the Penny Arcade web comic, "Internet user + anonymity =
892)     jerk". With respect to websites we're actually doing ok, since websites
893)     can make their users log in and use other application-level authentication
894)     approaches. But IRC servers are much worse off, because most IRC server
895)     code is poorly written: hard to maintain, and harder to modify. Many
896)     IRC networks now block connections from Tor, and we're basically down to
897)     two holdouts (OFTC and Freenode). This state of affairs means that a lot
898)     of people around the world are thinking "I told you so" about anonymity
899)     online, when in fact the problem is simply lack of technology to make the
900)     problem manageable. We need some way to let the IRC networks distinguish
901)     which users have developed a reputation as not being jerks, so they can
902)     treat the two groups separately. There are some really cool research
903)     designs like <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~nymble/">Nymble</a>,
904)     which aim to let websites blacklist users without needing to learn who
905)     they are.  But Nymble is designed around web interactions. We need to
906)     build the glue around the IRC protocol that would let us plug in a project
907)     like Nymble (or a simpler one to start, as a proof-of-concept). One way
908)     to do that would be to build an IRC proxy that knows how to hear from
909)     IRC clients, knows how to talk to IRC servers, and has an additional
910)     layer that requires the users to authenticate.  Some work on this has
911)     begun by other volunteers, see their progress at <a

912)     href="https://github.com/anonirc/orc">https://github.com/anonirc/orc</a>.

913)     </p>

914)     </li>
915)     

916)     <a id="torsocksForOSX"></a>

917)     <li>
918)     <b>Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X</b>

919)     <br>

920)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>

921)     <br>

922)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

923)     <br>

924)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>

925)     <br>

926)     Likely Mentors: <i>?</i>

927)     <p>

928)     <a href="https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> and <a
929)     href="https://code.google.com/p/dsocks/">dsocks</a> are wrappers that will

930)     run applications, intercept their outgoing network connections, and push
931)     those connections through Tor. The goal is to handle applications that
932)     don't support proxies (or don't supporting them well). To get it right,
933)     they need to intercept many system calls. The syscalls you need to
934)     intercept on Linux differ dramatically from those on BSD. So Torsocks
935)     works fine on Linux, dsocks works ok on BSD (though it may be less
936)     maintained and thus might miss more syscalls), and nothing works well
937)     on both. First, we should patch dsocks to use Tor's <i>mapaddress</i>
938)     commands from the controller interface, so we don't waste a whole
939)     round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before connecting. Second,
940)     we should make our <i>torify</i> script detect which of torsocks or
941)     dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
942)     unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
943)     or discarding one entirely.

944)     </p>
945)     </li>
946)     

947)     <a id="vidaliaStatusEventInterface"></a>

948)     <li>
949)     <b>Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia</b>
950)     <br>
951)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>
952)     <br>
953)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
954)     <br>
955)     Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
956)     <br>
957)     Likely Mentors: <i>Tomás?</i>
958)     <p>There are a number of status changes inside Tor of which the user may need
959)     to be informed. For example, if the user is trying to set up his Tor as a
960)     relay and Tor decides that its ports are not reachable from outside
961)     the user's network, we should alert the user. Currently, all the user
962)     gets is a couple of log messages in Vidalia's 'message log' window, which they
963)     likely never see since they don't receive a notification that something
964)     has gone wrong. Even if the user does actually look at the message log,
965)     most of the messages make little sense to the novice user.</p>
966)     <p>Tor has the ability to inform Vidalia of many such status
967)     changes, and we recently implemented support for a couple of these
968)     events. Still, there are many more status events which the user should
969)     be informed of, and we need a better UI for actually displaying them
970)     to the user.</p>
971)     <p>The goal of this project then is to design and implement a UI for
972)     displaying Tor status events to the user. For example, we might put a
973)     little badge on Vidalia's tray icon that alerts the user to new status
974)     events they should look at. Double-clicking the icon could bring up a
975)     dialog that summarizes recent status events in simple terms and maybe
976)     suggests a remedy for any negative events if they can be corrected by
977)     the user. Of course, this is just an example and one is free to
978)     suggest another approach.</p>
979)     <p>A person undertaking this project should have good UI design and layout
980)     skills and some C++ development experience. Previous experience with Qt and
981)     Qt's Designer will be very helpful, but are not required. Some
982)     English writing ability will also be useful, since this project will
983)     likely involve writing small amounts of help documentation that should
984)     be understandable by non-technical users. Bonus points for some graphic
985)     design/Photoshop fu, since we might want/need some shiny new icons too.</p>
986)     </li>
987)     

988)     <a id="vidaliaNetworkMap"></a>

989)     <li>
990)     <b>An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</b>
991)     <br>
992)     Priority: <i>Low to Medium</i>
993)     <br>
994)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
995)     <br>
996)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
997)     <br>
998)     Likely Mentors: <i>Tomás?</i>
999)     <p>
1000)     One of Vidalia's existing features is a network map that shows the user
1001)     the approximate geographic location of relays in the Tor network and
1002)     plots the paths the user's traffic takes as it is tunneled through the
1003)     Tor network. The map is currently not very interactive and has rather
1004)     poor graphics. Instead, we implemented KDE's Marble widget such
1005)     that it gives us a better quality map and enables improved interactivity,
1006)     such as allowing the user to click on individual relays or circuits to
1007)     display additional information. We want to add the ability
1008)     for users to click on a particular relay or a country containing one or
1009)     more Tor exit relays and say, "I want my connections to exit
1010)     from here."
1011)     </p>
1012)     
1013)     <p>
1014)     This project will first involve getting familiar with Vidalia
1015)     and the Marble widget's API. One will then integrate the widget
1016)     into Vidalia and customize Marble to be better suited for our application,
1017)     such as making circuits clickable, storing cached map data in Vidalia's
1018)     own data directory, and customizing some of the widget's dialogs.
1019)     </p>
1020)     
1021)     <p>
1022)     A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
1023)     experience. Previous experience with Qt and CMake is helpful, but not
1024)     required.
1025)     </p>

1026)     </li>
1027)     

1028)     <!--
1029)     <li>
1030)     <b>Help with independent Tor client implementations</b>
1031)     <br>
1032)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>
1033)     <br>
1034)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1035)     <br>
1036)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1037)     <br>
1038)     Likely Mentors: <i>Bruce, Nathan</i>
1039)     <p>Others are currently working on Tor clients for Java, Android, and Maemo
1040)     environments.  The first step is to get a handle on the current state of
1041)     the project in which you are interested in helping; <a

1042)     href="https://github.com/brl/JTor">Tor for Java</a>,

1043)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/">Android/Orbot</a>,
1044)      or <a href="<page docs/N900>">Tor for Maemo</a>. Check out the
1045)     repository and familiarize yourself
1046)     with the source code.  Further, support for requesting or even providing
1047)     Tor hidden services would be neat, but not required.</p>
1048)     <p>A prospective developer should be able to understand and write new Java
1049)     code, including a Java cryptography API. Being able to read C code would be helpful,
1050)     too. One should be willing to read the existing documentation,
1051)     implement code based on it, and refine the documentation
1052)     when things are underdocumented. This project is mostly about coding and
1053)     to a small degree about design.</p>
1054)     </li>
1055)     -->
1056) 

1057)     <!--
1058)     <li>
1059)     <b>Improvements for Tor+Vidalia interaction on Linux/Unix platforms</b>
1060)     <br>
1061)     Priority: <i>Medium</i>
1062)     <br>
1063)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1064)     <br>
1065)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1066)     <br>
1067)     Likely Mentors: <i>Erinn, Peter</i>
1068)     <p>
1069)     Vidalia currently doesn't play nicely with Tor on Linux and Unix platforms.
1070)     Currently, on Debian and Ubuntu, there is a configuration mechanism which
1071)     allows Vidalia to override Tor's ability to start on boot (by sourcing
1072)     <code>/etc/default/tor.vidalia</code> which sets <code>RUN_DAEMON=no</code> at the user's
1073)     request), but full implementation of <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a> 
1074)     communication is still required.
1075)     </p>
1076)     
1077)     <p>
1078)     A better solution on Linux and Unix platforms would be to use Tor's
1079)     ControlSocket, which allows Vidalia to talk to Tor via a Unix domain socket,
1080)     and could possibly be enabled by default in Tor's distribution packages.
1081)     Vidalia can then authenticate to Tor using filesystem-based (cookie)
1082)     authentication if the user running Vidalia is also in the distribution-specific
1083)     tor group.
1084)     </p>
1085)     
1086)     <p>
1087)     This project will first involve adding support for Tor's ControlSocket to
1088)     Vidalia. The student will then develop and test this support on various
1089)     distributions to make sure it behaves in a predictable and consistent manner on
1090)     all of them.
1091)     </p>
1092)     
1093)     <p>
1094)     The next challenge would be to find an intuitive and usable way for Vidalia to be
1095)     able to change Tor's configuration (torrc) even though it is located in
1096)     <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> and thus immutable. In Debian and Ubuntu we handle
1097)     this with the aforementioned <code>/etc/default/tor.vidalia</code> but this
1098)     functionality could (or should) be less distribution-specific.
1099)     </p>
1100)     
1101)     <p>
1102)     The best idea we've come up with so far is to feed Tor a new configuration via
1103)     the ControlSocket when Vidalia starts, but that's bad because if the user is not
1104)     using the latest Debian/Ubuntu packages, they may not have disabled Tor's
1105)     ability to run on boot and will end up with a configuration that is different
1106)     from what they want. The second best idea we've come up with is for Vidalia to
1107)     write out a temporary torrc file and ask the user to manually move it to
1108)     <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code>, but that's bad because users shouldn't have to
1109)     mess with files directly.
1110)     </p>
1111)     
1112)     <p>
1113)     A person undertaking this project should have prior knowledge of various Linux
1114)     distributions and their packaging mechanisms as well as some C++ development
1115)     experience. Previous experience with Qt is helpful, but not required.
1116)     </p>
1117)     </li>
1118)     -->
1119)     

1120)     <li>
1121)     <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>

1122)     <br>

1123)     Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
1124)     href="<gitblob>doc/roadmaps/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development
1125)     roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
1126)     and find out what you think needs fixing.
1127)     Some of the <a href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">current proposals</a>
1128)     might also be short on developers.
1129)     </li>
1130)     
1131)     </ol>
1132)     
1133)     <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
1134)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
1135)     <ol>
1136)     <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
1137)     Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
1138)     call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
1139)     that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a
1140)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing
1141)     havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
1142)     instead. One solution would be to teach <a
1143)     href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
1144)     overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
1145)     the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
1146)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
1147)     start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>
1148)     
1149)     <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
1150)     docs/documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
1151)     fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
1152)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
1153)     new features, and planning for deployment.</li>
1154)     
1155)     <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
1156)     traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
1157)     simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
1158)     really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
1159)     that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
1160)     giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
1161)     See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
1162)     details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
1163)     done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>
1164)     

1165)     <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
1166)     accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
1167)     possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing,

1168)     performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and

1169)     Tor if needed.</li>

1170)     
1171)     <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a

1172)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine

1173)     if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by
1174)     getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>
1175)     
1176)     <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
1177)     encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
1178)     on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
1179)     it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

1180)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list

1181)     of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
1182)     be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a
1183)     href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
1184)     for Tor and
1185)     UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>
1186)     
1187)     <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
1188)     (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
1189)     first place to start.</li>
1190)     
1191)     <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
1192)     Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
1193)     from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
1194)     them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
1195)     integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
1196)     generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>
1197)     
1198)     <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
1199)     to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a
1200)     href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">The (Amnesic) Incognito Live
1201)     System</a>.
1202)     </li>
1203)     
1204)     <li>
1205)     Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
1206)     more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a
1207)     href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
1208)     just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
1209)     and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
1210)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
1211)     webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
1212)     and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
1213)     To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
1214)     href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
1215)     </li>
1216)     
1217)     </ol>
1218)     
1219)     <a id="Research"></a>
1220)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
1221)     <ol>
1222)     <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
1223)     by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
1224)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
1225)     traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
1226)     stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
1227)     attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
1228)     much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
1229)     is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
1230)     that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
1231)     schemes work better than others?</li>
1232)     <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
1233)     protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
1234)     see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
1235)     Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
1236)     client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
1237)     that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
1238)     look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
1239)     timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
1240)     href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
1241)     but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
1242)     client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
1243)     strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
1244)     asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
1245)     natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
1246)     symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
1247)     <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
1248)     href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
1249)     Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
1250)     works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
1251)     fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
1252)     then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
1253)     options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
1254)     attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
1255)     attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
1256)     actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
1257)     much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
1258)     or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
1259)     orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
1260)     sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
1261)     Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
1262)     <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
1263)     the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
1264)     exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
1265)     though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
1266)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
1267)     that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
1268)     Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
1269)     exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
1270)     routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
1271)     approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
1272)     <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
1273)     the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
1274)     circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
1275)     href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
1276)     paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
1277)     anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
1278)     thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
1279)     <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
1280)     (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
1281)     each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
1282)     bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
1283)     don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
1284)     Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
1285)     and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
1286)     a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
1287)     slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
1288)     need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
1289)     solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
1290)     degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
1291)     <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
1292)     current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
1293)     we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
1294)     than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
1295)     href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh
1296)     throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
1297)     overhaul if the results are good.</li>
1298)     <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
1299)     an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
1300)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
1301)     it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
1302)     steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
1303)     block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
1304)     the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
1305)     bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
1306)     How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
1307)     wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
1308)     a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
1309)     <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
1310)     ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
1311)     third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
1312)     streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
1313)     the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
1314)     the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
1315)     tradeoff.</li>
1316)     <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
1317)     puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
1318)     if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
1319)     <li>Programs like <a

1320)     href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide