tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 4-optional
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
10)   </div>

11)   <div id="maincol">

12)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
13)     <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
14)     <ol>
15)     <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
16)     a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

17)     <li>Do you have an Amazon account? Are you willing to spend up to $3 a

18)     month? Then spin up your own Tor <a href="<page
19)     docs/bridges>">bridge</a> in less than 10 minutes with <a

20)     href="https://cloud.torproject.org/">tor cloud</a>!</li>

21)     <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
22)     services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
23)     <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
24)     to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
25)     for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
26)     or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
27)     security, let them know about us.</li>
28)     <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
29)     users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
30)     yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
31)     we'd love to hear from you.</li>
32)     </ol>

33) 

34)     <a id="Documentation"></a>
35)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
36)     <ol>

37)     <li>Help translate the
38) <!-- web page and -->
39)     documentation into other

40)     languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
41)     guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
42)     Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
43)     <li>Evaluate and document

44)     <a href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">our

45)     list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
46)     <li>We have a huge list of <a

47)     href="<wiki>doc/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

48)     programs that interface with Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which

49)     situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
50)     </ol>

51) 

52)     <a id="Advocacy"></a>
53)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
54)     <ol>

55)     <li>Monitor some of our <a 
56)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo">public mailing 
57)     lists</a>, like <a 
58)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk</a>, <a 
59)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays">tor-relays</a>, <a 
60)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev">tor-dev</a>, or <a 
61)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tbb-dev">tbb-dev</a>, 
62)     and summarize noteworthy exchanges into articles for <a 

63)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-news">Tor 

64)     Weekly News</a>.</li>

65)     <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
66) meetings around the world.</li>

67)     <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
68)     or how to use it.  Some have already started on <a

69)     href="https://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,

70)     <a

71)     href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

72)     and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li>

73)     <li>Create a poster around a theme, such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>

74)     <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "<a
75)     href="https://check.torproject.org/">Congratulations! You are using
76)     Tor!</a>" in any language.</li>

77)     </ol>

78) 

79) <!--

80)     <a id="gsoc"></a>
81)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#gsoc">Google Summer of Code</a></h2>
82) 
83)     <p>
84)     Tor is also taking part in this year's <a
85)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/homepage/google/gsoc2013">Google
86)     Summer of Code</a>! The criteria for this is a little different - either
87)     gender can apply but you need to be either <a
88)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/document/show/gsoc_program/google/gsoc2013/help_page#2._Whos_eligible_to_participate_as_a">a
89)     present student or just graduated</a>.
90)     </p>
91) 
92)     <p>
93)     As mentioned above if you're eligible for either program then please apply
94)     for both! Google Summer of Code is a far, far larger program for us than
95)     OPW so your chances of being applied that way are considerably better.
96)     </p>
97) 
98)     <p>
99)     <b>See our page for <a href="<page about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a>
100)     for more information.</b>
101)     </p>

102) -->

103) 

104)     <a id="Projects"></a>
105)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>

106) 

107)     <p>
108)     Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
109)     maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
110)     of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a

111)     href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Don't be shy
112)     to ask questions, and don't hesitate to ask even if the main contributors
113)     aren't active at that moment.

114)     </p>

115) 

116)     <p>
117)     For a presentation summarizing many of these projects see...
118)     </p>
119) 
120)     <div id="ecosystem_presentation">

121)       <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb6iqZcQsSg">Tor Ecosystem</a> (<a href="https://media.torproject.org/video/2013-11-t3am-damian-johnson.mp4">mp4</a>, <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/2013-11-t3am-tor-ecosystem.pdf">slides</a>)

122)     </div>
123) 
124)     <br /></br />
125) 

126)     <table id="projects">
127)       <tr>
128)         <th>Name</th>
129)         <th>Category</th>
130)         <th>Language</th>
131)         <th>Activity</th>
132)         <th>Contributors</th>
133)       </tr>

134) 

135)       <tr>
136)         <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
137)         <td>Core</td>
138)         <td>C</td>
139)         <td>Heavy</td>

140)         <td>nickm, athena, arma</td>

141)       </tr>

142) 

143)       <tr>

144)         <td><a href="#project-torbrowser">Tor Browser</a></td>

145)         <td>Bundle</td>

146)         <td>Javascript, XUL, Scripting</td>

147)         <td>Heavy</td>

148)         <td>mikeperry, Pearl Crescent</td>

149)       </tr>
150) 

151)       <tr>

152)         <td><a href="#project-httpseverywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a></td>
153)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
154)         <td>Javascript</td>

155)         <td>Heavy</td>

156)         <td>pde, mikeperry</td>

157)       </tr>

158) 

159)       <tr>

160)         <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
161)         <td>User Interface</td>
162)         <td>Python, Curses</td>

163)         <td>Light</td>

164)         <td>atagar</td>
165)       </tr>

166) 

167)       <tr>

168)         <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
169)         <td>User Interface</td>
170)         <td>Java</td>

171)         <td>Moderage</td>

172)         <td>n8fr8</td>

173)       </tr>

174) 

175)       <tr>

176)         <td><a href="#project-tails">Tails</a></td>
177)         <td>OS image</td>
178)         <td>Sys Admin</td>
179)         <td>Heavy</td>
180)         <td><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">#tails</a></td>

181)       </tr>

182) 

183)       <tr>

184)         <td><a href="#project-torramdisk">tor-ramdisk</a></td>
185)         <td>OS image</td>
186)         <td>Sys Admin</td>

187)         <td>Light</td>

188)         <td>blueness</td>
189)       </tr>
190) 

191)       <tr>

192)         <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
193)         <td>Usability</td>
194)         <td>C</td>

195)         <td>Light</td>

196)         <td>David Goulet</td>

197)       </tr>
198) 

199)       <tr>

200)         <td><a href="#project-torbirdy">TorBirdy</a></td>
201)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
202)         <td>JavaScript</td>

203)         <td>Light</td>
204)         <td>sukhe</td>

205)       </tr>

206) 

207)       <tr>

208)         <td><a href="#project-obfsproxy">Obfsproxy</a></td>
209)         <td>Client Add-on</td>

210)         <td>Python</td>

211)         <td>Light</td>

212)         <td>asn</td>

213)       </tr>
214) 

215)       <tr>

216)         <td><a href="#project-flash-proxy">Flash Proxy</a></td>
217)         <td>Client Add-on</td>
218)         <td>Python, JavaScript, Go</td>

219)         <td>Light</td>

220)         <td>dcf, infinity0, Arlo Breault</td>

221)       </tr>

222) 

223)       <tr>

224)         <td><a href="#project-shadow">Shadow</a></td>

225)         <td>Simulator</td>

226)         <td>C, Python</td>

227)         <td>Heavy</td>

228)         <td>robgjansen</td>
229)       </tr>

230) 

231)       <tr>

232)         <td><a href="#project-stem">Stem</a></td>

233)         <td>Library</td>
234)         <td>Python</td>

235)         <td>Moderate</td>

236)         <td>atagar</td>

237)       </tr>

238) 

239)       <tr>

240)         <td><a href="#project-txtorcon">Txtorcon</a></td>
241)         <td>Library</td>
242)         <td>Python, Twisted</td>

243)         <td>Light</td>

244)         <td>meejah</td>
245)       </tr>

246) 

247)       <tr>

248)         <td><a href="#project-tlsdate">Tlsdate</a></td>
249)         <td>Utility</td>
250)         <td>C</td>

251)         <td>Light</td>

252)         <td>ioerror</td>
253)       </tr>

254) 

255)       <tr>

256)         <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
257)         <td>Client Service</td>
258)         <td>Java</td>

259)         <td>Light</td>

260)         <td>karsten</td>
261)       </tr>

262) 

263)       <tr>

264)         <td><a href="#project-atlas">Atlas</a></td>
265)         <td>Client Service</td>
266)         <td>JavaScript</td>

267)         <td>None</td>

268)         <td></td>

269)       </tr>

270) 

271)       <tr>
272)         <td><a href="#project-globe">Globe</a></td>
273)         <td>Client Service</td>
274)         <td>JavaScript</td>

275)         <td>None</td>
276)         <td></td>

277)       </tr>
278) 

279)       <tr>

280)         <td><a href="#project-compass">Compass</a></td>
281)         <td>Client Service</td>
282)         <td>Python</td>

283)         <td>None</td>
284)         <td></td>

285)       </tr>

286) 

287)       <tr>

288)         <td><a href="#project-onionoo">Onionoo</a></td>
289)         <td>Backend Service</td>

290)         <td>Java</td>

291)         <td>Light</td>

292)         <td>karsten</td>

293)       </tr>
294) 

295)       <tr>
296)         <td><a href="#project-doctor">DocTor</a></td>
297)         <td>Backend Service</td>
298)         <td>Python</td>

299)         <td>None</td>

300)         <td>atagar</td>
301)       </tr>
302) 

303)       <tr>

304)         <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
305)         <td>Client Service</td>
306)         <td>Python</td>

307)         <td>None</td>

308)         <td>kaner</td>
309)       </tr>

310) 

311)       <tr>

312)         <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
313)         <td>Client Service</td>
314)         <td>Python</td>

315)         <td>None</td>

316)         <td>kaner</td>

317)       </tr>

318) 

319)       <tr>

320)         <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
321)         <td>Client Service</td>

322)         <td>Go</td>

323)         <td>None</td>

324)         <td>Arlo</td>

325)       </tr>

326) 

327)       <tr>

328)         <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
329)         <td>Backend Service</td>
330)         <td>Python</td>

331)         <td>Heavy</td>

332)         <td>isis</td>

333)       </tr>

334) 

335)       <tr>

336)         <td><a href="#project-ooni-probe">Ooni Probe</a></td>

337)         <td>Scanner</td>
338)         <td>Python</td>

339)         <td>Light</td>

340)         <td>hellais, aagbsn</td>

341)       </tr>
342) 

343)       <tr>
344)         <td><a href="#project-torps">TorPS</a></td>
345)         <td>Backend Service</td>
346)         <td>Python</td>

347)         <td>None</td>

348)         <td>Aaron Johnson</td>
349)       </tr>
350) 

351)       <tr>

352)         <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
353)         <td>Backend Service</td>
354)         <td>Python</td>

355)         <td>None</td>

356)         <td>aagbsn</td>

357)       </tr>

358) 

359)       <tr>

360)         <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
361)         <td>Backend Service</td>
362)         <td>Python</td>
363)         <td>None</td>
364)         <td>Sebastian</td>
365)       </tr>

366) 

367)       <tr>

368)         <td><a href="#project-tor2web">Tor2web</a></td>
369)         <td>Client Service</td>

370)         <td>Python</td>

371)         <td>Light</td>

372)         <td>evilaliv3, hellais</td>

373)       </tr>

374) 

375)       <tr>

376)         <td><a href="#project-anonbib">Anonbib</a></td>
377)         <td>Website</td>

378)         <td>Python</td>

379)         <td>Light</td>

380)         <td>arma, nickm</td>
381)       </tr>
382) 

383)     </table>

384) 

385)     <sub>
386)     * Project is still in an alpha state.
387)     </sub>

388) 

389)     <br /><br />

390) 

391)     <a id="project-tor"></a>
392)     <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a

393)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/12">bug

394)     tracker</a>)</h3>

395) 

396)     <p>
397)     Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
398)     the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
399)     extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
400)     </p>

401) 

402)     <p>
403)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

404)     <i><a href="#torCleanup">Tor Codebase Cleanup</a></i><br />

405)     <i><a href="#improveTorTestCoverage">Improve test coverage in Tor</a></i><br />
406)     <i><a href="#useMoreCores">Have the Tor daemon use more cores</a></i><br />
407)     <i><a href="#improveHiddenServices">Help improve Tor hidden services</a></i><br />
408)     <i><a href="#improvedDnsSupport">Improved DNS support for Tor</a></i><br />
409)     <i><a href="#torSandboxing">Help improve Tor sandboxing</a></i>

410)     </p>

411) 

412)     <a id="project-torbrowser"></a>

413)     <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a> (<a

414)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
415)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&component=Tor+Launcher&component=Tor+Browser&component=Tor+bundles%2Finstallation&col=id&col=summary&col=status&col=owner&col=type&col=priority&col=milestone&order=priority">bug

416)     tracker</a>, <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/">design doc</a>)</h3>
417) 

418)     <p>

419)     Tor Browser is an easy-to-use, portable package of Tor, HTTPS-Everywhere, 
420)     NoScript, TorLauncher, Torbutton, and a Firefox fork, all  preconfigured 
421)     to work together out of
422)     the box. The modified copy of Firefox aims to resolve the

423)     privacy and security issues in mainline version.

424)     </p>

425) 

426)     <p>
427)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
428)     <i><a href="#panopticlick">Panopticlick</a></i><br />
429)     </p>
430) 

431)     <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a>
432)     <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a
433)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a
434)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/19">bug

435)     tracker</a>)</h3>

436) 

437)     <p>

438)     HTTPS Everywhere is a Firefox and Chrome extension that encrypts
439)     your communications with many major websites, making your browsing
440)     more secure.

441)     </p>

442) 

443)     <p>
444)     The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
445)     project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development

446)     slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken the
447)     lead with pushing the project forward.

448)     </p>

449) 

450)     <a id="project-arm"></a>

451)     <h3><a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a

452)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git">code</a>, <a

453)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
454)     tracker</a>)</h3>

455) 

456)     <p>

457)     The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor,
458)     intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone with a
459)     tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, providing
460)     real time statistics for bandwidth, resource usage, connections, and quite
461)     a bit more.

462)     </p>

463) 

464)     <a id="project-orbot"></a>
465)     <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a

466)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">code</a>, <a

467)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
468)     tracker</a>)</h3>

469) 
470)     <p>

471)     Provides Tor on the Android platform. The project is under active 
472)     development, updates to latest Tor releases, and working to stay up to 
473)     date with all changes in Android and mobile threats.

474)     </p>
475) 
476)     <a id="project-tails"></a>
477)     <h3><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> (<a

478)     href="https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/">code</a>, <a
479)     href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails">bug

480)     tracker</a>)</h3>
481) 
482)     <p>
483)     The Amnesic Incognito Live System is a live CD/USB distribution
484)     preconfigured so that everything is safely routed through Tor and leaves no
485)     trace on the local system. This is a merger of the Amnesia and <a
486)     href="http://www.anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> projects,
487)     and still under very active development.
488)     </p>
489) 

490)     <a id="project-torramdisk"></a>
491)     <h3><a href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk">Tor-ramdisk</a> (<a

492)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-ramdisk.git">code</a>, <a

493)     href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-documentation">documentation</a>)</h3>

494) 
495)     <p>

496)     Tor-ramdisk is a uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose sole
497)     purpose is to securely host a Tor server purely in RAM.

498)     </p>
499) 

500)     <a id="project-torsocks"></a>

501)     <h3>Torsocks (<a

502)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
503)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
504)     tracker</a>)</h3>
505) 

506)     <p>

507)     Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
508)     slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
509)     otherwise feature complete.

510)     </p>

511) 

512)     <a id="project-torbirdy"></a>
513)     <h3>TorBirdy (<a
514)     href="https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy">code</a>, <a
515)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy/dev">bug
516)     tracker</a>)</h3>

517) 

518)     <p>
519)     TorBirdy is Torbutton for Thunderbird and related Mozilla mail clients.
520)     </p>

521) 

522)     <p>
523)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
524)     <i><a href="#makeTorbirdyBetter">Make TorBirdy Better</a></i>
525)     </p>
526) 

527)     <a id="project-obfsproxy"></a>

528)     <h3><a href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">Obfsproxy</a> (<a

529)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git">code</a>,
530)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Pluggable+transport&order=priority">bug

531)     tracker</a>)</h3>

532) 

533)     <p>
534)     A proxy that shapes Tor traffic, making it harder for censors to detect and

535)     block Tor. This has both a C and python implementation.

536)     </p>

537) 

538)     <p>
539)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

540)     <i><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports#Helpneeded">Various coding tasks</a></i> <br/>

541)     <i><a href="#betterPluggableTransports">Build Better Pluggable Transports</a></i>
542)     </p>
543) 

544)     <a id="project-flash-proxy"></a>
545)     <h3><a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">Flash Proxy</a> (<a
546)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git">code</a>, <a
547)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Flashproxy">bug
548)     tracker</a>)</h3>

549) 

550)     <p>
551)     Pluggable transport using proxies running in web browsers to defeat
552)     address-based blocking.
553)     </p>

554) 

555)     <a id="project-shadow"></a>
556)     <h3><a href="https://shadow.cs.umn.edu/">Shadow</a> (<a
557)     href="https://github.com/shadow">code</a>, <a
558)     href="https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues">bug
559)     tracker</a>)</h3>

560) 

561)     <p>
562)     Shadow is a discrete-event network simulator that runs the real
563)     Tor software as a plug-in. Shadow is open-source software that enables
564)     accurate, efficient, controlled, and repeatable Tor experimentation.

565)     For another simulator, see <a
566)     href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/exptor/">ExperimenTor</a>.

567)     </p>

568) 

569)     <a id="project-stem"></a>

570)     <h3><a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> (<a

571)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git">code</a>, <a

572)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">bug

573)     tracker</a>)</h3>

574) 

575)     <p>

576)     Python controller library for scripts and controller applications using
577)     Tor.

578)     </p>

579) 

580)     <p>
581)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

582)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i><br />

583)     <i><a href="#relayWebPanel">Relay Web Status Panel</a></i><br />

584)     </p>

585) 

586)     <a id="project-txtorcon"></a>

587)     <h3><a href="https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org">Txtorcon</a> (<a

588)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon">code</a>, <a

589)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

590) 

591)     <p>
592)     Twisted-based asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Includes
593)     unit-tests, examples, state-tracking code and configuration abstraction.
594)     Used by OONI and APAF.
595)     </p>

596) 

597)     <p>
598)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
599)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i>
600)     </p>
601) 

602)     <a id="project-tlsdate"></a>
603)     <h3>Tlsdate (<a href="https://github.com/ioerror/tlsdate">code</a>)</h3>

604) 

605)     <p>
606)     tlsdate: secure parasitic rdate replacement
607)     </p>

608) 

609)     <p>
610)     tlsdate sets the local clock by securely connecting with TLS to remote
611)     servers and extracting the remote time out of the secure handshake. Unlike
612)     ntpdate, tlsdate uses TCP, for instance connecting to a remote HTTPS or TLS
613)     enabled service, and provides some protection against adversaries that try
614)     to feed you malicious time information.
615)     </p>

616) 

617)     <a id="project-metrics"></a>
618)     <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
619)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
620)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a

621)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>)</h3>

622) 

623)     <p>
624)     Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
625)     metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by

626)     Karsten Loesing. See also <a
627)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torperf.git">TorPerf</a>.

628)     </p>

629) 

630)     <a id="project-atlas"></a>
631)     <h3><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/">Atlas</a> (<a
632)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/atlas.git">code</a>)</h3>

633) 

634)     <p>
635)     Atlas is a web application to discover Tor relays and bridges. It provides
636)     useful information on how relays are configured along with graphics about

637)     their past usage.

638)     </p>

639) 

640)     <p>

641)     This is the spiritual successor to <a
642)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torstatus.git">TorStatus</a>, the <a

643)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">original

644)     codebase</a> for which was written in PHP, and rewritten by students from
645)     Wesleyan as Django.

646)     </p>

647) 

648)     <a id="project-globe"></a>
649)     <h3><a href="http://globe.rndm.de/">Globe</a> (<a
650)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe">code</a>, <a
651)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>
652) 
653)     <p>
654)     Globe is a web application that allows you to search for Tor relays and
655)     bridges. It gives you a detailed overview of properties and configurations
656)     of a relay or bridge.
657)     </p>
658) 

659)     <a id="project-compass"></a>
660)     <h3><a href="https://compass.torproject.org/">Compass</a> (<a
661)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/compass.git">code</a>, <a
662)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Compass&order=priority">bug
663)     tracker</a>)</h3>

664) 

665)     <p>
666)     Compass is a web and command line application that filters and
667)     aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes.
668)     </p>

669) 
670)     <a id="project-onionoo"></a>

671)     <h3><a href="https://onionoo.torproject.org/">Onionoo</a> (<a
672)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git">code</a>,
673)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Onionoo&order=priority">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

674) 
675)     <p>
676)     Onionoo is a JSON based protocol to learn information about currently
677)     running Tor relays and bridges.
678)     </p>
679) 

680)     <a id="project-doctor"></a>
681)     <h3>DocTor (<a
682)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git">code</a>, <a
683)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=DocTor&order=priority">bug
684)     tracker</a>)</h3>
685) 
686)     <p>
687)     DocTor is a notification service that monitors newly published descriptor
688)     information for issues. This is primarily a service to help the tor
689)     directory authority operators, but it also checks for a handful of other
690)     issues like sybil attacks.
691)     </p>
692) 

693)     <a id="project-weather"></a>

694)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a

695)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
696)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
697)     tracker</a>)</h3>

698) 

699)     <p>
700)     Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
701)     relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
702)     href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
703)     in early 2011.
704)     </p>

705) 

706)     <a id="project-gettor"></a>

707)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/GetTor">GetTor</a> (<a

708)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git">code</a>, <a

709)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
710)     tracker</a>)</h3>

711) 

712)     <p>
713)     E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
714)     relatively unchanged for quite a while.
715)     </p>

716) 

717)     <a id="project-torcheck"></a>

718)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a

719)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git">code</a>, <a

720)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
721)     tracker</a>)</h3>

722) 

723)     <p>

724)     Site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.

725)     </p>

726) 

727)     <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>

728)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a

729)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
730)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
731)     tracker</a>)</h3>

732) 

733)     <p>
734)     Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
735)     in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
736)     </p>

737) 

738)     <p>
739)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
740)     <i><a href="#newBridgedbDistributor">New BridgeDB Distributor</a></i>
741)     </p>
742) 

743)     <a id="project-ooni-probe"></a>

744)     <h3><a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/">Ooni Probe</a> (<a

745)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/ooni-probe.git">code</a>, <a
746)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Ooni&order=priority">bug
747)     tracker</a>)</h3>
748) 
749)     <p>
750)     Censorship scanner, checking your local connection for blocked or modified
751)     content.
752)     </p>
753) 

754)     <p>
755)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

756)     <i><a href="#censorshipAnalyzer">Develop a Censorship Analyzer</a></i><br />
757)     <i><a href="#ooniprobePcapsSupport">Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</a></i>

758)     </p>
759) 

760)     <a id="project-torps"></a>
761)     <h3>TorPS</a> (<a href="https://github.com/torps/torps">code</a>)</h3>
762) 
763)     <p>
764)     The Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) is a tool for efficiently simulating
765)     path selection in Tor. It chooses circuits and assigns user streams to
766)     those circuits in the same way that Tor does. TorPS is fast enough to
767)     perform thousands of simulations over periods of months.
768)     </p>
769) 

770)     <a id="project-torflow"></a>

771)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a

772)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
773)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
774)     tracker</a>)</h3>

775) 

776)     <p>
777)     Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
778)     These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
779)     SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
780)     actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
781)     months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
782)     has stopped.
783)     </p>

784) 

785)     <a id="project-torbel"></a>
786)     <h3><a

787)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/torbel-tor-bulk-exit-list-tools">TorBEL</a> (<a
788)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbel.git">code</a>, <a

789)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
790)     tracker</a>)</h3>

791) 

792)     <p>
793)     The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
794)     exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
795)     (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
796)     version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
797)     been inactive.
798)     </p>

799) 
800)     <a id="project-tor2web"></a>
801)     <h3><a
802)     href="http://wiki.tor2web.org/index.php/Main_Page">Tor2web</a> (<a
803)     href="https://github.com/globaleaks/tor2web-3.0/wiki">code</a>)</h3>
804) 
805)     <p>
806)     Tor2web allows Internet users to browse websites running in <a
807)     href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Tor hidden services</a>. It trades
808)     user anonymity for usability by allowing anonymous content to be
809)     distributed to non-anonymous users.
810)     </p>
811) 

812)     <a id="project-anonbib"></a>
813)     <h3><a
814)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">Anonymity Bibliography</a> (<a
815)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/anonbib.git">code</a>)</h3>
816) 
817)     <p>

818)     Anonbib is a list of important papers in the field of anonymity. It's
819)     also a set of scripts to generate the website from Latex (bibtex). If
820)     we're missing any important papers, please let us know!

821)     </p>
822) 

823)     <a id="Coding"></a>
824)     <a id="Summer"></a>

825)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>

826) 

827)     <p>

828)     You may find some of these projects to be good ideas for <a href="<page
829)     about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a> and the <a
830)     href="https://live.gnome.org/OutreachProgramForWomen">Outreach Program for

831)     Women</a>. We have labelled each idea with how much work we expect it would
832)     be (effort level), how much clue you should start with (skill level),
833)     and which of our <a href="<page about/corepeople>">core developers</a>
834)     would be good mentors. If one or more of these ideas looks promising to
835)     you, please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your
836)     plans rather than sending blind applications. You may also want to propose
837)     your own project idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.

838)     </p>

839) 

840)     <ol>

841) 

842)     <a id="txtorcon-stemIntegration"></a>
843)     <li>
844)     <b>Txtorcon/Stem Integration</b>
845)     <br>
846)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
847)     <br>
848)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
849)     <br>
850)     Likely Mentors: <i>meejah, Damian (atagar)</i>
851)     <p>Txtorcon is a Twisted-based Python controller library, and Stem is a
852)     synchronous (threaded) one, also in Python. There is no need to have
853)     two implementations of (at least) the protocol parsing code. This
854)     project would entail eliminating duplication by leveraging Stem's
855)     parsing in txtorcon while keeping txtorcon's API the same (or at least
856)     close).</p>

857)     <p>Besides this you should identify some additional tasks to improve our
858)     controller space across these two libraries. Some ideas are...</p>
859)     <ul>
860)       <li>Write a tutorial for <a
861)       href="https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials.html">stem's tutorial
862)       page</a> demonstrating cross txtorcon/stem usage.</li>
863)       <li>Expand the txtorcon API to include functionality of <a

864)       href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/control.py">stem's

865)       controller</a> that would be of interest to twisted users. All additions
866)       should include tests!</li>
867)       <li>Come up with some ideas of your own! We'd love to discuss them with
868)       you.</li>
869)     </ul>

870)     <p>This would very likely involve changes to both libraries, although
871)     most would be expected to be in txtorcon. meejah is available to
872)     mentor txtorcon changes, and Damian (atagar) can help with Stem.</p>
873)     <p>It would help if you're already familiar with event-based programming,
874)     bonus points if it's Twisted.</p>
875)     </li>
876) 

877)     <a id="relayWebPanel"></a>
878)     <li>

879)     <b>Relay Web Status Dashboard</b>

880)     <br>
881)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
882)     <br>
883)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
884)     <br>
885)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
886)     <p>

887)     Relay operators presently have a good option for monitoring the status
888)     of their relay:
889)     <a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">arm</a> which uses

890)     curses. This project would be to make a new kind of monitor specifically
891)     for relay operators that provides a status dashboard site on localhost.
892)     </p>
893)     <p>
894)     The interface will likely <a
895)     href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/screenshots.php">borrow heavily from
896)     arm</a>, except of course in areas where we can improve upon it. Two
897)     important design constraints is that a localhost controller provides a
898)     bigger attack surface than guis or curses, so we should be a little more
899)     wary of what it does. This should be a read-only controller (ie, you can't
900)     *do* anything to the relay) and by default not surface any sensitive

901)     information (such as arm's connection panel). Also take a peek at <a
902)     href="http://www.ntop.org/products/ntop/">ntop</a> for ideas on what we can
903)     do with a web interface.

904)     </p>
905)     <p>
906)     This project will likely include two parts: an AJAX site and a localhost
907)     daemon to fulfill those requests. <a
908)     href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> is the backend of arm, and can
909)     be used to get everything you see in arm's interface (making it a natural
910)     choice for the daemon). That said, this project might entail some Stem
911)     improvements if we run across any gaps.
912)     </p>
913)     <p>
914)     Applicants should be familiar with Python, JavaScript, and learn about
915)     <a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a>. <b>As part of your
916)     application for this project please make both mockups of the interface and
917)     a proof of concept demo application using JS to surface something with
918)     Stem. <a
919)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">Involvement
920)     with Stem development</a> during the application process is also a big
921)     plus.</b>
922)     </p>
923)     </li>
924) 

925)     <a id="torCleanup"></a>

926)     <li>

927)     <b>Tor Codebase Cleanup</b>

928)     <br>

929)     Effort Level: <i>Low to High, depending on subproject chosen</i>

930)     <br>

931)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

932)     <br>

933)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

934)     <p>

935)     The Tor code is more than 10 years old in places, and we haven't always had

936)     enough time or wisdom to write things as well as we could have.  Our unit
937)     test coverage is shamefully low, and the dependency graph of our modules is
938)     shamefully convoluted . We could use refactoring and unit tests!  Please
939)     look through the Tor source code and look for ugly or tricky code or
940)     dependencies -- the uglier and trickier the better -- and think about how
941)     you could make the code look better, read better, and (subject to testing)
942)     work better.

943)     </p>

944) 

945)     <p>

946)     If this is for a fun side-project, it would be great for you to work on
947)     anything that can be made better and more tested.  For an internship-level
948)     position, we'd hope that you could find a number of particularly tricky or
949)     knotty piece of the code to clean up, and aim for resolving the ugliest
950)     problems, not necessarily the easiest.

951)     </p>

952) 

953)     <p>

954)     For a big project here, it would be great to pick one of the major
955)     "submodules" of Tor -- path selection, node discovery, directory authority
956)     operations, directory service -- and refactor its interface completely, to
957)     minify and codify its points of contact with the rest of Tor.

958)     </p>

959) 
960)     <p>
961)     <b>As part of your application for this project please identify one of the
962)     thorniest Tor functions and submit a patch refactoring it to be better. If
963)     you find this to be difficult then this likely isn't the project for
964)     you.</b>
965)     </p>

966)     </li>

967) 

968)     <a id="betterPluggableTransports"></a>
969)     <li>
970)     <b>Build Better Pluggable Transports</b>
971)     <br>
972)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
973)     <br>
974)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
975)     <br>

976)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch), Ximin (infinity0), George (asn)</i>

977)     <p>

978)     For Tor users in censored countries, we have a <a

979)     href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">

980)     pluggable transports</a> framework that uses external programs to bypass
981)     censorship in different ways. Each of these have their own strengths and
982)     weaknesses.

983)     </p>
984) 
985)     <p>

986)     We have deployed <a

987)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">obfsproxy</a>, 
988)     <a href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">flashproxy</a>, 
989)     <a href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/">scramblesuit</a>, 
990)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek">meek</a>,
991)     and <a href="https://fteproxy.org/about">FTE</a> bridges into the main 
992)     Tor Browser.</a>

993)     </p>
994) 
995)     <p>
996)     There are several possible directions for this project. Ideas include:
997)       <ol>
998)         <li>Address gaps or weaknesses in our existing pluggable transports
999)           <ul>
1000)             <li>Flashproxy: Add WebRTC support to traverse NATs.</li>
1001)             <li>Flashproxy: Improve the facilitator's resistance against DoS
1002)             and poisoning attacks.</li>
1003)           </ul>
1004)         </li>

1005)         <li>Finish and release our pluggable transport combiner, that chains
1006)         several transports together to take advantage of orthogonal types of
1007)         blocking resistance.</li>

1008)         <li>Improve the UX for selecting the appropriate pluggable transport in

1009)         the new Tor Browser, whilst maintaining user security.</li>

1010)         <li>Implement a new pluggable transport that resists blocking in a
1011)         novel way.
1012)         <ul>
1013)           <li>Impersonate a voice-over-IP protocol</li>
1014)           <li>Impersonate HTTP <a
1015)           href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~amir/papers/parrot.pdf">sufficiently
1016)           well</a> that traffic will go through a HTTP-only proxy</li>
1017)           <li>Implement <a
1018)           href="http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2011/cacr2011-21.pdf">scanning
1019)           resistance</a></li>
1020)         </ul>
1021)         </li>
1022)       </ol>
1023)     </p>
1024) 
1025)     <p>
1026)     Applicants should be familiar with asynchronous/reactive programming, in
1027)     particular the <a href="https://twistedmatrix.com/">Twisted framework</a>
1028)     or something related. Most of the existing code is written in Python, with
1029)     some parts in JavaScript and Go, so you should know at least one of these.
1030)     You are invited to talk to us and ask questions, via our mailing lists
1031)     or IRC. <b>As part of your application, please contribute a patch that
1032)     implements a small feature or fixes a bug related to this area, e.g. <a
1033)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Pluggable+transport">1</a>,
1034)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Obfsproxy">2</a>,
1035)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Flashproxy">3</a>.
1036)     </b>

1037)     </p>
1038) 
1039)     <a id="profileUDPTransport"></a>
1040)     <li>
1041)     <b>Profile UDP transport protocols</b>
1042)     <br>
1043)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1044)     <br>
1045)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1046)     <br>

1047)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch), Yawning</i>

1048)     <p>
1049)     There are <a
1050)     href="https://research.torproject.org/techreports/datagram-comparison-2011-11-07.pdf">lots
1051)     of options</a> as to how Tor could send its data over UDP rather than TCP,
1052)     and some will likely perform significantly better than others. This project
1053)     will evaluate these options, so as to decide which should be used in future
1054)     versions of Tor. A first step will be to benchmark the various transport
1055)     protocols being considered, in terms of performance and also code quality,
1056)     including userspace TCP, <a
1057)     href="https://github.com/bittorrent/libutp">&mu;TP</a>, <a
1058)     href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_Control_Transmission_Protocol">SCTP</a>
1059)     and <a href="http://curvecp.org/">CurveCP</a>. Initially these transport
1060)     protocols will be examined in isolation, but if the project progresses well
1061)     one or more could be integrated in Tor.
1062)     </p>
1063)     </li>
1064) 

1065)     <a id="httpsEverywhereRulesetTesting"></a>
1066)     <li>
1067)     <b>Incorporate Ruleset Testing into the HTTPS Everywhere release process</b>
1068)     <br>
1069)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1070)     <br>
1071)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1072)     <br>

1073)     Likely Mentors: <i>Peter Eckersley (pde), Micah Lee</i>

1074)     <p>
1075) Ondrej Mikle has implemented a codebase for testing HTTPS Everywhere rulesets
1076) by crawling pages that are affected by the ruleset (<a href="https://github.com/hiviah/https-everywhere-checker">repository</a>).
1077)     </p>
1078) 
1079)     <p>
1080) This codebase still has some rough edges that need to be smoothed over, but
1081) once those are done it should be incorporated into the HTTPS Everywhere build
1082) process, in order to improve the quality of our releases.
1083)     </p>
1084)     </li>
1085) 

1086)     <a id="censorshipAnalyzer"></a>
1087)     <li>
1088)     <b>Develop a Censorship Analyzer</b>
1089)     <br>
1090)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1091)     <br>
1092)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High (depends on the implemented tests)</i>
1093)     <br>
1094)     Likely Mentors: <i>Philipp (phw)</i>
1095)     <p>
1096) Tor is documented to be blocked in <a
1097) href="https://censorshipwiki.torproject.org">several countries</a>. Analyzing
1098) these censorship incidents can be a tedious task; especially without access to
1099) machines inside the censoring networks. To make analysis easier, it would be
1100) great to have a lightweight analysis tool which can be run by censored users.
1101) This tool would conduct a number of networking tests and figure out if and how
1102) Tor could be blocked. The tool's final report should then somehow make it back
1103) to the Tor project.
1104)     </p>
1105) 
1106)     <p>
1107) The theory behind this tool is already <a

1108) href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/pdf/foci2013.pdf">documented

1109) in a research paper</a>. What we now need is code! Implementing it would first
1110) mean getting familiar with <a href="https://ooni.torproject.org">OONI</a> and
1111) <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/trac/">Twisted</a>. After that, the tool
1112) should be implemented as a number of OONI-specific networking tests.
1113)     </p>

1114) 
1115)     <p>
1116) Applicants should be familiar with Python and asynchronous programming,
1117) e.g., as it is used in Twisted.  As part of your application for this
1118) project please contribute a patch for a bug in <a
1119) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Ooni">OONI</a>.
1120)     </p>

1121)     </li>
1122) 

1123)     <a id="makeTorbirdyBetter"></a>
1124)     <li>
1125)     <b>Make TorBirdy Better</b>
1126)     <br>
1127)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1128)     <br>
1129)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1130)     <br>
1131)     Likely Mentors: <i>Sukhbir Singh (sukhe), Jacob Appelbaum (ioerror)</i>
1132)     <p>
1133) TorBirdy is an extension that configures Thunderbird to make connections over
1134) the Tor anonymity network. TorBirdy has been under development for quite a
1135) while but there are two known leaks that prevent it from being used by a wider
1136) audience. As part of this project, you will be working on plugging the known
1137) leaks and implementing a HTTP proxy.
1138)     </p>
1139) 
1140)     <p>
1141) <b>Part 1:</b> There are two patches pending with Mozilla that will plug the two known
1142) leaks in Thunderbird where the local time is disclosed through the date and the
1143) message-ID header. As part of your project, you will work on getting these
1144) patches finished/reimplemented and getting them merged with Mozilla. Please
1145) look at tickets <a
1146) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6314">#6314</a> and <a
1147) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6315">#6315</a> for more
1148) information.
1149)     </p>
1150) 
1151)     <p>
1152) <b>Part 2:</b> TorBirdy needs a HTTP proxy or a HTTP -&gt; SOCKS5 shim. Please look at
1153) ticket <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6958">#6958</a>
1154) for more information. Note: this has to be done using JavaScript and not using
1155) an external proxy.
1156)     </p>
1157) 
1158)     <p>
1159) If time permits and you are awesome enough to finish the above two tasks, you
1160) will be working on the remaining TorBirdy tickets.
1161)     </p>
1162) 
1163)     <p>
1164) Applicants should be familiar with C++ and JavaScript. As part of your
1165) application for this project, please submit code samples for previous C++ and
1166) JavaScript projects that you have developed or point us to projects you have
1167) been involved with (links to a public Git/GitHub repository preferred). Prior
1168) extension development is a big plus and will be given preference during
1169) application ranking.
1170)     </p>
1171) 
1172)     <p>

1173) You may contact the mentors on IRC for more information. (sukhe on #tor-dev, #tor on irc.oftc.net)

1174)     </p>
1175)     </li>
1176) 

1177)     <a id="ooniprobePcapsSupport"></a>
1178)     <li>
1179)     <b>Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</b>
1180)     <br>
1181)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1182)     <br>
1183)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1184)     <br>
1185)     Likely Mentors: <i>Arturo (hellais), Aaron (aagbsn)</i>
1186)     <p>
1187) The feature should also add support for including only packet capture data that
1188) is relevant to the test being run. This means that the pcap should not contain
1189) all the data sniffed on the users machine, but only that which was generated
1190) and intended to be received by ooniprobe.
1191)     </p>
1192) 
1193)     <p>
1194) This can probably be implemented by setting up a tun/tap device and routing all
1195) the ooniprobe traffic through it and only capturing data sent and received from
1196) that device. The task for the student will also be that of doing research into
1197) what are possible strategies for doing this. <b><a
1198) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7416">For more
1199) information see ticket 7416.</a></b>
1200)     </p>
1201)     </li>
1202) 

1203) <!--

1204)     <a id="orbotVPN"></a>
1205)     <li>
1206)     <b>Orbot Android VPN</b>
1207)     <br>
1208)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1209)     <br>
1210)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1211)     <br>
1212)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan (n8fr8)</i>
1213)     <p>
1214) Android offers the ability for any application to establish a
1215) VPNService through which all traffic on the device is sent. We want to
1216) implement this type of service in order to route all traffic through
1217) the Tor network. This is a feature that will be implemented directly
1218) into Orbot: Tor for Android if successfully implemented.
1219)     </p>
1220) 
1221)     <p>
1222) The deliverables for the project will be a working Android VPN
1223) implementation that routes traffic through Tor, and integration of VPN
1224) code into the Orbot app. There must also be time made for reporting on
1225) the project through blog posts, network auditing of tracking to ensure
1226) leakage is not occurring.
1227)     </p>
1228) 
1229)     <p>
1230) Useful links and documentation to study:
1231)     </p>
1232) 
1233)     <ul>
1234)       <li><a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">Orbot</a></li>
1235)       <li><a href="http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html">Android VPNService API</a></li>
1236)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/OrbotVPN">Existing work on Orbot VPN</a></li>
1237)     </ul>
1238) 
1239)     <p>
1240) Applicant should have the ability to build Orbot application from
1241) source using Android SDK and NDK tools. A solid understanding of IP
1242) routing, iptables, netfilter and VPN protocols would also be very
1243) helpful. The ability to use Wireshark or other network monitoring
1244) software to test and verify solution is something that can be taught,
1245) but if you already know how, bonus! Finally, understanding how the
1246) exiting Tor software can be used with various transparent proxying
1247) configurations is a good first step to understanding this problem.
1248)     </p>
1249)     </li>

1250) -->

1251) 
1252)     <a id="improveTorTestCoverage"></a>
1253)     <li>
1254)     <b>Improve test coverage in Tor</b>
1255)     <br>
1256)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1257)     <br>
1258)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1259)     <br>

1260)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1261)     <p>
1262) Right now, our unit test coverage with the tests we ship is around 30%
1263) -- only 30% of the executable lines in our source are reached by the
1264) unit tests.  Improving this test coverage could make Tor development
1265) much more reliable.
1266)     </p>
1267) 
1268)     <p>
1269) So we need better unit tests, and we need better integration tests too.
1270)     </p>
1271) 
1272)     <p>
1273) Improving unit tests would would involve refactoring functions to be more
1274) testable, and writing a bunch of unit tests.
1275)     </p>
1276) 
1277)     <p>

1278) Improving integration tests would involve refactoring and improving

1279) the "chutney" program that launches a test tor network, and writing a
1280) bunch of tests to see what works and what doesn't work on such a
1281) network.  It could also involve writing tests using the library "<a
1282) href="https://stem.torproject.org/">stem</a>" to script individual clients on a
1283) Chutney network.
1284)     </p>
1285) 
1286)     <p>
1287) To get a feel for how testing works in Tor today, download Tor and
1288) Chutney, and make sure you can build Tor and use Chutney.  See how the
1289) unit tests work by skimming some of the test code in the src/test
1290) subdirectory.  Try computing test coverage (according to the
1291) instructions in the doc/HACKING file.
1292)     </p>
1293) 
1294)     <p>
1295) Also, have a look at the one current integration test that works on
1296) chutney today: it is a shell script distributed with Tor as
1297) src/test/test-tor-network.sh .  We probably don't want to have all of
1298) our integration tests be written as shell scripts, but it's interesting
1299) to see how one works.
1300)     </p>
1301) 
1302)     <p>
1303) If working on designs for an improved or refactored Chutney, watch out for <a
1304) href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/fog0000000018.html">"archicture
1305) astronautics"</a>: while it's important that we have a well-designed and
1306) maintainable Chutney architecture, it wouldn't be very useful if a good
1307) architecture were the <em>only</em> outcome here: we need tests too.
1308)     </p>
1309) 
1310)     <p>
1311) As part of the application process, please contribute a patch that makes
1312) a non-trivial improvement to chutney, and/or include a new test for some
1313) interesting Tor function. (Please pick a function that isn't completely
1314) easy to test.)
1315)     </p>
1316)     </li>
1317) 
1318)     <a id="useMoreCores"></a>
1319)     <li>
1320)     <b>Have the Tor daemon use more cores</b>
1321)     <br>
1322)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1323)     <br>
1324)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1325)     <br>

1326)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1327)     <p>
1328) Right now, if you run a busy Tor server on a multicore computer, most of
1329) the cores are mostly unused.  We have a "cpuworker" mechanism to move
1330) expensive computations into worker threads, but that mechanism is
1331) currently only used for a small fraction of our cryptography.  Moving
1332) more work into the worker threads could improve performance immensely.
1333)     </p>
1334) 
1335)     <p>
1336) So it would be great to parallelize our cryptography more in order to
1337) better handle more cores.  See
1338) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/MultithreadedCrypto">MultithreadedCrypto</a>
1339) for some background info, and
1340) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7572">ticket 7572</a> for some subtickets
1341) on our tracker.
1342)     </p>
1343) 
1344)     <p>
1345) (If you're reading through the code to see how it works today, you will
1346) also want to have a look at the new implementation for cpuworkers
1347) described in <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9682">9682</a>.)
1348)     </p>
1349) 
1350)     <p>
1351) Completing the implementation of ticket #7572 --which would move our
1352) circuit crypto onto separate threads-- could be a good summer project.
1353) Alternatively, moving all of the signature generation and verification
1354) code onto the cpuworkers could be fun.  In either case, you will have
1355) some important architectural decisions to make about how to minimize
1356) shared data between the main thread and the workers, how to avoid
1357) race conditions between them, and how to test it all to make sure it has
1358) no hidden failure cases.
1359)     </p>
1360) 
1361)     <p>
1362) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1363) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1364) the codebase that you want to work on.
1365)     </p>
1366)     </li>
1367) 
1368)     <a id="improveHiddenServices"></a>
1369)     <li>
1370)     <b>Help improve Tor hidden services</b>
1371)     <br>
1372)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1373)     <br>
1374)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1375)     <br>

1376)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1377)     <p>
1378) We're working on a revamp of the entire Tor hidden service design to
1379) improve the security and reliability of the hidden service system.
1380)     </p>
1381) 
1382)     <p>
1383) This is a big project: see
1384) <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt">proposal
1385) 224</a> for the latest design.  Are you interested in implementing some
1386) part of that?
1387)     </p>
1388) 
1389)     <p>
1390) This is a very ambitious project, so we're deliberately not suggesting
1391) particular sub-topics.  If you're interested in participating, try to
1392) read and understand the <a
1393) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/rend-spec.txt">existing
1394) design</a> and the design proposal for the new design, and then talk to
1395) us about what part you want to work on.
1396)     </p>
1397) 
1398)     <p>
1399) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1400) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1401) the codebase that you want to work on.
1402)     </p>
1403)     </li>
1404) 
1405)     <a id="improvedDnsSupport"></a>
1406)     <li>
1407)     <b>Improved DNS support for Tor</b>
1408)     <br>
1409)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1410)     <br>
1411)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1412)     <br>

1413)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1414)     <p>
1415) Right now, you can only use Tor's DNS support to look up IPv4 and IPv6
1416) addresses, and to fetch PTR records.  But DNS can do so much more!
1417)     </p>
1418) 
1419)     <p>
1420) <a
1421) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/219-expanded-dns.txt">Proposal
1422) 219</a> describes some new cell types that Tor could use to support
1423) more types of DNS over Tor.
1424)     </p>
1425) 
1426)     <p>
1427) To see how Tor implements its existing DNS lookups, start by tracing the
1428) the connection_exit_begin_resolve() function in src/or/connection_edge.c ,
1429) and see how we pass these requests downwards through src/or/dns.c to the
1430) underlying resolver.  It's not too complicated, but there are some
1431) tricky parts to understand.
1432)     </p>
1433) 
1434)     <p>
1435) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1436) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1437) the codebase that you want to work on.
1438)     </p>
1439)     </li>
1440) 
1441)     <a id="torSandboxing"></a>
1442)     <li>
1443)     <b>Help improve Tor sandboxing</b>
1444)     <br>
1445)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1446)     <br>
1447)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1448)     <br>

1449)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1450)     <p>
1451) The seccomp2 mechanism on Linux lets programs improve their robustness
1452) against unforseen bugs by running with restrictions on which system
1453) calls they can invoke and how they can call them.  This can help
1454) security a lot.
1455)     </p>
1456) 
1457)     <p>
1458) Thanks to a GSOC student from last year, we now have seccomp2 support on
1459) Linux, which we use to restrict the capabilities of the entire Tor
1460) process.  (For implementation details, see src/commmon/sandbox.c in the
1461) Tor source.)
1462)     </p>
1463) 
1464)     <p>
1465) But since the restrictions are done over the whole process, all pieces
1466) of the Tor code have permission to do things that only small parts of
1467) the Tor program need to do.  Also, since we use seccomp2, these
1468) restrictions only work on Linux.
1469)     </p>
1470) 
1471)     <p>
1472) It would be great to instead divide the main Tor program into multiple
1473) processes with a robust IPC mechanism and assign each process its own
1474) minimal set of privileges; and to have this work (as best we can) on
1475) systems that don't have seccomp2 (eg Windows, Mac).
1476)     </p>
1477) 
1478)     <p>
1479) Either of these could be a whole GSOC project.
1480)     </p>
1481) 
1482)     <p>
1483) To get started, make sure you understand the existing sandboxing code.
1484) If you're interested in splitting Tor into multiple processes, think
1485) about the architecture, and think about how we could reach this
1486) architecture without completely rewriting the codebase.  (Remember that
1487) even if you're focusing on Linux, Tor still needs to work on other
1488) operating systems.)
1489)     </p>
1490) 
1491)     <p>
1492) If you're interested in supporting more platforms, make sure you
1493) understand and can explain what sandboxing mechansisms you want to use,
1494) and what they're capable of.  (You might want to investigate the way
1495) that other open-source programs, like the Chrome web browser, do their
1496) sandboxing on different platforms.)
1497)     </p>
1498) 
1499)     <p>
1500) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1501) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1502) the codebase that you want to work on.
1503)     </p>
1504)     </li>
1505) 

1506)     <a id="panopticlick"></a>
1507)     <li>
1508)     <b>Panopticlick</b>
1509)     <br>
1510)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1511)     <br>
1512)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1513)     <br>

1514)     Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>, <i>Mike Perry</i>, <i>Nicolas Vigier</i>
1515)     <p>
1516) 
1517) The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a>
1518) revolutionized how people think about <a
1519) href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">browser
1520) fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser
1521) fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of
1522) individual browser features to overall fingerprintability.
1523) 
1524)     </p>
1525)     <p>
1526) 
1527) Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a
1528) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton">makes
1529) it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially
1530) for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is
1531) because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our
1532) users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint
1533) data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of
1534) one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser
1535) (Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example,
1536) based on feature set alone).
1537) 
1538)    </p>
1539)    <p>
1540) 
1541) To address this, we would like to have <a

1542) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119">our own

1543) fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser
1544) feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a
1545) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting">additional
1546) fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick.
1547)    </p>
1548)    <p>
1549) 
1550) For this project, the student would develop a website that users can
1551) voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint.  The user
1552) should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be
1553) available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser
1554) version.  In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated
1555) tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the
1556) uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each
1557) browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and
1558) version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific
1559) implementation.
1560) 

1561)     </p>
1562)     </li>
1563) 

1564)     <a id="improveStegotorus"></a>
1565)     <li>
1566)     <b>Improve Stegotorus</b>
1567)     <br>
1568)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1569)     <br>
1570)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1571)     <br>
1572)     Likely Mentors: <i>vmon</i>
1573)     <p>
1574) Stegotorus is a fork of obfsproxy which helps developers to write more intelligent pluggable transports which can hide easier from deep packet inspector (DPI) system.
1575)     </p>
1576) 
1577)     <p>
1578) For example, Stegotorus is equipped with a "chopper module" which takes care of following aspects:
1579)     </p>
1580) 
1581)     <ol>
1582)       <li>It randomize the packet size so it is harder for the DPI system to detect the traffic base on the distribution of the packet size.</li>
1583)       <li>It makes sure that it only handle as much (or as less) information as the transport module can handle.</li>
1584)       <li>Chopper is equipped with it is own acknowledge/retransmit protocol. If the censor trying to disturb the connection by dropping or disturbing some of packets, it can recover the data by sending them many times.</li>
1585)     </ol>
1586) 
1587)     <p>
1588) More importantly, Stegotorus is coming with its own HTTP transport module which obfuscates Tor or any other encrypted traffic in HTTP content such as Javascript code or images. HTTP transport module is also written in a way which new module developers can easily add new obfuscation modules for new contents or improve current obfuscation algorithms without the need of dealing with networking aspect of the problem.
1589)     </p>
1590) 
1591)     <p>
1592) Stegotorus is written in C++. you can find the latest code <a href="https://github.com/zackw/stegotorus/tree/tor-improve">here</a>.
1593)     </p>
1594) 
1595)     <p>
1596) In this regard, Stegotorus is offering one of the most complete and sophisticated platforms for writing stealthy pluggable transports.
1597)     </p>
1598) 
1599)     <p>
1600) If you know C++ and interested in Stegotorus and excited about battling censorship, there are many ways that you can contribute to Stegotorus. Here are few important tasks. Your proposal might contain a good number of them:
1601)     </p>
1602) 
1603)     <ol>
1604)       <li>Currently Stegotorus handshake is encrypted using the symmetric secret key of the Stegotorus bridge. However, we would like to implement a totally random handshake and considering that some transports suffer badly from "bandwidth shortage", our best choice currently is to implement <a href="http://elligator.cr.yp.to/">this algorithm</a>.</li>
1605)       <li>Stegotorus defense against active probing is to authenticate the header of the received packet. If the authentication fails Stegotorus turns into a transparent proxy. The capability of Stegotorus as a transparent proxy needs improvement and further testing.</li>
1606)       <li>Stegotorus has a new framework for writing Steg module. However some of the Steg modules (PDF, SWF and JS) are written in the old framework, we need to refactor their code in the new framework.</li>
1607)       <li>As writting new Steg modules in python is easier and safer, it is desirable to write an Steg module interface for Stegotorus which can accept and interact with Steg modules written in python/cython.</li>
1608)       <li>To make detection of anomalies in the traffic harder, Stegotorus hands a noise-to-signal ratio to each Steg modules. Steg modules' algorithms need to use more intelligent way of embedding to use this ratio.</li>
1609)       <li>Stegotorus has several parameters to tweak its behavior. Currently all these parameters are given in command line. We would like to have a config file to store these parameters as an alternative method.</li>
1610)       <li>The general security of the code needs to be reviewed and audited for buffer overflow, memory leak etc.</li>
1611)       <li>Steg modules for new file format for the HTTP transport are always welcome to reflect the actual traffic of the Internet.</li>
1612)       <li>Packaging Stegotorus for windows.</li>
1613)       <li>There is a parallel efforts to improve Stegotorus at SRI. We would like to merge the useful feature developed by SRI in our branch of Stegotorus.</li>
1614)       <li>Stegotorus needs to support SOCKS protocol to be able to receive the initial parameters from Tor through SOCKS handshake.</li>
1615)     </ol>
1616) 
1617)     <p>
1618) You can find a list of open issues concerning Stegotorus <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Stegotorus&order=priority">here</a>.
1619)     </p>
1620) 
1621)     <p>
1622) You also can think of lots of other awesome creative ways of improving Stegotorus and include those in your proposal.
1623)     </p>
1624)     </li>
1625) 

1626)     <a id="newBridgedbDistributor"></a>
1627)     <li>
1628)     <b>New BridgeDB Distributor</b>
1629)     <br>
1630)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1631)     <br>
1632)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1633)     <br>
1634)     Likely Mentors: <i>isis, sysrqb</i>
1635)     <p>
1636) BridgeDB is a Twisted Python system which runs a number of servers, in order
1637) to distribute Tor bridge relays to users in potentially censored regions. Each
1638) of BridgeDB's Distributors uses some unique channel to communicate bridge
1639) addresses to users, currently there is an <a href="https://bridges.torproject.org">
1640) HTTPS Distributor</a>, and an Email Distributor. This project would involve
1641) designing and creating a new Distributor for BridgeDB. Some ideas for new
1642) Distributors:
1643)     </p>
1644) 
1645)     <ul>
1646)       <li>A Twitter bot which interacts with Chinese and Farsi speaking Twitter users through PMs.</li>
1647)       <li>A distributor which uses XMPP+OTR to give bridges to users.</li>
1648)     </ul>
1649) 
1650)     <p>
1651) It's helpful if you already have some knowledge of Twisted. As part of your
1652) application, please submit a design for a Distributor, as well as supply a
1653) patch for a ticket which demonstrates knowledge of Twisted and Python ―
1654) preferably for BridgeDB, see the
1655) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&keywords=~bridgedb-gsoc-application">
1656) 'bridgedb-gsoc-application' Trac tag</a> for some examples of good tickets to
1657) try, or contact isis or sysrqb on IRC to ask for ticket suggestions or advice.
1658)     </p>
1659)     </li>
1660) 

1661) <!--
1662)     <a id=""></a>
1663)     <li>
1664)     <b></b>
1665)     <br>
1666)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1667)     <br>
1668)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1669)     <br>
1670)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
1671)     <p>
1672) 
1673)     </p>
1674) 
1675)     <p>
1676) 
1677)     </p>
1678)     </li>
1679) -->
1680) 

1681)     <li>
1682)     <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>

1683)     <br>

1684)     Don't like any of these? Look at the <a

1685)     href="/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development

1686)     roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor and Tor Browser,

1687)     and find out what you think needs fixing.

1688)     Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>

1689)     might also be short on developers.
1690)     </li>

1691) 

1692)     </ol>

1693) 

1694)     <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
1695)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
1696)     <ol>
1697)     <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
1698)     Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
1699)     call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
1700)     that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

1701)     href="<wiki>doc/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

1702)     havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
1703)     instead. One solution would be to teach <a
1704)     href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
1705)     overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
1706)     the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
1707)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
1708)     start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

1709) 

1710)     <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
1711)     traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
1712)     simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
1713)     really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
1714)     that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
1715)     giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
1716)     See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
1717)     details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
1718)     done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

1719) 

1720)     <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
1721)     accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
1722)     possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing,

1723)     performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and

1724)     Tor if needed.</li>

1725) 

1726)     <li>Write a <a
1727)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzzer</a>
1728)     for Tor to discover security vulnerabilities. Determine if there
1729)     are good fuzzing frameworks out there for what we want. Win fame by

1730)     getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

1731) 

1732)     <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
1733)     encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
1734)     on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
1735)     it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

1736)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list

1737)     of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
1738)     be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

1739)     href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

1740)     for Tor and
1741)     UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

1742) 

1743)     <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
1744)     (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
1745)     first place to start.</li>

1746) 

1747)     <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
1748)     Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
1749)     from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
1750)     them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
1751)     integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
1752)     generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>

1753) 

1754)     <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
1755)     to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a

1756)     href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live

1757)     System</a>.
1758)     </li>

1759) 

1760)     <li>
1761)     Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
1762)     more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a

1763)     href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>

1764)     just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
1765)     and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
1766)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
1767)     webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
1768)     and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
1769)     To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
1770)     href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
1771)     </li>

1772) 

1773)     </ol>

1774) 

1775)     <a id="Research"></a>
1776)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
1777)     <ol>
1778)     <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
1779)     by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
1780)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
1781)     traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
1782)     stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
1783)     attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
1784)     much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
1785)     is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
1786)     that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
1787)     schemes work better than others?</li>
1788)     <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
1789)     protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
1790)     see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
1791)     Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
1792)     client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
1793)     that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
1794)     look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
1795)     timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
1796)     href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
1797)     but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
1798)     client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
1799)     strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
1800)     asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
1801)     natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
1802)     symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
1803)     <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
1804)     href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
1805)     Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
1806)     works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
1807)     fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
1808)     then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
1809)     options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
1810)     attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
1811)     attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
1812)     actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
1813)     much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
1814)     or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
1815)     orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
1816)     sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
1817)     Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
1818)     <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
1819)     the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
1820)     exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
1821)     though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
1822)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
1823)     that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
1824)     Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
1825)     exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
1826)     routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
1827)     approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
1828)     <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
1829)     the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
1830)     circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
1831)     href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
1832)     paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
1833)     anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
1834)     thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
1835)     <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
1836)     (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
1837)     each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
1838)     bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
1839)     don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
1840)     Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
1841)     and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
1842)     a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
1843)     slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
1844)     need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
1845)     solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
1846)     degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
1847)     <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
1848)     current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
1849)     we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
1850)     than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a

1851)     href="http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh/638">ssh

1852)     throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
1853)     overhaul if the results are good.</li>
1854)     <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
1855)     an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
1856)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
1857)     it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
1858)     steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
1859)     block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
1860)     the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
1861)     bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
1862)     How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
1863)     wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
1864)     a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
1865)     <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
1866)     ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
1867)     third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
1868)     streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
1869)     the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
1870)     the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
1871)     tradeoff.</li>
1872)     <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
1873)     puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
1874)     if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
1875)     <li>Programs like <a

1876)     href="<page docs/torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

1877)     your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
1878)     every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
1879)     by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
1880)     by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
1881)     do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
1882)     that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
1883)     anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
1884)     Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
1885)     of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
1886)     in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
1887)     UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
1888)     hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
1889)     by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
1890)     browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
1891)     </li>
1892)     <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
1893)     reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
1894)     lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
1895)     connected?
1896)     </li>
1897)     </ol>

1898) 

1899)     <p>
1900)     <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
1901)     of these!
1902)     </p>
1903)   </div>
1904)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1905)   <div id = "sidecol">
1906) #include "side.wmi"
1907) #include "info.wmi"
1908)   </div>
1909)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1910) </div>
1911) <!-- END CONTENT -->