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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p>General questions:</p>
18)     <ul>
19)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>
20)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>
21)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
22)     Tor?</a></li>
23)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
24)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's
26)     CD?</a></li>
27)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
28)     Tor support mail?</a></li>
29)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>
30)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
31)     funding?</a></li>

32)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
33)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

34)     </ul>

35) 

36)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>
37)     <ul>
38)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
40)     page?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
42)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li>
44)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to
45)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>
46)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>
47)     </ul>

48) 

49)     <p>Running Tor:</p>

50)     <ul>
51)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
52)     that mean?</a></li>

53)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

54)     logs?</a></li>

55)     </ul>

56) 

57)     <p>Running a Tor client:</p>
58)     <ul>

59)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor and Polipo but it's not
60)     working.</a></li>
61)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
62)     start.</a></li>
63)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country)
64)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>
65)     <li><a href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells
66)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>
67)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
68)     been compromised.</a></li>

69)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
70)     ports.</a></li>

71)     </ul>

72) 

73)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>
74)     <ul>
75)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>
76)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal
77)     with abuse issues.</a></li>
78)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
79)     relay?</a></li>

80)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></li>

81)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>
82)     <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>
83)     </ul>

84) 

85)     <p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>

86) 

87)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
88)     <ul>
89)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>

90)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

91)     </ul>

92) 

93)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
94)     <ul>
95)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
96)     relay.</a></li>

97)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets,
98)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

99)     </ul>

100) 

101)     <p>Abuse:</p>

102)     <ul>
103)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
104)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
105)     relay?</a></li>
106)     </ul>

107) 

108)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a

109)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

110) 

111)     <hr>

112) 

113)     <a id="General"></a>

114) 

115)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
116)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

117) 

118)     <p>
119)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
120)     </p>

121) 

122)     <p>
123)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
124)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
125)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around
126)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from
127)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
128)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is
129)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
130)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
131)     </p>

132) 

133)     <p>
134)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains
135)     and develops the Tor software.
136)     </p>

137) 

138)     <hr>

139) 

140)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
141)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
142)     <p>

143)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and
144) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy to
145) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same server.
146) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through
147) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't have to
148) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy server.
149) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for
150) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad
151) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them.
152) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with
153) free wifi Internet.
154)     </p>
155)     <p>
156)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider
157) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your
158) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can see your
159) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.
160) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as
161) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic
162) stream, and isn't recording your personal details.
163)     </p>
164)     <p>
165)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending
166) it on to the destination.  Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are
167) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through
168) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely
169) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local
170) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through
171) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted
172) packets between themselves.</p>

173)     <p>
174)     <dl>

175)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of
176) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.  It
177) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It merely sees
178) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so
179) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node figuring
180) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>
181)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad third
182) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know who sent
183) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or
184) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the
185) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream.  You
186) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
187) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

188)     </dl>
189)     </p>

190) 

191)     <hr>

192) 

193)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

194)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

195) 

196)     <p>
197)     There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
198)     and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on
199)     making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor.
200)     This step is normally done by configuring
201)     the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are
202)     other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to
203)     make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt
204)     your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you
205)     still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This
206)     second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
207)     why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.
208)     </p>

209) 

210)     <p>
211)     Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
212)     bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> automatically

213)     install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox

214)     extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0,
215)     Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
216)     application-level worries.
217)     </p>

218) 

219)     <p>
220)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
221)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
222)     issues on them well enough to be able to recommend a safe
223)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

224)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

225)     specific applications</a>. There's also a <a

226)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">list

227)     of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
228)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
229)     </p>

230) 

231)     <hr>

232) 

233)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
234)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>

235) 

236)     <p>
237)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
238)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
239)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
240)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
241)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
242)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
243)     the Naval Research Lab.
244)     </p>

245) 

246)     <p>
247)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
248)     </p>

249) 

250)     <p>
251)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled
252)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
253)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned
254)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
255)     spell it wrong.
256)     </p>

257) 

258)     <hr>

259) 

260)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>
261)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>

262) 

263)     <p>
264)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one
265)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody
266)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
267)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
268)     </p>

269) 

270)     <p>
271)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
272)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software
273)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
274)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
275)     trust our software ever again &mdash; for excellent reason!
276)     </p>

277) 

278)     <p>
279)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
280)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
281)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should
282)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release)
283)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
284)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
285)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
286)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
287)     distribution sites.
288)     </p>

289) 

290)     <p>
291)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your
292)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
293)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
294)     </p>

295) 

296)     <hr>

297) 

298)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

299)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's CD?</a></h3>

300) 

301)     <p>
302)     Yes.
303)     </p>

304) 

305)     <p>
306)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
307)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
308)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
309)     ask us for specific permission.
310)     </p>

311) 

312)     <p>
313)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our
314)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.
315)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
316)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
317)     </p>

318) 

319)     <p>
320)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the
321)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor bundles, which
322)     typically include <a href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a>
323)     and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.
324)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
325)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
326)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General
327)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to
328)     include the source code for these programs everywhere you include
329)     the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on the <a
330)     href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and the <a
331)     href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo
332)     download page</a>.
333)     </p>

334) 

335)     <p>
336)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
337)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
338)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
339)     </p>

340) 

341)     <p>
342)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
343)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
344)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
345)     may not be supported &mdash; or even work &mdash; six months later. This
346)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
347)     </p>

348) 

349)     <hr>

350) 

351)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

352)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my Tor support mail?</a></h3>

353) 

354)     <p>There is no official support for Tor. Your best bet is to try the following:</p>

355)     <ol>
356)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>
357)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>
358)     <li>Read through the <a

359)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk
360)     archives</a> and

361)     see if your question is already answered.</li>
362)     <li>Join our <a href="irc://irc.oftc.net#tor">irc channel</a> and
363)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>
364)     <li>Send an email to tor-assistants at torproject.org. These are
365)     volunteers who may be able to help you but you may not get a response
366)     for days.</li>
367)     </ol>

368) 

369)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the
370)     mailing list and answer questions from others.</p>

371) 

372)     <hr>

373) 

374)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
375)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

376) 

377)     <p>
378)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
379)     </p>

380) 

381)     <p>
382)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
383)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
384)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency
385)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
386)     bandwidth through Tor.
387)     </p>

388) 

389)     <p>
390)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
391)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
392)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
393)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
394)     </p>

395) 

396)     <p>
397)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

398)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

399)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
400)     to go with it.
401)     </p>

402) 

403)     <p>
404)     What can you do to help?
405)     </p>

406) 

407)     <ul>

408) 

409)     <li>
410)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
411)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
412)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
413)     </li>

414) 

415)     <li>

416)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We

417)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
418)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
419)     walk people through setting it up.
420)     </li>

421) 

422)     <li>
423)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
424)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
425)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
426)     </li>

427) 

428)     <li>
429)     There are some steps that individuals
430)     can take to improve their Tor performance. <a

431)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/FireFoxTorPerf">You

432)     can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a
433)     href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use
434)     Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download/download>">upgrading
435)     to the latest version of Tor</a>.  If this works well, please help by
436)     documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
437)     </li>

438) 

439)     <li>
440)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to
441)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
442)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
443)     get to spend more time on it.
444)     </li>

445) 

446)     <li>
447)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
448)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
449)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
450)     </li>

451) 

452)     <li>
453)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
454)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
455)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers
456)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has
457)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
458)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
459)     </li>

460) 

461)     <li>
462)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
463)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of money to the
464)     cause</a>. It adds up!
465)     </li>

466) 

467)     </ul>

468) 

469)     <hr>

470) 

471)     <a id="Funding"></a>

472)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more funding?</a></h3>

473) 

474)     <p>
475)     We have about 1800 relays right now, pushing over 150 MB/s average
476)     traffic. We have several hundred thousand active users. But the Tor
477)     network is not yet self-sustaining.
478)     </p>

479) 

480)     <p>
481)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
482)     </p>

483) 

484)     <ul>

485) 

486)     <li>
487)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
488)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
489)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
490)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
491)     </li>

492) 

493)     <li>
494)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
495)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
496)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
497)     </li>

498) 

499)     <li>
500)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
501)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
502)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and
503)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay

504)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms — e.g.,
505)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

506)     </li>

507) 

508)     <li>
509)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
510)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
511)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of
512)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this

513)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much more work

514)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
515)     </li>

516) 

517)     <li>
518)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
519)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
520)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
521)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
522)     </li>

523) 

524)     <li>
525)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
526)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
527)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
528)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of
529)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a>
530)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of
531)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
532)     behind these.
533)     </li>

534) 

535)     </ul>

536) 

537)     <p>
538)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
539)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
540)     can keep up</a>.
541)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
542)     so we can continue to grow the network.
543)     </p>

544) 

545)     <p>
546)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
547)     censorship-resistance.
548)     </p>

549) 

550)     <p>
551)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
552)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
553)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
554)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
555)     </p>

556) 

557)     <p>
558)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
559)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate/donate>">donate</a>
560)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our executive
561)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
562)     </p>

563) 

564)     <hr>
565) 

566)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

567)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

568) 

569)     <p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

570)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

571)     <hr>

572) 

573)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

574)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>

575) 

576)     <p>
577)     This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
578)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to
579)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to
580)     completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any
581)     version of Windows is as follows:
582)     </p>

583) 

584)     <ol>
585)     <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
586)     and choose exit.</li>
587)     <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the
588)     Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li>
589)     <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall.
590)     This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li>
591)     <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
592)     Click the Uninstall button.</li>
593)     </ol>

594) 

595)     <p>
596)     If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall
597)     Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to
598)     reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".
599)     </p>

600) 

601)     <p>
602)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
603)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
604)     </p>

605) 

606)     <p>
607)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
608)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
609)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
610)     </p>

611) 

612)     <hr>

613) 

614)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

615)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download page?</a></h3>

616) 

617)     <p>
618)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
619)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
620)     </p>

621) 

622)     <p>
623)     Please read the <a
624)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.
625)     </p>

626) 

627) <hr>
628) 
629) <a id="GetTor"></a>
630) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
631) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
632) 
633) <p>
634) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
635) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

636) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

637) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the google cache
638) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
639) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
640) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail
641) '<tt>gettor AT torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'
642) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
643) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
644) to receive very large attachments.
645) </p>
646) 
647) <p>

648) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the signature</a>

649) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
650) other than our official HTTPS website.

651) </p>
652) 
653) <hr>

654) 

655)     <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>

656)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></h3>

657) 

658)     <p>
659)     Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
660)     tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.
661)     </p>

662) 

663)     <p>
664)     (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
665)     it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
666)     download/download>">download page</a>.)
667)     </p>

668) 

669)     <hr>

670) 

671)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>

672)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

673) 

674)     <p>
675)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
676)     parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false
677)     positives &mdash; after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a
678)     guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
679)     a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
680)     </p>

681) 

682)     <p>
683)     In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
684)     it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
685)     href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.
686)     </p>

687) 

688)     <hr>

689) 

690)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

691)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

692) 

693)     <p>

694)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

695)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor Browser
696)     Bundle</a>.

697)     </p>

698) 
699) <hr>
700) 

701) <a id="torrc"></a>

702) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does that mean?</a></h3>

703) 
704) <p>
705) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
706) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default
707) configuration should work fine for most Tor users. Users of Vidalia can
708) make common changes through the Vidalia interface &mdash; only advanced
709) users should need to modify their torrc file directly.
710) </p>
711) 
712) <p>
713) The location of your torrc file depends on the way you installed Tor:
714) </p>
715) 
716) <ul>
717) <li>On Windows, if you installed a Tor bundle with Vidalia, you can
718) find your torrc file in the Start menu under Programs -&gt; Vidalia
719) Bundle -&gt; Tor, or you can find it by hand in <code>\Documents and
720) Settings\<i>username</i>\Application Data\Vidalia\torrc</code>. If you
721) installed Tor without Vidalia, you can find your torrc in the Start
722) menu under Programs -&gt; Tor, or manually in either <code>\Documents
723) and Settings\Application Data\tor\torrc</code> or <code>\Documents and
724) Settings\<i>username</i>\Application Data\tor\torrc</code>.
725) </li>
726) <li>On OS X, if you use Vidalia, edit
727) <code>~/.vidalia/torrc</code>. Otherwise, open your favorite text editor
728) and load <code>/Library/Tor/torrc</code>.
729) </li>
730) <li>On Unix, if you installed a pre-built package, look for
731) <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> or consult your
732) package's documentation.
733) </li>
734) <li>Finally, if you installed from source, you may not have a torrc
735) installed yet: look in <code>/usr/local/etc/</code> and note that you
736) may need to manually copy <code>torrc.sample</code> to <code>torrc</code>.
737) </li>
738) </ul>
739) 
740) <p>
741) If you use Vidalia, be sure to exit both Tor and Vidalia before you edit
742) your torrc file. Otherwise Vidalia might overwrite your changes.
743) </p>
744) 
745) <p>
746) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart Tor for the
747) changes to take effect. (For advanced users on OS X and Unix, note that
748) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart it.)
749) </p>
750) 
751) <p>
752) For other configuration options you can use, look at the <a href="<page
753) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Remember, all lines beginning
754) with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect on Tor's
755) configuration.
756) </p>
757) 
758) <hr>
759) 

760) <a id="Logs"></a>

761) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's logs?</a></h3>

762) 
763) <p>

764) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a
765) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. You
766) can click on "Settings" to see more details, or to save the messages to
767) a file. You're all set.

768) </p>
769) 
770) <p>
771) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

772) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

773) </p>
774) 
775) <ul>
776) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
777) </li>

778) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
779) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
780) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
781) </li>
782) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
783) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
784) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
785) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

786) </li>
787) </ul>
788) 
789) <p>

790) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your torrc</a>
791) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
792) following line:

793) </p>
794) 
795) <pre>

796) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
797) \## else, like one of the below lines.

798) </pre>

799) 
800) <p>

801) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

802) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
803) of the section:
804) </p>
805) 
806) <pre>
807) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
808) </pre>
809) 
810) <p>

811) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
812) and filename for your Tor log.

813) </p>
814) 
815) <hr>
816) 

817) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

818) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor and Polipo but it's not working.</a></h3>

819) 
820) <p>
821) Once you've installed the Tor bundle, there are two questions to ask:
822) first, is your Tor able to establish a circuit? Second, is your
823) Firefox correctly configured to send its traffic through Tor?
824) </p>
825) 
826) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in
827) Vidalia will turn green. You can also check in the Vidalia
828) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
829) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

830) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

831) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
832) client functionality is working."
833) </p>
834) 
835) <p>
836) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
837) </p>
838) 
839) <ol>
840) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
841) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
842) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will
843) refuse to build circuits. For XP users, synchronize your clock under
844) the clock -&gt; Internet time tab. In addition, correct the day and date
845) under the 'Date &amp; Time' Tab.</li>
846) <li>Is your Internet connection <a

847) href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled by port</a>,

848) or do you normally need to use a <a

849) href="<wikifaq>#MyInternetconnectionrequiresanHTTPorSOCKSproxy.">proxy</a>?

850) </li>
851) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux that
852) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
853) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
854) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
855) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

856) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

857) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
858) about what's going wrong?</li>

859) </ol>
860) 
861) <p>
862) Step two is to confirm that Firefox is correctly configured to send its
863) traffic through Tor. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org/">Tor
864) Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor. See <a

865) href="<wikifaq>#HowcanItellifTorisworkingandthatmyconnectionsreallyareanonymizedArethereexternalserversthatwilltestmyconnection">the

866) Tor Check FAQ entry</a> for details.

867) </p>

868) 
869) <p>
870) If it thinks you're not using Tor, here are some hints:
871) </p>
872) 
873) <ol>
874) <li>Did you install the Torbutton extension for Firefox? The installation
875) bundles include it, but sometimes people forget to install it. Make sure
876) it says "Tor enabled" at the bottom right of your Firefox window. (For
877) expert users, make sure your http proxy is set to localhost port
878) 8118.)</li>
879) <li>Do you have incompatible Firefox extensions like FoxyProxy
880) installed? If so, uninstall them. (Note that using FoxyProxy is NOT
881) a sufficient substitute for Torbutton. There are many known attacks
882) against a browser setup that does not include Torbutton. Read more

883) in the <a href="<page torbutton/torbutton-faq>">Torbutton FAQ</a> and the <a

884) href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/design/">Torbutton design</a>
885) specification.)</li>
886) <li>If your browser says "The proxy server is refusing connections.",
887) check that Polipo (the http proxy that passes traffic between Firefox
888) and Tor) is running. On Windows, look in the task manager and check for
889) a polipo.exe. On OS X, open the utilities folder in your applications
890) folder, and open Terminal.app. Then run "ps aux|grep polipo".</li>
891) <li>If you're upgrading from OS X, some of the earlier OS X installers
892) were broken in really unfortunate ways. You may find that <a href="<page
893) docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstalling everything</a> and then
894) installing a fresh bundle helps. Alas, the current uninstall instructions
895) may not apply anymore to your old bundle. Sorry.</li>
896) <li>If you're on Linux, make sure Privoxy isn't running, since it will
897) conflict with the port that our Polipo configuration file picks.</li>
898) <li>If you installed Polipo yourself (not from a bundle), did you edit the

899) config file as described? Did you restart Polipo after this change? Are
900) you sure?</li>

901) <li>For Red Hat Linux and related systems, do you have SELinux enabled? If
902) so, it might be preventing Polipo from talking to Tor. We also run across
903) BSD users periodically who have local firewall rules that prevent some
904) connections to localhost.</li>
905) </ol>
906) 
907) <hr />
908) 
909) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>

910) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at start.</a></h3>

911) 
912) <p>
913) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
914) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
915) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
916) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
917) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
918) compromising your anonymity.
919) </p>
920) 
921) <p>
922) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
923) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
924) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
925) </p>
926) 
927) <ol>
928) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
929) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
930) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
931) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
932) </li>
933) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
934) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,
935) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are different.
936) <br />
937) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset button,
938) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
939) control password.
940) <br />
941) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
942) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
943) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
944) to restart Tor and all will work again.
945) </li>
946) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a Windows NT service. When Tor
947) is set to
948) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
949) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
950) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
951) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
952) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
953) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
954) <br />
955) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on

956) <a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a Windows NT service</a>

957) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
958) </li>
959) </ol>
960) 

961)     <hr>

962) 

963)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
964)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

965) 

966)     <p>

967)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
968)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

969)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
970)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

971)     </p>
972)     <dl>
973)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
974)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
975)         </dd>
976)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

977)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.

978)         </dd>
979)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

980)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

981)         </dd>
982)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

983)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.
984)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list.

985)         </dd>
986)     </dl>
987)     <p>

988)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>
989)     &mdash; they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions.
990)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
991)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
992)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

993)     </p>
994)     <p>

995)     The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are
996)     treated as a request, meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow,
997)     Tor will still avoid them. You can make the option mandatory by
998)     setting <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt>
999)     &mdash; but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working
1000)     if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable.
1001)     See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a>

1002)     for some nodes you might pick.
1003)     </p>
1004)     <p>

1005)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a 2 letter
1006)     ISO3166 country code in curly braces (for example {de}), or an ip
1007)     address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node nickname. Make
1008)     sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items.

1009)     </p>
1010)     <p>

1011)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface
1012)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an
1013)     internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

1014)     See the manual page for details.
1015)     </p>

1016) 

1017)     <hr>

1018) 
1019) <a id="GoogleCaptcha"></a>

1020) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1021) 
1022) <p>
1023) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1024) considers Tor to be spyware.
1025) </p>
1026) 
1027) <p>
1028) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are also
1029) shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message
1030) when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. Google
1031) interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit
1032) relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website,
1033) so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.
1034) </p>
1035) <p>
1036) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1037) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1038) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1039) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1040) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1041) an infection.
1042) </p>
1043) 
1044) <p>
1045) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically
1046) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1047) should clear up again after a short time.
1048) </p>
1049) 
1050) <p>
1051) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
1052) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as
1053) Ixquick or Bing.
1054) </p>
1055) 
1056) <hr />
1057) 
1058) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1059) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1060) 
1061) <p>
1062) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a

1063) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1064) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1065) throughout the world recently used to access your account.

1066) </p>
1067) 
1068) <p>
1069) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1070) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and decided
1071) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1072) rightful owner.

1073) </p>
1074) 
1075) <p>

1076) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1077) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1078) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1079) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1080) </p>
1081) 
1082) <p>
1083) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1084) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1085) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1086) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a
1087) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking">
1088) way more complex than that</a>.

1089) </p>
1090) 
1091) <p>
1092) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1093) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1094) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1095) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1096) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1097) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1098) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1099) </p>
1100) 

1101) <hr>
1102) 
1103) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

1104) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

1105) 
1106) <p>
1107) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only
1108) use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" to

1109) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

1110) configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect
1111) to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window.
1112) </p>
1113) 
1114) <p>
1115) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
1116) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
1117) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
1118) </p>
1119) 
1120) <p>
1121) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
1122) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
1123) </p>
1124) 
1125) <pre>
1126)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
1127)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
1128) </pre>
1129) 
1130) <hr>

1131) 

1132)     <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>

1133)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></h3>

1134) 

1135)     <p>
1136)     We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
1137)     </p>

1138) 

1139)     <ul>
1140)     <li>Tor has built-in support for <a

1141)     href="<wikifaq>#WhatbandwidthshapingoptionsareavailabletoTorrelays">

1142)     rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
1143)     link but want to limit the number of bytes per
1144)     day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a

1145)     href="<wikifaq>#HowcanIlimitthetotalamountofbandwidthusedbymyTorrelay">hibernation

1146)     feature</a>.
1147)     </li>
1148)     <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that
1149)     specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from
1150)     that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your
1151)     relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.
1152)     </li>
1153)     <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
1154)     notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
1155)     sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
1156)     disconnects will break.
1157)     </li>
1158)     <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
1159)     leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
1160)     </li>
1161)     <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
1162)     IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port

1163)     forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but

1164)     <a href="<wikifaq>#ImbehindaNATFirewall">this FAQ entry</a>

1165)     offers some examples on how to do this.
1166)     </li>
1167)     <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
1168)     bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than
1169)     low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
1170)     </li>
1171)     </ul>

1172) 

1173)     <hr>

1174) 

1175)     <a id="RunARelayBut"></a>
1176)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>

1177)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>

1178) 

1179)     <p>
1180)     Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
1181)     </p>

1182) 

1183)     <p>
1184)     Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
1185)     outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit
1186)     policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients
1187)     will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
1188)     exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
1189)     the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,

1190)     based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on
1191)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a>
1192)     if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's

1193)     <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

1194)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
1195)     </p>

1196) 

1197)     <p>

1198)     The default exit policy allows access to many popular services

1199)     (e.g. web browsing), but <a href="<wikifaq>#Istherealistofdefaultexitports">restricts</a>

1200)     some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
1201)     the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
1202)     file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy

1203)     using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your

1204)     <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc</a>

1205)     file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to
1206)     "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
1207)     that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
1208)     but not for connections to external websites or other services.
1209)     </p>

1210) 

1211)     <p>
1212)     If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
1213)     (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).
1214)     If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example,
1215)     you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please
1216)     explicitly reject them in your exit policy &mdash; otherwise Tor users
1217)     will be impacted too.
1218)     </p>

1219) 

1220)     <hr>

1221) 

1222)     <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>

1223)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge relay?</a></h3>

1224) 

1225)     <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)
1226)     are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
1227)     in the main Tor directory. That means
1228)     that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
1229)     network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
1230)     </p>

1231) 

1232)     <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
1233)     configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
1234)     publically or not.
1235)     </p>

1236) 

1237)     <p>Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter

1238)     connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
1239)     right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
1240)     get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
1241)     security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a
1242)     public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.
1243)     </p>

1244) 

1245)     <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
1246)     lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay &mdash;

1247)     bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to

1248)     <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely run a normal
1249)     relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and only have
1250)     a little bit of bandwidth, then flip a coin. Thanks for volunteering!
1251)     </p>

1252) 

1253)     <hr>

1254) 

1255) <a id="MultipleRelays"></a>
1256) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></h3>

1257) 
1258) <p>
1259) Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
1260) we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on
1261) the same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal
1262) and diversity.
1263) </p>
1264) 
1265) <p>
1266) If you do decide to run more than one relay, please set the "MyFamily"

1267) config option in the <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> of each relay, listing
1268) all the relays (comma-separated) that are under your control:

1269) </p>
1270) 
1271) <pre>
1272)     MyFamily $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2,$fingerprint3
1273) </pre>
1274) 
1275) <p>
1276) where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without
1277) spaces). You can also list them by nickname, but fingerprint is safer. Be
1278) sure to prefix the digest strings with a dollar sign ('$') so that the
1279) digest is not confused with a nickname in the config file.
1280) </p>
1281) 
1282) <p>
1283) That way clients will know to avoid using more than one of your relays
1284) in a single circuit. You should set MyFamily if you have administrative
1285) control of the computers or of their network, even if they're not all in
1286) the same geographic location.
1287) </p>
1288) 
1289)     <hr>
1290) 

1291)     <a id="RelayMemory"></a>

1292)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></h3>

1293) 

1294)     <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some
1295)     tips for reducing its footprint:
1296)     </p>

1297) 

1298)     <ol>
1299)     <li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation
1300)     bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory
1301)     back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard
1302)     to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation,
1303)     which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher
1304)     CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead:
1305)     <tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li>

1306) 

1307)     <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
1308)     open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
1309)     buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a

1310)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html">release

1311)     unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
1312)     1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
1313)     this feature.</li>

1314) 

1315)     <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or
1316)     old FreeBSD, Tor is probably forking separate processes
1317)     rather than using threads. Consider switching to a <a

1318)     href="<wikifaq>#WhydoesntmyWindowsorotherOSTorrelayrunwell">better

1319)     operating system</a>.</li>

1320) 

1321)     <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the
1322)     amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth
1323)     means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow
1324)     as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man
1325)     page.</li>

1326) 

1327)     </ol>

1328) 

1329)     <p>
1330)     All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual
1331)     for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.
1332)     </p>

1333) 

1334)     <hr>

1335) 

1336)     <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>

1337)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>

1338) 

1339)     <p>

1340)     We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br>

1341)     </p>
1342)     <ul>
1343)     <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings
1344)     are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li>
1345)     <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
1346)     <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
1347)     </ul>

1348) 

1349)     <hr>

1350) 

1351)     <a id="KeyManagement"></a>

1352)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></h3>

1353) 

1354)     <p>
1355)     Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)
1356)     encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
1357)     authentication so clients know they're
1358)     talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
1359)     sure all clients know the same set of relays.
1360)     </p>

1361) 

1362)     <p>
1363)     <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
1364)     so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
1365)     intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption
1366)     key with each relay in the circuit, so only the exit relay can read
1367)     the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
1368)     so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
1369)     won't work.
1370)     </p>

1371) 

1372)     <p>
1373)     <b>Authentication</b>:
1374)     Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
1375)     When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
1376)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
1377)     that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
1378)     the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
1379)     Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
1380)     </p>

1381) 

1382)     <p>
1383)     <b>Coordination</b>:
1384)     How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they
1385)     have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
1386)     key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a
1387)     "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a

1388)     href="<specblob>dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>

1389)     of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
1390)     each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
1391)     locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
1392)     a threshold of the directory authorities, he can't trick the Tor client
1393)     into using other Tor relays.
1394)     </p>

1395) 

1396)     <p>
1397)     How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
1398)     comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
1399)     authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network
1400)     is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
1401)     </p>

1402) 

1403)     <p>
1404)     How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
1405)     the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a
1406)     href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. See the <a
1407)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">instructions
1408)     on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
1409)     </p>

1410) 

1411)     <p>
1412)     In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
1413)     met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
1414)     need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on
1415)     this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
1416)     and start meeting people.
1417)     </p>

1418) 

1419)     <hr>

1420) 

1421) <a id="EntryGuards"></a>
1422) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></h3>
1423) 
1424) <p>
1425) Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails
1426) when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For

1427) example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose
1428) to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In

1429) this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design
1430) that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing
1431) information on the two sides.
1432) </p>
1433) 
1434) <p>
1435) So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,

1436) <i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select
1437) new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker
1438) will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability
1439) <i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad
1440) as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without
1441) an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the
1442) attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits
1443) gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker.

1444) </p>
1445) 
1446) <p>
1447) The solution is "entry guards": each user selects a few relays at random

1448) to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If
1449) those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win,
1450) ever, and the user is secure. If those relays <i>are</i> observed or
1451) controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger <i>fraction</i>
1452) of the user's traffic &mdash; but still the user is no more profiled than
1453) before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of <i>(n-c)/n</i>)
1454) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before.

1455) </p>
1456) 
1457) <p>

1458) You can read more at <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright02">An
1459) Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols</a>, <a
1460) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright03">Defending Anonymous
1461) Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks</a>, and especially
1462) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06">Locating Hidden
1463) Servers</a>.

1464) </p>
1465) 
1466) <p>
1467) Restricting your entry nodes may also help against attackers who want
1468) to run a few Tor nodes and easily enumerate all of the Tor user IP
1469) addresses. (Even though they can't learn what destinations the users
1470) are talking to, they still might be able to do bad things with just a

1471) list of users.) However, that feature won't really become useful until
1472) we move to a "directory guard" design as well.

1473) </p>
1474) 
1475)     <hr>
1476) 

1477)     <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>

1478)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a relay.</a></h3>

1479) 

1480)     <p>
1481)     Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the

1482)     network to handle all our users, and <a
1483)     href="<wikifaq>#DoIgetbetteranonymityifIrunarelay">running a Tor

1484)     relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good
1485)     relays &mdash; for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive
1486)     firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they
1487)     can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical
1488)     part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users
1489)     are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
1490)     increases the size of the anonymity set.
1491)     </p>

1492) 

1493)     <p>
1494)     That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
1495)     really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining
1496)     a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past
1497)     few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports
1498)     uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
1499)     how much bandwidth it can offer.
1500)     </p>

1501) 

1502)     <p>
1503)     There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
1504)     </p>

1505) 

1506)     <p>
1507)     First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
1508)     operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
1509)     and we plan to finally address that in 2009. See Section 4.1 of <a
1510)     href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
1511)     development roadmap</a>.
1512)     </p>

1513) 

1514)     <p>
1515)     Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
1516)     the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
1517)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">research section of the
1518)     volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays
1519)     have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a

1520)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">switching

1521)     to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here &mdash; which alas is
1522)     not a very simple answer at all.
1523)     </p>

1524) 

1525)     <p>
1526)     Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
1527)     stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
1528)     relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
1529)     users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
1530)     impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
1531)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
1532)     for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
1533)     </p>

1534) 

1535)     <p>
1536)     Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
1537)     letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
1538)     you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. <a
1539)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Three</a> <a
1540)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a>
1541)     <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers
1542)     describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic
1543)     through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the
1544)     circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor
1545)     context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to
1546)     encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as
1547)     <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
1548)     we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
1549)     </p>

1550) 

1551)     <p>
1552)     Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
1553)     to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our

1554)     <a href="<blog>two-incentive-designs-tor">current

1555)     thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.
1556)     </p>

1557) 

1558)     <p>
1559)     Please help on all of these!
1560)     </p>

1561) 

1562) <hr>
1563) 
1564) <a id="TransportIPnotTCP"></a>

1565) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets, not just TCP packets.</a></h3>

1566) 
1567) <p>

1568) This would be handy, because it would make Tor better able to handle
1569) new protocols like VoIP, it could solve the whole need to socksify
1570) applications, and it would solve the fact that exit relays need to
1571) allocate a lot of file descriptors to hold open all the exit connections.

1572) </p>
1573) 
1574) <p>

1575) We're heading in this direction: see <a
1576) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1855">this trac
1577) ticket</a> for directions we should investigate. Some of the hard
1578) problems are:

1579) </p>
1580) 

1581) <ol>

1582) <li>IP packets reveal OS characteristics. We would still need to do
1583) IP-level packet normalization, to stop things like TCP fingerprinting
1584) attacks. Given the diversity and complexity of TCP stacks, along with <a

1585) href="<wikifaq>#DoesTorresistremotephysicaldevicefingerprinting">device

1586) fingerprinting attacks</a>, it looks like our best bet is shipping our
1587) own user-space TCP stack.

1588) </li>

1589) <li>Application-level streams still need scrubbing. We will still need
1590) user-side applications like Torbutton. So it won't become just a matter
1591) of capturing packets and anonymizing them at the IP layer.

1592) </li>
1593) <li>Certain protocols will still leak information. For example, we must
1594) rewrite DNS requests so they are delivered to an unlinkable DNS server
1595) rather than the DNS server at a user's ISP; thus, we must understand
1596) the protocols we are transporting.
1597) </li>
1598) <li><a
1599) href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/dtls/dtls.html">DTLS</a>

1600) (datagram TLS) basically has no users, and IPsec sure is big. Once we've
1601) picked a transport mechanism, we need to design a new end-to-end Tor
1602) protocol for avoiding tagging attacks and other potential anonymity and
1603) integrity issues now that we allow drops, resends, et cetera.

1604) </li>
1605) <li>Exit policies for arbitrary IP packets mean building a secure
1606) IDS. Our node operators tell us that exit policies are one of the main
1607) reasons they're willing to run Tor. Adding an Intrusion Detection System
1608) to handle exit policies would increase the security complexity of Tor,
1609) and would likely not work anyway, as evidenced by the entire field of IDS
1610) and counter-IDS papers. Many potential abuse issues are resolved by the
1611) fact that Tor only transports valid TCP streams (as opposed to arbitrary
1612) IP including malformed packets and IP floods), so exit policies become
1613) even <i>more</i> important as we become able to transport IP packets. We
1614) also need to compactly describe exit policies in the Tor directory,
1615) so clients can predict which nodes will allow their packets to exit &mdash;
1616) and clients need to predict all the packets they will want to send in
1617) a session before picking their exit node!
1618) </li>

1619) <li>The Tor-internal name spaces would need to be redesigned. We support
1620) hidden service ".onion" addresses by intercepting the addresses when
1621) they are passed to the Tor client. Doing so at the IP level will require
1622) a more complex interface between Tor and the local DNS resolver.

1623) </li>
1624) </ol>
1625) 

1626)     <hr>

1627) 

1628)     <a id="Criminals"></a>

1629)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3>

1630) 

1631)     <p>
1632)     For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a
1633)     href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.
1634)     </p>

1635) 

1636)     <hr>

1637) 

1638)     <a id="RespondISP"></a>

1639)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></h3>

1640) 

1641)     <p>
1642)     A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a

1643)     href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/TorAbuseTemplates">collected

1644)     here</a>.
1645)     </p>

1646) 

1647)     <hr>

1648) 

1649)   </div>
1650)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1651)   <div id = "sidecol">
1652) #include "side.wmi"
1653) #include "info.wmi"
1654)   </div>
1655)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1656) </div>
1657) <!-- END CONTENT -->