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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16)     
17)     <p>General questions:</p>
18)     <ul>
19)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>
20)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>
21)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
22)     Tor?</a></li>
23)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
24)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's
26)     CD?</a></li>
27)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
28)     Tor support mail?</a></li>
29)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>
30)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
31)     funding?</a></li>

32)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor?  How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></li>

33)     </ul>
34)     
35)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>
36)     <ul>
37)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
39)     page?</a></li>
40)     <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li>
41)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to
42)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>
43)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>
44)     </ul>
45)     
46)     <p>Running Tor:</p>
47)     
48)     <p>Running a Tor client:</p>
49)     <ul>

50)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor and Polipo but it's not
51)     working.</a></li>
52)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
53)     start.</a></li>
54)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country)
55)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>
56)     <li><a href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells
57)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>
58)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
59)     been compromised.</a></li>

60)     </ul>
61)     
62)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>
63)     <ul>
64)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>
65)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal
66)     with abuse issues.</a></li>
67)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
68)     relay?</a></li>
69)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>
70)     <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>
71)     </ul>
72)     
73)     <p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>
74)     
75)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
76)     <ul>
77)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>
78)     </ul>
79)     
80)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
81)     <ul>
82)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
83)     relay.</a></li>
84)     </ul>
85)     
86)     <p>Abuse</p>
87)     <ul>
88)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
89)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
90)     relay?</a></li>
91)     </ul>
92)     
93)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a

94)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

95)     

96)     <hr>

97)     
98)     <a id="General"></a>
99)     
100)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
101)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>
102)     
103)     <p>
104)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
105)     </p>
106)     
107)     <p>
108)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
109)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
110)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around
111)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from
112)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
113)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is
114)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
115)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
116)     </p>
117)     
118)     <p>
119)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains
120)     and develops the Tor software.
121)     </p>
122)     

123)     <hr>

124)     
125)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
126)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
127)     <p>

128)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and
129) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy to
130) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same server.
131) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through
132) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't have to
133) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy server.
134) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for
135) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad
136) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them.
137) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with
138) free wifi Internet.
139)     </p>
140)     <p>
141)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider
142) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your
143) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can see your
144) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.
145) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as
146) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic
147) stream, and isn't recording your personal details.
148)     </p>
149)     <p>
150)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending
151) it on to the destination.  Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are
152) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through
153) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely
154) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local
155) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through
156) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted
157) packets between themselves.</p>

158)     <p>
159)     <dl>

160)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of
161) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.  It
162) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It merely sees
163) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so
164) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node figuring
165) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>
166)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad third
167) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know who sent
168) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or
169) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the
170) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream.  You
171) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
172) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

173)     </dl>
174)     </p>
175)     

176)     <hr>

177)     
178)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>
179)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can
180)     I use with Tor?</a></h3>
181)     
182)     <p>
183)     There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
184)     and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on
185)     making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor.
186)     This step is normally done by configuring
187)     the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are
188)     other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to
189)     make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt
190)     your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you
191)     still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This
192)     second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
193)     why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.
194)     </p>
195)     
196)     <p>
197)     Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
198)     bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> automatically

199)     install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox

200)     extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0,
201)     Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
202)     application-level worries.
203)     </p>
204)     
205)     <p>
206)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
207)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
208)     issues on them well enough to be able to recommend a safe
209)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

210)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

211)     specific applications</a>. There's also a <a

212)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">list

213)     of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
214)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
215)     </p>
216)     

217)     <hr>

218)     
219)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
220)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>
221)     
222)     <p>
223)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
224)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
225)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
226)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
227)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
228)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
229)     the Naval Research Lab.
230)     </p>
231)     
232)     <p>
233)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
234)     </p>
235)     
236)     <p>
237)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled
238)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
239)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned
240)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
241)     spell it wrong.
242)     </p>
243)     

244)     <hr>

245)     
246)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>
247)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>
248)     
249)     <p>
250)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one
251)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody
252)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
253)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
254)     </p>
255)     
256)     <p>
257)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
258)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software
259)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
260)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
261)     trust our software ever again &mdash; for excellent reason!
262)     </p>
263)     
264)     <p>
265)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
266)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
267)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should
268)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release)
269)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
270)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
271)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
272)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
273)     distribution sites.
274)     </p>
275)     
276)     <p>
277)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your
278)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
279)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
280)     </p>
281)     

282)     <hr>

283)     
284)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>
285)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on
286)     my magazine's CD?</a></h3>
287)     
288)     <p>
289)     Yes.
290)     </p>
291)     
292)     <p>
293)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
294)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
295)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
296)     ask us for specific permission.
297)     </p>
298)     
299)     <p>
300)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our
301)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.
302)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
303)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
304)     </p>
305)     
306)     <p>
307)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the
308)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor bundles, which
309)     typically include <a href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a>
310)     and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.
311)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
312)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
313)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General
314)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to
315)     include the source code for these programs everywhere you include
316)     the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on the <a
317)     href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and the <a
318)     href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo
319)     download page</a>.
320)     </p>
321)     
322)     <p>
323)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
324)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
325)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
326)     </p>
327)     
328)     <p>
329)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
330)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
331)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
332)     may not be supported &mdash; or even work &mdash; six months later. This
333)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
334)     </p>
335)     

336)     <hr>

337)     
338)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>
339)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
340)     Tor support mail?</a></h3>

341) 

342)     <p>There is no official support for Tor. Your best bet is to try the following:</p>

343)     <ol>
344)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>
345)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>
346)     <li>Read through the <a
347)     href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk">OR-TALK Archives</a> and
348)     see if your question is already answered.</li>
349)     <li>Join our <a href="irc://irc.oftc.net#tor">irc channel</a> and
350)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>
351)     <li>Send an email to tor-assistants at torproject.org. These are
352)     volunteers who may be able to help you but you may not get a response
353)     for days.</li>
354)     </ol>

355)     
356)     

357)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the
358)     mailing list and answer questions from others.</p>

359)     

360)     <hr>

361)     
362)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
363)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>
364)     
365)     <p>
366)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
367)     </p>
368)     
369)     <p>
370)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
371)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
372)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency
373)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
374)     bandwidth through Tor.
375)     </p>
376)     
377)     <p>
378)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
379)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
380)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
381)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
382)     </p>
383)     
384)     <p>
385)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

386)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

387)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
388)     to go with it.
389)     </p>
390)     
391)     <p>
392)     What can you do to help?
393)     </p>
394)     
395)     <ul>
396)     
397)     <li>
398)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
399)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
400)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
401)     </li>
402)     
403)     <li>

404)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We

405)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
406)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
407)     walk people through setting it up.
408)     </li>
409)     
410)     <li>
411)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
412)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
413)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
414)     </li>
415)     
416)     <li>
417)     There are some steps that individuals
418)     can take to improve their Tor performance. <a

419)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/FireFoxTorPerf">You

420)     can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a
421)     href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use
422)     Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download/download>">upgrading
423)     to the latest version of Tor</a>.  If this works well, please help by
424)     documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
425)     </li>
426)     
427)     <li>
428)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to
429)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
430)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
431)     get to spend more time on it.
432)     </li>
433)     
434)     <li>
435)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
436)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
437)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
438)     </li>
439)     
440)     <li>
441)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
442)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
443)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers
444)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has
445)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
446)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
447)     </li>
448)     
449)     <li>
450)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
451)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of money to the
452)     cause</a>. It adds up!
453)     </li>
454)     
455)     </ul>
456)     

457)     <hr>

458)     
459)     <a id="Funding"></a>
460)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with
461)     more funding?</a></h3>
462)     
463)     <p>
464)     We have about 1800 relays right now, pushing over 150 MB/s average
465)     traffic. We have several hundred thousand active users. But the Tor
466)     network is not yet self-sustaining.
467)     </p>
468)     
469)     <p>
470)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
471)     </p>
472)     
473)     <ul>
474)     
475)     <li>
476)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
477)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
478)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
479)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
480)     </li>
481)     
482)     <li>
483)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
484)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
485)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
486)     </li>
487)     
488)     <li>
489)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
490)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
491)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and
492)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay
493)     happy. We also need to work on <a href="#RelayOS">stability</a> on some
494)     platforms &mdash; e.g., Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.
495)     </li>
496)     
497)     <li>
498)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
499)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
500)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of
501)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this

502)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much more work

503)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
504)     </li>
505)     
506)     <li>
507)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
508)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
509)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
510)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
511)     </li>
512)     
513)     <li>
514)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
515)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
516)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
517)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of
518)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a>
519)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of
520)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
521)     behind these.
522)     </li>
523)     
524)     </ul>
525)     
526)     <p>
527)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
528)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
529)     can keep up</a>.
530)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
531)     so we can continue to grow the network.
532)     </p>
533)     
534)     <p>
535)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
536)     censorship-resistance.
537)     </p>
538)     
539)     <p>
540)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
541)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
542)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
543)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
544)     </p>
545)     
546)     <p>
547)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
548)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate/donate>">donate</a>
549)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our executive
550)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
551)     </p>
552)     

553)     <a id="Metrics"></a>
554) 		<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor?  How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>
555) 
556) 		<p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

557)     <hr>

558)     
559)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>
560)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>
561)     
562)     <p>
563)     This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
564)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to
565)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to
566)     completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any
567)     version of Windows is as follows:
568)     </p>
569)     
570)     <ol>
571)     <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
572)     and choose exit.</li>
573)     <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the
574)     Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li>
575)     <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall.
576)     This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li>
577)     <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
578)     Click the Uninstall button.</li>
579)     </ol>
580)     
581)     <p>
582)     If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall
583)     Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to
584)     reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".
585)     </p>
586)     
587)     <p>
588)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
589)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
590)     </p>
591)     
592)     <p>
593)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
594)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
595)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
596)     </p>
597)     

598)     <hr>

599)     
600)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>
601)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the
602)     download page?</a></h3>
603)     
604)     <p>
605)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
606)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
607)     </p>
608)     
609)     <p>
610)     Please read the <a
611)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.
612)     </p>
613)     

614)     <hr>

615)     
616)     <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>
617)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under
618)     Windows?</a></h3>
619)     
620)     <p>
621)     Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
622)     tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.
623)     </p>
624)     
625)     <p>
626)     (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
627)     it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
628)     download/download>">download page</a>.)
629)     </p>
630)     

631)     <hr>

632)     
633)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
634)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor
635)     executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>
636)     
637)     <p>
638)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
639)     parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false
640)     positives &mdash; after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a
641)     guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
642)     a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
643)     </p>
644)     
645)     <p>
646)     In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
647)     it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
648)     href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.
649)     </p>
650)     

651)     <hr>

652)     
653)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>
654)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
655)     includes Tor?</a></h3>
656)     
657)     <p>
658)     There isn't any official LiveCD at this point. We're still trying to find good
659)     solutions and trying to understand the security and anonymity implications of
660)     the various options. In the mean time, feel free to check out the list below
661)     and use your best judgement:
662)     </p>
663)     
664)     <p>
665)     LiveCDs:
666)     </p>
667)     
668)     <ol>
669)     <li><a href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">The (Amnesic) Incognito Live
670)     System</a> is a Live System aimed at preserving your privacy and
671)     anonymity:
672)     <ul>
673)     <li> All outgoing connections to the Internet are forced to go through
674)     the Tor network.</li>
675)     <li> No trace is left on local storage devices unless explicitely asked.</li>
676)     <li> It includes Firefox, Tor, Torbutton, Vidalia graphical Tor
677)     controller, Pidgin Instant Messaging client, and lots of other
678)     software.</li>
679)     <li> It's based upon Debian gnu/linux and comes with the GNOME desktop
680)     environment.</li>
681)     </ul>
682)     <li><a href="http://tork.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LiveCD">TorK LiveCD</a>
683)     is Knoppix-based with an emphasis on user-friendliness. You can work
684)     anonymously or non-anonymously while TorK tries to keep you informed of the
685)     consequences of your activity. The TorK LiveCD is experimental, so the aim is
686)     to provide regular releases through 2007 and beyond.</li>
687)     <li><a href="http://mandalka.name/privatix/">Privatix LiveCD/USB</a> is a
688)     debian based live-system including tor, firefox and torbutton which can save
689)     bookmarks and other settings or data on an encrypted usb-key</li>
690)     </li>
691)     </ol>
692)     
693)     <p>
694)     Windows bundles:
695)     </p>
696)     
697)     <ol>
698)     <li><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a>
699)     for Windows comes with a pre-configured web browser and is self contained
700)     so you can run it from a USB stick.</li>
701)     <li><a href="http://www.janusvm.com/tor_vm/">Tor VM</a> is a successor
702)     to JanusVM. It needs testing from you!</li>
703)     <li><a href="http://janusvm.com/">JanusVM</a> is a Linux kernel and software
704)     running in VMWare that sits between your Windows computer and the Internet,
705)     making sure that your Internet traffic is scrubbed and anonymized.</li>
706)     <li><a href="http://www.xerobank.com/xB_browser.html">xB Browser</a>,
707)     previously known as Torpark, is a Firefox+Tor package for Win32 that can
708)     installed on a USB key. It needs a host Win32 operating system.</li>
709)     </ol>
710)     
711)     <p>
712)     Not currently maintained as far as we know:
713)     </p>
714)     
715)     <ol>
716)     <li>Polippix / Privatlivets Fred is a Danish Knoppix-based LiveCD with Tor
717)     and utilities to encrypt IP-telephony. <a href="http://polippix.org/">Info and
718)     download</a>.</li>
719)     <li>ELE is a Linux LiveCD which is focused on privacy related
720)     software. It includes Tor and you can download it at
721)     <a
722)     href="http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/">http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/</a>.</li>
723)     <li>Virtual Privacy Machine is a Linux LiveCD that includes Firefox, Privoxy,
724)     Tor, some IRC and IM applications, and a set of ipchains rules aimed to prevent
725)     non-Tor traffic from accidentally leaving your computer. More information at

726)     <a href="<wiki>VirtualPrivacyMachine"><wiki>VirtualPrivacyMachine</a>.</li>

727)     <li>Anonym.OS is a LiveCD similar to the above but is based on OpenBSD rather
728)     than Linux for maximum security. It was designed to be anonymous and secure
729)     from the ground up, and thus has some features and limitations not found in
730)     other LiveCDs (Tor related or otherwise). You can obtain more information and
731)     download Anonym.OS from <a href="http://theory.kaos.to/projects.html">Kaos.Theory</a>.</li>
732)     <li>Phantomix is a LiveCD for anonymous surfing and chatting based on the most
733)     recent KNOPPIX release. It comes preconfigured with Privoxy, Tor and Polipo. You can
734)     get it from the <a href="http://phantomix.ytternhagen.de/">Phantomix
735)     Website</a>.</li>
736)     </ol>
737)     
738)     <p>
739)     Please contact us if you know any others.
740)     </p>

741) 
742) <hr>
743) 
744) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>
745) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor and Polipo but
746) it's not working.</a></h3>
747) 
748) <p>
749) Once you've installed the Tor bundle, there are two questions to ask:
750) first, is your Tor able to establish a circuit? Second, is your
751) Firefox correctly configured to send its traffic through Tor?
752) </p>
753) 
754) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in
755) Vidalia will turn green. You can also check in the Vidalia
756) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
757) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

758) href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIsetuploggingorseeTorslogs">Tor logs</a> for

759) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
760) client functionality is working."
761) </p>
762) 
763) <p>
764) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
765) </p>
766) 
767) <ol>
768) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
769) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
770) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will
771) refuse to build circuits. For XP users, synchronize your clock under
772) the clock -&gt; Internet time tab. In addition, correct the day and date
773) under the 'Date &amp; Time' Tab.</li>
774) <li>Is your Internet connection <a

775) href="<wikifaq>#Myfirewallonlyallowsafewoutgoingports.">firewalled</a>,

776) or do you normally need to use a <a

777) href="<wikifaq>#MyInternetconnectionrequiresanHTTPorSOCKSproxy.">proxy</a>?

778) </li>
779) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux that
780) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
781) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
782) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
783) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

784) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>
785) <li>Check your <a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIsetuploggingorseeTorslogs">Tor

786) logs</a>. Do they give you any hints about what's going wrong?</li>
787) </ol>
788) 
789) <p>
790) Step two is to confirm that Firefox is correctly configured to send its
791) traffic through Tor. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org/">Tor
792) Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor. See <a

793) href="<wikifaq>#HowcanItellifTorisworkingandthatmyconnectionsreallyareanonymizedArethereexternalserversthatwilltestmyconnection">the

794) Tor Check FAQ entry</a> for details.

795) </p>

796) 
797) <p>
798) If it thinks you're not using Tor, here are some hints:
799) </p>
800) 
801) <ol>
802) <li>Did you install the Torbutton extension for Firefox? The installation
803) bundles include it, but sometimes people forget to install it. Make sure
804) it says "Tor enabled" at the bottom right of your Firefox window. (For
805) expert users, make sure your http proxy is set to localhost port
806) 8118.)</li>
807) <li>Do you have incompatible Firefox extensions like FoxyProxy
808) installed? If so, uninstall them. (Note that using FoxyProxy is NOT
809) a sufficient substitute for Torbutton. There are many known attacks
810) against a browser setup that does not include Torbutton. Read more

811) in the <a href="<page torbutton/torbutton-faq>">Torbutton FAQ</a> and the <a

812) href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/design/">Torbutton design</a>
813) specification.)</li>
814) <li>If your browser says "The proxy server is refusing connections.",
815) check that Polipo (the http proxy that passes traffic between Firefox
816) and Tor) is running. On Windows, look in the task manager and check for
817) a polipo.exe. On OS X, open the utilities folder in your applications
818) folder, and open Terminal.app. Then run "ps aux|grep polipo".</li>
819) <li>If you're upgrading from OS X, some of the earlier OS X installers
820) were broken in really unfortunate ways. You may find that <a href="<page
821) docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstalling everything</a> and then
822) installing a fresh bundle helps. Alas, the current uninstall instructions
823) may not apply anymore to your old bundle. Sorry.</li>
824) <li>If you're on Linux, make sure Privoxy isn't running, since it will
825) conflict with the port that our Polipo configuration file picks.</li>
826) <li>If you installed Polipo yourself (not from a bundle), did you edit the

827) config file as described? Did you restart Polipo after this change? Are
828) you sure?</li>

829) <li>For Red Hat Linux and related systems, do you have SELinux enabled? If
830) so, it might be preventing Polipo from talking to Tor. We also run across
831) BSD users periodically who have local firewall rules that prevent some
832) connections to localhost.</li>
833) </ol>
834) 
835) <hr />
836) 
837) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>
838) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for
839) a password at start.</a></h3>
840) 
841) <p>
842) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
843) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
844) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
845) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
846) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
847) compromising your anonymity.
848) </p>
849) 
850) <p>
851) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
852) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
853) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
854) </p>
855) 
856) <ol>
857) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
858) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
859) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
860) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
861) </li>
862) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
863) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,
864) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are different.
865) <br />
866) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset button,
867) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
868) control password.
869) <br />
870) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
871) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
872) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
873) to restart Tor and all will work again.
874) </li>
875) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a Windows NT service. When Tor
876) is set to
877) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
878) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
879) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
880) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
881) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
882) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
883) <br />
884) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on

885) <a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a Windows NT service</a>

886) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
887) </li>
888) </ol>
889) 

890)     <hr>

891)     
892)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
893)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>
894)     
895)     <p>
896)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as 
897)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use. 
898)     The following options can be added to your config file "torrc" 
899)     or specified on the command line:
900)     </p>
901)     <dl>
902)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
903)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
904)         </dd>
905)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
906)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible. 
907)         </dd>
908)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
909)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit. 
910)         </dd>
911)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
912)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit. 
913)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list. 
914)         </dd>
915)     </dl>
916)     <p>
917)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em> 
918)     &mdash; they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions. 
919)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; 
920)     overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.
921)     </p>
922)     <p>
923)     The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are treated as a request, 
924)     meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow, Tor will still avoid them. 
925)     You can make the option mandatory by setting 
926)     <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt> 
927)     &mdash; but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working 
928)     if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable. 

929)     See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a> 

930)     for some nodes you might pick.
931)     </p>
932)     <p>
933)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify 
934)     a 2 letter ISO3166 country code in curly braces 
935)     (for example {de}), 
936)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), 
937)     or a node nickname. 
938)     Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items. 
939)     </p>
940)     <p>
941)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface 
942)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to 
943)     set up an internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>. 
944)     See the manual page for details.
945)     </p>
946)     

947)     <hr>

948) 
949) <a id="GoogleCaptcha"></a>
950) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a
951) Captcha or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>
952) 
953) <p>
954) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
955) considers Tor to be spyware.
956) </p>
957) 
958) <p>
959) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are also
960) shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message
961) when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. Google
962) interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit
963) relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website,
964) so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.
965) </p>
966) <p>
967) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
968) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
969) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
970) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
971) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
972) an infection.
973) </p>
974) 
975) <p>
976) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically
977) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
978) should clear up again after a short time.
979) </p>
980) 
981) <p>
982) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
983) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as
984) Ixquick or Bing.
985) </p>
986) 
987) <hr />
988) 
989) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>
990) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account
991) may have been compromised.</a></h3>
992) 
993) <p>
994) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
995) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised. The
996) notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations throughout
997) the world recently used to access your account.
998) </p>
999) 
1000) <p>
1001) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from
1002) different places  and wanted to let
1003) you know. If you use Tor to access a Google service, then it will appear
1004) like you're coming from lots of different places. Nothing to worry about
1005) in particular.
1006) </p>
1007) 
1008) <p>
1009) But that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It's
1010) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be. It is possible
1011) that somebody could at some point steal your Google cookie, which would
1012) allow them to log in to the Google service as you. They might steal it
1013) by breaking into your computer, or by watching your network traffic at
1014) Starbucks or sniffing your wireless at home (when you're not using Tor),
1015) or by watching traffic going over the Tor network. In theory none of
1016) this should be possible because Gmail and similar services should only
1017) send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a
1018) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking">way
1019) more complex than that</a>.
1020) </p>
1021) 
1022) <p>
1023) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1024) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1025) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1026) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1027) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1028) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1029) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1030) </p>
1031) 
1032) <hr />
1033) 

1034)     <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>
1035)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay
1036)     need to be?</a></h3>
1037)     
1038)     <p>
1039)     We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
1040)     </p>
1041)     
1042)     <ul>
1043)     <li>Tor has built-in support for <a

1044)     href="<wikifaq>#LimitBandwidth">

1045)     rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
1046)     link but want to limit the number of bytes per
1047)     day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a

1048)     href="<wikifaq>#Hibernation">hibernation

1049)     feature</a>.
1050)     </li>
1051)     <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that
1052)     specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from
1053)     that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your
1054)     relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.
1055)     </li>
1056)     <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
1057)     notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
1058)     sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
1059)     disconnects will break.
1060)     </li>
1061)     <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
1062)     leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
1063)     </li>
1064)     <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
1065)     IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port
1066)     forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but 

1067)     <a href="<wikifaq>#ServerForFirewalledClients">this FAQ entry</a> 

1068)     offers some examples on how to do this.
1069)     </li>
1070)     <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
1071)     bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than
1072)     low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
1073)     </li>
1074)     </ul>
1075)     

1076)     <hr>

1077)     
1078)     <a id="RunARelayBut"></a>
1079)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
1080)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't
1081)     want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>
1082)     
1083)     <p>
1084)     Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
1085)     </p>
1086)     
1087)     <p>
1088)     Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
1089)     outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit
1090)     policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients
1091)     will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
1092)     exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
1093)     the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,
1094)     based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on 
1095)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a> 
1096)     if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's 

1097)     <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

1098)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
1099)     </p>
1100)     
1101)     <p>
1102)     The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but 

1103)     <a href="<wikifaq>#DefaultPorts">restricts</a>

1104)     some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
1105)     the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
1106)     file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy
1107)     using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your 

1108)     <a href="<wikifaq>#torrc">torrc</a>

1109)     file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to
1110)     "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
1111)     that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
1112)     but not for connections to external websites or other services.
1113)     </p>
1114)     
1115)     <p>
1116)     If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
1117)     (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).
1118)     If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example,
1119)     you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please
1120)     explicitly reject them in your exit policy &mdash; otherwise Tor users
1121)     will be impacted too.
1122)     </p>
1123)     

1124)     <hr>

1125)     
1126)     <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>
1127)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay
1128)     or bridge relay?</a></h3>
1129)     
1130)     <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)
1131)     are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
1132)     in the main Tor directory. That means
1133)     that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
1134)     network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
1135)     </p>
1136)     
1137)     <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
1138)     configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
1139)     publically or not.
1140)     </p>
1141)     

1142)     <p>Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter

1143)     connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
1144)     right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
1145)     get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
1146)     security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a
1147)     public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.
1148)     </p>
1149)     
1150)     <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
1151)     lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay &mdash;
1152)     bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to 
1153)     <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely run a normal
1154)     relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and only have
1155)     a little bit of bandwidth, then flip a coin. Thanks for volunteering!
1156)     </p>
1157)     

1158)     <hr>

1159)     
1160)     <a id="RelayMemory"></a>
1161)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so
1162)     much memory?</a></h3>
1163)     
1164)     <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some
1165)     tips for reducing its footprint:
1166)     </p>
1167)     
1168)     <ol>
1169)     <li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation
1170)     bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory
1171)     back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard
1172)     to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation,
1173)     which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher
1174)     CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead:
1175)     <tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li>
1176)     
1177)     <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
1178)     open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
1179)     buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a
1180)     href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jun-2008/msg00001.html">release
1181)     unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
1182)     1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
1183)     this feature.</li>
1184)     
1185)     <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or
1186)     old FreeBSD, Tor is probably forking separate processes
1187)     rather than using threads. Consider switching to a <a

1188)     href="<wikifaq>#RelayOS">better

1189)     operating system</a>.</li>
1190)     
1191)     <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the
1192)     amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth
1193)     means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow
1194)     as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man
1195)     page.</li>
1196)     
1197)     </ol>
1198)     
1199)     <p>
1200)     All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual
1201)     for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.
1202)     </p>
1203)     

1204)     <hr>

1205)     
1206)     <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>
1207)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>
1208)     
1209)     <p>

1210)     We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br>

1211)     </p>
1212)     <ul>
1213)     <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings
1214)     are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li>
1215)     <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
1216)     <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
1217)     </ul>
1218)     

1219)     <hr>

1220)     
1221)     <a id="KeyManagement"></a>
1222)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys
1223)     Tor uses.</a></h3>
1224)     
1225)     <p>
1226)     Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)
1227)     encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
1228)     authentication so clients know they're
1229)     talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
1230)     sure all clients know the same set of relays.
1231)     </p>
1232)     
1233)     <p>
1234)     <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
1235)     so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
1236)     intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption
1237)     key with each relay in the circuit, so only the exit relay can read
1238)     the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
1239)     so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
1240)     won't work.
1241)     </p>
1242)     
1243)     <p>
1244)     <b>Authentication</b>:
1245)     Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
1246)     When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
1247)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
1248)     that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
1249)     the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
1250)     Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
1251)     </p>
1252)     
1253)     <p>
1254)     <b>Coordination</b>:
1255)     How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they
1256)     have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
1257)     key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a
1258)     "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a
1259)     href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>
1260)     of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
1261)     each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
1262)     locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
1263)     a threshold of the directory authorities, he can't trick the Tor client
1264)     into using other Tor relays.
1265)     </p>
1266)     
1267)     <p>
1268)     How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
1269)     comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
1270)     authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network
1271)     is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
1272)     </p>
1273)     
1274)     <p>
1275)     How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
1276)     the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a
1277)     href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. See the <a
1278)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">instructions
1279)     on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
1280)     </p>
1281)     
1282)     <p>
1283)     In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
1284)     met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
1285)     need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on
1286)     this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
1287)     and start meeting people.
1288)     </p>
1289)     

1290)     <hr>

1291)     
1292)     <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>
1293)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor
1294)     user be a relay.</a></h3>
1295)     
1296)     <p>
1297)     Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the

1298)     network to handle all our users, and <a href="<wikifaq>#RelayAnonymity">running a Tor

1299)     relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good
1300)     relays &mdash; for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive
1301)     firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they
1302)     can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical
1303)     part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users
1304)     are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
1305)     increases the size of the anonymity set.
1306)     </p>
1307)     
1308)     <p>
1309)     That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
1310)     really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining
1311)     a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past
1312)     few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports
1313)     uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
1314)     how much bandwidth it can offer.
1315)     </p>
1316)     
1317)     <p>
1318)     There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
1319)     </p>
1320)     
1321)     <p>
1322)     First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
1323)     operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
1324)     and we plan to finally address that in 2009. See Section 4.1 of <a
1325)     href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
1326)     development roadmap</a>.
1327)     </p>
1328)     
1329)     <p>
1330)     Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
1331)     the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
1332)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">research section of the
1333)     volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays
1334)     have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a

1335)     href="<wikifaq>#TransportIPnotTCP">switching

1336)     to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here &mdash; which alas is
1337)     not a very simple answer at all.
1338)     </p>
1339)     
1340)     <p>
1341)     Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
1342)     stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
1343)     relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
1344)     users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
1345)     impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
1346)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
1347)     for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
1348)     </p>
1349)     
1350)     <p>
1351)     Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
1352)     letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
1353)     you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. <a
1354)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Three</a> <a
1355)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a>
1356)     <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers
1357)     describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic
1358)     through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the
1359)     circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor
1360)     context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to
1361)     encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as
1362)     <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
1363)     we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
1364)     </p>
1365)     
1366)     <p>
1367)     Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
1368)     to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our

1369)     <a href="<blog>two-incentive-designs-tor">current

1370)     thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.
1371)     </p>
1372)     
1373)     <p>
1374)     Please help on all of these!
1375)     </p>
1376)     

1377)     <hr>

1378)     
1379)     <a id="Criminals"></a>
1380)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
1381)     things?</a></h3>
1382)     
1383)     <p>
1384)     For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a
1385)     href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.
1386)     </p>
1387)     

1388)     <hr>

1389)     
1390)     <a id="RespondISP"></a>
1391)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my
1392)     exit relay?</a></h3>
1393)     
1394)     <p>
1395)     A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a

1396)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/TorAbuseTemplates">collected

1397)     here</a>.
1398)     </p>
1399)     

1400)     <hr>

1401)