tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 4-optional
4) 
5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>">Volunteer</a>
10)   </div>

11)   <div id="maincol">

12)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
13)     <h1>A few things everyone can do now:</h1>
14)     <ol>
15)     <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
16)     a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>

17)     <li>Do you have an Amazon account? Are you willing to spend up to $3 a

18)     month? Then spin up your own Tor <a href="<page
19)     docs/bridges>">bridge</a> in less than 10 minutes with <a

20)     href="https://cloud.torproject.org/">tor cloud</a>!</li>

21)     <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
22)     services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
23)     <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate/donate>">take a moment
24)     to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
25)     for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
26)     or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
27)     security, let them know about us.</li>
28)     <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page about/torusers>">good examples of Tor
29)     users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
30)     yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
31)     we'd love to hear from you.</li>
32)     </ol>

33) 

34)     <a id="Documentation"></a>
35)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
36)     <ol>

37)     <li>Help translate the
38) <!-- web page and -->
39)     documentation into other

40)     languages. See the <a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">translation
41)     guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
42)     Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
43)     <li>Evaluate and document

44)     <a href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">our

45)     list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
46)     <li>We have a huge list of <a

47)     href="<wiki>doc/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

48)     programs that interface with Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which

49)     situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
50)     </ol>

51) 

52)     <a id="Advocacy"></a>
53)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
54)     <ol>

55)     <li>Monitor some of our <a 
56)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo">public mailing 
57)     lists</a>, like <a 
58)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk</a>, <a 
59)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays">tor-relays</a>, <a 
60)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev">tor-dev</a>, or <a 
61)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tbb-dev">tbb-dev</a>, 
62)     and summarize noteworthy exchanges into articles for <a 

63)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-news">Tor 

64)     Weekly News</a>.</li>

65)     <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group
66) meetings around the world.</li>

67)     <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is,
68)     or how to use it.  Some have already started on <a

69)     href="https://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media server</a>,

70)     <a

71)     href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

72)     and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">YouTube</a>.</li>

73)     <li>Create a poster around a theme, such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>

74)     <li>Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "<a
75)     href="https://check.torproject.org/">Congratulations! You are using
76)     Tor!</a>" in any language.</li>

77)     </ol>

78) 

79) <!--

80)     <a id="gsoc"></a>
81)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#gsoc">Google Summer of Code</a></h2>
82) 
83)     <p>
84)     Tor is also taking part in this year's <a
85)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/homepage/google/gsoc2013">Google
86)     Summer of Code</a>! The criteria for this is a little different - either
87)     gender can apply but you need to be either <a
88)     href="https://www.google-melange.com/gsoc/document/show/gsoc_program/google/gsoc2013/help_page#2._Whos_eligible_to_participate_as_a">a
89)     present student or just graduated</a>.
90)     </p>
91) 
92)     <p>
93)     As mentioned above if you're eligible for either program then please apply
94)     for both! Google Summer of Code is a far, far larger program for us than
95)     OPW so your chances of being applied that way are considerably better.
96)     </p>
97) 
98)     <p>
99)     <b>See our page for <a href="<page about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a>
100)     for more information.</b>
101)     </p>

102) -->

103) 

104)     <a id="Projects"></a>
105)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Projects</a></h2>

106) 

107)     <p>
108)     Below are a list of Tor related projects we're developing and/or
109)     maintaining. Most discussions happen on IRC so if you're interested in any
110)     of these (or you have a project idea of your own), then please <a

111)     href="<page about/contact>#irc">join us in #tor-dev</a>. Don't be shy
112)     to ask questions, and don't hesitate to ask even if the main contributors
113)     aren't active at that moment.

114)     </p>

115) 

116)     <p>
117)     For a presentation summarizing many of these projects see...
118)     </p>
119) 
120)     <div id="ecosystem_presentation">

121)       <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb6iqZcQsSg">Tor Ecosystem</a> (<a href="https://media.torproject.org/video/2013-11-t3am-damian-johnson.mp4">mp4</a>, <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/presentations/2013-11-t3am-tor-ecosystem.pdf">slides</a>)

122)     </div>
123) 
124)     <br /></br />
125) 

126)     <table id="projects">
127)       <tr>
128)         <th>Name</th>
129)         <th>Category</th>
130)         <th>Language</th>
131)         <th>Activity</th>
132)         <th>Contributors</th>
133)       </tr>

134) 

135)       <tr>
136)         <td><a href="#project-tor">Tor</a></td>
137)         <td>Core</td>
138)         <td>C</td>
139)         <td>Heavy</td>

140)         <td>nickm, athena, arma</td>

141)       </tr>

142) 

143)       <tr>

144)         <td><a href="#project-torbrowser">Tor Browser</a></td>

145)         <td>Bundle</td>

146)         <td>Javascript, XUL, Scripting</td>

147)         <td>Heavy</td>

148)         <td>mikeperry, Pearl Crescent</td>

149)       </tr>
150) 

151)       <tr>

152)         <td><a href="#project-httpseverywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a></td>
153)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
154)         <td>Javascript</td>

155)         <td>Heavy</td>

156)         <td>pde, mikeperry</td>

157)       </tr>

158) 

159)       <tr>

160)         <td><a href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a></td>
161)         <td>User Interface</td>
162)         <td>C++, Qt</td>

163)         <td>None</td>

164)         <td></td>

165)       </tr>

166) 

167)       <tr>

168)         <td><a href="#project-arm">Arm</a></td>
169)         <td>User Interface</td>
170)         <td>Python, Curses</td>

171)         <td>Light</td>

172)         <td>atagar</td>
173)       </tr>

174) 

175)       <tr>

176)         <td><a href="#project-orbot">Orbot</a></td>
177)         <td>User Interface</td>
178)         <td>Java</td>

179)         <td>Moderage</td>

180)         <td>n8fr8</td>

181)       </tr>

182) 

183)       <tr>

184)         <td><a href="#project-tails">Tails</a></td>
185)         <td>OS image</td>
186)         <td>Sys Admin</td>
187)         <td>Heavy</td>
188)         <td><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">#tails</a></td>

189)       </tr>

190) 

191)       <tr>

192)         <td><a href="#project-torramdisk">tor-ramdisk</a></td>
193)         <td>OS image</td>
194)         <td>Sys Admin</td>

195)         <td>Light</td>

196)         <td>blueness</td>
197)       </tr>
198) 

199)       <tr>

200)         <td><a href="#project-torsocks">Torsocks</a></td>
201)         <td>Usability</td>
202)         <td>C</td>

203)         <td>Light</td>

204)         <td>David Goulet</td>

205)       </tr>
206) 

207)       <tr>

208)         <td><a href="#project-torbirdy">TorBirdy</a></td>
209)         <td>Browser Add-on</td>
210)         <td>JavaScript</td>

211)         <td>Light</td>
212)         <td>sukhe</td>

213)       </tr>

214) 

215)       <tr>

216)         <td><a href="#project-obfsproxy">Obfsproxy</a></td>
217)         <td>Client Add-on</td>

218)         <td>Python</td>

219)         <td>Light</td>

220)         <td>asn</td>

221)       </tr>
222) 

223)       <tr>

224)         <td><a href="#project-flash-proxy">Flash Proxy</a></td>
225)         <td>Client Add-on</td>
226)         <td>Python, JavaScript, Go</td>

227)         <td>Light</td>

228)         <td>dcf, infinity0, Arlo Breault</td>

229)       </tr>

230) 

231)       <tr>

232)         <td><a href="#project-shadow">Shadow</a></td>

233)         <td>Simulator</td>

234)         <td>C, Python</td>

235)         <td>Heavy</td>

236)         <td>robgjansen</td>
237)       </tr>

238) 

239)       <tr>

240)         <td><a href="#project-stem">Stem</a></td>

241)         <td>Library</td>
242)         <td>Python</td>

243)         <td>Moderate</td>

244)         <td>atagar</td>

245)       </tr>

246) 

247)       <tr>

248)         <td><a href="#project-txtorcon">Txtorcon</a></td>
249)         <td>Library</td>
250)         <td>Python, Twisted</td>

251)         <td>Light</td>

252)         <td>meejah</td>
253)       </tr>

254) 

255)       <tr>

256)         <td><a href="#project-tlsdate">Tlsdate</a></td>
257)         <td>Utility</td>
258)         <td>C</td>

259)         <td>Light</td>

260)         <td>ioerror</td>
261)       </tr>

262) 

263)       <tr>

264)         <td><a href="#project-metrics">Metrics</a></td>
265)         <td>Client Service</td>
266)         <td>Java</td>

267)         <td>Light</td>

268)         <td>karsten</td>
269)       </tr>

270) 

271)       <tr>

272)         <td><a href="#project-atlas">Atlas</a></td>
273)         <td>Client Service</td>
274)         <td>JavaScript</td>

275)         <td>None</td>

276)         <td></td>

277)       </tr>

278) 

279)       <tr>
280)         <td><a href="#project-globe">Globe</a></td>
281)         <td>Client Service</td>
282)         <td>JavaScript</td>

283)         <td>None</td>
284)         <td></td>

285)       </tr>
286) 

287)       <tr>

288)         <td><a href="#project-compass">Compass</a></td>
289)         <td>Client Service</td>
290)         <td>Python</td>

291)         <td>None</td>
292)         <td></td>

293)       </tr>

294) 

295)       <tr>

296)         <td><a href="#project-onionoo">Onionoo</a></td>
297)         <td>Backend Service</td>

298)         <td>Java</td>

299)         <td>Light</td>

300)         <td>karsten</td>

301)       </tr>
302) 

303)       <tr>
304)         <td><a href="#project-doctor">DocTor</a></td>
305)         <td>Backend Service</td>
306)         <td>Python</td>

307)         <td>None</td>

308)         <td>atagar</td>
309)       </tr>
310) 

311)       <tr>

312)         <td><a href="#project-weather">Weather</a></td>
313)         <td>Client Service</td>
314)         <td>Python</td>

315)         <td>None</td>

316)         <td>kaner</td>
317)       </tr>

318) 

319)       <tr>

320)         <td><a href="#project-gettor">GetTor</a></td>
321)         <td>Client Service</td>
322)         <td>Python</td>

323)         <td>None</td>

324)         <td>kaner</td>

325)       </tr>

326) 

327)       <tr>

328)         <td><a href="#project-torcheck">TorCheck</a></td>
329)         <td>Client Service</td>

330)         <td>Go</td>

331)         <td>None</td>

332)         <td>Arlo</td>

333)       </tr>

334) 

335)       <tr>

336)         <td><a href="#project-bridgedb">BridgeDB</a></td>
337)         <td>Backend Service</td>
338)         <td>Python</td>

339)         <td>Heavy</td>

340)         <td>isis</td>

341)       </tr>

342) 

343)       <tr>

344)         <td><a href="#project-ooni-probe">Ooni Probe</a></td>

345)         <td>Scanner</td>
346)         <td>Python</td>

347)         <td>Light</td>

348)         <td>hellais, aagbsn</td>

349)       </tr>
350) 

351)       <tr>
352)         <td><a href="#project-torps">TorPS</a></td>
353)         <td>Backend Service</td>
354)         <td>Python</td>

355)         <td>None</td>

356)         <td>Aaron Johnson</td>
357)       </tr>
358) 

359)       <tr>

360)         <td><a href="#project-torflow">TorFlow</a></td>
361)         <td>Backend Service</td>
362)         <td>Python</td>

363)         <td>None</td>

364)         <td>aagbsn</td>

365)       </tr>

366) 

367)       <tr>

368)         <td>*<a href="#project-torbel">TorBEL</a></td>
369)         <td>Backend Service</td>
370)         <td>Python</td>
371)         <td>None</td>
372)         <td>Sebastian</td>
373)       </tr>

374) 

375)       <tr>

376)         <td><a href="#project-tor2web">Tor2web</a></td>
377)         <td>Client Service</td>

378)         <td>Python</td>

379)         <td>Light</td>

380)         <td>evilaliv3, hellais</td>

381)       </tr>

382) 

383)       <tr>

384)         <td><a href="#project-anonbib">Anonbib</a></td>
385)         <td>Website</td>

386)         <td>Python</td>

387)         <td>Light</td>

388)         <td>arma, nickm</td>
389)       </tr>
390) 

391)     </table>

392) 

393)     <sub>
394)     * Project is still in an alpha state.
395)     </sub>

396) 

397)     <br /><br />

398) 

399)     <a id="project-tor"></a>
400)     <h3>Tor (<a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git">code</a>, <a

401)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/12">bug

402)     tracker</a>)</h3>

403) 

404)     <p>
405)     Central project, providing the core software for using and participating in
406)     the Tor network. Numerous people contribute to the project to varying
407)     extents, but the chief architects are Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine.
408)     </p>

409) 

410)     <p>
411)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

412)     <i><a href="#torCleanup">Tor Codebase Cleanup</a></i><br />

413)     <i><a href="#improveTorTestCoverage">Improve test coverage in Tor</a></i><br />
414)     <i><a href="#useMoreCores">Have the Tor daemon use more cores</a></i><br />
415)     <i><a href="#improveHiddenServices">Help improve Tor hidden services</a></i><br />
416)     <i><a href="#improvedDnsSupport">Improved DNS support for Tor</a></i><br />
417)     <i><a href="#torSandboxing">Help improve Tor sandboxing</a></i>

418)     </p>

419) 

420)     <a id="project-torbrowser"></a>

421)     <h3><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a> (<a

422)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git">code</a>, <a
423)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torbutton&component=Tor+Launcher&component=Tor+Browser&component=Tor+bundles%2Finstallation&col=id&col=summary&col=status&col=owner&col=type&col=priority&col=milestone&order=priority">bug

424)     tracker</a>, <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/">design doc</a>)</h3>
425) 

426)     <p>

427)     Tor Browser is an easy-to-use, portable package of Tor, HTTPS-Everywhere, 
428)     NoScript, TorLauncher, Torbutton, and a Firefox fork, all  preconfigured 
429)     to work together out of
430)     the box. The modified copy of Firefox aims to resolve the

431)     privacy and security issues in mainline version.

432)     </p>

433) 

434)     <p>
435)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
436)     <i><a href="#panopticlick">Panopticlick</a></i><br />
437)     </p>
438) 

439)     <a id="project-httpseverywhere"></a>
440)     <h3><a href="https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere">HTTPS Everywhere</a> (<a
441)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/https-everywhere.git">code</a>, <a
442)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/19">bug

443)     tracker</a>)</h3>

444) 

445)     <p>

446)     HTTPS Everywhere is a Firefox and Chrome extension that encrypts
447)     your communications with many major websites, making your browsing
448)     more secure.

449)     </p>

450) 

451)     <a id="project-vidalia"></a>
452)     <h3><a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> (<a

453)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/vidalia.git">code</a>, <a

454)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Vidalia&order=priority">bug
455)     tracker</a>)</h3>

456) 

457)     <p>
458)     The most commonly used user interface for Tor. Matt Edman started the
459)     project in 2006 and brought it to its current stable state. Development

460)     slowed for several years, though Tomás Touceda has since taken the
461)     lead with pushing the project forward.

462)     </p>

463) 

464)     <a id="project-arm"></a>

465)     <h3><a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">Arm</a> (<a

466)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git">code</a>, <a

467)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=arm&order=priority">bug
468)     tracker</a>)</h3>

469) 

470)     <p>

471)     The anonymizing relay monitor (arm) is a terminal status monitor for Tor,
472)     intended for command-line aficionados, ssh connections, and anyone with a
473)     tty terminal. This works much like top does for system usage, providing
474)     real time statistics for bandwidth, resource usage, connections, and quite
475)     a bit more.

476)     </p>

477) 

478)     <a id="project-orbot"></a>
479)     <h3><a href="https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/">Orbot</a> (<a

480)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">code</a>, <a

481)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Orbot&order=priority">bug
482)     tracker</a>)</h3>

483) 
484)     <p>

485)     Provides Tor on the Android platform. The project is under active 
486)     development, updates to latest Tor releases, and working to stay up to 
487)     date with all changes in Android and mobile threats.

488)     </p>
489) 
490)     <a id="project-tails"></a>
491)     <h3><a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> (<a

492)     href="https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/">code</a>, <a
493)     href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails">bug

494)     tracker</a>)</h3>
495) 
496)     <p>
497)     The Amnesic Incognito Live System is a live CD/USB distribution
498)     preconfigured so that everything is safely routed through Tor and leaves no
499)     trace on the local system. This is a merger of the Amnesia and <a
500)     href="http://www.anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito</a> projects,
501)     and still under very active development.
502)     </p>
503) 

504)     <a id="project-torramdisk"></a>
505)     <h3><a href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk">Tor-ramdisk</a> (<a

506)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-ramdisk.git">code</a>, <a

507)     href="http://opensource.dyc.edu/tor-ramdisk-documentation">documentation</a>)</h3>

508) 
509)     <p>

510)     Tor-ramdisk is a uClibc-based micro Linux distribution whose sole
511)     purpose is to securely host a Tor server purely in RAM.

512)     </p>
513) 

514)     <a id="project-torsocks"></a>

515)     <h3>Torsocks (<a

516)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git">code</a>, <a
517)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torify&order=priority">bug
518)     tracker</a>)</h3>
519) 

520)     <p>

521)     Utility for adapting other applications to work with Tor. Development has
522)     slowed and compatibility issues remain with some platforms, but it's
523)     otherwise feature complete.

524)     </p>

525) 

526)     <a id="project-torbirdy"></a>
527)     <h3>TorBirdy (<a
528)     href="https://github.com/ioerror/torbirdy">code</a>, <a
529)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/torbirdy/dev">bug
530)     tracker</a>)</h3>

531) 

532)     <p>
533)     TorBirdy is Torbutton for Thunderbird and related Mozilla mail clients.
534)     </p>

535) 

536)     <p>
537)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
538)     <i><a href="#makeTorbirdyBetter">Make TorBirdy Better</a></i>
539)     </p>
540) 

541)     <a id="project-obfsproxy"></a>

542)     <h3><a href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">Obfsproxy</a> (<a

543)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/obfsproxy.git">code</a>,
544)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Pluggable+transport&order=priority">bug

545)     tracker</a>)</h3>

546) 

547)     <p>
548)     A proxy that shapes Tor traffic, making it harder for censors to detect and

549)     block Tor. This has both a C and python implementation.

550)     </p>

551) 

552)     <p>
553)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

554)     <i><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports#Helpneeded">Various coding tasks</a></i> <br/>

555)     <i><a href="#betterPluggableTransports">Build Better Pluggable Transports</a></i>
556)     </p>
557) 

558)     <a id="project-flash-proxy"></a>
559)     <h3><a href="https://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">Flash Proxy</a> (<a
560)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/flashproxy.git">code</a>, <a
561)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Flashproxy">bug
562)     tracker</a>)</h3>

563) 

564)     <p>
565)     Pluggable transport using proxies running in web browsers to defeat
566)     address-based blocking.
567)     </p>

568) 

569)     <a id="project-shadow"></a>
570)     <h3><a href="https://shadow.cs.umn.edu/">Shadow</a> (<a
571)     href="https://github.com/shadow">code</a>, <a
572)     href="https://github.com/shadow/shadow/issues">bug
573)     tracker</a>)</h3>

574) 

575)     <p>
576)     Shadow is a discrete-event network simulator that runs the real
577)     Tor software as a plug-in. Shadow is open-source software that enables
578)     accurate, efficient, controlled, and repeatable Tor experimentation.

579)     For another simulator, see <a
580)     href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/exptor/">ExperimenTor</a>.

581)     </p>

582) 

583)     <a id="project-stem"></a>

584)     <h3><a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> (<a

585)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git">code</a>, <a

586)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">bug

587)     tracker</a>)</h3>

588) 

589)     <p>

590)     Python controller library for scripts and controller applications using
591)     Tor.

592)     </p>

593) 

594)     <p>
595)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

596)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i><br />

597)     <i><a href="#relayWebPanel">Relay Web Status Panel</a></i><br />

598)     </p>

599) 

600)     <a id="project-txtorcon"></a>

601)     <h3><a href="https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org">Txtorcon</a> (<a

602)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon">code</a>, <a

603)     href="https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

604) 

605)     <p>
606)     Twisted-based asynchronous Tor control protocol implementation. Includes
607)     unit-tests, examples, state-tracking code and configuration abstraction.
608)     Used by OONI and APAF.
609)     </p>

610) 

611)     <p>
612)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
613)     <i><a href="#txtorcon-stemIntegration">Txtorcon/Stem Integration</a></i>
614)     </p>
615) 

616)     <a id="project-tlsdate"></a>
617)     <h3>Tlsdate (<a href="https://github.com/ioerror/tlsdate">code</a>)</h3>

618) 

619)     <p>
620)     tlsdate: secure parasitic rdate replacement
621)     </p>

622) 

623)     <p>
624)     tlsdate sets the local clock by securely connecting with TLS to remote
625)     servers and extracting the remote time out of the secure handshake. Unlike
626)     ntpdate, tlsdate uses TCP, for instance connecting to a remote HTTPS or TLS
627)     enabled service, and provides some protection against adversaries that try
628)     to feed you malicious time information.
629)     </p>

630) 

631)     <a id="project-metrics"></a>
632)     <h3><a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Metrics</a> (code: <a
633)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-db.git">db</a>, <a
634)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-utils.git">utils</a>, <a

635)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git">web</a>)</h3>

636) 

637)     <p>
638)     Processing and analytics of consensus data, provided to users via the
639)     metrics portal. This has been under active development for several years by

640)     Karsten Loesing. See also <a
641)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torperf.git">TorPerf</a>.

642)     </p>

643) 

644)     <a id="project-atlas"></a>
645)     <h3><a href="https://atlas.torproject.org/">Atlas</a> (<a
646)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/atlas.git">code</a>)</h3>

647) 

648)     <p>
649)     Atlas is a web application to discover Tor relays and bridges. It provides
650)     useful information on how relays are configured along with graphics about

651)     their past usage.

652)     </p>

653) 

654)     <p>

655)     This is the spiritual successor to <a
656)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torstatus.git">TorStatus</a>, the <a

657)     href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torstatus/trunk/">original

658)     codebase</a> for which was written in PHP, and rewritten by students from
659)     Wesleyan as Django.

660)     </p>

661) 

662)     <a id="project-globe"></a>
663)     <h3><a href="http://globe.rndm.de/">Globe</a> (<a
664)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe">code</a>, <a
665)     href="https://github.com/makepanic/globe/issues">bug tracker</a>)</h3>
666) 
667)     <p>
668)     Globe is a web application that allows you to search for Tor relays and
669)     bridges. It gives you a detailed overview of properties and configurations
670)     of a relay or bridge.
671)     </p>
672) 

673)     <a id="project-compass"></a>
674)     <h3><a href="https://compass.torproject.org/">Compass</a> (<a
675)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/compass.git">code</a>, <a
676)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Compass&order=priority">bug
677)     tracker</a>)</h3>

678) 

679)     <p>
680)     Compass is a web and command line application that filters and
681)     aggregates the Tor relays based on various attributes.
682)     </p>

683) 
684)     <a id="project-onionoo"></a>

685)     <h3><a href="https://onionoo.torproject.org/">Onionoo</a> (<a
686)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git">code</a>,
687)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Onionoo&order=priority">bug tracker</a>)</h3>

688) 
689)     <p>
690)     Onionoo is a JSON based protocol to learn information about currently
691)     running Tor relays and bridges.
692)     </p>
693) 

694)     <a id="project-doctor"></a>
695)     <h3>DocTor (<a
696)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git">code</a>, <a
697)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=DocTor&order=priority">bug
698)     tracker</a>)</h3>
699) 
700)     <p>
701)     DocTor is a notification service that monitors newly published descriptor
702)     information for issues. This is primarily a service to help the tor
703)     directory authority operators, but it also checks for a handful of other
704)     issues like sybil attacks.
705)     </p>
706) 

707)     <a id="project-weather"></a>

708)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Weather">Weather</a> (<a

709)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/weather.git">code</a>, <a
710)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Weather&order=priority">bug
711)     tracker</a>)</h3>

712) 

713)     <p>
714)     Provides automatic notification to subscribed relay operators when their
715)     relay's unreachable. This underwent a rewrite by the <a
716)     href="http://hfoss.wesleyan.edu/">Wesleyan HFOSS team</a>, which went live
717)     in early 2011.
718)     </p>

719) 

720)     <a id="project-gettor"></a>

721)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/GetTor">GetTor</a> (<a

722)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git">code</a>, <a

723)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=GetTor&order=priority">bug
724)     tracker</a>)</h3>

725) 

726)     <p>
727)     E-mail autoresponder providing Tor's packages over SMTP. This has been
728)     relatively unchanged for quite a while.
729)     </p>

730) 

731)     <a id="project-torcheck"></a>

732)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorCheck">TorCheck</a> (<a

733)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git">code</a>, <a

734)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Tor+Check&order=priority">bug
735)     tracker</a>)</h3>

736) 

737)     <p>

738)     Site for determining if the visitor is using Tor or not.

739)     </p>

740) 

741)     <a id="project-bridgedb"></a>

742)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/BridgeDB">BridgeDB</a> (<a

743)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git">code</a>, <a
744)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=BridgeDB&order=priority">bug
745)     tracker</a>)</h3>

746) 

747)     <p>
748)     Backend bridge distributor, handling the various pools they're distributed
749)     in. This was actively developed until Fall of 2010.
750)     </p>

751) 

752)     <p>
753)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />
754)     <i><a href="#newBridgedbDistributor">New BridgeDB Distributor</a></i>
755)     </p>
756) 

757)     <a id="project-ooni-probe"></a>

758)     <h3><a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/">Ooni Probe</a> (<a

759)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/ooni-probe.git">code</a>, <a
760)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Ooni&order=priority">bug
761)     tracker</a>)</h3>
762) 
763)     <p>
764)     Censorship scanner, checking your local connection for blocked or modified
765)     content.
766)     </p>
767) 

768)     <p>
769)     <b>Project Ideas:</b><br />

770)     <i><a href="#censorshipAnalyzer">Develop a Censorship Analyzer</a></i><br />
771)     <i><a href="#ooniprobePcapsSupport">Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</a></i>

772)     </p>
773) 

774)     <a id="project-torps"></a>
775)     <h3>TorPS</a> (<a href="https://github.com/torps/torps">code</a>)</h3>
776) 
777)     <p>
778)     The Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) is a tool for efficiently simulating
779)     path selection in Tor. It chooses circuits and assigns user streams to
780)     those circuits in the same way that Tor does. TorPS is fast enough to
781)     perform thousands of simulations over periods of months.
782)     </p>
783) 

784)     <a id="project-torflow"></a>

785)     <h3><a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/TorFlow">TorFlow</a> (<a

786)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git">code</a>, <a
787)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=Torflow&order=priority">bug
788)     tracker</a>)</h3>

789) 

790)     <p>
791)     Library and collection of services for actively monitoring the Tor network.
792)     These include the Bandwidth Scanners (measuring throughput of relays) and
793)     SoaT (scans for malicious or misconfigured exit nodes). SoaT was last
794)     actively developed in the Summer of 2010, and the Bandwidth Scanners a few
795)     months later. Both have been under active use since then, but development
796)     has stopped.
797)     </p>

798) 

799)     <a id="project-torbel"></a>
800)     <h3><a

801)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/torbel-tor-bulk-exit-list-tools">TorBEL</a> (<a
802)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbel.git">code</a>, <a

803)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_review&status=new&status=reopened&component=TorDNSEL/TorBEL&order=priority">bug
804)     tracker</a>)</h3>

805) 

806)     <p>
807)     The Tor Bulk Exitlist provides a method of identifying if IPs belong to
808)     exit nodes or not. This is a replacement for TorDNSEL which is a stable
809)     (though unmaintained) Haskell application for this purpose. The initial
810)     version of TorBEL was started in GSOC 2010 but since then the project has
811)     been inactive.
812)     </p>

813) 
814)     <a id="project-tor2web"></a>
815)     <h3><a
816)     href="http://wiki.tor2web.org/index.php/Main_Page">Tor2web</a> (<a
817)     href="https://github.com/globaleaks/tor2web-3.0/wiki">code</a>)</h3>
818) 
819)     <p>
820)     Tor2web allows Internet users to browse websites running in <a
821)     href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Tor hidden services</a>. It trades
822)     user anonymity for usability by allowing anonymous content to be
823)     distributed to non-anonymous users.
824)     </p>
825) 

826)     <a id="project-anonbib"></a>
827)     <h3><a
828)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">Anonymity Bibliography</a> (<a
829)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/anonbib.git">code</a>)</h3>
830) 
831)     <p>

832)     Anonbib is a list of important papers in the field of anonymity. It's
833)     also a set of scripts to generate the website from Latex (bibtex). If
834)     we're missing any important papers, please let us know!

835)     </p>
836) 

837)     <a id="Coding"></a>
838)     <a id="Summer"></a>

839)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Project Ideas</a></h2>

840) 

841)     <p>

842)     You may find some of these projects to be good ideas for <a href="<page
843)     about/gsoc>">Google Summer of Code</a> and the <a
844)     href="https://live.gnome.org/OutreachProgramForWomen">Outreach Program for

845)     Women</a>. We have labelled each idea with how much work we expect it would
846)     be (effort level), how much clue you should start with (skill level),
847)     and which of our <a href="<page about/corepeople>">core developers</a>
848)     would be good mentors. If one or more of these ideas looks promising to
849)     you, please <a href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your
850)     plans rather than sending blind applications. You may also want to propose
851)     your own project idea &mdash; which often results in the best applications.

852)     </p>

853) 

854)     <ol>

855) 

856)     <a id="txtorcon-stemIntegration"></a>
857)     <li>
858)     <b>Txtorcon/Stem Integration</b>
859)     <br>
860)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
861)     <br>
862)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
863)     <br>
864)     Likely Mentors: <i>meejah, Damian (atagar)</i>
865)     <p>Txtorcon is a Twisted-based Python controller library, and Stem is a
866)     synchronous (threaded) one, also in Python. There is no need to have
867)     two implementations of (at least) the protocol parsing code. This
868)     project would entail eliminating duplication by leveraging Stem's
869)     parsing in txtorcon while keeping txtorcon's API the same (or at least
870)     close).</p>

871)     <p>Besides this you should identify some additional tasks to improve our
872)     controller space across these two libraries. Some ideas are...</p>
873)     <ul>
874)       <li>Write a tutorial for <a
875)       href="https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials.html">stem's tutorial
876)       page</a> demonstrating cross txtorcon/stem usage.</li>
877)       <li>Expand the txtorcon API to include functionality of <a

878)       href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/control.py">stem's

879)       controller</a> that would be of interest to twisted users. All additions
880)       should include tests!</li>
881)       <li>Come up with some ideas of your own! We'd love to discuss them with
882)       you.</li>
883)     </ul>

884)     <p>This would very likely involve changes to both libraries, although
885)     most would be expected to be in txtorcon. meejah is available to
886)     mentor txtorcon changes, and Damian (atagar) can help with Stem.</p>
887)     <p>It would help if you're already familiar with event-based programming,
888)     bonus points if it's Twisted.</p>
889)     </li>
890) 

891)     <a id="relayWebPanel"></a>
892)     <li>

893)     <b>Relay Web Status Dashboard</b>

894)     <br>
895)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
896)     <br>
897)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
898)     <br>
899)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
900)     <p>
901)     Relay operators presently have a couple options for monitoring the status
902)     of their relay: <a

903)     href="#project-vidalia">Vidalia</a>

904)     which is a gui and <a href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/">arm</a> which uses
905)     curses. This project would be to make a new kind of monitor specifically
906)     for relay operators that provides a status dashboard site on localhost.
907)     </p>
908)     <p>
909)     The interface will likely <a
910)     href="https://www.atagar.com/arm/screenshots.php">borrow heavily from
911)     arm</a>, except of course in areas where we can improve upon it. Two
912)     important design constraints is that a localhost controller provides a
913)     bigger attack surface than guis or curses, so we should be a little more
914)     wary of what it does. This should be a read-only controller (ie, you can't
915)     *do* anything to the relay) and by default not surface any sensitive

916)     information (such as arm's connection panel). Also take a peek at <a
917)     href="http://www.ntop.org/products/ntop/">ntop</a> for ideas on what we can
918)     do with a web interface.

919)     </p>
920)     <p>
921)     This project will likely include two parts: an AJAX site and a localhost
922)     daemon to fulfill those requests. <a
923)     href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a> is the backend of arm, and can
924)     be used to get everything you see in arm's interface (making it a natural
925)     choice for the daemon). That said, this project might entail some Stem
926)     improvements if we run across any gaps.
927)     </p>
928)     <p>
929)     Applicants should be familiar with Python, JavaScript, and learn about
930)     <a href="https://stem.torproject.org/">Stem</a>. <b>As part of your
931)     application for this project please make both mockups of the interface and
932)     a proof of concept demo application using JS to surface something with
933)     Stem. <a
934)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/stem/bugs">Involvement
935)     with Stem development</a> during the application process is also a big
936)     plus.</b>
937)     </p>
938)     </li>
939) 

940)     <a id="torCleanup"></a>

941)     <li>

942)     <b>Tor Codebase Cleanup</b>

943)     <br>

944)     Effort Level: <i>Low to High, depending on subproject chosen</i>

945)     <br>

946)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

947)     <br>

948)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

949)     <p>

950)     The Tor code is more than 10 years old in places, and we haven't always had

951)     enough time or wisdom to write things as well as we could have.  Our unit
952)     test coverage is shamefully low, and the dependency graph of our modules is
953)     shamefully convoluted . We could use refactoring and unit tests!  Please
954)     look through the Tor source code and look for ugly or tricky code or
955)     dependencies -- the uglier and trickier the better -- and think about how
956)     you could make the code look better, read better, and (subject to testing)
957)     work better.

958)     </p>

959) 

960)     <p>

961)     If this is for a fun side-project, it would be great for you to work on
962)     anything that can be made better and more tested.  For an internship-level
963)     position, we'd hope that you could find a number of particularly tricky or
964)     knotty piece of the code to clean up, and aim for resolving the ugliest
965)     problems, not necessarily the easiest.

966)     </p>

967) 

968)     <p>

969)     For a big project here, it would be great to pick one of the major
970)     "submodules" of Tor -- path selection, node discovery, directory authority
971)     operations, directory service -- and refactor its interface completely, to
972)     minify and codify its points of contact with the rest of Tor.

973)     </p>

974) 
975)     <p>
976)     <b>As part of your application for this project please identify one of the
977)     thorniest Tor functions and submit a patch refactoring it to be better. If
978)     you find this to be difficult then this likely isn't the project for
979)     you.</b>
980)     </p>

981)     </li>

982) 

983)     <a id="betterPluggableTransports"></a>
984)     <li>
985)     <b>Build Better Pluggable Transports</b>
986)     <br>
987)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
988)     <br>
989)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
990)     <br>

991)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch), Ximin (infinity0), George (asn)</i>

992)     <p>

993)     For Tor users in censored countries, we have a <a

994)     href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">

995)     pluggable transports</a> framework that uses external programs to bypass
996)     censorship in different ways. Each of these have their own strengths and
997)     weaknesses.

998)     </p>
999) 
1000)     <p>

1001)     We have deployed <a

1002)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">obfsproxy</a>, 
1003)     <a href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/flashproxy/">flashproxy</a>, 
1004)     <a href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/">scramblesuit</a>, 
1005)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek">meek</a>,
1006)     and <a href="https://fteproxy.org/about">FTE</a> bridges into the main 
1007)     Tor Browser.</a>

1008)     </p>
1009) 
1010)     <p>
1011)     There are several possible directions for this project. Ideas include:
1012)       <ol>
1013)         <li>Address gaps or weaknesses in our existing pluggable transports
1014)           <ul>
1015)             <li>Flashproxy: Add WebRTC support to traverse NATs.</li>
1016)             <li>Flashproxy: Improve the facilitator's resistance against DoS
1017)             and poisoning attacks.</li>
1018)           </ul>
1019)         </li>
1020)         <li>Build our pluggable transport combiner, that chains several
1021)         transports together to take advantage of orthogonal types of blocking
1022)         resistance.</li>
1023)         <li>Improve the UX for selecting the appropriate pluggable transport in

1024)         the new Tor Browser, whilst maintaining user security.</li>

1025)         <li>Implement a new pluggable transport that resists blocking in a
1026)         novel way.
1027)         <ul>
1028)           <li>Impersonate a voice-over-IP protocol</li>
1029)           <li>Impersonate HTTP <a
1030)           href="http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~amir/papers/parrot.pdf">sufficiently
1031)           well</a> that traffic will go through a HTTP-only proxy</li>
1032)           <li>Implement <a
1033)           href="http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2011/cacr2011-21.pdf">scanning
1034)           resistance</a></li>
1035)         </ul>
1036)         </li>
1037)       </ol>
1038)     </p>
1039) 
1040)     <p>
1041)     Applicants should be familiar with asynchronous/reactive programming, in
1042)     particular the <a href="https://twistedmatrix.com/">Twisted framework</a>
1043)     or something related. Most of the existing code is written in Python, with
1044)     some parts in JavaScript and Go, so you should know at least one of these.
1045)     You are invited to talk to us and ask questions, via our mailing lists
1046)     or IRC. <b>As part of your application, please contribute a patch that
1047)     implements a small feature or fixes a bug related to this area, e.g. <a
1048)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Pluggable+transport">1</a>,
1049)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Obfsproxy">2</a>,
1050)     <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Flashproxy">3</a>.
1051)     </b>

1052)     </p>
1053) 
1054)     <a id="profileUDPTransport"></a>
1055)     <li>
1056)     <b>Profile UDP transport protocols</b>
1057)     <br>
1058)     Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1059)     <br>
1060)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1061)     <br>
1062)     Likely Mentors: <i>Steven (sjmurdoch)</i>
1063)     <p>
1064)     There are <a
1065)     href="https://research.torproject.org/techreports/datagram-comparison-2011-11-07.pdf">lots
1066)     of options</a> as to how Tor could send its data over UDP rather than TCP,
1067)     and some will likely perform significantly better than others. This project
1068)     will evaluate these options, so as to decide which should be used in future
1069)     versions of Tor. A first step will be to benchmark the various transport
1070)     protocols being considered, in terms of performance and also code quality,
1071)     including userspace TCP, <a
1072)     href="https://github.com/bittorrent/libutp">&mu;TP</a>, <a
1073)     href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stream_Control_Transmission_Protocol">SCTP</a>
1074)     and <a href="http://curvecp.org/">CurveCP</a>. Initially these transport
1075)     protocols will be examined in isolation, but if the project progresses well
1076)     one or more could be integrated in Tor.
1077)     </p>
1078)     </li>
1079) 

1080)     <a id="httpsEverywhereRulesetTesting"></a>
1081)     <li>
1082)     <b>Incorporate Ruleset Testing into the HTTPS Everywhere release process</b>
1083)     <br>
1084)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1085)     <br>
1086)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1087)     <br>

1088)     Likely Mentors: <i>Peter Eckersley (pde), Micah Lee</i>

1089)     <p>
1090) Ondrej Mikle has implemented a codebase for testing HTTPS Everywhere rulesets
1091) by crawling pages that are affected by the ruleset (<a href="https://github.com/hiviah/https-everywhere-checker">repository</a>).
1092)     </p>
1093) 
1094)     <p>
1095) This codebase still has some rough edges that need to be smoothed over, but
1096) once those are done it should be incorporated into the HTTPS Everywhere build
1097) process, in order to improve the quality of our releases.
1098)     </p>
1099)     </li>
1100) 

1101)     <a id="censorshipAnalyzer"></a>
1102)     <li>
1103)     <b>Develop a Censorship Analyzer</b>
1104)     <br>
1105)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1106)     <br>
1107)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High (depends on the implemented tests)</i>
1108)     <br>
1109)     Likely Mentors: <i>Philipp (phw)</i>
1110)     <p>
1111) Tor is documented to be blocked in <a
1112) href="https://censorshipwiki.torproject.org">several countries</a>. Analyzing
1113) these censorship incidents can be a tedious task; especially without access to
1114) machines inside the censoring networks. To make analysis easier, it would be
1115) great to have a lightweight analysis tool which can be run by censored users.
1116) This tool would conduct a number of networking tests and figure out if and how
1117) Tor could be blocked. The tool's final report should then somehow make it back
1118) to the Tor project.
1119)     </p>
1120) 
1121)     <p>
1122) The theory behind this tool is already <a

1123) href="http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/pdf/foci2013.pdf">documented

1124) in a research paper</a>. What we now need is code! Implementing it would first
1125) mean getting familiar with <a href="https://ooni.torproject.org">OONI</a> and
1126) <a href="http://twistedmatrix.com/trac/">Twisted</a>. After that, the tool
1127) should be implemented as a number of OONI-specific networking tests.
1128)     </p>

1129) 
1130)     <p>
1131) Applicants should be familiar with Python and asynchronous programming,
1132) e.g., as it is used in Twisted.  As part of your application for this
1133) project please contribute a patch for a bug in <a
1134) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&component=Ooni">OONI</a>.
1135)     </p>

1136)     </li>
1137) 

1138)     <a id="makeTorbirdyBetter"></a>
1139)     <li>
1140)     <b>Make TorBirdy Better</b>
1141)     <br>
1142)     Effort Level: <i>High</i>
1143)     <br>
1144)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1145)     <br>
1146)     Likely Mentors: <i>Sukhbir Singh (sukhe), Jacob Appelbaum (ioerror)</i>
1147)     <p>
1148) TorBirdy is an extension that configures Thunderbird to make connections over
1149) the Tor anonymity network. TorBirdy has been under development for quite a
1150) while but there are two known leaks that prevent it from being used by a wider
1151) audience. As part of this project, you will be working on plugging the known
1152) leaks and implementing a HTTP proxy.
1153)     </p>
1154) 
1155)     <p>
1156) <b>Part 1:</b> There are two patches pending with Mozilla that will plug the two known
1157) leaks in Thunderbird where the local time is disclosed through the date and the
1158) message-ID header. As part of your project, you will work on getting these
1159) patches finished/reimplemented and getting them merged with Mozilla. Please
1160) look at tickets <a
1161) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6314">#6314</a> and <a
1162) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6315">#6315</a> for more
1163) information.
1164)     </p>
1165) 
1166)     <p>
1167) <b>Part 2:</b> TorBirdy needs a HTTP proxy or a HTTP -&gt; SOCKS5 shim. Please look at
1168) ticket <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6958">#6958</a>
1169) for more information. Note: this has to be done using JavaScript and not using
1170) an external proxy.
1171)     </p>
1172) 
1173)     <p>
1174) If time permits and you are awesome enough to finish the above two tasks, you
1175) will be working on the remaining TorBirdy tickets.
1176)     </p>
1177) 
1178)     <p>
1179) Applicants should be familiar with C++ and JavaScript. As part of your
1180) application for this project, please submit code samples for previous C++ and
1181) JavaScript projects that you have developed or point us to projects you have
1182) been involved with (links to a public Git/GitHub repository preferred). Prior
1183) extension development is a big plus and will be given preference during
1184) application ranking.
1185)     </p>
1186) 
1187)     <p>

1188) You may contact the mentors on IRC for more information. (sukhe on #tor-dev, #tor on irc.oftc.net)

1189)     </p>
1190)     </li>
1191) 

1192)     <a id="ooniprobePcapsSupport"></a>
1193)     <li>
1194)     <b>Add Support for Reporting Pcaps to OoniBackend and OoniProbe</b>
1195)     <br>
1196)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1197)     <br>
1198)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1199)     <br>
1200)     Likely Mentors: <i>Arturo (hellais), Aaron (aagbsn)</i>
1201)     <p>
1202) The feature should also add support for including only packet capture data that
1203) is relevant to the test being run. This means that the pcap should not contain
1204) all the data sniffed on the users machine, but only that which was generated
1205) and intended to be received by ooniprobe.
1206)     </p>
1207) 
1208)     <p>
1209) This can probably be implemented by setting up a tun/tap device and routing all
1210) the ooniprobe traffic through it and only capturing data sent and received from
1211) that device. The task for the student will also be that of doing research into
1212) what are possible strategies for doing this. <b><a
1213) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7416">For more
1214) information see ticket 7416.</a></b>
1215)     </p>
1216)     </li>
1217) 

1218) <!--

1219)     <a id="orbotVPN"></a>
1220)     <li>
1221)     <b>Orbot Android VPN</b>
1222)     <br>
1223)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1224)     <br>
1225)     Skill Level: <i>High</i>
1226)     <br>
1227)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan (n8fr8)</i>
1228)     <p>
1229) Android offers the ability for any application to establish a
1230) VPNService through which all traffic on the device is sent. We want to
1231) implement this type of service in order to route all traffic through
1232) the Tor network. This is a feature that will be implemented directly
1233) into Orbot: Tor for Android if successfully implemented.
1234)     </p>
1235) 
1236)     <p>
1237) The deliverables for the project will be a working Android VPN
1238) implementation that routes traffic through Tor, and integration of VPN
1239) code into the Orbot app. There must also be time made for reporting on
1240) the project through blog posts, network auditing of tracking to ensure
1241) leakage is not occurring.
1242)     </p>
1243) 
1244)     <p>
1245) Useful links and documentation to study:
1246)     </p>
1247) 
1248)     <ul>
1249)       <li><a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/orbot.git">Orbot</a></li>
1250)       <li><a href="http://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/VpnService.html">Android VPNService API</a></li>
1251)       <li><a href="https://github.com/guardianproject/OrbotVPN">Existing work on Orbot VPN</a></li>
1252)     </ul>
1253) 
1254)     <p>
1255) Applicant should have the ability to build Orbot application from
1256) source using Android SDK and NDK tools. A solid understanding of IP
1257) routing, iptables, netfilter and VPN protocols would also be very
1258) helpful. The ability to use Wireshark or other network monitoring
1259) software to test and verify solution is something that can be taught,
1260) but if you already know how, bonus! Finally, understanding how the
1261) exiting Tor software can be used with various transparent proxying
1262) configurations is a good first step to understanding this problem.
1263)     </p>
1264)     </li>

1265) -->

1266) 
1267)     <a id="improveTorTestCoverage"></a>
1268)     <li>
1269)     <b>Improve test coverage in Tor</b>
1270)     <br>
1271)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1272)     <br>
1273)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1274)     <br>

1275)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1276)     <p>
1277) Right now, our unit test coverage with the tests we ship is around 30%
1278) -- only 30% of the executable lines in our source are reached by the
1279) unit tests.  Improving this test coverage could make Tor development
1280) much more reliable.
1281)     </p>
1282) 
1283)     <p>
1284) So we need better unit tests, and we need better integration tests too.
1285)     </p>
1286) 
1287)     <p>
1288) Improving unit tests would would involve refactoring functions to be more
1289) testable, and writing a bunch of unit tests.
1290)     </p>
1291) 
1292)     <p>

1293) Improving integration tests would involve refactoring and improving

1294) the "chutney" program that launches a test tor network, and writing a
1295) bunch of tests to see what works and what doesn't work on such a
1296) network.  It could also involve writing tests using the library "<a
1297) href="https://stem.torproject.org/">stem</a>" to script individual clients on a
1298) Chutney network.
1299)     </p>
1300) 
1301)     <p>
1302) To get a feel for how testing works in Tor today, download Tor and
1303) Chutney, and make sure you can build Tor and use Chutney.  See how the
1304) unit tests work by skimming some of the test code in the src/test
1305) subdirectory.  Try computing test coverage (according to the
1306) instructions in the doc/HACKING file.
1307)     </p>
1308) 
1309)     <p>
1310) Also, have a look at the one current integration test that works on
1311) chutney today: it is a shell script distributed with Tor as
1312) src/test/test-tor-network.sh .  We probably don't want to have all of
1313) our integration tests be written as shell scripts, but it's interesting
1314) to see how one works.
1315)     </p>
1316) 
1317)     <p>
1318) If working on designs for an improved or refactored Chutney, watch out for <a
1319) href="http://www.joelonsoftware.com/articles/fog0000000018.html">"archicture
1320) astronautics"</a>: while it's important that we have a well-designed and
1321) maintainable Chutney architecture, it wouldn't be very useful if a good
1322) architecture were the <em>only</em> outcome here: we need tests too.
1323)     </p>
1324) 
1325)     <p>
1326) As part of the application process, please contribute a patch that makes
1327) a non-trivial improvement to chutney, and/or include a new test for some
1328) interesting Tor function. (Please pick a function that isn't completely
1329) easy to test.)
1330)     </p>
1331)     </li>
1332) 
1333)     <a id="useMoreCores"></a>
1334)     <li>
1335)     <b>Have the Tor daemon use more cores</b>
1336)     <br>
1337)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1338)     <br>
1339)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1340)     <br>

1341)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1342)     <p>
1343) Right now, if you run a busy Tor server on a multicore computer, most of
1344) the cores are mostly unused.  We have a "cpuworker" mechanism to move
1345) expensive computations into worker threads, but that mechanism is
1346) currently only used for a small fraction of our cryptography.  Moving
1347) more work into the worker threads could improve performance immensely.
1348)     </p>
1349) 
1350)     <p>
1351) So it would be great to parallelize our cryptography more in order to
1352) better handle more cores.  See
1353) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/MultithreadedCrypto">MultithreadedCrypto</a>
1354) for some background info, and
1355) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7572">ticket 7572</a> for some subtickets
1356) on our tracker.
1357)     </p>
1358) 
1359)     <p>
1360) (If you're reading through the code to see how it works today, you will
1361) also want to have a look at the new implementation for cpuworkers
1362) described in <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9682">9682</a>.)
1363)     </p>
1364) 
1365)     <p>
1366) Completing the implementation of ticket #7572 --which would move our
1367) circuit crypto onto separate threads-- could be a good summer project.
1368) Alternatively, moving all of the signature generation and verification
1369) code onto the cpuworkers could be fun.  In either case, you will have
1370) some important architectural decisions to make about how to minimize
1371) shared data between the main thread and the workers, how to avoid
1372) race conditions between them, and how to test it all to make sure it has
1373) no hidden failure cases.
1374)     </p>
1375) 
1376)     <p>
1377) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1378) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1379) the codebase that you want to work on.
1380)     </p>
1381)     </li>
1382) 
1383)     <a id="improveHiddenServices"></a>
1384)     <li>
1385)     <b>Help improve Tor hidden services</b>
1386)     <br>
1387)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1388)     <br>
1389)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1390)     <br>

1391)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1392)     <p>
1393) We're working on a revamp of the entire Tor hidden service design to
1394) improve the security and reliability of the hidden service system.
1395)     </p>
1396) 
1397)     <p>
1398) This is a big project: see
1399) <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt">proposal
1400) 224</a> for the latest design.  Are you interested in implementing some
1401) part of that?
1402)     </p>
1403) 
1404)     <p>
1405) This is a very ambitious project, so we're deliberately not suggesting
1406) particular sub-topics.  If you're interested in participating, try to
1407) read and understand the <a
1408) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/rend-spec.txt">existing
1409) design</a> and the design proposal for the new design, and then talk to
1410) us about what part you want to work on.
1411)     </p>
1412) 
1413)     <p>
1414) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1415) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1416) the codebase that you want to work on.
1417)     </p>
1418)     </li>
1419) 
1420)     <a id="improvedDnsSupport"></a>
1421)     <li>
1422)     <b>Improved DNS support for Tor</b>
1423)     <br>
1424)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1425)     <br>
1426)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1427)     <br>

1428)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1429)     <p>
1430) Right now, you can only use Tor's DNS support to look up IPv4 and IPv6
1431) addresses, and to fetch PTR records.  But DNS can do so much more!
1432)     </p>
1433) 
1434)     <p>
1435) <a
1436) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/refs/heads/master:/proposals/219-expanded-dns.txt">Proposal
1437) 219</a> describes some new cell types that Tor could use to support
1438) more types of DNS over Tor.
1439)     </p>
1440) 
1441)     <p>
1442) To see how Tor implements its existing DNS lookups, start by tracing the
1443) the connection_exit_begin_resolve() function in src/or/connection_edge.c ,
1444) and see how we pass these requests downwards through src/or/dns.c to the
1445) underlying resolver.  It's not too complicated, but there are some
1446) tricky parts to understand.
1447)     </p>
1448) 
1449)     <p>
1450) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1451) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1452) the codebase that you want to work on.
1453)     </p>
1454)     </li>
1455) 
1456)     <a id="torSandboxing"></a>
1457)     <li>
1458)     <b>Help improve Tor sandboxing</b>
1459)     <br>
1460)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1461)     <br>
1462)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1463)     <br>

1464)     Likely Mentors: <i>Nick (nickm), David (dgoulet)</i>

1465)     <p>
1466) The seccomp2 mechanism on Linux lets programs improve their robustness
1467) against unforseen bugs by running with restrictions on which system
1468) calls they can invoke and how they can call them.  This can help
1469) security a lot.
1470)     </p>
1471) 
1472)     <p>
1473) Thanks to a GSOC student from last year, we now have seccomp2 support on
1474) Linux, which we use to restrict the capabilities of the entire Tor
1475) process.  (For implementation details, see src/commmon/sandbox.c in the
1476) Tor source.)
1477)     </p>
1478) 
1479)     <p>
1480) But since the restrictions are done over the whole process, all pieces
1481) of the Tor code have permission to do things that only small parts of
1482) the Tor program need to do.  Also, since we use seccomp2, these
1483) restrictions only work on Linux.
1484)     </p>
1485) 
1486)     <p>
1487) It would be great to instead divide the main Tor program into multiple
1488) processes with a robust IPC mechanism and assign each process its own
1489) minimal set of privileges; and to have this work (as best we can) on
1490) systems that don't have seccomp2 (eg Windows, Mac).
1491)     </p>
1492) 
1493)     <p>
1494) Either of these could be a whole GSOC project.
1495)     </p>
1496) 
1497)     <p>
1498) To get started, make sure you understand the existing sandboxing code.
1499) If you're interested in splitting Tor into multiple processes, think
1500) about the architecture, and think about how we could reach this
1501) architecture without completely rewriting the codebase.  (Remember that
1502) even if you're focusing on Linux, Tor still needs to work on other
1503) operating systems.)
1504)     </p>
1505) 
1506)     <p>
1507) If you're interested in supporting more platforms, make sure you
1508) understand and can explain what sandboxing mechansisms you want to use,
1509) and what they're capable of.  (You might want to investigate the way
1510) that other open-source programs, like the Chrome web browser, do their
1511) sandboxing on different platforms.)
1512)     </p>
1513) 
1514)     <p>
1515) As part of the application process for this project, please contribute a
1516) nontrivial patch to Tor -- ideally, one that will affect some part of
1517) the codebase that you want to work on.
1518)     </p>
1519)     </li>
1520) 

1521)     <a id="panopticlick"></a>
1522)     <li>
1523)     <b>Panopticlick</b>
1524)     <br>
1525)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1526)     <br>
1527)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1528)     <br>

1529)     Likely Mentors: <i>Georg (GeKo)</i>, <i>Mike Perry</i>, <i>Nicolas Vigier</i>
1530)     <p>
1531) 
1532) The <a href="https://panopticlick.eff.org">Panopticlick project by the EFF</a>
1533) revolutionized how people think about <a
1534) href="https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf">browser
1535) fingerprinting</a>, both by developing tests and metrics to measure browser
1536) fingerprintability, and by crowdsourcing the evaluation and contribution of
1537) individual browser features to overall fingerprintability.
1538) 
1539)     </p>
1540)     <p>
1541) 
1542) Unfortunately, the way Panopticlick is designed <a
1543) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/effs-panopticlick-and-torbutton">makes
1544) it difficult</a> to evaluate defenses to browser fingerprinting, especially
1545) for browsers with a relatively small userbase such as Tor Browser. This is
1546) because any approach we take to reduce fingerprinting automatically makes our
1547) users more distinct from the previous users who submitted their fingerprint
1548) data to the EFF. Indeed, it is also impossible to ever expect that users of
1549) one browser will ever be able to blend in with users of another browser
1550) (Chrome users will always be distinguishable from Firefox users for example,
1551) based on feature set alone).
1552) 
1553)    </p>
1554)    <p>
1555) 
1556) To address this, we would like to have <a

1557) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6119">our own

1558) fingerprint test suite</a> to evaluate the fingerprintability of each browser
1559) feature for users running a specific Tor Browser version. There are also <a
1560) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords=~tbb-fingerprinting">additional
1561) fingerprinting tests</a> we can add beyond those deployed by Panopticlick.
1562)    </p>
1563)    <p>
1564) 
1565) For this project, the student would develop a website that users can
1566) voluntarily visit to test and record their Tor Browser fingerprint.  The user
1567) should get feedback on how she performed and the test results should be
1568) available in a machine readable format (e.g. JSON), broken down by Tor Browser
1569) version.  In a second step one could think about adding more sophisticated
1570) tests or supporting other browser vendors that might want to test the
1571) uniformity amongst their userbase as well. Of course, results from each
1572) browser would also need to be broken down by both browser implementation and
1573) version, so that results would only reflect the population of that specific
1574) implementation.
1575) 

1576)     </p>
1577)     </li>
1578) 

1579)     <a id="improveStegotorus"></a>
1580)     <li>
1581)     <b>Improve Stegotorus</b>
1582)     <br>
1583)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1584)     <br>
1585)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1586)     <br>
1587)     Likely Mentors: <i>vmon</i>
1588)     <p>
1589) Stegotorus is a fork of obfsproxy which helps developers to write more intelligent pluggable transports which can hide easier from deep packet inspector (DPI) system.
1590)     </p>
1591) 
1592)     <p>
1593) For example, Stegotorus is equipped with a "chopper module" which takes care of following aspects:
1594)     </p>
1595) 
1596)     <ol>
1597)       <li>It randomize the packet size so it is harder for the DPI system to detect the traffic base on the distribution of the packet size.</li>
1598)       <li>It makes sure that it only handle as much (or as less) information as the transport module can handle.</li>
1599)       <li>Chopper is equipped with it is own acknowledge/retransmit protocol. If the censor trying to disturb the connection by dropping or disturbing some of packets, it can recover the data by sending them many times.</li>
1600)     </ol>
1601) 
1602)     <p>
1603) More importantly, Stegotorus is coming with its own HTTP transport module which obfuscates Tor or any other encrypted traffic in HTTP content such as Javascript code or images. HTTP transport module is also written in a way which new module developers can easily add new obfuscation modules for new contents or improve current obfuscation algorithms without the need of dealing with networking aspect of the problem.
1604)     </p>
1605) 
1606)     <p>
1607) Stegotorus is written in C++. you can find the latest code <a href="https://github.com/zackw/stegotorus/tree/tor-improve">here</a>.
1608)     </p>
1609) 
1610)     <p>
1611) In this regard, Stegotorus is offering one of the most complete and sophisticated platforms for writing stealthy pluggable transports.
1612)     </p>
1613) 
1614)     <p>
1615) If you know C++ and interested in Stegotorus and excited about battling censorship, there are many ways that you can contribute to Stegotorus. Here are few important tasks. Your proposal might contain a good number of them:
1616)     </p>
1617) 
1618)     <ol>
1619)       <li>Currently Stegotorus handshake is encrypted using the symmetric secret key of the Stegotorus bridge. However, we would like to implement a totally random handshake and considering that some transports suffer badly from "bandwidth shortage", our best choice currently is to implement <a href="http://elligator.cr.yp.to/">this algorithm</a>.</li>
1620)       <li>Stegotorus defense against active probing is to authenticate the header of the received packet. If the authentication fails Stegotorus turns into a transparent proxy. The capability of Stegotorus as a transparent proxy needs improvement and further testing.</li>
1621)       <li>Stegotorus has a new framework for writing Steg module. However some of the Steg modules (PDF, SWF and JS) are written in the old framework, we need to refactor their code in the new framework.</li>
1622)       <li>As writting new Steg modules in python is easier and safer, it is desirable to write an Steg module interface for Stegotorus which can accept and interact with Steg modules written in python/cython.</li>
1623)       <li>To make detection of anomalies in the traffic harder, Stegotorus hands a noise-to-signal ratio to each Steg modules. Steg modules' algorithms need to use more intelligent way of embedding to use this ratio.</li>
1624)       <li>Stegotorus has several parameters to tweak its behavior. Currently all these parameters are given in command line. We would like to have a config file to store these parameters as an alternative method.</li>
1625)       <li>The general security of the code needs to be reviewed and audited for buffer overflow, memory leak etc.</li>
1626)       <li>Steg modules for new file format for the HTTP transport are always welcome to reflect the actual traffic of the Internet.</li>
1627)       <li>Packaging Stegotorus for windows.</li>
1628)       <li>There is a parallel efforts to improve Stegotorus at SRI. We would like to merge the useful feature developed by SRI in our branch of Stegotorus.</li>
1629)       <li>Stegotorus needs to support SOCKS protocol to be able to receive the initial parameters from Tor through SOCKS handshake.</li>
1630)     </ol>
1631) 
1632)     <p>
1633) You can find a list of open issues concerning Stegotorus <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted&status=assigned&status=needs_information&status=needs_review&status=needs_revision&status=new&status=reopened&component=Stegotorus&order=priority">here</a>.
1634)     </p>
1635) 
1636)     <p>
1637) You also can think of lots of other awesome creative ways of improving Stegotorus and include those in your proposal.
1638)     </p>
1639)     </li>
1640) 

1641)     <a id="newBridgedbDistributor"></a>
1642)     <li>
1643)     <b>New BridgeDB Distributor</b>
1644)     <br>
1645)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1646)     <br>
1647)     Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
1648)     <br>
1649)     Likely Mentors: <i>isis, sysrqb</i>
1650)     <p>
1651) BridgeDB is a Twisted Python system which runs a number of servers, in order
1652) to distribute Tor bridge relays to users in potentially censored regions. Each
1653) of BridgeDB's Distributors uses some unique channel to communicate bridge
1654) addresses to users, currently there is an <a href="https://bridges.torproject.org">
1655) HTTPS Distributor</a>, and an Email Distributor. This project would involve
1656) designing and creating a new Distributor for BridgeDB. Some ideas for new
1657) Distributors:
1658)     </p>
1659) 
1660)     <ul>
1661)       <li>A Twitter bot which interacts with Chinese and Farsi speaking Twitter users through PMs.</li>
1662)       <li>A distributor which uses XMPP+OTR to give bridges to users.</li>
1663)     </ul>
1664) 
1665)     <p>
1666) It's helpful if you already have some knowledge of Twisted. As part of your
1667) application, please submit a design for a Distributor, as well as supply a
1668) patch for a ticket which demonstrates knowledge of Twisted and Python ―
1669) preferably for BridgeDB, see the
1670) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=!closed&keywords=~bridgedb-gsoc-application">
1671) 'bridgedb-gsoc-application' Trac tag</a> for some examples of good tickets to
1672) try, or contact isis or sysrqb on IRC to ask for ticket suggestions or advice.
1673)     </p>
1674)     </li>
1675) 

1676) <!--
1677)     <a id=""></a>
1678)     <li>
1679)     <b></b>
1680)     <br>
1681)     Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
1682)     <br>
1683)     Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
1684)     <br>
1685)     Likely Mentors: <i>Damian (atagar)</i>
1686)     <p>
1687) 
1688)     </p>
1689) 
1690)     <p>
1691) 
1692)     </p>
1693)     </li>
1694) -->
1695) 

1696)     <li>
1697)     <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>

1698)     <br>

1699)     Don't like any of these? Look at the <a

1700)     href="/press/presskit/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development

1701)     roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
1702)     and find out what you think needs fixing.

1703)     Some of the <a href="<spectree>proposals">current proposals</a>

1704)     might also be short on developers.
1705)     </li>

1706) 

1707)     </ol>

1708) 

1709)     <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
1710)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>
1711)     <ol>
1712)     <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
1713)     Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
1714)     call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
1715)     that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

1716)     href="<wiki>doc/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

1717)     havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
1718)     instead. One solution would be to teach <a
1719)     href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
1720)     overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
1721)     the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
1722)     <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good
1723)     start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

1724) 

1725)     <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
1726)     docs/documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
1727)     fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
1728)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the
1729)     new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

1730) 

1731)     <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
1732)     traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
1733)     simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
1734)     really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
1735)     that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
1736)     giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
1737)     See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
1738)     details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
1739)     done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

1740) 

1741)     <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto
1742)     accelerators via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is
1743)     possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing,

1744)     performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to OpenSSL and

1745)     Tor if needed.</li>

1746) 

1747)     <li>Write a <a
1748)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Fuzz_testing">fuzzer</a>
1749)     for Tor to discover security vulnerabilities. Determine if there
1750)     are good fuzzing frameworks out there for what we want. Win fame by

1751)     getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

1752) 

1753)     <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
1754)     encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
1755)     on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
1756)     it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

1757)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">list

1758)     of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
1759)     be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

1760)     href="<specblob>proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

1761)     for Tor and
1762)     UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

1763) 

1764)     <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
1765)     (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
1766)     first place to start.</li>

1767) 

1768)     <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
1769)     Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>
1770)     from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
1771)     them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
1772)     integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
1773)     generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>

1774) 

1775)     <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
1776)     to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a

1777)     href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live

1778)     System</a>.
1779)     </li>

1780) 

1781)     <li>
1782)     Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
1783)     more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a

1784)     href="<specblob>proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>

1785)     just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
1786)     and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
1787)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
1788)     webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
1789)     and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
1790)     To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
1791)     href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
1792)     </li>

1793) 

1794)     </ol>

1795) 

1796)     <a id="Research"></a>
1797)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
1798)     <ol>
1799)     <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
1800)     by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
1801)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
1802)     traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
1803)     stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
1804)     attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
1805)     much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
1806)     is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
1807)     that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
1808)     schemes work better than others?</li>
1809)     <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
1810)     protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
1811)     see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
1812)     Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
1813)     client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
1814)     that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
1815)     look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
1816)     timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
1817)     href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
1818)     but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
1819)     client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
1820)     strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
1821)     asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
1822)     natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
1823)     symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
1824)     <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
1825)     href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
1826)     Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
1827)     works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
1828)     fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
1829)     then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
1830)     options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
1831)     attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
1832)     attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
1833)     actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
1834)     much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
1835)     or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
1836)     orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
1837)     sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
1838)     Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
1839)     <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
1840)     the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
1841)     exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
1842)     though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
1843)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
1844)     that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
1845)     Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
1846)     exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
1847)     routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
1848)     approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
1849)     <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
1850)     the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
1851)     circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
1852)     href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
1853)     paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
1854)     anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
1855)     thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
1856)     <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
1857)     (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
1858)     each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
1859)     bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
1860)     don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
1861)     Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
1862)     and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
1863)     a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
1864)     slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
1865)     need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
1866)     solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
1867)     degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
1868)     <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
1869)     current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
1870)     we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
1871)     than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a

1872)     href="http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh/638">ssh

1873)     throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
1874)     overhaul if the results are good.</li>
1875)     <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
1876)     an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
1877)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
1878)     it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
1879)     steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
1880)     block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
1881)     the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
1882)     bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
1883)     How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
1884)     wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
1885)     a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
1886)     <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
1887)     ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
1888)     third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
1889)     streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
1890)     the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
1891)     the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
1892)     tradeoff.</li>
1893)     <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
1894)     puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
1895)     if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
1896)     <li>Programs like <a

1897)     href="<page docs/torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

1898)     your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
1899)     every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
1900)     by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
1901)     by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
1902)     do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
1903)     that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
1904)     anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
1905)     Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
1906)     of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
1907)     in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
1908)     UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
1909)     hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
1910)     by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
1911)     browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
1912)     </li>
1913)     <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
1914)     reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
1915)     lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
1916)     connected?
1917)     </li>
1918)     </ol>

1919) 

1920)     <p>
1921)     <a href="<page about/contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
1922)     of these!
1923)     </p>
1924)   </div>
1925)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1926)   <div id = "sidecol">
1927) #include "side.wmi"
1928) #include "info.wmi"
1929)   </div>
1930)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1931) </div>
1932) <!-- END CONTENT -->