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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Abuse FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Abuse FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol"> 
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Abuse FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16)     #<!-- BEGIN SIDEBAR -->
17)     #<div class="sidebar-left">
18)     #<h3>Questions</h3>
19)     #<ul>
20)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#WhatAboutCriminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
21)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#DDoS">What about distributed denial of service attacks?</a></li>
22)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#WhatAboutSpammers">What about spammers?</a></li>
23)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#HowMuchAbuse">Does Tor get much abuse?</a></li>
24)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run an exit relay?</a></li>
25)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#IrcBans">Tor is banned from the IRC network I want to use.</a></li>
26)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#SMTPBans">Your nodes are banned from the mail server I want to use.</a></li>
27)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#Bans">I want to ban the Tor network from my service.</a></li>
28)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TracingUsers">I have a compelling reason to trace a Tor user. Can you help?</a></li>
29)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></li>
30)     #<li><a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions about Tor abuse.</a></li>
31)     #</ul>
32)     #</div>
33)     #<!-- END SIDEBAR -->

34)     <h3>Questions</h3>
35)     <ul>
36)     <li><a href="#WhatAboutCriminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
37)     <li><a href="#DDoS">What about distributed denial of service attacks?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#WhatAboutSpammers">What about spammers?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#HowMuchAbuse">Does Tor get much abuse?</a></li>
40)     <li><a href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run an exit relay?</a></li>
41)     <li><a href="#IrcBans">Tor is banned from the IRC network I want to use.</a></li>
42)     <li><a href="#SMTPBans">Your nodes are banned from the mail server I want to use.</a></li>
43)     <li><a href="#Bans">I want to ban the Tor network from my service.</a></li>
44)     <li><a href="#TracingUsers">I have a compelling reason to trace a Tor user. Can you help?</a></li>
45)     <li><a href="#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></li>
46)     <li><a href="#LegalQuestions">I have legal questions about Tor abuse.</a></li>
47)     </ul>
48)     <hr>

49)     
50)     <a id="WhatAboutCriminals"></a>
51)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatAboutCriminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3>
52)     
53)     <p>Criminals can already do bad things. Since they're willing to
54)     break laws, they already have lots of options available that provide
55)     <em>better</em> privacy than Tor provides. They can steal cell phones,
56)     use them, and throw them in a ditch; they can crack into computers
57)     in Korea or Brazil and use them to launch abusive activities; they
58)     can use spyware, viruses, and other techniques to take control of
59)     literally millions of Windows machines around the world. </p>
60)     
61)     <p>Tor aims to provide protection for ordinary people who want to follow
62)     the law. Only criminals have privacy right now, and we need to fix that. </p>
63)     
64)     <p>Some advocates of anonymity explain that it's just a tradeoff &mdash;
65)     accepting the bad uses for the good ones &mdash; but there's more to it
66)     than that.
67)     Criminals and other bad people have the motivation to learn how to
68)     get good anonymity, and many have the motivation to pay well to achieve
69)     it. Being able to steal and reuse the identities of innocent victims
70)     (identify theft) makes it even easier. Normal people, on the other hand,
71)     don't have the time or money to spend figuring out how to get
72)     privacy online. This is the worst of all possible worlds. </p>
73)     
74)     <p>So yes, criminals could in theory use Tor, but they already have
75)     better options, and it seems unlikely that taking Tor away from the
76)     world will stop them from doing their bad things. At the same time, Tor
77)     and other privacy measures can <em>fight</em> identity theft, physical
78)     crimes like stalking, and so on. </p>
79)     

80)     #<a id="Pervasive"></a>
81)     #<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Pervasive">If the whole world starts using
82)     #Tor, won't civilization collapse?</a></h3>

83)     
84)     <a id="DDoS"></a>
85)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DDoS">What about distributed denial of service attacks?</a></h3>
86)     
87)     <p>Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks typically rely on having a group
88)     of thousands of computers all sending floods of traffic to a victim. Since
89)     the goal is to overpower the bandwidth of the victim, they typically send
90)     UDP packets since those don't require handshakes or coordination. </p>
91)     
92)     <p>But because Tor only transports correctly formed TCP streams, not
93)     all IP packets, you cannot send UDP packets over Tor. (You can't do
94)     specialized forms of this attack like SYN flooding either.) So ordinary
95)     DDoS attacks are not possible over Tor. Tor also doesn't allow bandwidth
96)     amplification attacks against external sites: you need to send in a byte
97)     for every byte that the Tor network will send to your destination. So
98)     in general, attackers who control enough bandwidth to launch an effective
99)     DDoS attack can do it just fine without Tor. </p>
100)     
101)     <a id="WhatAboutSpammers"></a>
102)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatAboutSpammers">What about spammers?</a></h3>
103)     
104)     <p>First of all, the default Tor exit policy rejects all outgoing
105)     port 25 (SMTP) traffic. So sending spam mail through Tor isn't going to
106)     work by default. It's possible that some relay operators will enable
107)     port 25 on their particular exit node, in which case that computer will
108)     allow outgoing mails; but that individual could just set up an open mail
109)     relay too, independent of Tor. In short, Tor isn't useful for spamming,
110)     because nearly all Tor relays refuse to deliver the mail. </p>
111)     
112)     <p>Of course, it's not all about delivering the mail. Spammers can use
113)     Tor to connect to open HTTP proxies (and from there to SMTP servers); to
114)     connect to badly written mail-sending CGI scripts; and to control their
115)     botnets &mdash; that is, to covertly communicate with armies of
116)     compromised computers that deliver the spam.
117)     </p>
118)     
119)     <p>
120)     This is a shame, but notice that spammers are already doing great
121)     without Tor. Also, remember that many of their more subtle communication
122)     mechanisms (like spoofed UDP packets) can't be used over Tor, because
123)     it only transports correctly-formed TCP connections.
124)     </p>
125)     
126)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
127)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">How do Tor exit policies work?</a></h3>
128)     
129)     <p>

130)     <a href="<page docs/faq>#ExitPolicies">See the main FAQ</a>

131)     </p>
132)     
133)     <a id="HowMuchAbuse"></a>
134)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowMuchAbuse">Does Tor get much abuse?</a></h3>
135)     

136)     <p>Not much, in the grand scheme of things. The network has been running

137)     since October 2003, and it's only generated a handful of complaints. Of

138)     course, like all privacy-oriented networks on the net, it attracts its

139)     share of jerks. Tor's exit policies help separate the role of "willing
140)     to donate resources to the network" from the role of "willing to deal
141)     with exit abuse complaints," so we hope our network is more sustainable
142)     than past attempts at anonymity networks. </p>
143)     
144)     <p>Since Tor has

145)     <a href="<page about/torusers>">many good uses as

146)     well</a>, we feel that we're doing pretty well at striking a balance
147)     currently. </p>
148)     
149)     <a id="TypicalAbuses"></a>
150)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TypicalAbuses">So what should I expect if I run an exit relay?</a></h3>
151)     
152)     <p>If you run a Tor relay that allows exit connections (such as the
153)     default exit policy), it's probably safe to say that you will eventually
154)     hear from somebody. Abuse
155)     complaints may come in a variety of forms. For example: </p>
156)     <ul>
157)     <li>Somebody connects to Hotmail, and sends a ransom note to a
158)     company. The
159)     FBI sends you a polite email, you explain that you run a Tor relay,
160)     and they say "oh well" and leave you alone. [Port 80]</li>
161)     <li>Somebody tries to get you shut down by using Tor to connect to Google
162)     groups and post spam to Usenet, and then sends an angry mail to
163)     your ISP about how you're destroying the world. [Port 80]</li>
164)     <li>Somebody connects to an IRC network and makes a nuisance of
165)     himself. Your ISP gets polite mail about how your computer has been
166)     compromised; and/or your computer gets DDoSed. [Port 6667]</li>
167)     <li>Somebody uses Tor to download a Vin Diesel movie, and
168)     your ISP gets a DMCA takedown notice. See EFF's
169)     <a href="<page eff/tor-dmca-response>">Tor DMCA Response
170)     Template</a>, which explains why your ISP can probably ignore
171)     the notice without any liability. [Arbitrary ports]</li>
172)     </ul>

173) 

174)     <p>Some hosting providers are friendlier than others when it comes to Tor
175)     exits. For a listing see the <a
176)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs">good
177)     and bad ISPs wiki</a>.
178) 

179)     <p>For a complete set of template responses to different abuse complaint
180)     types, see <a

181)     href="<wiki>doc/TorAbuseTemplates">the collection of templates

182)     on the Tor wiki</a>. You can also proactively reduce the amount of abuse you
183)     get by following <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">these tips

184)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a> and <a
185)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy">running
186)     a reduced exit policy</a>.</p>

187)     
188)     <p>You might also find that your Tor relay's IP is blocked from accessing
189)     some Internet sites/services. This might happen regardless of your exit
190)     policy, because some groups don't seem to know or care that Tor has
191)     exit policies. (If you have a spare IP not used for other activities,
192)     you might consider running your Tor relay on it.) For example, </p>
193)     
194)     <ul>
195)     <li>Because of a few cases of anonymous jerks messing with its web
196)     pages, Wikipedia is currently blocking many Tor relay IPs from writing
197)     (reading still works). We're talking to Wikipedia about how they might
198)     control abuse while still providing access to anonymous contributors,
199)     who often have hot news or inside info on a topic but don't want to risk
200)     revealing their identities when publishing it (or don't want to reveal
201)     to local observers that they're accessing Wikipedia). Slashdot is also
202)     in the same boat.</li>
203)     
204)     <li>SORBS is putting some Tor relay IPs on their email
205)     blacklist as well. They do this because they passively detect whether your
206)     relay connects to certain IRC networks, and they conclude from this that
207)     your relay is capable of spamming. We tried to work with
208)     them to teach them that not all software works this way,
209)     but we have given up. We recommend you avoid them, and <a
210)     href="http://paulgraham.com/spamhausblacklist.html">teach your friends
211)     (if they use them) to avoid abusive blacklists too</a>.</li>
212)     
213)     </ul>
214)     
215)     <a id="IrcBans"></a>
216)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IrcBans">Tor is banned from the IRC network I want to use.</a></h3>
217)     
218)     <p>Sometimes jerks make use of Tor to troll IRC channels. This abuse
219)     results in IP-specific temporary bans ("klines" in IRC lingo), as the
220)     network operators try to keep the troll off of their network. </p>
221)     
222)     <p>This response underscores a fundamental flaw in IRC's security model:
223)     they assume that IP addresses equate to humans, and by banning the
224)     IP address they can ban the human. In reality this is not the case &mdash;
225)     many such trolls routinely make use of the literally millions of open
226)     proxies and compromised computers around the Internet. The IRC networks
227)     are fighting a losing battle of trying to block all these nodes,
228)     and an entire cottage industry of blacklists and counter-trolls has
229)     sprung up based on this flawed security model (not unlike the antivirus
230)     industry). The Tor network is just a drop in the bucket here. </p>
231)     
232)     <p>On the other hand, from the viewpoint of IRC server operators, security
233)     is not an all-or-nothing thing.  By responding quickly to trolls or
234)     any other social attack, it may be possible to make the attack scenario
235)     less attractive to the attacker.  And most individual IP addresses do
236)     equate to individual humans, on any given IRC network at any given time.
237)     The exceptions include NAT gateways which may be allocated access as
238)     special cases. While it's a losing battle to try to stop the use of open
239)     proxies, it's not generally a losing battle to keep klining a single
240)     ill-behaved IRC user until that user gets bored and goes away. </p>
241)     
242)     <p>But the real answer is to implement application-level auth systems,
243)     to let in well-behaving users and keep out badly-behaving users. This
244)     needs to be based on some property of the human (such as a password he
245)     knows), not some property of the way his packets are transported. </p>
246)     
247)     <p>Of course, not all IRC networks are trying to ban Tor nodes. After
248)     all, quite a few people use Tor to IRC in privacy in order to carry
249)     on legitimate communications without tying them to their real-world
250)     identity. Each IRC network needs to decide for itself if blocking a few
251)     more of the millions of IPs that bad people can use is worth losing the
252)     contributions from the well-behaved Tor users. </p>
253)     
254)     <p>If you're being blocked, have a discussion with the network operators
255)     and explain the issues to them. They may not be aware of the existence of
256)     Tor at all, or they may not be aware that the hostnames they're klining
257)     are Tor exit nodes.  If you explain the problem, and they conclude that
258)     Tor ought to be blocked, you may want to consider moving to a network that
259)     is more open to free speech.  Maybe inviting them to #tor on irc.oftc.net
260)     will help show them that we are not all evil people. </p>
261)     
262)     <p>Finally, if you become aware of an IRC network that seems to be
263)     blocking Tor, or a single Tor exit node, please put that information on <a

264)     href="<wiki>doc/BlockingIrc">The Tor

265)     IRC block tracker</a>
266)     so that others can share.  At least one IRC network consults that page
267)     to unblock exit nodes that have been blocked inadvertently. </p>
268)     
269)     <a id="SMTPBans"></a>
270)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SMTPBans">Your nodes are banned from the mail server I want to use.</a></h3>
271)     
272)     <p>Even though <a href="#WhatAboutSpammers">Tor isn't useful for
273)     spamming</a>, some over-zealous blacklisters seem to think that all
274)     open networks like Tor are evil &mdash; they attempt to strong-arm network
275)     administrators on policy, service, and routing issues, and then extract
276)     ransoms from victims. </p>
277)     
278)     <p>If your server administrators decide to make use of these
279)     blacklists to refuse incoming mail, you should have a conversation with
280)     them and explain about Tor and Tor's exit policies. </p>
281)     
282)     <a id="Bans"></a>
283)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Bans">I want to ban the Tor network from my service.</a></h3>
284)     
285)     <p>We're sorry to hear that. There are some situations where it makes
286)     sense to block anonymous users for an Internet service. But in many
287)     cases, there are easier solutions that can solve your problem while
288)     still allowing users to access your website securely.</p>
289)     
290)     <p>First, ask yourself if there's a way to do application-level decisions
291)     to separate the legitimate users from the jerks. For example, you might
292)     have certain areas of the site, or certain privileges like posting,
293)     available only to people who are registered. It's easy to build an
294)     up-to-date list of Tor IP addresses that allow connections to your
295)     service, so you could set up this distinction only for Tor users. This
296)     way you can have multi-tiered access and not have to ban every aspect
297)     of your service. </p>
298)     
299)     <p>For example, the <a
300)     href="http://freenode.net/policy.shtml#tor">Freenode IRC network</a>
301)     had a problem with a coordinated group of abusers joining channels and
302)     subtly taking over the conversation; but when they labelled all users
303)     coming from Tor nodes as "anonymous users," removing the ability of the
304)     abusers to blend in, the abusers moved back to using their open proxies
305)     and bot networks. </p>
306)     
307)     <p>Second, consider that hundreds of thousands of
308)     people use Tor every day simply for
309)     good data hygiene &mdash; for example, to protect against data-gathering
310)     advertising companies while going about their normal activities. Others
311)     use Tor because it's their only way to get past restrictive local
312)     firewalls. Some Tor users may be legitimately connecting
313)     to your service right now to carry on normal activities. You need to
314)     decide whether banning the Tor network is worth losing the contributions
315)     of these users, as well as potential future legitimate users. (Often
316)     people don't have a good measure of how many polite Tor users are
317)     connecting to their service &mdash; you never notice them until there's
318)     an impolite one.)</p>
319)     
320)     <p>At this point, you should also ask yourself what you do about other
321)     services that aggregate many users behind a few IP addresses. Tor is
322)     not so different from AOL in this respect.</p>
323)     
324)     <p>Lastly, please remember that Tor relays have <a

325)     href="<page docs/faq>#ExitPolicies">individual exit policies</a>. Many
326)     Tor relays do

327)     not allow exiting connections at all. Many of those that do allow some
328)     exit connections might already disallow connections to
329)     your service. When you go about banning nodes, you should parse the
330)     exit policies and only block the ones that allow these connections;
331)     and you should keep in mind that exit policies can change (as well as
332)     the overall list of nodes in the network).</p>
333)     
334)     <p>If you really want to do this, we provide a
335)     <a href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">Tor
336)     exit relay list</a> or a
337)     <a href="<page projects/tordnsel>">DNS-based list you can query</a>.
338)     </p>
339)     
340)     <p>
341)     (Some system administrators block ranges of IP addresses because of
342)     official policy or some abuse pattern, but some have also asked about
343)     whitelisting Tor exit relays because they want to permit access to their
344)     systems only using Tor. These scripts are usable for whitelisting as well.)
345)     </p>
346)     
347)     <a id="TracingUsers"></a>
348)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TracingUsers">I have a compelling reason to trace a Tor user. Can you help?</a></h3>
349)     
350)     <p>
351)     There is nothing the Tor developers can do to trace Tor users. The same
352)     protections that keep bad people from breaking Tor's anonymity also
353)     prevent us from figuring out what's going on.
354)     </p>
355)     
356)     <p>
357)     Some fans have suggested that we redesign Tor to include a <a

358)     href="<page docs/faq>#Backdoor">backdoor</a>.

359)     There are two problems with this idea. First, it technically weakens the
360)     system too far. Having a central way to link users to their activities
361)     is a gaping hole for all sorts of attackers; and the policy mechanisms
362)     needed to ensure correct handling of this responsibility are enormous
363)     and unsolved. Second, the bad people <a href="#WhatAboutCriminals">aren't
364)     going to get caught by this anyway</a>, since they will use other means
365)     to ensure their anonymity (identity theft, compromising computers and
366)     using them as bounce points, etc).
367)     </p>

368) 
369)     <p>
370)     This ultimately means that it is the responsibility of site owners to protect
371)     themselves against compromise and security issues that can come from
372)     anywhere. This is just part of signing up for the benefits of the
373)     Internet. You must be prepared to secure yourself against the bad elements,
374)     wherever they may come from. Tracking and increased surveillance are not
375)     the answer to preventing abuse.
376)     </p>
377) 

378)     <p>
379)     But remember that this doesn't mean that Tor is invulnerable. Traditional
380)     police techniques can still be very effective against Tor, such as

381)     investigating means, motive, and opportunity, interviewing suspects,
382)     writing style analysis, technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations,
383)     keyboard taps, and other physical investigations. The Tor Project is also happy to work with everyone
384)     including law enforcement groups to train them how to use the Tor software to safely conduct
385)     investigations or anonymized activities online.

386)     </p>

387) 
388) 

389)     <a id="RemoveContent"></a>
390)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></h3>
391)     <p>The Tor Project does not host, control, nor have the ability to
392)     discover the owner or location of a .onion address.  The .onion address is
393)     an address from <a href="<page docs/hidden-services>">a hidden
394)     service</a>.  The name you see ending in .onion is a hidden service descriptor.
395)     It's an automatically generated name which can be located on any Tor
396)     relay or client anywhere on the Internet.  Hidden services are designed
397)     to protect both the user and service provider from discovering who they
398)     are and where they are from.  The design of hidden services means the
399)     owner and location of the .onion site is hidden even from us.</p>
400)     <p>But remember that this doesn't mean that hidden services are
401)     invulnerable. Traditional police techniques can still be very effective

402)     against them, such as interviewing suspects, writing style analysis,
403)     technical analysis of the content itself, sting operations, keyboard taps,
404)     and other physical investigations.</p>
405) 

406)     <p>If you have a complaint about child abuse materials, you may wish to report

407)     it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which serves
408)     as a national coordination point for investigation of child pornography:
409)     <a href="http://www.missingkids.com/">http://www.missingkids.com/</a>.
410)     We do not view links you report.</p>

411)