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en/volunteer.wml   4) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Volunteer"

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en/volunteer.wml   9) <h2>Three things everyone can do now:</h2>

volunteer.html    10) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  11) <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-server>">running

volunteer.html    12) a server</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  13) <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run servers. Get them to run hidden

volunteer.html    14) services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  15) <li>We are looking for funding and sponsors. If you like Tor's goals, please

en/volunteer.wml  16)   <a href="<page donate>">take a moment to donate to support further
en/volunteer.wml  17)   Tor development</a>. Also, if you know any

en/volunteer.wml  18)   companies, NGOs, agencies, or other organizations that want communications

en/volunteer.wml  19)   security, let them know about us.</li>

volunteer.html    20) </ol>
volunteer.html    21) 

en/volunteer.wml  22) <a id="Usability"></a>

en/volunteer.wml  23) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Usability">Supporting Applications</a></h2>

volunteer.html    24) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  25) <li>We need good ways to intercept DNS requests so they don't "leak" their
en/volunteer.wml  26) request to a local observer while we're trying to be anonymous. (This
en/volunteer.wml  27) happens because the application does the DNS resolve before going to
en/volunteer.wml  28) the SOCKS proxy.)</li>

en/volunteer.wml  29) <li>Tsocks/dsocks items:

en/volunteer.wml  30) <ul>
en/volunteer.wml  31) <li>We need to <a
en/volunteer.wml  32) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TSocksPatches">apply
en/volunteer.wml  33) all our tsocks patches</a> and maintain a new fork. We'll host it if
en/volunteer.wml  34) you want.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  35) <li>We should patch Dug Song's "dsocks" program to use Tor's
en/volunteer.wml  36) <i>mapaddress</i> commands from the controller interface, so we
en/volunteer.wml  37) don't waste a whole round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before
en/volunteer.wml  38) connecting.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  39) <li>We need to make our <i>torify</i> script detect which of tsocks or
en/volunteer.wml  40) dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
en/volunteer.wml  41) unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
en/volunteer.wml  42) or discarding one entirely.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  43) </ul>

en/volunteer.wml  44) </li>

volunteer.html    45) <li>People running servers tell us they want to have one BandwidthRate

en/volunteer.wml  46) during some part of the day, and a different BandwidthRate at other
en/volunteer.wml  47) parts of the day. Rather than coding this inside Tor, we should have a
en/volunteer.wml  48) little script that speaks via the <a href="<page gui/index>">Tor
en/volunteer.wml  49) Controller Interface</a>, and does a setconf to change the bandwidth
en/volunteer.wml  50) rate.  There is one for Unix and Mac already (it uses bash and cron),
en/volunteer.wml  51) but Windows users still need a solution.

en/volunteer.wml  52) </li>

en/volunteer.wml  53) <li>Tor can <a

volunteer.html    54) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ChooseEntryExit">exit

en/volunteer.wml  55) the Tor network from a particular exit node</a>, but we should be able
en/volunteer.wml  56) to specify just a country and have something automatically pick. The
en/volunteer.wml  57) best bet is to fetch Blossom's directory also, and run a local Blossom
en/volunteer.wml  58) client that fetches this directory securely (via Tor and checking its
en/volunteer.wml  59) signature), intercepts <tt>.country.blossom</tt> hostnames, and does
en/volunteer.wml  60) the right thing.</li>

volunteer.html    61) <li>Speaking of geolocation data, somebody should draw a map of the Earth
volunteer.html    62) with a pin-point for each Tor server. Bonus points if it updates as the

en/volunteer.wml  63) network grows and changes. Unfortunately, the easy ways to do this involve
en/volunteer.wml  64) sending all the data to Google and having them draw the map for you. How
en/volunteer.wml  65) much does this impact privacy, and do we have any other good options?</li>

volunteer.html    66) </ol>
volunteer.html    67) 

en/volunteer.wml  68) <a id="Documentation"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  69) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>

volunteer.html    70) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  71) <li>We hear that Tor users can fall victim to anonymity-breaking attacks
en/volunteer.wml  72) from javascript, java, activex, flash, etc, if they don't disable
en/volunteer.wml  73) them. Are there plugins out there (like NoScript for Firefox) that make
en/volunteer.wml  74) it easier for users to manage this risk? What is the risk exactly?</li>
en/volunteer.wml  75) <li>Is there a full suite of plugins that will replace all of Privoxy's
en/volunteer.wml  76) functionality for Firefox 1.5+? We hear Tor is much faster when you take
en/volunteer.wml  77) Privoxy out of the loop.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  78) <li>Please help Matt Edman with the documentation and how-tos for his

en/volunteer.wml  79) Tor controller,
en/volunteer.wml  80) <a href="http://vidalia-project.net/">Vidalia</a>.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  81) <li>Evaluate and document
en/volunteer.wml  82) <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">our
en/volunteer.wml  83) list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>

volunteer.html    84) <li>We need better documentation for dynamically intercepting

en/volunteer.wml  85) connections and sending them through Tor. tsocks (Linux), dsocks (BSD),

en/volunteer.wml  86) and freecap (Windows) seem to be good candidates, as would better
en/volunteer.wml  87) use of our new TransPort feature.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  88) <li>We have a huge list of <a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

volunteer.html    89) programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
volunteer.html    90) situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  91) <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
en/volunteer.wml  92) languages. See the <a href="<page translation>">translation

en/volunteer.wml  93) guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
en/volunteer.wml  94) Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>

volunteer.html    95) </ol>
volunteer.html    96) 

en/volunteer.wml  97) <a id="Coding"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  98) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Coding and Design</a></h2>

volunteer.html    99) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml 100) <li>Tor servers don't work well on Windows XP. On

en/volunteer.wml 101) Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system

en/volunteer.wml 102) call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
en/volunteer.wml 103) that a medium sized Tor server will empty the non-page pool, <a
en/volunteer.wml 104) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

en/volunteer.wml 105) havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO

en/volunteer.wml 106) instead. One solution would be to teach <a
en/volunteer.wml 107) href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
en/volunteer.wml 108) overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
en/volunteer.wml 109) the new libevent interface.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 110) <li>Because Tor servers need to store-and-forward each cell they handle,
en/volunteer.wml 111) high-bandwidth Tor servers end up using dozens of megabytes of memory
en/volunteer.wml 112) just for buffers. We need better heuristics for when to shrink/expand
en/volunteer.wml 113) buffers. Maybe this should be modelled after the Linux kernel buffer

en/volunteer.wml 114) design, where we have many smaller buffers that link to each other,

en/volunteer.wml 115) rather than monolithic buffers?</li>
en/volunteer.wml 116) <li>We need an official central site to answer "Is this IP address a Tor

en/volunteer.wml 117) exit server?" questions. This should provide several interfaces, including

en/volunteer.wml 118) a web interface and a DNSBL-style interface. It can provide the most
en/volunteer.wml 119) up-to-date answers by keeping a local mirror of the Tor directory

en/volunteer.wml 120) information. The tricky point is that being an exit server is not a
en/volunteer.wml 121) boolean: so the question is actually "Is this IP address a Tor exit
en/volunteer.wml 122) server that can exit to my IP address:port?" The DNSBL interface
en/volunteer.wml 123) will probably receive hundreds of queries a minute, so some smart
en/volunteer.wml 124) algorithms are in order. Bonus points if it does active testing through

en/volunteer.wml 125) each exit node to find out what IP address it's really exiting from.
en/volunteer.wml 126) <a href="<svnsandbox>doc/contrib/torbl-design.txt">Read more here</a>.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 127) <li>Sometimes Tor servers crash, or the computers they're on fall off the
en/volunteer.wml 128) network, or other accidents happen. Some Tor operators have expressed
en/volunteer.wml 129) an interest in signing up to a "notifying" service that periodically
en/volunteer.wml 130) checks whether their Tor server is healthy and sends them a reminder mail
en/volunteer.wml 131) when it's not. Anybody want to write a few cgi scripts, a few web pages,
en/volunteer.wml 132) and set up some sort of wget hack and/or something more complex like <a
en/volunteer.wml 133) href="http://nagios.org/">Nagios</a> to do the monitoring? The first
en/volunteer.wml 134) version could check just the directory port, e.g. looking through the
en/volunteer.wml 135) cached network-status page for the right IP address and port and then
en/volunteer.wml 136) asking for the "/tor/server/authority" page.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 137) <li>It would be great to have a LiveCD that includes the latest
en/volunteer.wml 138) versions of Tor, Polipo or Privoxy, Firefox, Gaim+OTR, etc. There are
en/volunteer.wml 139) two challenges here: first is documenting the system and choices well
en/volunteer.wml 140) enough that security people can form an opinion on whether it should be
en/volunteer.wml 141) secure, and the second is figuring out how to make it easily maintainable,
en/volunteer.wml 142) so it doesn't become quickly obsolete like AnonymOS. Bonus points if
en/volunteer.wml 143) the CD image fits on one of those small-form-factor CDs.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 144) <li>Related to the LiveCD image, we should work on an intuitively secure
en/volunteer.wml 145) and well-documented USB image for Tor and supporting applications. A
en/volunteer.wml 146) lot of the hard part here is deciding what configurations are secure,
en/volunteer.wml 147) documentating these decisions, and making something that is easy to
en/volunteer.wml 148) maintain going forward.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 149) <li>Our preferred graphical front-end for Tor, named
en/volunteer.wml 150) <a href="http://vidalia-project.net/">Vidalia</a>, needs all sorts
en/volunteer.wml 151) of development work.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 152) <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
en/volunteer.wml 153) documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves

en/volunteer.wml 154) fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
en/volunteer.wml 155) <a href="http://vidalia-project.net/">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
en/volunteer.wml 156) new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 157) <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
en/volunteer.wml 158) traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
en/volunteer.wml 159) simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
en/volunteer.wml 160) really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
en/volunteer.wml 161) that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
en/volunteer.wml 162) giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
en/volunteer.wml 163) See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
en/volunteer.wml 164) details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
en/volunteer.wml 165) done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 166) <li>We need a measurement study of <a
en/volunteer.wml 167) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a>
en/volunteer.wml 168) vs <a href="http://www.privoxy.org/">Privoxy</a>. Is Polipo in fact
en/volunteer.wml 169) significantly faster, once you factor in the slow-down from Tor? Are the
en/volunteer.wml 170) results the same on both Linux and Windows? Related, does Polipo handle
en/volunteer.wml 171) more web sites correctly than Privoxy, or vice versa? Are there stability
en/volunteer.wml 172) issues on any common platforms, e.g. Windows?</li>
en/volunteer.wml 173) <li>Related on the above, would you like to help port <a
en/volunteer.wml 174) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a> so it
en/volunteer.wml 175) runs stably and efficiently on Windows?</li>

en/volunteer.wml 176) <li>We need a distributed testing framework. We have unit tests,

en/volunteer.wml 177) but it would be great to have a script that starts up a Tor network, uses
en/volunteer.wml 178) it for a while, and verifies that at least parts of it are working.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 179) <li>Help Mike Perry on his <a

en/volunteer.wml 180) href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torflow/">TorFlow</a>
en/volunteer.wml 181) library (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torflow/TODO">TODO</a>):

en/volunteer.wml 182) it's a python library that uses the <a

en/volunteer.wml 183) href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torctl/doc/howto.txt">Tor controller

en/volunteer.wml 184) protocol</a> to instruct Tor to build circuits in a variety of ways,
en/volunteer.wml 185) and then it measures performance and tries to detect anomalies.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 186) <!--

en/volunteer.wml 187) <li>Right now the hidden service descriptors are being stored on just a
en/volunteer.wml 188) few directory servers. This is bad for privacy and bad for robustness. To
en/volunteer.wml 189) get more robustness, we're going to need to make hidden service
en/volunteer.wml 190) descriptors even less private because we're going to have to mirror them
en/volunteer.wml 191) onto many places. Ideally we'd like to separate the storage/lookup system
en/volunteer.wml 192) from the Tor directory servers entirely. The first problem is that we need
en/volunteer.wml 193) to design a new hidden service descriptor format to a) be ascii rather
en/volunteer.wml 194) than binary for convenience; b) keep the list of introduction points
en/volunteer.wml 195) encrypted unless you know the <tt>.onion</tt> address, so the directory
en/volunteer.wml 196) can't learn them; and c) allow the directories to verify the timestamp
en/volunteer.wml 197) and signature on a hidden service descriptor so they can't be tricked
en/volunteer.wml 198) into giving out fake ones. Second, any reliable distributed storage
en/volunteer.wml 199) system will do, as long as it allows authenticated updates, but as far
en/volunteer.wml 200) as we know no implemented DHT code supports authenticated updates.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 201) -->

en/volunteer.wml 202) <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto accelerators
en/volunteer.wml 203) via

volunteer.html   204) OpenSSL. Nobody has ever tested it, though. Does somebody want to get
volunteer.html   205) a card and let us know how it goes?</li>

volunteer.html   206) <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a
volunteer.html   207) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine

en/volunteer.wml 208) if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by

volunteer.html   209) getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

volunteer.html   210) <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
volunteer.html   211) encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
volunteer.html   212) on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
volunteer.html   213) it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a
volunteer.html   214) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#TransportIPnotTCP">list

en/volunteer.wml 215) of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
en/volunteer.wml 216) be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

en/volunteer.wml 217) href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
en/volunteer.wml 218) for Tor and

en/volunteer.wml 219) UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

volunteer.html   220) <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
volunteer.html   221) (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
volunteer.html   222) first place to start.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 223) <li>Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
en/volunteer.wml 224) href="<svnsandbox>doc/design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">Tor development
en/volunteer.wml 225) roadmap</a> for more ideas.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 226) <li>Don't see your idea here? We probably need it anyway! Contact
en/volunteer.wml 227) us and find out.</li>

volunteer.html   228) </ol>
volunteer.html   229) 

en/volunteer.wml 230) <a id="Research"></a>
en/volunteer.wml 231) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>

volunteer.html   232) <ol>

volunteer.html   233) <li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
volunteer.html   234) hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
volunteer.html   235) "signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
volunteer.html   236) you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
volunteer.html   237) (if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
volunteer.html   238) this attack on the deployed Tor codebase? Then start exploring
volunteer.html   239) defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 512
volunteer.html   240) bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a
volunteer.html   241) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>,
volunteer.html   242) or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
volunteer.html   243) and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
volunteer.html   244) a successful defense in each case?</li>

volunteer.html   245) <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
volunteer.html   246) by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
volunteer.html   247) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
volunteer.html   248) traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
volunteer.html   249) stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
volunteer.html   250) attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
volunteer.html   251) much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
volunteer.html   252) is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
volunteer.html   253) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
volunteer.html   254) schemes work better than others?</li>

volunteer.html   255) <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
volunteer.html   256) the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
volunteer.html   257) exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
volunteer.html   258) though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
volunteer.html   259) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
volunteer.html   260) that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
volunteer.html   261) Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
volunteer.html   262) exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
volunteer.html   263) routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
volunteer.html   264) approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>

en/volunteer.wml 265) <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
en/volunteer.wml 266) the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random

en/volunteer.wml 267) circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a

en/volunteer.wml 268) href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
en/volunteer.wml 269) paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting

en/volunteer.wml 270) anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
en/volunteer.wml 271) thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>

volunteer.html   272) <li>Tor doesn't work very well when servers have asymmetric bandwidth
volunteer.html   273) (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
volunteer.html   274) each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
volunteer.html   275) bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
volunteer.html   276) don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
volunteer.html   277) Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
volunteer.html   278) and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
volunteer.html   279) a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
volunteer.html   280) slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
volunteer.html   281) need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
volunteer.html   282) solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
volunteer.html   283) degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
volunteer.html   284) <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
volunteer.html   285) current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
volunteer.html   286) we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
volunteer.html   287) than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
volunteer.html   288) href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh
volunteer.html   289) throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
volunteer.html   290) overhaul if the results are good.</li>

volunteer.html   291) <li>To let dissidents in remote countries use Tor without being blocked
volunteer.html   292) at their country's firewall, we need a way to get tens of thousands of
volunteer.html   293) relays, not just a few hundred. We can imagine a Tor client GUI that

en/volunteer.wml 294) has a "Tor for Freedom" button at the top that opens a port and relays a

volunteer.html   295) few KB/s of traffic into the Tor network. (A few KB/s shouldn't be too
volunteer.html   296) much hassle, and there are few abuse issues since they're not being exit
volunteer.html   297) nodes.) But how do we distribute a list of these volunteer clients to the
volunteer.html   298) good dissidents in an automated way that doesn't let the country-level
volunteer.html   299) firewalls intercept and enumerate them? Probably needs to work on a

en/volunteer.wml 300) human-trust level. See our <a href="<page documentation>#DesignDoc">early
en/volunteer.wml 301) blocking-resistance design document</a> and our
en/volunteer.wml 302) <a

en/volunteer.wml 303) href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#BlockingResistance">FAQ

en/volunteer.wml 304) entry</a> on this, and then read the <a
en/volunteer.wml 305) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/topic.html#Communications_20Censorship">censorship
en/volunteer.wml 306) resistance section of anonbib</a>.</li>

volunteer.html   307) <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
volunteer.html   308) ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
volunteer.html   309) third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
volunteer.html   310) streams that a given server can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
volunteer.html   311) the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
volunteer.html   312) the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
volunteer.html   313) tradeoff.</li>
volunteer.html   314) <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor servers or dirservers. Are client
volunteer.html   315) puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
volunteer.html   316) if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>

volunteer.html   317) </ol>
volunteer.html   318) 

en/volunteer.wml 319) <a href="<page contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
en/volunteer.wml 320) of these!

volunteer.html   321) 

en/volunteer.wml 322)   </div><!-- #main -->

volunteer.html   323) 

en/volunteer.wml 324) #include <foot.wmi>