tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 4-optional
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
10)   </div>

11)   <div id="maincol">

12)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
13)     <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
14)     <ol>
15)     <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
16)     a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

17)     <li>Do you have an Amazon account? Are you willing to spend up to $3 a

18)     month? Then spin up your own Tor <a href="<page
19)     docs/bridges>">bridge</a> in less than 10 minutes with <a

20)     href="https://cloud.torproject.org/">tor cloud</a>!</li>

21)     <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
22)     services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
23)     <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
24)     to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
25)     for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
26)     or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
27)     security, let them know about us.</li>
28)     <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
29)     users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
30)     yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
31)     we'd love to hear from you.</li>
32)     </ol>

33) 

34)     <a id="Documentation"></a>
35)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
36)     <ol>

37)     <li>Help translate the
38) <!-- web page and -->
39)     documentation into other

40)     languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
41)     guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
42)     Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
43)     <li>Evaluate and document

44)     <a href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">our

45)     list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
46)     <li>We have a huge list of <a

47)     href="<wiki>doc/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

48)     programs that interface with Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which

49)     situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
50)     </ol>

51) 

52)     <a id="Advocacy"></a>
53)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
54)     <ol>

55)     <li>Monitor some of our <a 
56)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo">public mailing 
57)     lists</a>, like <a 
58)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk</a>, <a 
59)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays">tor-relays</a>, <a 
60)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev">tor-dev</a>, or <a 
61)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tbb-dev">tbb-dev</a>, 
62)     and summarize noteworthy exchanges into articles for <a 

63)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-news">Tor 

64)     Weekly News</a>.</li>

65)     <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
66) meetings around the world.</li>

67)     <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
68)     or how to use it.  Some have already started on <a

69)     href="https://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,

70)     <a

71)     href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

72)     and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li>

73)     <li>Create a poster around a theme, such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>

74)     <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "<a
75)     href="https://check.torproject.org/">Congratulations! You are using
76)     Tor!</a>" in any language.</li>

77)     </ol>

78) 

79) <!--

80)     <a id="gsoc"></a>
81)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#gsoc">Google Summer of Code</a></h2>
82) 
83)     <p>
84)     Tor is also taking part in this year's <a
85)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/homepage/google/gsoc2013">Google
86)     Summer of Code</a>! The criteria for this is a little different - either
87)     gender can apply but you need to be either <a
88)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/document/show/gsoc_program/google/gsoc2013/help_page#2._Whos_eligible_to_participate_as_a">a
89)     present student or just graduated</a>.
90)     </p>
91) 
92)     <p>
93)     As mentioned above if you're eligible for either program then please apply
94)     for both! Google Summer of Code is a far, far larger program for us than
95)     OPW so your chances of being applied that way are considerably better.
96)     </p>
97) 
98)     <p>
99)     <b>See our page for <a href="<page about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a>
100)     for more information.</b>
101)     </p>

102) -->

103) 

104)     <a id="Projects"></a>
105)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>

106) 

107)     <p>
108)     Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
109)     maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
110)     of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a

111)     href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Don't be shy
112)     to ask questions, and don't hesitate to ask even if the main contributors
113)     aren't active at that moment.

114)     </p>

115) 

116)     <p>
117)     For a presentation summarizing many of these projects see...
118)     </p>
119) 
120)     <div id="ecosystem_presentation">

121)       <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb6iqZcQsSg">Tor Ecosystem</a> (<a href="https://media.torproject.org/video/2013-11-t3am-damian-johnson.mp4">mp4</a>, <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/2013-11-t3am-tor-ecosystem.pdf">slides</a>)

122)     </div>
123) 
124)     <br /></br />
125) 

126)     <table id="projects">
127)       <tr>
128)         <th>Name</th>
129)         <th>Category</th>
130)         <th>Language</th>
131)         <th>Activity</th>
132)         <th>Contributors</th>
133)       </tr>

134) 

135)       <tr>
136)         <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
137)         <td>Core</td>
138)         <td>C</td>
139)         <td>Heavy</td>

140)         <td>nickm, athena, arma</td>

141)       </tr>

142) 

143)       <tr>

144)         <td><a href="#project-torbrowser">Tor Browser</a></td>

145)         <td>Bundle</td>

146)         <td>Javascript, XUL, Scripting</td>

147)         <td>Heavy</td>

148)         <td>mikeperry, Pearl Crescent</td>

149)       </tr>
150) 

151)       <tr>

152)         <td><a href="#project-httpseverywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a></td>
153)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
154)         <td>Javascript</td>

155)         <td>Heavy</td>

156)         <td>pde, mikeperry</td>

157)       </tr>

158) 

159)       <tr>

160)         <td><a href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a></td>
161)         <td>User Interface</td>
162)         <td>C++, Qt</td>

163)         <td>None</td>

164)         <td></td>

165)       </tr>

166) 

167)       <tr>

168)         <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
169)         <td>User Interface</td>
170)         <td>Python, Curses</td>

171)         <td>Light</td>

172)         <td>atagar</td>
173)       </tr>

174) 

175)       <tr>

176)         <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
177)         <td>User Interface</td>
178)         <td>Java</td>

179)         <td>Moderage</td>

180)         <td>n8fr8</td>

181)       </tr>

182) 

183)       <tr>

184)         <td><a href="#project-tails">Tails</a></td>
185)         <td>OS image</td>
186)         <td>Sys Admin</td>
187)         <td>Heavy</td>
188)         <td><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">#tails</a></td>

189)       </tr>

190) 

191)       <tr>

192)         <td><a href="#project-torramdisk">tor-ramdisk</a></td>
193)         <td>OS image</td>
194)         <td>Sys Admin</td>

195)         <td>Light</td>

196)         <td>blueness</td>
197)       </tr>
198) 

199)       <tr>

200)         <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
201)         <td>Usability</td>
202)         <td>C</td>

203)         <td>Light</td>

204)         <td>David Goulet</td>

205)       </tr>
206) 

207)       <tr>

208)         <td><a href="#project-torbirdy">TorBirdy</a></td>
209)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
210)         <td>JavaScript</td>

211)         <td>Light</td>
212)         <td>sukhe</td>

213)       </tr>

214) 

215)       <tr>

216)         <td><a href="#project-obfsproxy">Obfsproxy</a></td>
217)         <td>Client Add-on</td>

218)         <td>Python</td>

219)         <td>Light</td>

220)         <td>asn</td>

221)       </tr>
222) 

223)       <tr>

224)         <td><a href="#project-flash-proxy">Flash Proxy</a></td>
225)         <td>Client Add-on</td>
226)         <td>Python, JavaScript, Go</td>

227)         <td>Light</td>

228)         <td>dcf, infinity0, Arlo Breault</td>

229)       </tr>

230) 

231)       <tr>

232)         <td><a href="#project-shadow">Shadow</a></td>

233)         <td>Simulator</td>

234)         <td>C, Python</td>

235)         <td>Heavy</td>

236)         <td>robgjansen</td>
237)       </tr>

238) 

239)       <tr>

240)         <td><a href="#project-stem">Stem</a></td>

241)         <td>Library</td>
242)         <td>Python</td>

243)         <td>Moderate</td>

244)         <td>atagar</td>

245)       </tr>

246) 

247)       <tr>

248)         <td><a href="#project-txtorcon">Txtorcon</a></td>
249)         <td>Library</td>
250)         <td>Python, Twisted</td>

251)         <td>Light</td>

252)         <td>meejah</td>
253)       </tr>

254) 

255)       <tr>

256)         <td><a href="#project-tlsdate">Tlsdate</a></td>
257)         <td>Utility</td>
258)         <td>C</td>

259)         <td>Light</td>

260)         <td>ioerror</td>
261)       </tr>

262) 

263)       <tr>

264)         <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
265)         <td>Client Service</td>
266)         <td>Java</td>

267)         <td>Light</td>

268)         <td>karsten</td>
269)       </tr>

270) 

271)       <tr>

272)         <td><a href="#project-atlas">Atlas</a></td>
273)         <td>Client Service</td>
274)         <td>JavaScript</td>

275)         <td>None</td>

276)         <td></td>

277)       </tr>

278) 

279)       <tr>
280)         <td><a href="#project-globe">Globe</a></td>
281)         <td>Client Service</td>
282)         <td>JavaScript</td>

283)         <td>None</td>
284)         <td></td>

285)       </tr>
286) 

287)       <tr>

288)         <td><a href="#project-compass">Compass</a></td>
289)         <td>Client Service</td>
290)         <td>Python</td>

291)         <td>None</td>
292)         <td></td>

293)       </tr>

294) 

295)       <tr>

296)         <td><a href="#project-onionoo">Onionoo</a></td>
297)         <td>Backend Service</td>

298)         <td>Java</td>

299)         <td>Light</td>

300)         <td>karsten</td>

301)       </tr>
302) 

303)       <tr>
304)         <td><a href="#project-doctor">DocTor</a></td>
305)         <td>Backend Service</td>
306)         <td>Python</td>

307)         <td>None</td>

308)         <td>atagar</td>
309)       </tr>
310) 

311)       <tr>

312)         <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
313)         <td>Client Service</td>
314)         <td>Python</td>

315)         <td>None</td>

316)         <td>kaner</td>
317)       </tr>

318) 

319)       <tr>

320)         <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
321)         <td>Client Service</td>
322)         <td>Python</td>

323)         <td>None</td>

324)         <td>kaner</td>

325)       </tr>

326) 

327)       <tr>

328)         <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
329)         <td>Client Service</td>

330)         <td>Go</td>

331)         <td>None</td>

332)         <td>Arlo</td>

333)       </tr>

334) 

335)       <tr>

336)         <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
337)         <td>Backend Service</td>
338)         <td>Python</td>

339)         <td>Heavy</td>

340)         <td>isis</td>

341)       </tr>

342) 

343)       <tr>

344)         <td><a href="#project-ooni-probe">Ooni Probe</a></td>

345)         <td>Scanner</td>
346)         <td>Python</td>

347)         <td>Light</td>

348)         <td>hellais, aagbsn</td>

349)       </tr>
350) 

351)       <tr>
352)         <td><a href="#project-torps">TorPS</a></td>
353)         <td>Backend Service</td>
354)         <td>Python</td>

355)         <td>None</td>

356)         <td>Aaron Johnson</td>
357)       </tr>
358) 

359)       <tr>

360)         <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
361)         <td>Backend Service</td>
362)         <td>Python</td>

363)         <td>None</td>

364)         <td>aagbsn</td>

365)       </tr>

366) 

367)       <tr>

368)         <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
369)         <td>Backend Service</td>
370)         <td>Python</td>
371)         <td>None</td>
372)         <td>Sebastian</td>
373)       </tr>

374) 

375)       <tr>

376)         <td><a href="#project-tor2web">Tor2web</a></td>
377)         <td>Client Service</td>

378)         <td>Python</td>

379)         <td>Light</td>

380)         <td>evilaliv3, hellais</td>

381)       </tr>

382) 

383)       <tr>

384)         <td><a href="#project-anonbib">Anonbib</a></td>
385)         <td>Website</td>

386)         <td>Python</td>

387)         <td>Light</td>

388)         <td>arma, nickm</td>
389)       </tr>
390) 

391)     </table>

392) 

393)     <sub>
394)     * Project is still in an alpha state.
395)     </sub>

396) 

397)     <br /><br />

398) 

399)     <a id="project-tor"></a>
400)     <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a

401)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/12">bug

402)     tracker</a>)</h3>

403) 

404)     <p>
405)     Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
406)     the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
407)     extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
408)     </p>

409) 

410)     <p>
411)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

412)     <i><a href="#torCleanup">Tor Codebase Cleanup</a></i><br />

413)     <i><a href="#improveTorTestCoverage">Improve test coverage in Tor</a></i><br />
414)     <i><a href="#useMoreCores">Have the Tor daemon use more cores</a></i><br />
415)     <i><a href="#improveHiddenServices">Help improve Tor hidden services</a></i><br />
416)     <i><a href="#improvedDnsSupport">Improved DNS support for Tor</a></i><br />
417)     <i><a href="#torSandboxing">Help improve Tor sandboxing</a></i>

418)     </p>

419) 

420)     <a id="project-torbrowser"></a>

421)     <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a> (<a

422)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
423)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&component=Tor+Launcher&component=Tor+Browser&component=Tor+bundles%2Finstallation&col=id&col=summary&col=status&col=owner&col=type&col=priority&col=milestone&order=priority">bug

424)     tracker</a>, <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/">design doc</a>)</h3>
425) 

426)     <p>

427)     Tor Browser is an easy-to-use, portable package of Tor, HTTPS-Everywhere, 
428)     NoScript, TorLauncher, Torbutton, and a Firefox fork, all  preconfigured 
429)     to work together out of
430)     the box. The modified copy of Firefox aims to resolve the

431)     privacy and security issues in mainline version.

432)     </p>

433) 

434)     <p>
435)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
436)     <i><a href="#panopticlick">Panopticlick</a></i><br />
437)     </p>
438) 

439)     <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a>
440)     <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a
441)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a
442)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/19">bug

443)     tracker</a>)</h3>

444) 

445)     <p>

446)     HTTPS Everywhere is a Firefox and Chrome extension that encrypts
447)     your communications with many major websites, making your browsing
448)     more secure.

449)     </p>

450) 

451)     <a id="project-vidalia"></a>
452)     <h3><a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> (<a

453)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/vidalia.git">code</a>, <a

454)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Vidalia&order=priority">bug
455)     tracker</a>)</h3>

456) 

457)     <p>
458)     The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
459)     project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development

460)     slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken the
461)     lead with pushing the project forward.

462)     </p>

463) 

464)     <a id="project-arm"></a>

465)     <h3><a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a

466)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git">code</a>, <a

467)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
468)     tracker</a>)</h3>

469) 

470)     <p>

471)     The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor,
472)     intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone with a
473)     tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, providing
474)     real time statistics for bandwidth, resource usage, connections, and quite
475)     a bit more.

476)     </p>

477) 

478)     <a id="project-orbot"></a>
479)     <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a

480)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">code</a>, <a

481)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
482)     tracker</a>)</h3>

483) 
484)     <p>

485)     Provides Tor on the Android platform. The project is under active 
486)     development, updates to latest Tor releases, and working to stay up to 
487)     date with all changes in Android and mobile threats.

488)     </p>
489) 

490)     <p>
491)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
492)     <i><a href="#orbotVPN">Orbot Android VPN</a></i><br />
493)     </p>
494) 

495)     <a id="project-tails"></a>
496)     <h3><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> (<a

497)     href="https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/">code</a>, <a
498)     href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails">bug

499)     tracker</a>)</h3>
500) 
501)     <p>
502)     The Amnesic Incognito Live System is a live CD/USB distribution
503)     preconfigured so that everything is safely routed through Tor and leaves no
504)     trace on the local system. This is a merger of the Amnesia and <a
505)     href="http://www.anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> projects,
506)     and still under very active development.
507)     </p>
508) 

509)     <a id="project-torramdisk"></a>
510)     <h3><a href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk">Tor-ramdisk</a> (<a

511)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-ramdisk.git">code</a>, <a

512)     href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-documentation">documentation</a>)</h3>

513) 
514)     <p>

515)     Tor-ramdisk is a uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose sole
516)     purpose is to securely host a Tor server purely in RAM.

517)     </p>
518) 

519)     <a id="project-torsocks"></a>

520)     <h3>Torsocks (<a

521)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
522)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
523)     tracker</a>)</h3>
524) 

525)     <p>

526)     Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
527)     slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
528)     otherwise feature complete.

529)     </p>

530) 

531)     <a id="project-torbirdy"></a>
532)     <h3>TorBirdy (<a
533)     href="https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy">code</a>, <a
534)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy/dev">bug
535)     tracker</a>)</h3>

536) 

537)     <p>
538)     TorBirdy is Torbutton for Thunderbird and related Mozilla mail clients.
539)     </p>

540) 

541)     <p>
542)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
543)     <i><a href="#makeTorbirdyBetter">Make TorBirdy Better</a></i>
544)     </p>
545) 

546)     <a id="project-obfsproxy"></a>

547)     <h3><a href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">Obfsproxy</a> (<a

548)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git">code</a>,
549)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Pluggable+transport&order=priority">bug

550)     tracker</a>)</h3>

551) 

552)     <p>
553)     A proxy that shapes Tor traffic, making it harder for censors to detect and

554)     block Tor. This has both a C and python implementation.

555)     </p>

556) 

557)     <p>
558)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

559)     <i><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports#Helpneeded">Various coding tasks</a></i> <br/>

560)     <i><a href="#betterPluggableTransports">Build Better Pluggable Transports</a></i>
561)     </p>
562) 

563)     <a id="project-flash-proxy"></a>
564)     <h3><a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">Flash Proxy</a> (<a
565)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git">code</a>, <a
566)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Flashproxy">bug
567)     tracker</a>)</h3>

568) 

569)     <p>
570)     Pluggable transport using proxies running in web browsers to defeat
571)     address-based blocking.
572)     </p>

573) 

574)     <a id="project-shadow"></a>
575)     <h3><a href="https://shadow.cs.umn.edu/">Shadow</a> (<a
576)     href="https://github.com/shadow">code</a>, <a
577)     href="https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues">bug
578)     tracker</a>)</h3>

579) 

580)     <p>
581)     Shadow is a discrete-event network simulator that runs the real
582)     Tor software as a plug-in. Shadow is open-source software that enables
583)     accurate, efficient, controlled, and repeatable Tor experimentation.

584)     For another simulator, see <a
585)     href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/exptor/">ExperimenTor</a>.

586)     </p>

587) 

588)     <a id="project-stem"></a>

589)     <h3><a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> (<a

590)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git">code</a>, <a

591)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">bug

592)     tracker</a>)</h3>

593) 

594)     <p>

595)     Python controller library for scripts and controller applications using
596)     Tor.

597)     </p>

598) 

599)     <p>
600)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

601)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i><br />

602)     <i><a href="#relayWebPanel">Relay Web Status Panel</a></i><br />

603)     </p>

604) 

605)     <a id="project-txtorcon"></a>

606)     <h3><a href="https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org">Txtorcon</a> (<a

607)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon">code</a>, <a

608)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

609) 

610)     <p>
611)     Twisted-based asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Includes
612)     unit-tests, examples, state-tracking code and configuration abstraction.
613)     Used by OONI and APAF.
614)     </p>

615) 

616)     <p>
617)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
618)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i>
619)     </p>
620) 

621)     <a id="project-tlsdate"></a>
622)     <h3>Tlsdate (<a href="https://github.com/ioerror/tlsdate">code</a>)</h3>

623) 

624)     <p>
625)     tlsdate: secure parasitic rdate replacement
626)     </p>

627) 

628)     <p>
629)     tlsdate sets the local clock by securely connecting with TLS to remote
630)     servers and extracting the remote time out of the secure handshake. Unlike
631)     ntpdate, tlsdate uses TCP, for instance connecting to a remote HTTPS or TLS
632)     enabled service, and provides some protection against adversaries that try
633)     to feed you malicious time information.
634)     </p>

635) 

636)     <a id="project-metrics"></a>
637)     <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
638)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
639)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a

640)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>)</h3>

641) 

642)     <p>
643)     Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
644)     metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by

645)     Karsten Loesing. See also <a
646)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torperf.git">TorPerf</a>.

647)     </p>

648) 

649)     <a id="project-atlas"></a>
650)     <h3><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/">Atlas</a> (<a
651)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/atlas.git">code</a>)</h3>

652) 

653)     <p>
654)     Atlas is a web application to discover Tor relays and bridges. It provides
655)     useful information on how relays are configured along with graphics about

656)     their past usage.

657)     </p>

658) 

659)     <p>

660)     This is the spiritual successor to <a
661)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torstatus.git">TorStatus</a>, the <a

662)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">original

663)     codebase</a> for which was written in PHP, and rewritten by students from
664)     Wesleyan as Django.

665)     </p>

666) 

667)     <a id="project-globe"></a>
668)     <h3><a href="http://globe.rndm.de/">Globe</a> (<a
669)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe">code</a>, <a
670)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>
671) 
672)     <p>
673)     Globe is a web application that allows you to search for Tor relays and
674)     bridges. It gives you a detailed overview of properties and configurations
675)     of a relay or bridge.
676)     </p>
677) 

678)     <a id="project-compass"></a>
679)     <h3><a href="https://compass.torproject.org/">Compass</a> (<a
680)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/compass.git">code</a>, <a
681)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Compass&order=priority">bug
682)     tracker</a>)</h3>

683) 

684)     <p>
685)     Compass is a web and command line application that filters and
686)     aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes.
687)     </p>

688) 
689)     <a id="project-onionoo"></a>

690)     <h3><a href="https://onionoo.torproject.org/">Onionoo</a> (<a
691)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git">code</a>,
692)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Onionoo&order=priority">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

693) 
694)     <p>
695)     Onionoo is a JSON based protocol to learn information about currently
696)     running Tor relays and bridges.
697)     </p>
698) 

699)     <a id="project-doctor"></a>
700)     <h3>DocTor (<a
701)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git">code</a>, <a
702)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=DocTor&order=priority">bug
703)     tracker</a>)</h3>
704) 
705)     <p>
706)     DocTor is a notification service that monitors newly published descriptor
707)     information for issues. This is primarily a service to help the tor
708)     directory authority operators, but it also checks for a handful of other
709)     issues like sybil attacks.
710)     </p>
711) 

712)     <a id="project-weather"></a>

713)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a

714)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
715)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
716)     tracker</a>)</h3>

717) 

718)     <p>
719)     Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
720)     relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
721)     href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
722)     in early 2011.
723)     </p>

724) 

725)     <a id="project-gettor"></a>

726)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/GetTor">GetTor</a> (<a

727)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git">code</a>, <a

728)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
729)     tracker</a>)</h3>

730) 

731)     <p>
732)     E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
733)     relatively unchanged for quite a while.
734)     </p>

735) 

736)     <a id="project-torcheck"></a>

737)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a

738)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git">code</a>, <a

739)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
740)     tracker</a>)</h3>

741) 

742)     <p>

743)     Site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.

744)     </p>

745) 

746)     <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>

747)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a

748)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
749)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
750)     tracker</a>)</h3>

751) 

752)     <p>
753)     Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
754)     in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
755)     </p>

756) 

757)     <p>
758)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
759)     <i><a href="#newBridgedbDistributor">New BridgeDB Distributor</a></i>
760)     </p>
761) 

762)     <a id="project-ooni-probe"></a>

763)     <h3><a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/">Ooni Probe</a> (<a

764)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/ooni-probe.git">code</a>, <a
765)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Ooni&order=priority">bug
766)     tracker</a>)</h3>
767) 
768)     <p>
769)     Censorship scanner, checking your local connection for blocked or modified
770)     content.
771)     </p>
772) 

773)     <p>
774)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

775)     <i><a href="#censorshipAnalyzer">Develop a Censorship Analyzer</a></i><br />
776)     <i><a href="#ooniprobePcapsSupport">Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</a></i>

777)     </p>
778) 

779)     <a id="project-torps"></a>
780)     <h3>TorPS</a> (<a href="https://github.com/torps/torps">code</a>)</h3>
781) 
782)     <p>
783)     The Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) is a tool for efficiently simulating
784)     path selection in Tor. It chooses circuits and assigns user streams to
785)     those circuits in the same way that Tor does. TorPS is fast enough to
786)     perform thousands of simulations over periods of months.
787)     </p>
788) 

789)     <a id="project-torflow"></a>

790)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a

791)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
792)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
793)     tracker</a>)</h3>

794) 

795)     <p>
796)     Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
797)     These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
798)     SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
799)     actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
800)     months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
801)     has stopped.
802)     </p>

803) 

804)     <a id="project-torbel"></a>
805)     <h3><a

806)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/torbel-tor-bulk-exit-list-tools">TorBEL</a> (<a
807)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbel.git">code</a>, <a

808)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
809)     tracker</a>)</h3>

810) 

811)     <p>
812)     The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
813)     exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
814)     (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
815)     version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
816)     been inactive.
817)     </p>

818) 
819)     <a id="project-tor2web"></a>
820)     <h3><a
821)     href="http://wiki.tor2web.org/index.php/Main_Page">Tor2web</a> (<a
822)     href="https://github.com/globaleaks/tor2web-3.0/wiki">code</a>)</h3>
823) 
824)     <p>
825)     Tor2web allows Internet users to browse websites running in <a
826)     href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Tor hidden services</a>. It trades
827)     user anonymity for usability by allowing anonymous content to be
828)     distributed to non-anonymous users.
829)     </p>
830) 

831)     <a id="project-anonbib"></a>
832)     <h3><a
833)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">Anonymity Bibliography</a> (<a
834)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/anonbib.git">code</a>)</h3>
835) 
836)     <p>

837)     Anonbib is a list of important papers in the field of anonymity. It's
838)     also a set of scripts to generate the website from Latex (bibtex). If
839)     we're missing any important papers, please let us know!

840)     </p>
841) 

842)     <a id="Coding"></a>
843)     <a id="Summer"></a>

844)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>

845) 

846)     <p>

847)     You may find some of these projects to be good ideas for <a href="<page
848)     about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a> and the <a
849)     href="https://live.gnome.org/OutreachProgramForWomen">Outreach Program for

850)     Women</a>. We have labelled each idea with how much work we expect it would
851)     be (effort level), how much clue you should start with (skill level),
852)     and which of our <a href="<page about/corepeople>">core developers</a>
853)     would be good mentors. If one or more of these ideas looks promising to
854)     you, please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your
855)     plans rather than sending blind applications. You may also want to propose
856)     your own project idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.

857)     </p>

858) 

859)     <ol>

860) 

861)     <a id="txtorcon-stemIntegration"></a>
862)     <li>
863)     <b>Txtorcon/Stem Integration</b>
864)     <br>
865)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
866)     <br>
867)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
868)     <br>
869)     Likely Mentors: <i>meejah, Damian (atagar)</i>
870)     <p>Txtorcon is a Twisted-based Python controller library, and Stem is a
871)     synchronous (threaded) one, also in Python. There is no need to have
872)     two implementations of (at least) the protocol parsing code. This
873)     project would entail eliminating duplication by leveraging Stem's
874)     parsing in txtorcon while keeping txtorcon's API the same (or at least
875)     close).</p>

876)     <p>Besides this you should identify some additional tasks to improve our
877)     controller space across these two libraries. Some ideas are...</p>
878)     <ul>
879)       <li>Write a tutorial for <a
880)       href="https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials.html">stem's tutorial
881)       page</a> demonstrating cross txtorcon/stem usage.</li>
882)       <li>Expand the txtorcon API to include functionality of <a

883)       href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/control.py">stem's

884)       controller</a> that would be of interest to twisted users. All additions
885)       should include tests!</li>
886)       <li>Come up with some ideas of your own! We'd love to discuss them with
887)       you.</li>
888)     </ul>

889)     <p>This would very likely involve changes to both libraries, although
890)     most would be expected to be in txtorcon. meejah is available to
891)     mentor txtorcon changes, and Damian (atagar) can help with Stem.</p>
892)     <p>It would help if you're already familiar with event-based programming,
893)     bonus points if it's Twisted.</p>
894)     </li>
895) 

896)     <a id="relayWebPanel"></a>
897)     <li>

898)     <b>Relay Web Status Dashboard</b>

899)     <br>
900)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
901)     <br>
902)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
903)     <br>
904)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
905)     <p>
906)     Relay operators presently have a couple options for monitoring the status
907)     of their relay: <a

908)     href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a>

909)     which is a gui and <a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">arm</a> which uses
910)     curses. This project would be to make a new kind of monitor specifically
911)     for relay operators that provides a status dashboard site on localhost.
912)     </p>
913)     <p>
914)     The interface will likely <a
915)     href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/screenshots.php">borrow heavily from
916)     arm</a>, except of course in areas where we can improve upon it. Two
917)     important design constraints is that a localhost controller provides a
918)     bigger attack surface than guis or curses, so we should be a little more
919)     wary of what it does. This should be a read-only controller (ie, you can't
920)     *do* anything to the relay) and by default not surface any sensitive

921)     information (such as arm's connection panel). Also take a peek at <a
922)     href="http://www.ntop.org/products/ntop/">ntop</a> for ideas on what we can
923)     do with a web interface.

924)     </p>
925)     <p>
926)     This project will likely include two parts: an AJAX site and a localhost
927)     daemon to fulfill those requests. <a
928)     href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> is the backend of arm, and can
929)     be used to get everything you see in arm's interface (making it a natural
930)     choice for the daemon). That said, this project might entail some Stem
931)     improvements if we run across any gaps.
932)     </p>
933)     <p>
934)     Applicants should be familiar with Python, JavaScript, and learn about
935)     <a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a>. <b>As part of your
936)     application for this project please make both mockups of the interface and
937)     a proof of concept demo application using JS to surface something with
938)     Stem. <a
939)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">Involvement
940)     with Stem development</a> during the application process is also a big
941)     plus.</b>
942)     </p>
943)     </li>
944) 

945)     <a id="torCleanup"></a>

946)     <li>

947)     <b>Tor Codebase Cleanup</b>

948)     <br>

949)     Effort Level: <i>Low to High, depending on subproject chosen</i>

950)     <br>

951)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

952)     <br>

953)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>

954)     <p>

955)     The Tor code is more than 10 years old in places, and we haven't always had

956)     enough time or wisdom to write things as well as we could have.  Our unit
957)     test coverage is shamefully low, and the dependency graph of our modules is
958)     shamefully convoluted . We could use refactoring and unit tests!  Please
959)     look through the Tor source code and look for ugly or tricky code or
960)     dependencies -- the uglier and trickier the better -- and think about how
961)     you could make the code look better, read better, and (subject to testing)
962)     work better.

963)     </p>

964) 

965)     <p>

966)     If this is for a fun side-project, it would be great for you to work on
967)     anything that can be made better and more tested.  For an internship-level
968)     position, we'd hope that you could find a number of particularly tricky or
969)     knotty piece of the code to clean up, and aim for resolving the ugliest
970)     problems, not necessarily the easiest.

971)     </p>

972) 

973)     <p>

974)     For a big project here, it would be great to pick one of the major
975)     "submodules" of Tor -- path selection, node discovery, directory authority
976)     operations, directory service -- and refactor its interface completely, to
977)     minify and codify its points of contact with the rest of Tor.

978)     </p>

979) 
980)     <p>
981)     <b>As part of your application for this project please identify one of the
982)     thorniest Tor functions and submit a patch refactoring it to be better. If
983)     you find this to be difficult then this likely isn't the project for
984)     you.</b>
985)     </p>

986)     </li>

987) 

988)     <a id="betterPluggableTransports"></a>
989)     <li>
990)     <b>Build Better Pluggable Transports</b>
991)     <br>
992)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
993)     <br>
994)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
995)     <br>

996)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch), Ximin (infinity0), George (asn)</i>

997)     <p>

998)     For Tor users in censored countries, we have a <a

999)     href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">

1000)     pluggable transports</a> framework that uses external programs to bypass
1001)     censorship in different ways. Each of these have their own strengths and
1002)     weaknesses.

1003)     </p>
1004) 
1005)     <p>

1006)     We have deployed <a

1007)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">obfsproxy</a>, 
1008)     <a href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">flashproxy</a>, 
1009)     <a href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/">scramblesuit</a>, 
1010)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek">meek</a>,
1011)     and <a href="https://fteproxy.org/about">FTE</a> bridges into the main 
1012)     Tor Browser.</a>

1013)     </p>
1014) 
1015)     <p>
1016)     There are several possible directions for this project. Ideas include:
1017)       <ol>
1018)         <li>Address gaps or weaknesses in our existing pluggable transports
1019)           <ul>
1020)             <li>Flashproxy: Add WebRTC support to traverse NATs.</li>
1021)             <li>Flashproxy: Improve the facilitator's resistance against DoS
1022)             and poisoning attacks.</li>
1023)           </ul>
1024)         </li>
1025)         <li>Build our pluggable transport combiner, that chains several
1026)         transports together to take advantage of orthogonal types of blocking
1027)         resistance.</li>
1028)         <li>Improve the UX for selecting the appropriate pluggable transport in

1029)         the new Tor Browser, whilst maintaining user security.</li>

1030)         <li>Implement a new pluggable transport that resists blocking in a
1031)         novel way.
1032)         <ul>
1033)           <li>Impersonate a voice-over-IP protocol</li>
1034)           <li>Impersonate HTTP <a
1035)           href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~amir/papers/parrot.pdf">sufficiently
1036)           well</a> that traffic will go through a HTTP-only proxy</li>
1037)           <li>Implement <a
1038)           href="http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2011/cacr2011-21.pdf">scanning
1039)           resistance</a></li>
1040)         </ul>
1041)         </li>
1042)       </ol>
1043)     </p>
1044) 
1045)     <p>
1046)     Applicants should be familiar with asynchronous/reactive programming, in
1047)     particular the <a href="https://twistedmatrix.com/">Twisted framework</a>
1048)     or something related. Most of the existing code is written in Python, with
1049)     some parts in JavaScript and Go, so you should know at least one of these.
1050)     You are invited to talk to us and ask questions, via our mailing lists
1051)     or IRC. <b>As part of your application, please contribute a patch that
1052)     implements a small feature or fixes a bug related to this area, e.g. <a
1053)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Pluggable+transport">1</a>,
1054)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Obfsproxy">2</a>,
1055)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Flashproxy">3</a>.
1056)     </b>

1057)     </p>
1058) 
1059)     <a id="profileUDPTransport"></a>
1060)     <li>
1061)     <b>Profile UDP transport protocols</b>
1062)     <br>
1063)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1064)     <br>
1065)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1066)     <br>
1067)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch)</i>
1068)     <p>
1069)     There are <a
1070)     href="https://research.torproject.org/techreports/datagram-comparison-2011-11-07.pdf">lots
1071)     of options</a> as to how Tor could send its data over UDP rather than TCP,
1072)     and some will likely perform significantly better than others. This project
1073)     will evaluate these options, so as to decide which should be used in future
1074)     versions of Tor. A first step will be to benchmark the various transport
1075)     protocols being considered, in terms of performance and also code quality,
1076)     including userspace TCP, <a
1077)     href="https://github.com/bittorrent/libutp">&mu;TP</a>, <a
1078)     href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_Control_Transmission_Protocol">SCTP</a>
1079)     and <a href="http://curvecp.org/">CurveCP</a>. Initially these transport
1080)     protocols will be examined in isolation, but if the project progresses well
1081)     one or more could be integrated in Tor.
1082)     </p>
1083)     </li>
1084) 

1085)     <a id="httpsEverywhereRulesetTesting"></a>
1086)     <li>
1087)     <b>Incorporate Ruleset Testing into the HTTPS Everywhere release process</b>
1088)     <br>
1089)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1090)     <br>
1091)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1092)     <br>

1093)     Likely Mentors: <i>Peter Eckersley (pde), Micah Lee</i>

1094)     <p>
1095) Ondrej Mikle has implemented a codebase for testing HTTPS Everywhere rulesets
1096) by crawling pages that are affected by the ruleset (<a href="https://github.com/hiviah/https-everywhere-checker">repository</a>).
1097)     </p>
1098) 
1099)     <p>
1100) This codebase still has some rough edges that need to be smoothed over, but
1101) once those are done it should be incorporated into the HTTPS Everywhere build
1102) process, in order to improve the quality of our releases.
1103)     </p>
1104)     </li>
1105) 

1106)     <a id="censorshipAnalyzer"></a>
1107)     <li>
1108)     <b>Develop a Censorship Analyzer</b>
1109)     <br>
1110)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1111)     <br>
1112)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High (depends on the implemented tests)</i>
1113)     <br>
1114)     Likely Mentors: <i>Philipp (phw)</i>
1115)     <p>
1116) Tor is documented to be blocked in <a
1117) href="https://censorshipwiki.torproject.org">several countries</a>. Analyzing
1118) these censorship incidents can be a tedious task; especially without access to
1119) machines inside the censoring networks. To make analysis easier, it would be
1120) great to have a lightweight analysis tool which can be run by censored users.
1121) This tool would conduct a number of networking tests and figure out if and how
1122) Tor could be blocked. The tool's final report should then somehow make it back
1123) to the Tor project.
1124)     </p>
1125) 
1126)     <p>
1127) The theory behind this tool is already <a

1128) href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/pdf/foci2013.pdf">documented

1129) in a research paper</a>. What we now need is code! Implementing it would first
1130) mean getting familiar with <a href="https://ooni.torproject.org">OONI</a> and
1131) <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/trac/">Twisted</a>. After that, the tool
1132) should be implemented as a number of OONI-specific networking tests.
1133)     </p>
1134)     </li>
1135) 

1136)     <a id="makeTorbirdyBetter"></a>
1137)     <li>
1138)     <b>Make TorBirdy Better</b>
1139)     <br>
1140)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1141)     <br>
1142)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1143)     <br>
1144)     Likely Mentors: <i>Sukhbir Singh (sukhe), Jacob Appelbaum (ioerror)</i>
1145)     <p>
1146) TorBirdy is an extension that configures Thunderbird to make connections over
1147) the Tor anonymity network. TorBirdy has been under development for quite a
1148) while but there are two known leaks that prevent it from being used by a wider
1149) audience. As part of this project, you will be working on plugging the known
1150) leaks and implementing a HTTP proxy.
1151)     </p>
1152) 
1153)     <p>
1154) <b>Part 1:</b> There are two patches pending with Mozilla that will plug the two known
1155) leaks in Thunderbird where the local time is disclosed through the date and the
1156) message-ID header. As part of your project, you will work on getting these
1157) patches finished/reimplemented and getting them merged with Mozilla. Please
1158) look at tickets <a
1159) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6314">#6314</a> and <a
1160) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6315">#6315</a> for more
1161) information.
1162)     </p>
1163) 
1164)     <p>
1165) <b>Part 2:</b> TorBirdy needs a HTTP proxy or a HTTP -&gt; SOCKS5 shim. Please look at
1166) ticket <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6958">#6958</a>
1167) for more information. Note: this has to be done using JavaScript and not using
1168) an external proxy.
1169)     </p>
1170) 
1171)     <p>
1172) If time permits and you are awesome enough to finish the above two tasks, you
1173) will be working on the remaining TorBirdy tickets.
1174)     </p>
1175) 
1176)     <p>
1177) Applicants should be familiar with C++ and JavaScript. As part of your
1178) application for this project, please submit code samples for previous C++ and
1179) JavaScript projects that you have developed or point us to projects you have
1180) been involved with (links to a public Git/GitHub repository preferred). Prior
1181) extension development is a big plus and will be given preference during
1182) application ranking.
1183)     </p>
1184) 
1185)     <p>

1186) You may contact the mentors on IRC for more information. (sukhe on #tor-dev, #tor on irc.oftc.net)

1187)     </p>
1188)     </li>
1189) 

1190)     <a id="ooniprobePcapsSupport"></a>
1191)     <li>
1192)     <b>Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</b>
1193)     <br>
1194)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1195)     <br>
1196)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1197)     <br>
1198)     Likely Mentors: <i>Arturo (hellais), Aaron (aagbsn)</i>
1199)     <p>
1200) The feature should also add support for including only packet capture data that
1201) is relevant to the test being run. This means that the pcap should not contain
1202) all the data sniffed on the users machine, but only that which was generated
1203) and intended to be received by ooniprobe.
1204)     </p>
1205) 
1206)     <p>
1207) This can probably be implemented by setting up a tun/tap device and routing all
1208) the ooniprobe traffic through it and only capturing data sent and received from
1209) that device. The task for the student will also be that of doing research into
1210) what are possible strategies for doing this. <b><a
1211) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7416">For more
1212) information see ticket 7416.</a></b>
1213)     </p>
1214)     </li>
1215) 

1216)     <a id="orbotVPN"></a>
1217)     <li>
1218)     <b>Orbot Android VPN</b>
1219)     <br>
1220)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1221)     <br>
1222)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1223)     <br>
1224)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan (n8fr8)</i>
1225)     <p>
1226) Android offers the ability for any application to establish a
1227) VPNService through which all traffic on the device is sent. We want to
1228) implement this type of service in order to route all traffic through
1229) the Tor network. This is a feature that will be implemented directly
1230) into Orbot: Tor for Android if successfully implemented.
1231)     </p>
1232) 
1233)     <p>
1234) The deliverables for the project will be a working Android VPN
1235) implementation that routes traffic through Tor, and integration of VPN
1236) code into the Orbot app. There must also be time made for reporting on
1237) the project through blog posts, network auditing of tracking to ensure
1238) leakage is not occurring.
1239)     </p>
1240) 
1241)     <p>
1242) Useful links and documentation to study:
1243)     </p>
1244) 
1245)     <ul>
1246)       <li><a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">Orbot</a></li>
1247)       <li><a href="http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html">Android VPNService API</a></li>
1248)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/OrbotVPN">Existing work on Orbot VPN</a></li>
1249)     </ul>
1250) 
1251)     <p>
1252) Applicant should have the ability to build Orbot application from
1253) source using Android SDK and NDK tools. A solid understanding of IP
1254) routing, iptables, netfilter and VPN protocols would also be very
1255) helpful. The ability to use Wireshark or other network monitoring
1256) software to test and verify solution is something that can be taught,
1257) but if you already know how, bonus! Finally, understanding how the
1258) exiting Tor software can be used with various transparent proxying
1259) configurations is a good first step to understanding this problem.
1260)     </p>
1261)     </li>
1262) 
1263)     <a id="improveTorTestCoverage"></a>
1264)     <li>
1265)     <b>Improve test coverage in Tor</b>
1266)     <br>
1267)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1268)     <br>
1269)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1270)     <br>
1271)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1272)     <p>
1273) Right now, our unit test coverage with the tests we ship is around 30%
1274) -- only 30% of the executable lines in our source are reached by the
1275) unit tests.  Improving this test coverage could make Tor development
1276) much more reliable.
1277)     </p>
1278) 
1279)     <p>
1280) So we need better unit tests, and we need better integration tests too.
1281)     </p>
1282) 
1283)     <p>
1284) Improving unit tests would would involve refactoring functions to be more
1285) testable, and writing a bunch of unit tests.
1286)     </p>
1287) 
1288)     <p>

1289) Improving integration tests would involve refactoring and improving

1290) the "chutney" program that launches a test tor network, and writing a
1291) bunch of tests to see what works and what doesn't work on such a
1292) network.  It could also involve writing tests using the library "<a
1293) href="https://stem.torproject.org/">stem</a>" to script individual clients on a
1294) Chutney network.
1295)     </p>
1296) 
1297)     <p>
1298) To get a feel for how testing works in Tor today, download Tor and
1299) Chutney, and make sure you can build Tor and use Chutney.  See how the
1300) unit tests work by skimming some of the test code in the src/test
1301) subdirectory.  Try computing test coverage (according to the
1302) instructions in the doc/HACKING file.
1303)     </p>
1304) 
1305)     <p>
1306) Also, have a look at the one current integration test that works on
1307) chutney today: it is a shell script distributed with Tor as
1308) src/test/test-tor-network.sh .  We probably don't want to have all of
1309) our integration tests be written as shell scripts, but it's interesting
1310) to see how one works.
1311)     </p>
1312) 
1313)     <p>
1314) If working on designs for an improved or refactored Chutney, watch out for <a
1315) href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/fog0000000018.html">"archicture
1316) astronautics"</a>: while it's important that we have a well-designed and
1317) maintainable Chutney architecture, it wouldn't be very useful if a good
1318) architecture were the <em>only</em> outcome here: we need tests too.
1319)     </p>
1320) 
1321)     <p>
1322) As part of the application process, please contribute a patch that makes
1323) a non-trivial improvement to chutney, and/or include a new test for some
1324) interesting Tor function. (Please pick a function that isn't completely
1325) easy to test.)
1326)     </p>
1327)     </li>
1328) 
1329)     <a id="useMoreCores"></a>
1330)     <li>
1331)     <b>Have the Tor daemon use more cores</b>
1332)     <br>
1333)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1334)     <br>
1335)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1336)     <br>
1337)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1338)     <p>
1339) Right now, if you run a busy Tor server on a multicore computer, most of
1340) the cores are mostly unused.  We have a "cpuworker" mechanism to move
1341) expensive computations into worker threads, but that mechanism is
1342) currently only used for a small fraction of our cryptography.  Moving
1343) more work into the worker threads could improve performance immensely.
1344)     </p>
1345) 
1346)     <p>
1347) So it would be great to parallelize our cryptography more in order to
1348) better handle more cores.  See
1349) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/MultithreadedCrypto">MultithreadedCrypto</a>
1350) for some background info, and
1351) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7572">ticket 7572</a> for some subtickets
1352) on our tracker.
1353)     </p>
1354) 
1355)     <p>
1356) (If you're reading through the code to see how it works today, you will
1357) also want to have a look at the new implementation for cpuworkers
1358) described in <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9682">9682</a>.)
1359)     </p>
1360) 
1361)     <p>
1362) Completing the implementation of ticket #7572 --which would move our
1363) circuit crypto onto separate threads-- could be a good summer project.
1364) Alternatively, moving all of the signature generation and verification
1365) code onto the cpuworkers could be fun.  In either case, you will have
1366) some important architectural decisions to make about how to minimize
1367) shared data between the main thread and the workers, how to avoid
1368) race conditions between them, and how to test it all to make sure it has
1369) no hidden failure cases.
1370)     </p>
1371) 
1372)     <p>
1373) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1374) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1375) the codebase that you want to work on.
1376)     </p>
1377)     </li>
1378) 
1379)     <a id="improveHiddenServices"></a>
1380)     <li>
1381)     <b>Help improve Tor hidden services</b>
1382)     <br>
1383)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1384)     <br>
1385)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1386)     <br>
1387)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1388)     <p>
1389) We're working on a revamp of the entire Tor hidden service design to
1390) improve the security and reliability of the hidden service system.
1391)     </p>
1392) 
1393)     <p>
1394) This is a big project: see
1395) <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt">proposal
1396) 224</a> for the latest design.  Are you interested in implementing some
1397) part of that?
1398)     </p>
1399) 
1400)     <p>
1401) This is a very ambitious project, so we're deliberately not suggesting
1402) particular sub-topics.  If you're interested in participating, try to
1403) read and understand the <a
1404) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/rend-spec.txt">existing
1405) design</a> and the design proposal for the new design, and then talk to
1406) us about what part you want to work on.
1407)     </p>
1408) 
1409)     <p>
1410) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1411) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1412) the codebase that you want to work on.
1413)     </p>
1414)     </li>
1415) 
1416)     <a id="improvedDnsSupport"></a>
1417)     <li>
1418)     <b>Improved DNS support for Tor</b>
1419)     <br>
1420)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1421)     <br>
1422)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1423)     <br>
1424)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1425)     <p>
1426) Right now, you can only use Tor's DNS support to look up IPv4 and IPv6
1427) addresses, and to fetch PTR records.  But DNS can do so much more!
1428)     </p>
1429) 
1430)     <p>
1431) <a
1432) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/219-expanded-dns.txt">Proposal
1433) 219</a> describes some new cell types that Tor could use to support
1434) more types of DNS over Tor.
1435)     </p>
1436) 
1437)     <p>
1438) To see how Tor implements its existing DNS lookups, start by tracing the
1439) the connection_exit_begin_resolve() function in src/or/connection_edge.c ,
1440) and see how we pass these requests downwards through src/or/dns.c to the
1441) underlying resolver.  It's not too complicated, but there are some
1442) tricky parts to understand.
1443)     </p>
1444) 
1445)     <p>
1446) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1447) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1448) the codebase that you want to work on.
1449)     </p>
1450)     </li>
1451) 
1452)     <a id="torSandboxing"></a>
1453)     <li>
1454)     <b>Help improve Tor sandboxing</b>
1455)     <br>
1456)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1457)     <br>
1458)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1459)     <br>
1460)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm)</i>
1461)     <p>
1462) The seccomp2 mechanism on Linux lets programs improve their robustness
1463) against unforseen bugs by running with restrictions on which system
1464) calls they can invoke and how they can call them.  This can help
1465) security a lot.
1466)     </p>
1467) 
1468)     <p>
1469) Thanks to a GSOC student from last year, we now have seccomp2 support on
1470) Linux, which we use to restrict the capabilities of the entire Tor
1471) process.  (For implementation details, see src/commmon/sandbox.c in the
1472) Tor source.)
1473)     </p>
1474) 
1475)     <p>
1476) But since the restrictions are done over the whole process, all pieces
1477) of the Tor code have permission to do things that only small parts of
1478) the Tor program need to do.  Also, since we use seccomp2, these
1479) restrictions only work on Linux.
1480)     </p>
1481) 
1482)     <p>
1483) It would be great to instead divide the main Tor program into multiple
1484) processes with a robust IPC mechanism and assign each process its own
1485) minimal set of privileges; and to have this work (as best we can) on
1486) systems that don't have seccomp2 (eg Windows, Mac).
1487)     </p>
1488) 
1489)     <p>
1490) Either of these could be a whole GSOC project.
1491)     </p>
1492) 
1493)     <p>
1494) To get started, make sure you understand the existing sandboxing code.
1495) If you're interested in splitting Tor into multiple processes, think
1496) about the architecture, and think about how we could reach this
1497) architecture without completely rewriting the codebase.  (Remember that
1498) even if you're focusing on Linux, Tor still needs to work on other
1499) operating systems.)
1500)     </p>
1501) 
1502)     <p>
1503) If you're interested in supporting more platforms, make sure you
1504) understand and can explain what sandboxing mechansisms you want to use,
1505) and what they're capable of.  (You might want to investigate the way
1506) that other open-source programs, like the Chrome web browser, do their
1507) sandboxing on different platforms.)
1508)     </p>
1509) 
1510)     <p>
1511) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1512) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1513) the codebase that you want to work on.
1514)     </p>
1515)     </li>
1516) 

1517)     <a id="panopticlick"></a>
1518)     <li>
1519)     <b>Panopticlick</b>
1520)     <br>
1521)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1522)     <br>
1523)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1524)     <br>

1525)     Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>, <i>Mike Perry</i>, <i>Nicolas Vigier</i>
1526)     <p>
1527) 
1528) The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a>
1529) revolutionized how people think about <a
1530) href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">browser
1531) fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser
1532) fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of
1533) individual browser features to overall fingerprintability.
1534) 
1535)     </p>
1536)     <p>
1537) 
1538) Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a
1539) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton">makes
1540) it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially
1541) for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is
1542) because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our
1543) users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint
1544) data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of
1545) one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser
1546) (Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example,
1547) based on feature set alone).
1548) 
1549)    </p>
1550)    <p>
1551) 
1552) To address this, we would like to have <a

1553) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119">our own

1554) fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser
1555) feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a
1556) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting">additional
1557) fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick.
1558)    </p>
1559)    <p>
1560) 
1561) For this project, the student would develop a website that users can
1562) voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint.  The user
1563) should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be
1564) available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser
1565) version.  In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated
1566) tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the
1567) uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each
1568) browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and
1569) version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific
1570) implementation.
1571) 

1572)     </p>
1573)     </li>
1574) 

1575)     <a id="improveStegotorus"></a>
1576)     <li>
1577)     <b>Improve Stegotorus</b>
1578)     <br>
1579)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1580)     <br>
1581)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1582)     <br>
1583)     Likely Mentors: <i>vmon</i>
1584)     <p>
1585) Stegotorus is a fork of obfsproxy which helps developers to write more intelligent pluggable transports which can hide easier from deep packet inspector (DPI) system.
1586)     </p>
1587) 
1588)     <p>
1589) For example, Stegotorus is equipped with a "chopper module" which takes care of following aspects:
1590)     </p>
1591) 
1592)     <ol>
1593)       <li>It randomize the packet size so it is harder for the DPI system to detect the traffic base on the distribution of the packet size.</li>
1594)       <li>It makes sure that it only handle as much (or as less) information as the transport module can handle.</li>
1595)       <li>Chopper is equipped with it is own acknowledge/retransmit protocol. If the censor trying to disturb the connection by dropping or disturbing some of packets, it can recover the data by sending them many times.</li>
1596)     </ol>
1597) 
1598)     <p>
1599) More importantly, Stegotorus is coming with its own HTTP transport module which obfuscates Tor or any other encrypted traffic in HTTP content such as Javascript code or images. HTTP transport module is also written in a way which new module developers can easily add new obfuscation modules for new contents or improve current obfuscation algorithms without the need of dealing with networking aspect of the problem.
1600)     </p>
1601) 
1602)     <p>
1603) Stegotorus is written in C++. you can find the latest code <a href="https://github.com/zackw/stegotorus/tree/tor-improve">here</a>.
1604)     </p>
1605) 
1606)     <p>
1607) In this regard, Stegotorus is offering one of the most complete and sophisticated platforms for writing stealthy pluggable transports.
1608)     </p>
1609) 
1610)     <p>
1611) If you know C++ and interested in Stegotorus and excited about battling censorship, there are many ways that you can contribute to Stegotorus. Here are few important tasks. Your proposal might contain a good number of them:
1612)     </p>
1613) 
1614)     <ol>
1615)       <li>Currently Stegotorus handshake is encrypted using the symmetric secret key of the Stegotorus bridge. However, we would like to implement a totally random handshake and considering that some transports suffer badly from "bandwidth shortage", our best choice currently is to implement <a href="http://elligator.cr.yp.to/">this algorithm</a>.</li>
1616)       <li>Stegotorus defense against active probing is to authenticate the header of the received packet. If the authentication fails Stegotorus turns into a transparent proxy. The capability of Stegotorus as a transparent proxy needs improvement and further testing.</li>
1617)       <li>Stegotorus has a new framework for writing Steg module. However some of the Steg modules (PDF, SWF and JS) are written in the old framework, we need to refactor their code in the new framework.</li>
1618)       <li>As writting new Steg modules in python is easier and safer, it is desirable to write an Steg module interface for Stegotorus which can accept and interact with Steg modules written in python/cython.</li>
1619)       <li>To make detection of anomalies in the traffic harder, Stegotorus hands a noise-to-signal ratio to each Steg modules. Steg modules' algorithms need to use more intelligent way of embedding to use this ratio.</li>
1620)       <li>Stegotorus has several parameters to tweak its behavior. Currently all these parameters are given in command line. We would like to have a config file to store these parameters as an alternative method.</li>
1621)       <li>The general security of the code needs to be reviewed and audited for buffer overflow, memory leak etc.</li>
1622)       <li>Steg modules for new file format for the HTTP transport are always welcome to reflect the actual traffic of the Internet.</li>
1623)       <li>Packaging Stegotorus for windows.</li>
1624)       <li>There is a parallel efforts to improve Stegotorus at SRI. We would like to merge the useful feature developed by SRI in our branch of Stegotorus.</li>
1625)       <li>Stegotorus needs to support SOCKS protocol to be able to receive the initial parameters from Tor through SOCKS handshake.</li>
1626)     </ol>
1627) 
1628)     <p>
1629) You can find a list of open issues concerning Stegotorus <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Stegotorus&order=priority">here</a>.
1630)     </p>
1631) 
1632)     <p>
1633) You also can think of lots of other awesome creative ways of improving Stegotorus and include those in your proposal.
1634)     </p>
1635)     </li>
1636) 

1637)     <a id="newBridgedbDistributor"></a>
1638)     <li>
1639)     <b>New BridgeDB Distributor</b>
1640)     <br>
1641)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1642)     <br>
1643)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1644)     <br>
1645)     Likely Mentors: <i>isis, sysrqb</i>
1646)     <p>
1647) BridgeDB is a Twisted Python system which runs a number of servers, in order
1648) to distribute Tor bridge relays to users in potentially censored regions. Each
1649) of BridgeDB's Distributors uses some unique channel to communicate bridge
1650) addresses to users, currently there is an <a href="https://bridges.torproject.org">
1651) HTTPS Distributor</a>, and an Email Distributor. This project would involve
1652) designing and creating a new Distributor for BridgeDB. Some ideas for new
1653) Distributors:
1654)     </p>
1655) 
1656)     <ul>
1657)       <li>A Twitter bot which interacts with Chinese and Farsi speaking Twitter users through PMs.</li>
1658)       <li>A distributor which uses XMPP+OTR to give bridges to users.</li>
1659)     </ul>
1660) 
1661)     <p>
1662) It's helpful if you already have some knowledge of Twisted. As part of your
1663) application, please submit a design for a Distributor, as well as supply a
1664) patch for a ticket which demonstrates knowledge of Twisted and Python ―
1665) preferably for BridgeDB, see the
1666) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&keywords=~bridgedb-gsoc-application">
1667) 'bridgedb-gsoc-application' Trac tag</a> for some examples of good tickets to
1668) try, or contact isis or sysrqb on IRC to ask for ticket suggestions or advice.
1669)     </p>
1670)     </li>
1671) 

1672) <!--
1673)     <a id=""></a>
1674)     <li>
1675)     <b></b>
1676)     <br>
1677)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1678)     <br>
1679)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1680)     <br>
1681)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
1682)     <p>
1683) 
1684)     </p>
1685) 
1686)     <p>
1687) 
1688)     </p>
1689)     </li>
1690) -->
1691) 

1692)     <li>
1693)     <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>

1694)     <br>

1695)     Don't like any of these? Look at the <a

1696)     href="/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development

1697)     roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
1698)     and find out what you think needs fixing.

1699)     Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>

1700)     might also be short on developers.
1701)     </li>

1702) 

1703)     </ol>

1704) 

1705)     <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
1706)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
1707)     <ol>
1708)     <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
1709)     Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
1710)     call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
1711)     that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

1712)     href="<wiki>doc/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

1713)     havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
1714)     instead. One solution would be to teach <a
1715)     href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
1716)     overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
1717)     the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
1718)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
1719)     start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

1720) 

1721)     <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
1722)     docs/documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
1723)     fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
1724)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
1725)     new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

1726) 

1727)     <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
1728)     traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
1729)     simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
1730)     really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
1731)     that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
1732)     giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
1733)     See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
1734)     details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
1735)     done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

1736) 

1737)     <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
1738)     accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
1739)     possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing,

1740)     performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and

1741)     Tor if needed.</li>

1742) 

1743)     <li>Write a <a
1744)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzzer</a>
1745)     for Tor to discover security vulnerabilities. Determine if there
1746)     are good fuzzing frameworks out there for what we want. Win fame by

1747)     getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

1748) 

1749)     <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
1750)     encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
1751)     on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
1752)     it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

1753)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list

1754)     of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
1755)     be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

1756)     href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

1757)     for Tor and
1758)     UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

1759) 

1760)     <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
1761)     (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
1762)     first place to start.</li>

1763) 

1764)     <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
1765)     Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
1766)     from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
1767)     them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
1768)     integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
1769)     generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>

1770) 

1771)     <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
1772)     to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a

1773)     href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live

1774)     System</a>.
1775)     </li>

1776) 

1777)     <li>
1778)     Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
1779)     more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a

1780)     href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>

1781)     just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
1782)     and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
1783)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
1784)     webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
1785)     and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
1786)     To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
1787)     href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
1788)     </li>

1789) 

1790)     </ol>

1791) 

1792)     <a id="Research"></a>
1793)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
1794)     <ol>
1795)     <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
1796)     by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
1797)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
1798)     traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
1799)     stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
1800)     attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
1801)     much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
1802)     is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
1803)     that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
1804)     schemes work better than others?</li>
1805)     <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
1806)     protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
1807)     see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
1808)     Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
1809)     client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
1810)     that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
1811)     look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
1812)     timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
1813)     href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
1814)     but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
1815)     client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
1816)     strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
1817)     asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
1818)     natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
1819)     symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
1820)     <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
1821)     href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
1822)     Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
1823)     works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
1824)     fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
1825)     then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
1826)     options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
1827)     attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
1828)     attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
1829)     actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
1830)     much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
1831)     or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
1832)     orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
1833)     sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
1834)     Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
1835)     <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
1836)     the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
1837)     exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
1838)     though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
1839)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
1840)     that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
1841)     Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
1842)     exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
1843)     routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
1844)     approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
1845)     <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
1846)     the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
1847)     circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
1848)     href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
1849)     paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
1850)     anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
1851)     thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
1852)     <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
1853)     (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
1854)     each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
1855)     bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
1856)     don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
1857)     Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
1858)     and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
1859)     a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
1860)     slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
1861)     need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
1862)     solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
1863)     degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
1864)     <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
1865)     current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
1866)     we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
1867)     than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a

1868)     href="http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh/638">ssh

1869)     throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
1870)     overhaul if the results are good.</li>
1871)     <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
1872)     an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
1873)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
1874)     it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
1875)     steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
1876)     block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
1877)     the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
1878)     bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
1879)     How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
1880)     wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
1881)     a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
1882)     <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
1883)     ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
1884)     third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
1885)     streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
1886)     the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
1887)     the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
1888)     tradeoff.</li>
1889)     <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
1890)     puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
1891)     if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
1892)     <li>Programs like <a

1893)     href="<page docs/torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

1894)     your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
1895)     every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
1896)     by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
1897)     by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
1898)     do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
1899)     that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
1900)     anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
1901)     Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
1902)     of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
1903)     in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
1904)     UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
1905)     hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
1906)     by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
1907)     browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
1908)     </li>
1909)     <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
1910)     reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
1911)     lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
1912)     connected?
1913)     </li>
1914)     </ol>

1915) 

1916)     <p>
1917)     <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
1918)     of these!
1919)     </p>
1920)   </div>
1921)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1922)   <div id = "sidecol">
1923) #include "side.wmi"
1924) #include "info.wmi"
1925)   </div>
1926)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1927) </div>
1928) <!-- END CONTENT -->