tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 4-optional
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
10)   </div>

11)   <div id="maincol">

12)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
13)     <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
14)     <ol>
15)     <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
16)     a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

17)     <li>Do you have an Amazon account? Are you willing to spend up to $3 a

18)     month? Then spin up your own Tor <a href="<page
19)     docs/bridges>">bridge</a> in less than 10 minutes with <a

20)     href="https://cloud.torproject.org/">tor cloud</a>!</li>

21)     <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
22)     services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
23)     <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
24)     to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
25)     for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
26)     or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
27)     security, let them know about us.</li>
28)     <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
29)     users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
30)     yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
31)     we'd love to hear from you.</li>
32)     </ol>

33) 

34)     <a id="Documentation"></a>
35)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
36)     <ol>

37)     <li>Help translate the
38) <!-- web page and -->
39)     documentation into other

40)     languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
41)     guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
42)     Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
43)     <li>Evaluate and document

44)     <a href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">our

45)     list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
46)     <li>We have a huge list of <a

47)     href="<wiki>doc/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

48)     programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
49)     situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
50)     </ol>

51) 

52)     <a id="Advocacy"></a>
53)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
54)     <ol>

55)     <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
56) meetings around the world.</li>

57)     <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
58)     or how to use it.  Some have already started on <a

59)     href="https://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,

60)     <a

61)     href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

62)     and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li>

63)     <li>Create a poster, or a set of posters, around a theme,

64)     such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>
65)     <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "<a
66)     href="https://check.torproject.org/">Congratulations! You are using
67)     Tor!</a>" in any language.</li>

68)     </ol>

69) 

70) <!--

71)     <a id="gsoc"></a>
72)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#gsoc">Google Summer of Code</a></h2>
73) 
74)     <p>
75)     Tor is also taking part in this year's <a
76)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/homepage/google/gsoc2013">Google
77)     Summer of Code</a>! The criteria for this is a little different - either
78)     gender can apply but you need to be either <a
79)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/document/show/gsoc_program/google/gsoc2013/help_page#2._Whos_eligible_to_participate_as_a">a
80)     present student or just graduated</a>.
81)     </p>
82) 
83)     <p>
84)     As mentioned above if you're eligible for either program then please apply
85)     for both! Google Summer of Code is a far, far larger program for us than
86)     OPW so your chances of being applied that way are considerably better.
87)     </p>
88) 
89)     <p>
90)     <b>See our page for <a href="<page about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a>
91)     for more information.</b>
92)     </p>

93) -->

94) 

95)     <a id="Projects"></a>
96)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>

97) 

98)     <p>
99)     Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
100)     maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
101)     of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a

102)     href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Don't be shy
103)     to ask questions, and don't hesitate to ask even if the main contributors
104)     aren't active at that moment.

105)     </p>

106) 

107)     <p>
108)     For a presentation summarizing many of these projects see...
109)     </p>
110) 
111)     <div id="ecosystem_presentation">
112)       <a href="https://media.torproject.org/video/2013-11-t3am-damian-johnson.mp4">Tor Ecosystem</a> (<a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/2013-11-t3am-tor-ecosystem.pdf">slides</a>)
113)     </div>
114) 
115)     <br /></br />
116) 

117)     <table id="projects">
118)       <tr>
119)         <th>Name</th>
120)         <th>Category</th>
121)         <th>Language</th>
122)         <th>Activity</th>
123)         <th>Contributors</th>
124)       </tr>

125) 

126)       <tr>
127)         <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
128)         <td>Core</td>
129)         <td>C</td>
130)         <td>Heavy</td>

131)         <td>nickm, athena, arma</td>

132)       </tr>

133) 

134)       <tr>

135)         <td>*<a href="#project-orchid">Orchid</a></td>

136)         <td>Core</td>
137)         <td>Java</td>

138)         <td>Moderate</td>

139)         <td>bleidl</td>
140)       </tr>
141) 
142)       <tr>

143)         <td><a href="#project-torbrowser">Tor Browser</a></td>

144)         <td>Bundle</td>

145)         <td>C, Scripting</td>

146)         <td>Moderate</td>

147)         <td>mikeperry, Erinn</td>

148)       </tr>

149) 

150)       <tr>

151)         <td><a href="#project-torbutton">Torbutton</a></td>
152)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
153)         <td>Javascript</td>
154)         <td>Moderate</td>
155)         <td>mikeperry</td>

156)       </tr>

157) 

158)       <tr>

159)         <td><a href="#project-httpseverywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a></td>
160)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
161)         <td>Javascript</td>

162)         <td>Heavy</td>

163)         <td>pde, mikeperry</td>

164)       </tr>

165) 

166)       <tr>

167)         <td><a href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a></td>
168)         <td>User Interface</td>
169)         <td>C++, Qt</td>

170)         <td>None</td>

171)         <td>chiiph</td>
172)       </tr>

173) 

174)       <tr>

175)         <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
176)         <td>User Interface</td>
177)         <td>Python, Curses</td>

178)         <td>Light</td>

179)         <td>atagar</td>
180)       </tr>

181) 

182)       <tr>

183)         <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
184)         <td>User Interface</td>
185)         <td>Java</td>

186)         <td>Light</td>

187)         <td>n8fr8</td>

188)       </tr>

189) 

190)       <tr>

191)         <td><a href="#project-tails">Tails</a></td>
192)         <td>OS image</td>
193)         <td>Sys Admin</td>
194)         <td>Heavy</td>
195)         <td><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">#tails</a></td>

196)       </tr>

197) 

198)       <tr>

199)         <td><a href="#project-torramdisk">tor-ramdisk</a></td>
200)         <td>OS image</td>
201)         <td>Sys Admin</td>

202)         <td>None</td>

203)         <td>blueness</td>
204)       </tr>
205) 

206)       <tr>

207)         <td>*<a href="#project-torouter">Torouter</a></td>
208)         <td>OS image</td>
209)         <td>Sys Admin</td>

210)         <td>None</td>

211)         <td>ioerror</td>
212)       </tr>
213) 

214)       <tr>

215)         <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
216)         <td>Usability</td>
217)         <td>C</td>

218)         <td>Light</td>

219)         <td>ioerror, nickm</td>
220)       </tr>
221) 

222)       <tr>

223)         <td><a href="#project-torbirdy">TorBirdy</a></td>
224)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
225)         <td>JavaScript</td>
226)         <td>Heavy</td>

227)         <td>Sukhbir (sukhe)</td>

228)       </tr>

229) 

230)       <tr>

231)         <td><a href="#project-obfsproxy">Obfsproxy</a></td>
232)         <td>Client Add-on</td>

233)         <td>Python</td>

234)         <td>Moderate</td>

235)         <td>asn</td>

236)       </tr>
237) 

238)       <tr>

239)         <td><a href="#project-flash-proxy">Flash Proxy</a></td>
240)         <td>Client Add-on</td>
241)         <td>Python, JavaScript, Go</td>

242)         <td>Heavy</td>

243)         <td>dcf, infinity0, aallai, jct</td>

244)       </tr>

245) 

246)       <tr>

247)         <td><a href="#project-shadow">Shadow</a></td>

248)         <td>Simulator</td>

249)         <td>C, Python</td>

250)         <td>Heavy</td>

251)         <td>robgjansen</td>
252)       </tr>

253) 

254)       <tr>

255)         <td><a href="#project-stem">Stem</a></td>

256)         <td>Library</td>
257)         <td>Python</td>
258)         <td>Heavy</td>

259)         <td>atagar</td>

260)       </tr>

261) 

262)       <tr>

263)         <td><a href="#project-txtorcon">Txtorcon</a></td>
264)         <td>Library</td>
265)         <td>Python, Twisted</td>

266)         <td>Moderate</td>

267)         <td>meejah</td>
268)       </tr>

269) 

270)       <tr>

271)         <td><a href="#project-tlsdate">Tlsdate</a></td>
272)         <td>Utility</td>
273)         <td>C</td>

274)         <td>Moderate</td>

275)         <td>ioerror</td>
276)       </tr>

277) 

278)       <tr>

279)         <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
280)         <td>Client Service</td>
281)         <td>Java</td>

282)         <td>Moderate</td>

283)         <td>karsten</td>
284)       </tr>

285) 

286)       <tr>

287)         <td><a href="#project-atlas">Atlas</a></td>
288)         <td>Client Service</td>
289)         <td>JavaScript</td>

290)         <td>Light</td>

291)         <td>hellais, karsten</td>

292)       </tr>

293) 

294)       <tr>
295)         <td><a href="#project-globe">Globe</a></td>
296)         <td>Client Service</td>
297)         <td>JavaScript</td>
298)         <td>Heavy</td>
299)         <td>Christian</td>
300)       </tr>
301) 

302)       <tr>

303)         <td><a href="#project-compass">Compass</a></td>
304)         <td>Client Service</td>
305)         <td>Python</td>

306)         <td>Light</td>

307)         <td>gsathya, karsten, cwacek</td>

308)       </tr>

309) 

310)       <tr>

311)         <td><a href="#project-onionoo">Onionoo</a></td>
312)         <td>Backend Service</td>
313)         <td>Java, Python</td>

314)         <td>Moderate</td>

315)         <td>karsten, gsathya</td>
316)       </tr>
317) 

318)       <tr>
319)         <td><a href="#project-doctor">DocTor</a></td>
320)         <td>Backend Service</td>
321)         <td>Python</td>
322)         <td>Light</td>
323)         <td>atagar</td>
324)       </tr>
325) 

326)       <tr>

327)         <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
328)         <td>Client Service</td>
329)         <td>Python</td>

330)         <td>None</td>

331)         <td>kaner</td>
332)       </tr>

333) 

334)       <tr>

335)         <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
336)         <td>Client Service</td>
337)         <td>Python</td>

338)         <td>None</td>

339)         <td>kaner</td>

340)       </tr>

341) 

342)       <tr>

343)         <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
344)         <td>Client Service</td>

345)         <td>Go</td>
346)         <td>Moderate</td>
347)         <td>Arlo</td>

348)       </tr>

349) 

350)       <tr>

351)         <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
352)         <td>Backend Service</td>
353)         <td>Python</td>

354)         <td>Light</td>

355)         <td>kaner, nickm</td>

356)       </tr>

357) 

358)       <tr>

359)         <td><a href="#project-ooni-probe">Ooni Probe</a></td>

360)         <td>Scanner</td>
361)         <td>Python</td>

362)         <td>Moderate</td>

363)         <td>hellais, isis, ioerror</td>
364)       </tr>
365) 

366)       <tr>
367)         <td><a href="#project-torps">TorPS</a></td>
368)         <td>Backend Service</td>
369)         <td>Python</td>
370)         <td>Light</td>
371)         <td>Aaron Johnson</td>
372)       </tr>
373) 

374)       <tr>

375)         <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
376)         <td>Backend Service</td>
377)         <td>Python</td>

378)         <td>None</td>

379)         <td>aagbsn, mikeperry</td>

380)       </tr>

381) 

382)       <tr>

383)         <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
384)         <td>Backend Service</td>
385)         <td>Python</td>
386)         <td>None</td>
387)         <td>Sebastian</td>
388)       </tr>

389) 

390)       <tr>

391)         <td><a href="#project-tor2web">Tor2web</a></td>
392)         <td>Client Service</td>

393)         <td>Python</td>

394)         <td>Moderate</td>

395)         <td>evilaliv3, hellais</td>

396)       </tr>

397) 

398)       <tr>

399)         <td><a href="#project-anonbib">Anonbib</a></td>
400)         <td>Website</td>

401)         <td>Python</td>

402)         <td>Light</td>
403)         <td>arma, nickm</td>
404)       </tr>
405) 

406)     </table>

407) 

408)     <sub>
409)     * Project is still in an alpha state.
410)     </sub>

411) 

412)     <br /><br />

413) 

414)     <a id="project-tor"></a>
415)     <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a

416)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/12">bug

417)     tracker</a>)</h3>

418) 

419)     <p>
420)     Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
421)     the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
422)     extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
423)     </p>

424) 

425)     <p>
426)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

427)     <i><a href="#torCleanup">Tor Codebase Cleanup</a></i><br />

428)     <i><a href="#chutneyExpansion">Make Chutney Do More, More Reliably</a></i><br />
429)     <i><a href="#improveTorTestCoverage">Improve test coverage in Tor</a></i><br />
430)     <i><a href="#useMoreCores">Have the Tor daemon use more cores</a></i><br />
431)     <i><a href="#improveHiddenServices">Help improve Tor hidden services</a></i><br />
432)     <i><a href="#consensusDiffs">Implement consensus diffs</a></i><br />
433)     <i><a href="#improvedDnsSupport">Improved DNS support for Tor</a></i><br />
434)     <i><a href="#torSandboxing">Help improve Tor sandboxing</a></i>

435)     </p>

436) 

437)     <a id="project-orchid"></a>
438)     <h3><a href="https://github.com/subgraph/Orchid">Orchid</a> (<a
439)     href="https://github.com/subgraph/Orchid">code</a>, <a
440)     href="https://github.com/subgraph/Orchid/issues">bug

441)     tracker</a>)</h3>

442) 

443)     <p>

444)     Java implementation of Tor and successor to <a href="http://onioncoffee.sourceforge.net/">OnionCoffee</a>.

445)     </p>

446) 

447)     <a id="project-torbrowser"></a>

448)     <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a> (<a
449)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git">code</a>, <a
450)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+bundles/installation&order=priority">bug

451)     tracker</a>, <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/">design doc</a>)</h3>
452) 

453)     <p>
454)     The Tor Browser Bundle is an easy-to-use portable package of Tor, Vidalia,

455)     Torbutton, and a Firefox fork preconfigured to work together out of

456)     the box. It contains a modified copy of Firefox that aims to resolve the
457)     privacy and security issues in mainline version.

458)     </p>

459) 
460)     <a id="project-torbutton"></a>
461)     <h3><a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> (<a
462)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
463)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&order=priority">bug

464)     tracker</a>)</h3>

465) 

466)     <p>

467)     Firefox addon that addresses many of the client-side threats to browsing
468)     the Internet anonymously. Mike has since continued to adapt it to new
469)     threats, updated versions of Firefox, and possibly <a
470)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">Chrome
471)     as well</a>.

472)     </p>

473) 
474)     <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a>
475)     <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a
476)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a
477)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/19">bug

478)     tracker</a>)</h3>

479) 

480)     <p>

481)     HTTPS Everywhere is a Firefox and Chrome extension that encrypts
482)     your communications with many major websites, making your browsing
483)     more secure.

484)     </p>

485) 

486)     <a id="project-vidalia"></a>
487)     <h3><a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> (<a

488)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/vidalia.git">code</a>, <a

489)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Vidalia&order=priority">bug
490)     tracker</a>)</h3>

491) 

492)     <p>
493)     The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
494)     project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development

495)     slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken the
496)     lead with pushing the project forward.

497)     </p>

498) 

499)     <a id="project-arm"></a>

500)     <h3><a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a

501)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git">code</a>, <a

502)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
503)     tracker</a>)</h3>

504) 

505)     <p>

506)     The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor,
507)     intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone with a
508)     tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, providing
509)     real time statistics for bandwidth, resource usage, connections, and quite
510)     a bit more.

511)     </p>

512) 

513)     <a id="project-orbot"></a>
514)     <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a

515)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">code</a>, <a

516)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
517)     tracker</a>)</h3>

518) 
519)     <p>

520)     Provides Tor on the Android platform. The project is under active 
521)     development, updates to latest Tor releases, and working to stay up to 
522)     date with all changes in Android and mobile threats.

523)     </p>
524) 

525)     <p>
526)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
527)     <i><a href="#orbotVPN">Orbot Android VPN</a></i><br />
528)     <i><a href="#orfox">Orfox - Firefox/Gecko-based Android Browser for Tor</a></i>
529)     </p>
530) 

531)     <a id="project-tails"></a>
532)     <h3><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> (<a

533)     href="https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/">code</a>, <a
534)     href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails">bug

535)     tracker</a>)</h3>
536) 
537)     <p>
538)     The Amnesic Incognito Live System is a live CD/USB distribution
539)     preconfigured so that everything is safely routed through Tor and leaves no
540)     trace on the local system. This is a merger of the Amnesia and <a
541)     href="http://www.anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> projects,
542)     and still under very active development.
543)     </p>
544) 

545)     <a id="project-torramdisk"></a>
546)     <h3><a href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk">Tor-ramdisk</a> (<a

547)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-ramdisk.git">code</a>, <a

548)     href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-documentation">documentation</a>)</h3>

549) 
550)     <p>

551)     Tor-ramdisk is a uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose sole
552)     purpose is to securely host a Tor server purely in RAM.

553)     </p>
554) 

555)     <a id="project-torouter"></a>
556)     <h3><a
557)     href="<wiki>doc/Torouter">Torouter</a> (<a

558)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torouter.git">code</a>, <a

559)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torouter&order=priority">bug
560)     tracker</a>)</h3>
561) 
562)     <p>
563)     Project to provide an easy-to-use, embedded Tor instance for routers. This
564)     had high activity in late 2010, but has since been rather quiet.
565)     </p>
566) 
567)     <a id="project-torsocks"></a>

568)     <h3>Torsocks (<a

569)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
570)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
571)     tracker</a>)</h3>
572) 

573)     <p>

574)     Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
575)     slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
576)     otherwise feature complete.

577)     </p>

578) 

579)     <a id="project-torbirdy"></a>
580)     <h3>TorBirdy (<a
581)     href="https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy">code</a>, <a
582)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy/dev">bug
583)     tracker</a>)</h3>

584) 

585)     <p>
586)     TorBirdy is Torbutton for Thunderbird and related Mozilla mail clients.
587)     </p>

588) 

589)     <p>
590)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
591)     <i><a href="#makeTorbirdyBetter">Make TorBirdy Better</a></i>
592)     </p>
593) 

594)     <a id="project-obfsproxy"></a>

595)     <h3><a href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">Obfsproxy</a> (<a

596)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git">code</a>,
597)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Pluggable+transport&order=priority">bug

598)     tracker</a>)</h3>

599) 

600)     <p>
601)     A proxy that shapes Tor traffic, making it harder for censors to detect and

602)     block Tor. This has both a C and python implementation.

603)     </p>

604) 

605)     <p>
606)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
607)     <i><a href="#betterPluggableTransports">Build Better Pluggable Transports</a></i>
608)     </p>
609) 

610)     <a id="project-flash-proxy"></a>
611)     <h3><a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">Flash Proxy</a> (<a
612)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git">code</a>, <a
613)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Flashproxy">bug
614)     tracker</a>)</h3>

615) 

616)     <p>
617)     Pluggable transport using proxies running in web browsers to defeat
618)     address-based blocking.
619)     </p>

620) 

621)     <a id="project-shadow"></a>
622)     <h3><a href="https://shadow.cs.umn.edu/">Shadow</a> (<a
623)     href="https://github.com/shadow">code</a>, <a
624)     href="https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues">bug
625)     tracker</a>)</h3>

626) 

627)     <p>
628)     Shadow is a discrete-event network simulator that runs the real
629)     Tor software as a plug-in. Shadow is open-source software that enables
630)     accurate, efficient, controlled, and repeatable Tor experimentation.

631)     For another simulator, see <a
632)     href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/exptor/">ExperimenTor</a>.

633)     </p>

634) 

635)     <a id="project-stem"></a>

636)     <h3><a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> (<a

637)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git">code</a>, <a

638)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">bug

639)     tracker</a>)</h3>

640) 

641)     <p>

642)     Python controller library for scripts and controller applications using
643)     Tor.

644)     </p>

645) 

646)     <p>
647)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

648)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i><br />

649)     <i><a href="#relayWebPanel">Relay Web Status Panel </a></i><br />

650)     </p>

651) 

652)     <a id="project-txtorcon"></a>

653)     <h3><a href="https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org">Txtorcon</a> (<a

654)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon">code</a>, <a

655)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

656) 

657)     <p>
658)     Twisted-based asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Includes
659)     unit-tests, examples, state-tracking code and configuration abstraction.
660)     Used by OONI and APAF.
661)     </p>

662) 

663)     <p>
664)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
665)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i>
666)     </p>
667) 

668)     <a id="project-tlsdate"></a>
669)     <h3>Tlsdate (<a href="https://github.com/ioerror/tlsdate">code</a>)</h3>

670) 

671)     <p>
672)     tlsdate: secure parasitic rdate replacement
673)     </p>

674) 

675)     <p>
676)     tlsdate sets the local clock by securely connecting with TLS to remote
677)     servers and extracting the remote time out of the secure handshake. Unlike
678)     ntpdate, tlsdate uses TCP, for instance connecting to a remote HTTPS or TLS
679)     enabled service, and provides some protection against adversaries that try
680)     to feed you malicious time information.
681)     </p>

682) 

683)     <a id="project-metrics"></a>
684)     <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
685)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
686)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a

687)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>)</h3>

688) 

689)     <p>
690)     Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
691)     metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by

692)     Karsten Loesing. See also <a
693)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torperf.git">TorPerf</a>.

694)     </p>

695) 

696)     <a id="project-atlas"></a>
697)     <h3><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/">Atlas</a> (<a
698)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/atlas.git">code</a>)</h3>

699) 

700)     <p>
701)     Atlas is a web application to discover Tor relays and bridges. It provides
702)     useful information on how relays are configured along with graphics about

703)     their past usage.

704)     </p>

705) 

706)     <p>

707)     This is the spiritual successor to <a
708)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torstatus.git">TorStatus</a>, the <a

709)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">original

710)     codebase</a> for which was written in PHP, and rewritten by students from
711)     Wesleyan as Django.

712)     </p>

713) 

714)     <a id="project-globe"></a>
715)     <h3><a href="http://globe.rndm.de/">Globe</a> (<a
716)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe">code</a>, <a
717)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>
718) 
719)     <p>
720)     Globe is a web application that allows you to search for Tor relays and
721)     bridges. It gives you a detailed overview of properties and configurations
722)     of a relay or bridge.
723)     </p>
724) 

725)     <a id="project-compass"></a>
726)     <h3><a href="https://compass.torproject.org/">Compass</a> (<a
727)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/compass.git">code</a>, <a
728)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Compass&order=priority">bug
729)     tracker</a>)</h3>

730) 

731)     <p>
732)     Compass is a web and command line application that filters and
733)     aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes.
734)     </p>

735) 
736)     <a id="project-onionoo"></a>
737)     <h3><a href="<page projects/onionoo>">Onionoo</a> (<a
738)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git">java codebase</a>, <a
739)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pyonionoo.git">python

740)     codebase</a>, <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Onionoo&order=priority">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

741) 
742)     <p>
743)     Onionoo is a JSON based protocol to learn information about currently
744)     running Tor relays and bridges.
745)     </p>
746) 

747)     <a id="project-doctor"></a>
748)     <h3>DocTor (<a
749)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git">code</a>, <a
750)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=DocTor&order=priority">bug
751)     tracker</a>)</h3>
752) 
753)     <p>
754)     DocTor is a notification service that monitors newly published descriptor
755)     information for issues. This is primarily a service to help the tor
756)     directory authority operators, but it also checks for a handful of other
757)     issues like sybil attacks.
758)     </p>
759) 

760)     <a id="project-weather"></a>

761)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a

762)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
763)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
764)     tracker</a>)</h3>

765) 

766)     <p>
767)     Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
768)     relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
769)     href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
770)     in early 2011.
771)     </p>

772) 

773)     <a id="project-gettor"></a>

774)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/GetTor">GetTor</a> (<a

775)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git">code</a>, <a

776)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
777)     tracker</a>)</h3>

778) 

779)     <p>
780)     E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
781)     relatively unchanged for quite a while.
782)     </p>

783) 

784)     <a id="project-torcheck"></a>

785)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a

786)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git">code</a>, <a

787)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
788)     tracker</a>)</h3>

789) 

790)     <p>

791)     Site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.

792)     </p>

793) 

794)     <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>

795)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a

796)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
797)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
798)     tracker</a>)</h3>

799) 

800)     <p>
801)     Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
802)     in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
803)     </p>

804) 
805)     <a id="project-ooni-probe"></a>

806)     <h3><a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/">Ooni Probe</a> (<a

807)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/ooni-probe.git">code</a>, <a
808)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Ooni&order=priority">bug
809)     tracker</a>)</h3>
810) 
811)     <p>
812)     Censorship scanner, checking your local connection for blocked or modified
813)     content.
814)     </p>
815) 

816)     <p>
817)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

818)     <i><a href="#censorshipAnalyzer">Develop a Censorship Analyzer</a></i><br />
819)     <i><a href="#ooniprobePcapsSupport">Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</a></i>

820)     </p>
821) 

822)     <a id="project-torps"></a>
823)     <h3>TorPS</a> (<a href="https://github.com/torps/torps">code</a>)</h3>
824) 
825)     <p>
826)     The Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) is a tool for efficiently simulating
827)     path selection in Tor. It chooses circuits and assigns user streams to
828)     those circuits in the same way that Tor does. TorPS is fast enough to
829)     perform thousands of simulations over periods of months.
830)     </p>
831) 

832)     <a id="project-torflow"></a>

833)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a

834)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
835)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
836)     tracker</a>)</h3>

837) 

838)     <p>
839)     Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
840)     These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
841)     SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
842)     actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
843)     months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
844)     has stopped.
845)     </p>

846) 

847)     <a id="project-torbel"></a>
848)     <h3><a

849)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/torbel-tor-bulk-exit-list-tools">TorBEL</a> (<a
850)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbel.git">code</a>, <a

851)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
852)     tracker</a>)</h3>

853) 

854)     <p>
855)     The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
856)     exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
857)     (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
858)     version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
859)     been inactive.
860)     </p>

861) 
862)     <a id="project-tor2web"></a>
863)     <h3><a
864)     href="http://wiki.tor2web.org/index.php/Main_Page">Tor2web</a> (<a
865)     href="https://github.com/globaleaks/tor2web-3.0/wiki">code</a>)</h3>
866) 
867)     <p>
868)     Tor2web allows Internet users to browse websites running in <a
869)     href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Tor hidden services</a>. It trades
870)     user anonymity for usability by allowing anonymous content to be
871)     distributed to non-anonymous users.
872)     </p>
873) 

874)     <a id="project-anonbib"></a>
875)     <h3><a
876)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">Anonymity Bibliography</a> (<a
877)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/anonbib.git">code</a>)</h3>
878) 
879)     <p>

880)     Anonbib is a list of important papers in the field of anonymity. It's
881)     also a set of scripts to generate the website from Latex (bibtex). If
882)     we're missing any important papers, please let us know!

883)     </p>
884) 

885)     <a id="Coding"></a>
886)     <a id="Summer"></a>

887)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>

888) 

889)     <p>

890)     You may find some of these projects to be good ideas for <a href="<page
891)     about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a> and the <a
892)     href="https://live.gnome.org/OutreachProgramForWomen">Outreach Program for

893)     Women</a>. We have labelled each idea with how much work we expect it would
894)     be (effort level), how much clue you should start with (skill level),
895)     and which of our <a href="<page about/corepeople>">core developers</a>
896)     would be good mentors. If one or more of these ideas looks promising to
897)     you, please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your
898)     plans rather than sending blind applications. You may also want to propose
899)     your own project idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.

900)     </p>

901) 

902)     <ol>

903) 

904)     <a id="txtorcon-stemIntegration"></a>
905)     <li>
906)     <b>Txtorcon/Stem Integration</b>
907)     <br>
908)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
909)     <br>
910)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
911)     <br>
912)     Likely Mentors: <i>meejah, Damian (atagar)</i>
913)     <p>Txtorcon is a Twisted-based Python controller library, and Stem is a
914)     synchronous (threaded) one, also in Python. There is no need to have
915)     two implementations of (at least) the protocol parsing code. This
916)     project would entail eliminating duplication by leveraging Stem's
917)     parsing in txtorcon while keeping txtorcon's API the same (or at least
918)     close).</p>

919)     <p>Besides this you should identify some additional tasks to improve our
920)     controller space across these two libraries. Some ideas are...</p>
921)     <ul>
922)       <li>Write a tutorial for <a
923)       href="https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials.html">stem's tutorial
924)       page</a> demonstrating cross txtorcon/stem usage.</li>
925)       <li>Expand the txtorcon API to include functionality of <a
926)       href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/blob/HEAD:/stem/control.py">stem's
927)       controller</a> that would be of interest to twisted users. All additions
928)       should include tests!</li>
929)       <li>Come up with some ideas of your own! We'd love to discuss them with
930)       you.</li>
931)     </ul>

932)     <p>This would very likely involve changes to both libraries, although
933)     most would be expected to be in txtorcon. meejah is available to
934)     mentor txtorcon changes, and Damian (atagar) can help with Stem.</p>
935)     <p>It would help if you're already familiar with event-based programming,
936)     bonus points if it's Twisted.</p>
937)     </li>
938) 

939)     <a id="relayWebPanel"></a>
940)     <li>

941)     <b>Relay Web Status Dashboard</b>

942)     <br>
943)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
944)     <br>
945)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
946)     <br>
947)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
948)     <p>
949)     Relay operators presently have a couple options for monitoring the status
950)     of their relay: <a
951)     href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a>
952)     which is a gui and <a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">arm</a> which uses
953)     curses. This project would be to make a new kind of monitor specifically
954)     for relay operators that provides a status dashboard site on localhost.
955)     </p>
956)     <p>
957)     The interface will likely <a
958)     href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/screenshots.php">borrow heavily from
959)     arm</a>, except of course in areas where we can improve upon it. Two
960)     important design constraints is that a localhost controller provides a
961)     bigger attack surface than guis or curses, so we should be a little more
962)     wary of what it does. This should be a read-only controller (ie, you can't
963)     *do* anything to the relay) and by default not surface any sensitive
964)     information (such as arm's connection panel).
965)     </p>
966)     <p>
967)     This project will likely include two parts: an AJAX site and a localhost
968)     daemon to fulfill those requests. <a
969)     href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> is the backend of arm, and can
970)     be used to get everything you see in arm's interface (making it a natural
971)     choice for the daemon). That said, this project might entail some Stem
972)     improvements if we run across any gaps.
973)     </p>
974)     <p>

975)     This project has the potential for numerous users, one of which is an
976)     interface for <a
977)     href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#project-torouter">Torouter</a>.
978)     We should check if Torouter has any special use cases or constraints we
979)     should take into consideration.
980)     </p>
981)     <p>

982)     Applicants should be familiar with Python, JavaScript, and learn about
983)     <a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a>. <b>As part of your
984)     application for this project please make both mockups of the interface and
985)     a proof of concept demo application using JS to surface something with
986)     Stem. <a
987)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">Involvement
988)     with Stem development</a> during the application process is also a big
989)     plus.</b>
990)     </p>
991)     </li>
992) 

993)     <a id="chutneyExpansion"></a>
994)     <li>
995)     <b>Make Chutney Do More, More Reliably</b>
996)     <br>
997)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High, depending on scope of project</i>
998)     <br>
999)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1000)     <br>

1001)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1002)     <p>

1003)     We have a little Python tool called <a
1004)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/nickm/chutney.git">Chutney</a> for
1005)     making small local test networks.  It's small, not widely used, and not as
1006)     automated as it could be.

1007)     </p>

1008) 

1009)     <p>

1010)     It would be great to see chutney extended and a set of supporting tests
1011)     built to the point where we could use Chutney to exercise various Tor
1012)     features as an automated integration test.

1013)     </p>

1014) 
1015)     <p>
1016)     <b>As part of your application for this project please submit a patch that
1017)     expands Chutney.</b>
1018)     </p>
1019) 

1020)     </li>

1021) 

1022)     <a id="torCleanup"></a>

1023)     <li>

1024)     <b>Tor Codebase Cleanup</b>

1025)     <br>

1026)     Effort Level: <i>Low to High, depending on subproject chosen</i>

1027)     <br>

1028)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

1029)     <br>

1030)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>

1031)     <p>

1032)     The Tor code is almost 10 years old in places, and we haven't always had
1033)     enough time or wisdom to write things as well as we could have.  Our unit
1034)     test coverage is shamefully low, and the dependency graph of our modules is
1035)     shamefully convoluted . We could use refactoring and unit tests!  Please
1036)     look through the Tor source code and look for ugly or tricky code or
1037)     dependencies -- the uglier and trickier the better -- and think about how
1038)     you could make the code look better, read better, and (subject to testing)
1039)     work better.

1040)     </p>

1041) 

1042)     <p>

1043)     If this is for a fun side-project, it would be great for you to work on
1044)     anything that can be made better and more tested.  For an internship-level
1045)     position, we'd hope that you could find a number of particularly tricky or
1046)     knotty piece of the code to clean up, and aim for resolving the ugliest
1047)     problems, not necessarily the easiest.

1048)     </p>

1049) 

1050)     <p>

1051)     For a big project here, it would be great to pick one of the major
1052)     "submodules" of Tor -- path selection, node discovery, directory authority
1053)     operations, directory service -- and refactor its interface completely, to
1054)     minify and codify its points of contact with the rest of Tor.

1055)     </p>

1056) 
1057)     <p>
1058)     <b>As part of your application for this project please identify one of the
1059)     thorniest Tor functions and submit a patch refactoring it to be better. If
1060)     you find this to be difficult then this likely isn't the project for
1061)     you.</b>
1062)     </p>

1063)     </li>

1064) 

1065)     <a id="betterPluggableTransports"></a>
1066)     <li>
1067)     <b>Build Better Pluggable Transports</b>
1068)     <br>
1069)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1070)     <br>
1071)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1072)     <br>

1073)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch), Ximin (infinity0), George (asn)</i>

1074)     <p>

1075)     For Tor users in censored countries, we have a <a
1076)     href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en">
1077)     pluggable transports</a> framework that uses external programs to bypass
1078)     censorship in different ways. Each of these have their own strengths and
1079)     weaknesses.

1080)     </p>
1081) 
1082)     <p>

1083)     We have deployed <a
1084)     href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy.html.en">obfsproxy</a>
1085)     and <a href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">flashproxy</a> bridges
1086)     for a while, accessible using separately-installed pluggable transport
1087)     clients. Recently, we added this client support to the main Tor Browser
1088)     Bundle, and are adding more transports such as scramblesuit and fteproxy.
1089)     </p>
1090) 
1091)     <p>
1092)     There are several possible directions for this project. Ideas include:
1093)       <ol>
1094)         <li>Address gaps or weaknesses in our existing pluggable transports
1095)           <ul>
1096)             <li>Flashproxy: Add WebRTC support to traverse NATs.</li>
1097)             <li>Flashproxy: Improve the facilitator's resistance against DoS
1098)             and poisoning attacks.</li>
1099)           </ul>
1100)         </li>
1101)         <li>Build our pluggable transport combiner, that chains several
1102)         transports together to take advantage of orthogonal types of blocking
1103)         resistance.</li>
1104)         <li>Improve the UX for selecting the appropriate pluggable transport in
1105)         the new Tor Browser Bundle, whilst maintaining user security.</li>
1106)         <li>Implement a new pluggable transport that resists blocking in a
1107)         novel way.
1108)         <ul>
1109)           <li>Impersonate a voice-over-IP protocol</li>
1110)           <li>Impersonate HTTP <a
1111)           href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~amir/papers/parrot.pdf">sufficiently
1112)           well</a> that traffic will go through a HTTP-only proxy</li>
1113)           <li>Implement <a
1114)           href="http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2011/cacr2011-21.pdf">scanning
1115)           resistance</a></li>
1116)         </ul>
1117)         </li>
1118)       </ol>
1119)     </p>
1120) 
1121)     <p>
1122)     Applicants should be familiar with asynchronous/reactive programming, in
1123)     particular the <a href="https://twistedmatrix.com/">Twisted framework</a>
1124)     or something related. Most of the existing code is written in Python, with
1125)     some parts in JavaScript and Go, so you should know at least one of these.
1126)     You are invited to talk to us and ask questions, via our mailing lists
1127)     or IRC. <b>As part of your application, please contribute a patch that
1128)     implements a small feature or fixes a bug related to this area, e.g. <a
1129)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Pluggable+transport">1</a>,
1130)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Obfsproxy">2</a>,
1131)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Flashproxy">3</a>.
1132)     </b>

1133)     </p>
1134) 

1135)     <a id="hsSearchEngine"></a>
1136)     <li>
1137)     <b>Search Engine for Hidden Services</b>
1138)     <br>
1139)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1140)     <br>
1141)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1142)     <br>
1143)     Likely Mentors: <i>George (asn)</i>
1144)     <p>
1145)     This project involves researching and developing a search engine for
1146)     Hidden Services.
1147)     </p>
1148) 
1149)     <p>
1150)     The student is expected to develop a search engine that can index
1151)     hidden services and reply to search queries. The student should also
1152)     develop a crawler that can search both "clear web" and hidden service
1153)     websites to find more addresses. The student is expected to use and
1154)     improve already existing search engine frameworks (e.g. YaCy), and not
1155)     reinvent the wheel when it's possible.
1156)     </p>
1157) 
1158)     <p>
1159)     The student should have a decent understanding of how search engines
1160)     work, what algorithms they use, and of any related open source tools
1161)     that are currently available.
1162)     </p>
1163) 

1164)     <a id="profileUDPTransport"></a>
1165)     <li>
1166)     <b>Profile UDP transport protocols</b>
1167)     <br>
1168)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1169)     <br>
1170)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1171)     <br>
1172)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch)</i>
1173)     <p>
1174)     There are <a
1175)     href="https://research.torproject.org/techreports/datagram-comparison-2011-11-07.pdf">lots
1176)     of options</a> as to how Tor could send its data over UDP rather than TCP,
1177)     and some will likely perform significantly better than others. This project
1178)     will evaluate these options, so as to decide which should be used in future
1179)     versions of Tor. A first step will be to benchmark the various transport
1180)     protocols being considered, in terms of performance and also code quality,
1181)     including userspace TCP, <a
1182)     href="https://github.com/bittorrent/libutp">&mu;TP</a>, <a
1183)     href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_Control_Transmission_Protocol">SCTP</a>
1184)     and <a href="http://curvecp.org/">CurveCP</a>. Initially these transport
1185)     protocols will be examined in isolation, but if the project progresses well
1186)     one or more could be integrated in Tor.
1187)     </p>
1188)     </li>
1189) 

1190)     <a id="httpsEverywhereRulesetTesting"></a>
1191)     <li>
1192)     <b>Incorporate Ruleset Testing into the HTTPS Everywhere release process</b>
1193)     <br>
1194)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1195)     <br>
1196)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1197)     <br>

1198)     Likely Mentors: <i>Peter Eckersley (pde), Micah Lee</i>

1199)     <p>
1200) Ondrej Mikle has implemented a codebase for testing HTTPS Everywhere rulesets
1201) by crawling pages that are affected by the ruleset (<a href="https://github.com/hiviah/https-everywhere-checker">repository</a>).
1202)     </p>
1203) 
1204)     <p>
1205) This codebase still has some rough edges that need to be smoothed over, but
1206) once those are done it should be incorporated into the HTTPS Everywhere build
1207) process, in order to improve the quality of our releases.
1208)     </p>
1209)     </li>
1210) 

1211)     <a id="censorshipAnalyzer"></a>
1212)     <li>
1213)     <b>Develop a Censorship Analyzer</b>
1214)     <br>
1215)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1216)     <br>
1217)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High (depends on the implemented tests)</i>
1218)     <br>
1219)     Likely Mentors: <i>Philipp (phw)</i>
1220)     <p>
1221) Tor is documented to be blocked in <a
1222) href="https://censorshipwiki.torproject.org">several countries</a>. Analyzing
1223) these censorship incidents can be a tedious task; especially without access to
1224) machines inside the censoring networks. To make analysis easier, it would be
1225) great to have a lightweight analysis tool which can be run by censored users.
1226) This tool would conduct a number of networking tests and figure out if and how
1227) Tor could be blocked. The tool's final report should then somehow make it back
1228) to the Tor project.
1229)     </p>
1230) 
1231)     <p>
1232) The theory behind this tool is already <a

1233) href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/pdf/foci2013.pdf">documented

1234) in a research paper</a>. What we now need is code! Implementing it would first
1235) mean getting familiar with <a href="https://ooni.torproject.org">OONI</a> and
1236) <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/trac/">Twisted</a>. After that, the tool
1237) should be implemented as a number of OONI-specific networking tests.
1238)     </p>
1239)     </li>
1240) 

1241)     <a id="makeTorbirdyBetter"></a>
1242)     <li>
1243)     <b>Make TorBirdy Better</b>
1244)     <br>
1245)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1246)     <br>
1247)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1248)     <br>
1249)     Likely Mentors: <i>Sukhbir Singh (sukhe), Jacob Appelbaum (ioerror)</i>
1250)     <p>
1251) TorBirdy is an extension that configures Thunderbird to make connections over
1252) the Tor anonymity network. TorBirdy has been under development for quite a
1253) while but there are two known leaks that prevent it from being used by a wider
1254) audience. As part of this project, you will be working on plugging the known
1255) leaks and implementing a HTTP proxy.
1256)     </p>
1257) 
1258)     <p>
1259) <b>Part 1:</b> There are two patches pending with Mozilla that will plug the two known
1260) leaks in Thunderbird where the local time is disclosed through the date and the
1261) message-ID header. As part of your project, you will work on getting these
1262) patches finished/reimplemented and getting them merged with Mozilla. Please
1263) look at tickets <a
1264) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6314">#6314</a> and <a
1265) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6315">#6315</a> for more
1266) information.
1267)     </p>
1268) 
1269)     <p>
1270) <b>Part 2:</b> TorBirdy needs a HTTP proxy or a HTTP -&gt; SOCKS5 shim. Please look at
1271) ticket <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6958">#6958</a>
1272) for more information. Note: this has to be done using JavaScript and not using
1273) an external proxy.
1274)     </p>
1275) 
1276)     <p>
1277) If time permits and you are awesome enough to finish the above two tasks, you
1278) will be working on the remaining TorBirdy tickets.
1279)     </p>
1280) 
1281)     <p>
1282) Applicants should be familiar with C++ and JavaScript. As part of your
1283) application for this project, please submit code samples for previous C++ and
1284) JavaScript projects that you have developed or point us to projects you have
1285) been involved with (links to a public Git/GitHub repository preferred). Prior
1286) extension development is a big plus and will be given preference during
1287) application ranking.
1288)     </p>
1289) 
1290)     <p>

1291) You may contact the mentors on IRC for more information. (sukhe on #tor-dev, #tor on irc.oftc.net)

1292)     </p>
1293)     </li>
1294) 

1295)     <a id="ooniprobePcapsSupport"></a>
1296)     <li>
1297)     <b>Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</b>
1298)     <br>
1299)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1300)     <br>
1301)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1302)     <br>
1303)     Likely Mentors: <i>Arturo (hellais), Aaron (aagbsn)</i>
1304)     <p>
1305) The feature should also add support for including only packet capture data that
1306) is relevant to the test being run. This means that the pcap should not contain
1307) all the data sniffed on the users machine, but only that which was generated
1308) and intended to be received by ooniprobe.
1309)     </p>
1310) 
1311)     <p>
1312) This can probably be implemented by setting up a tun/tap device and routing all
1313) the ooniprobe traffic through it and only capturing data sent and received from
1314) that device. The task for the student will also be that of doing research into
1315) what are possible strategies for doing this. <b><a
1316) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7416">For more
1317) information see ticket 7416.</a></b>
1318)     </p>
1319)     </li>
1320) 

1321)     <a id="orbotVPN"></a>
1322)     <li>
1323)     <b>Orbot Android VPN</b>
1324)     <br>
1325)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1326)     <br>
1327)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1328)     <br>
1329)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan (n8fr8)</i>
1330)     <p>
1331) Android offers the ability for any application to establish a
1332) VPNService through which all traffic on the device is sent. We want to
1333) implement this type of service in order to route all traffic through
1334) the Tor network. This is a feature that will be implemented directly
1335) into Orbot: Tor for Android if successfully implemented.
1336)     </p>
1337) 
1338)     <p>
1339) The deliverables for the project will be a working Android VPN
1340) implementation that routes traffic through Tor, and integration of VPN
1341) code into the Orbot app. There must also be time made for reporting on
1342) the project through blog posts, network auditing of tracking to ensure
1343) leakage is not occurring.
1344)     </p>
1345) 
1346)     <p>
1347) Useful links and documentation to study:
1348)     </p>
1349) 
1350)     <ul>
1351)       <li><a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">Orbot</a></li>
1352)       <li><a href="http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html">Android VPNService API</a></li>
1353)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/OrbotVPN">Existing work on Orbot VPN</a></li>
1354)     </ul>
1355) 
1356)     <p>
1357) Applicant should have the ability to build Orbot application from
1358) source using Android SDK and NDK tools. A solid understanding of IP
1359) routing, iptables, netfilter and VPN protocols would also be very
1360) helpful. The ability to use Wireshark or other network monitoring
1361) software to test and verify solution is something that can be taught,
1362) but if you already know how, bonus! Finally, understanding how the
1363) exiting Tor software can be used with various transparent proxying
1364) configurations is a good first step to understanding this problem.
1365)     </p>
1366)     </li>
1367) 
1368)     <a id="orfox"></a>
1369)     <li>
1370)     <b>Orfox - Firefox/Gecko-based Android Browser for Tor</b>
1371)     <br>
1372)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1373)     <br>
1374)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1375)     <br>
1376)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan (n8fr8)</i>
1377)     <p>
1378) With almost 1 million downloads, our Orweb browser has been a popular
1379) solution for easily accessing the web via Tor or any other HTTP or
1380) SOCKS proxy, while also ensuring local data caches are cleared and
1381) cookies are properly managed. Orweb is based on WebView, which has its
1382) limitations unfortunately. We would like to move to a
1383) Firefox/Fennec/GeckoView based browser, and have created a prototype
1384) for it. Mozilla has begun releasing GeckoView as a standalone
1385) component, as well, but it needs more testing, debugging and work on
1386) integration into our streamlined browser app model. Our end goal is to
1387) have a mobile browser that matches Tor Browser in terms of privacy
1388) enhancing features and security.
1389)     </p>
1390) 
1391)     <p>
1392) The deliverables for the project are expected to be the creation of a
1393) alpha quality release of Orfox, a GeckoView-based browser with feature
1394) parity of Orweb browser. A bonus goal is to implement additional
1395) features and capabilities based on Tor Browser patches for
1396) Fennec/Mozilla core. Finally, as always, a required activity is a
1397) network audit testing of implemented solution with write-ups, reports
1398) posted publicly.
1399)     </p>
1400) 
1401)     <p>
1402) Useful links to review:
1403)     </p>
1404) 
1405)     <ul>
1406)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/orfox">Orfox (gecko prototype)</a></li>
1407)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/orweb">Orweb (production browser on WebView)</a></li>
1408)       <li><a href="http://starkravingfinkle.org/blog/2013/10/geckoview-embedding-gecko-in-your-android-application/">GeckoView info</a></li>
1409)       <li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor Browser (desktop)</a></li>
1410)     </ul>
1411) 
1412)     <p>
1413) Applicant should have the ability to build Fennec and GeckoView
1414) libraries from source using Android SDK and NDK. Some experince with
1415) browser security models and threats would be a useful background to
1416) have. Ability to do network audits to ensure browser proxying is not
1417) leaking DNS, media streams or other network traffic, as well as tests
1418) against common browser de-anonymizing attacks are necessary.
1419)     </p>
1420)     </li>
1421) 
1422)     <a id="improveTorTestCoverage"></a>
1423)     <li>
1424)     <b>Improve test coverage in Tor</b>
1425)     <br>
1426)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1427)     <br>
1428)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1429)     <br>
1430)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1431)     <p>
1432) Right now, our unit test coverage with the tests we ship is around 30%
1433) -- only 30% of the executable lines in our source are reached by the
1434) unit tests.  Improving this test coverage could make Tor development
1435) much more reliable.
1436)     </p>
1437) 
1438)     <p>
1439) So we need better unit tests, and we need better integration tests too.
1440)     </p>
1441) 
1442)     <p>
1443) Improving unit tests would would involve refactoring functions to be more
1444) testable, and writing a bunch of unit tests.
1445)     </p>
1446) 
1447)     <p>
1448) Improving integratino tests would involve refactoring and improving
1449) the "chutney" program that launches a test tor network, and writing a
1450) bunch of tests to see what works and what doesn't work on such a
1451) network.  It could also involve writing tests using the library "<a
1452) href="https://stem.torproject.org/">stem</a>" to script individual clients on a
1453) Chutney network.
1454)     </p>
1455) 
1456)     <p>
1457) To get a feel for how testing works in Tor today, download Tor and
1458) Chutney, and make sure you can build Tor and use Chutney.  See how the
1459) unit tests work by skimming some of the test code in the src/test
1460) subdirectory.  Try computing test coverage (according to the
1461) instructions in the doc/HACKING file.
1462)     </p>
1463) 
1464)     <p>
1465) Also, have a look at the one current integration test that works on
1466) chutney today: it is a shell script distributed with Tor as
1467) src/test/test-tor-network.sh .  We probably don't want to have all of
1468) our integration tests be written as shell scripts, but it's interesting
1469) to see how one works.
1470)     </p>
1471) 
1472)     <p>
1473) If working on designs for an improved or refactored Chutney, watch out for <a
1474) href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/fog0000000018.html">"archicture
1475) astronautics"</a>: while it's important that we have a well-designed and
1476) maintainable Chutney architecture, it wouldn't be very useful if a good
1477) architecture were the <em>only</em> outcome here: we need tests too.
1478)     </p>
1479) 
1480)     <p>
1481) As part of the application process, please contribute a patch that makes
1482) a non-trivial improvement to chutney, and/or include a new test for some
1483) interesting Tor function. (Please pick a function that isn't completely
1484) easy to test.)
1485)     </p>
1486)     </li>
1487) 
1488)     <a id="useMoreCores"></a>
1489)     <li>
1490)     <b>Have the Tor daemon use more cores</b>
1491)     <br>
1492)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1493)     <br>
1494)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1495)     <br>
1496)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1497)     <p>
1498) Right now, if you run a busy Tor server on a multicore computer, most of
1499) the cores are mostly unused.  We have a "cpuworker" mechanism to move
1500) expensive computations into worker threads, but that mechanism is
1501) currently only used for a small fraction of our cryptography.  Moving
1502) more work into the worker threads could improve performance immensely.
1503)     </p>
1504) 
1505)     <p>
1506) So it would be great to parallelize our cryptography more in order to
1507) better handle more cores.  See
1508) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/MultithreadedCrypto">MultithreadedCrypto</a>
1509) for some background info, and
1510) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7572">ticket 7572</a> for some subtickets
1511) on our tracker.
1512)     </p>
1513) 
1514)     <p>
1515) (If you're reading through the code to see how it works today, you will
1516) also want to have a look at the new implementation for cpuworkers
1517) described in <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9682">9682</a>.)
1518)     </p>
1519) 
1520)     <p>
1521) Completing the implementation of ticket #7572 --which would move our
1522) circuit crypto onto separate threads-- could be a good summer project.
1523) Alternatively, moving all of the signature generation and verification
1524) code onto the cpuworkers could be fun.  In either case, you will have
1525) some important architectural decisions to make about how to minimize
1526) shared data between the main thread and the workers, how to avoid
1527) race conditions between them, and how to test it all to make sure it has
1528) no hidden failure cases.
1529)     </p>
1530) 
1531)     <p>
1532) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1533) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1534) the codebase that you want to work on.
1535)     </p>
1536)     </li>
1537) 
1538)     <a id="improveHiddenServices"></a>
1539)     <li>
1540)     <b>Help improve Tor hidden services</b>
1541)     <br>
1542)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1543)     <br>
1544)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1545)     <br>
1546)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1547)     <p>
1548) We're working on a revamp of the entire Tor hidden service design to
1549) improve the security and reliability of the hidden service system.
1550)     </p>
1551) 
1552)     <p>
1553) This is a big project: see
1554) <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt">proposal
1555) 224</a> for the latest design.  Are you interested in implementing some
1556) part of that?
1557)     </p>
1558) 
1559)     <p>
1560) This is a very ambitious project, so we're deliberately not suggesting
1561) particular sub-topics.  If you're interested in participating, try to
1562) read and understand the <a
1563) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/rend-spec.txt">existing
1564) design</a> and the design proposal for the new design, and then talk to
1565) us about what part you want to work on.
1566)     </p>
1567) 
1568)     <p>
1569) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1570) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1571) the codebase that you want to work on.
1572)     </p>
1573)     </li>
1574) 
1575)     <a id="consensusDiffs"></a>
1576)     <li>
1577)     <b>Implement consensus diffs</b>
1578)     <br>
1579)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1580)     <br>
1581)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1582)     <br>
1583)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1584)     <p>
1585) Right now, every few hours, a Tor client downloads a new signed "consensus
1586) document" that describes the state of the network.  Even though these
1587) documents are compressed, thisstill takes almost half a megabyte.
1588)     </p>
1589) 
1590)     <p>
1591) <a
1592) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/140-consensus-diffs.txt">Proposal
1593) 140</a> describes a design to save a lot of bandwidth by transferring
1594) compressed <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diff">diff</a>s instead
1595) of transferring the entire consensus document.
1596)     </p>
1597) 
1598)     <p>
1599) That's an attractive idea, but it presents some programming challenges.
1600) We probably don't want to ship a 'diff' and 'patch' along with Tor.  Is
1601) there a free, <strong>safe</strong>, robust implementation of one of the
1602) good diff algorithms that we can use?
1603)     </p>
1604) 
1605)     <p>
1606) Alternatively, can we take advantage of regularities in the descriptor
1607) format in order to generate diffs more simply?
1608)     </p>
1609) 
1610)     <p>
1611) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1612) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1613) the codebase that you want to work on.  Make sure that your application
1614) describes which implementations of the diff and patch algorithms you
1615) intend to use, and that your coding samples show strong evidence that
1616) you can do secure string manipulation in C.
1617)     </p>
1618)     </li>
1619) 
1620)     <a id="improvedDnsSupport"></a>
1621)     <li>
1622)     <b>Improved DNS support for Tor</b>
1623)     <br>
1624)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1625)     <br>
1626)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1627)     <br>
1628)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1629)     <p>
1630) Right now, you can only use Tor's DNS support to look up IPv4 and IPv6
1631) addresses, and to fetch PTR records.  But DNS can do so much more!
1632)     </p>
1633) 
1634)     <p>
1635) <a
1636) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/219-expanded-dns.txt">Proposal
1637) 219</a> describes some new cell types that Tor could use to support
1638) more types of DNS over Tor.
1639)     </p>
1640) 
1641)     <p>
1642) To see how Tor implements its existing DNS lookups, start by tracing the
1643) the connection_exit_begin_resolve() function in src/or/connection_edge.c ,
1644) and see how we pass these requests downwards through src/or/dns.c to the
1645) underlying resolver.  It's not too complicated, but there are some
1646) tricky parts to understand.
1647)     </p>
1648) 
1649)     <p>
1650) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1651) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1652) the codebase that you want to work on.
1653)     </p>
1654)     </li>
1655) 
1656)     <a id="torSandboxing"></a>
1657)     <li>
1658)     <b>Help improve Tor sandboxing</b>
1659)     <br>
1660)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1661)     <br>
1662)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1663)     <br>
1664)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1665)     <p>
1666) The seccomp2 mechanism on Linux lets programs improve their robustness
1667) against unforseen bugs by running with restrictions on which system
1668) calls they can invoke and how they can call them.  This can help
1669) security a lot.
1670)     </p>
1671) 
1672)     <p>
1673) Thanks to a GSOC student from last year, we now have seccomp2 support on
1674) Linux, which we use to restrict the capabilities of the entire Tor
1675) process.  (For implementation details, see src/commmon/sandbox.c in the
1676) Tor source.)
1677)     </p>
1678) 
1679)     <p>
1680) But since the restrictions are done over the whole process, all pieces
1681) of the Tor code have permission to do things that only small parts of
1682) the Tor program need to do.  Also, since we use seccomp2, these
1683) restrictions only work on Linux.
1684)     </p>
1685) 
1686)     <p>
1687) It would be great to instead divide the main Tor program into multiple
1688) processes with a robust IPC mechanism and assign each process its own
1689) minimal set of privileges; and to have this work (as best we can) on
1690) systems that don't have seccomp2 (eg Windows, Mac).
1691)     </p>
1692) 
1693)     <p>
1694) Either of these could be a whole GSOC project.
1695)     </p>
1696) 
1697)     <p>
1698) To get started, make sure you understand the existing sandboxing code.
1699) If you're interested in splitting Tor into multiple processes, think
1700) about the architecture, and think about how we could reach this
1701) architecture without completely rewriting the codebase.  (Remember that
1702) even if you're focusing on Linux, Tor still needs to work on other
1703) operating systems.)
1704)     </p>
1705) 
1706)     <p>
1707) If you're interested in supporting more platforms, make sure you
1708) understand and can explain what sandboxing mechansisms you want to use,
1709) and what they're capable of.  (You might want to investigate the way
1710) that other open-source programs, like the Chrome web browser, do their
1711) sandboxing on different platforms.)
1712)     </p>
1713) 
1714)     <p>
1715) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1716) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1717) the codebase that you want to work on.
1718)     </p>
1719)     </li>
1720) 
1721) <!--
1722)     <a id=""></a>
1723)     <li>
1724)     <b></b>
1725)     <br>
1726)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1727)     <br>
1728)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1729)     <br>
1730)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
1731)     <p>
1732) 
1733)     </p>
1734) 
1735)     <p>
1736) 
1737)     </p>
1738)     </li>
1739) -->
1740) 

1741)     <li>
1742)     <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>

1743)     <br>

1744)     Don't like any of these? Look at the <a

1745)     href="/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development

1746)     roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
1747)     and find out what you think needs fixing.

1748)     Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>

1749)     might also be short on developers.
1750)     </li>

1751) 

1752)     </ol>

1753) 

1754)     <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
1755)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
1756)     <ol>
1757)     <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
1758)     Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
1759)     call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
1760)     that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

1761)     href="<wiki>doc/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

1762)     havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
1763)     instead. One solution would be to teach <a
1764)     href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
1765)     overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
1766)     the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
1767)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
1768)     start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

1769) 

1770)     <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
1771)     docs/documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
1772)     fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
1773)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
1774)     new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

1775) 

1776)     <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
1777)     traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
1778)     simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
1779)     really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
1780)     that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
1781)     giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
1782)     See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
1783)     details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
1784)     done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

1785) 

1786)     <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
1787)     accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
1788)     possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing,

1789)     performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and

1790)     Tor if needed.</li>

1791) 

1792)     <li>Write a <a
1793)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzzer</a>
1794)     for Tor to discover security vulnerabilities. Determine if there
1795)     are good fuzzing frameworks out there for what we want. Win fame by

1796)     getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

1797) 

1798)     <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
1799)     encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
1800)     on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
1801)     it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

1802)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list

1803)     of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
1804)     be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

1805)     href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

1806)     for Tor and
1807)     UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

1808) 

1809)     <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
1810)     (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
1811)     first place to start.</li>

1812) 

1813)     <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
1814)     Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
1815)     from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
1816)     them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
1817)     integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
1818)     generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>

1819) 

1820)     <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
1821)     to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a

1822)     href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live

1823)     System</a>.
1824)     </li>

1825) 

1826)     <li>
1827)     Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
1828)     more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a

1829)     href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>

1830)     just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
1831)     and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
1832)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
1833)     webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
1834)     and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
1835)     To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
1836)     href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
1837)     </li>

1838) 

1839)     </ol>

1840) 

1841)     <a id="Research"></a>
1842)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
1843)     <ol>
1844)     <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
1845)     by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
1846)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
1847)     traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
1848)     stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
1849)     attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
1850)     much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
1851)     is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
1852)     that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
1853)     schemes work better than others?</li>
1854)     <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
1855)     protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
1856)     see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
1857)     Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
1858)     client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
1859)     that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
1860)     look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
1861)     timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
1862)     href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
1863)     but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
1864)     client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
1865)     strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
1866)     asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
1867)     natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
1868)     symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
1869)     <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
1870)     href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
1871)     Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
1872)     works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
1873)     fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
1874)     then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
1875)     options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
1876)     attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
1877)     attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
1878)     actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
1879)     much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
1880)     or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
1881)     orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
1882)     sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
1883)     Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
1884)     <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
1885)     the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
1886)     exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
1887)     though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
1888)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
1889)     that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
1890)     Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
1891)     exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
1892)     routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
1893)     approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
1894)     <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
1895)     the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
1896)     circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
1897)     href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
1898)     paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
1899)     anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
1900)     thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
1901)     <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
1902)     (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
1903)     each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
1904)     bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
1905)     don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
1906)     Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
1907)     and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
1908)     a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
1909)     slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
1910)     need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
1911)     solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
1912)     degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
1913)     <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
1914)     current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
1915)     we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
1916)     than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a

1917)     href="http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh/638">ssh

1918)     throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
1919)     overhaul if the results are good.</li>
1920)     <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
1921)     an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
1922)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
1923)     it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
1924)     steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
1925)     block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
1926)     the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
1927)     bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
1928)     How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
1929)     wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
1930)     a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
1931)     <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
1932)     ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
1933)     third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
1934)     streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
1935)     the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
1936)     the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
1937)     tradeoff.</li>
1938)     <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
1939)     puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
1940)     if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
1941)     <li>Programs like <a

1942)     href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

1943)     your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
1944)     every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
1945)     by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
1946)     by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
1947)     do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
1948)     that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
1949)     anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
1950)     Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
1951)     of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
1952)     in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
1953)     UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
1954)     hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
1955)     by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
1956)     browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
1957)     </li>
1958)     <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
1959)     reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
1960)     lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
1961)     connected?
1962)     </li>
1963)     </ol>

1964) 

1965)     <p>
1966)     <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
1967)     of these!
1968)     </p>
1969)   </div>
1970)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1971)   <div id = "sidecol">
1972) #include "side.wmi"
1973) #include "info.wmi"
1974)   </div>
1975)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1976) </div>
1977) <!-- END CONTENT -->