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volunteer.html      4) 

en/volunteer.wml    5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"

volunteer.html      6) 
volunteer.html      7) <div class="main-column">
volunteer.html      8) 
volunteer.html      9) <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

en/volunteer.wml   10) <h2>A few things everyone can do now:</h2>

volunteer.html     11) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml   12) <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
en/volunteer.wml   13) a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>
en/volunteer.wml   14) <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden

volunteer.html     15) services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>

en/volunteer.wml   16) <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate>">take a moment
en/volunteer.wml   17) to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
en/volunteer.wml   18) for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
en/volunteer.wml   19) or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
en/volunteer.wml   20) security, let them know about us.</li>
en/volunteer.wml   21) <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page torusers>">good examples of Tor
en/volunteer.wml   22) users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
en/volunteer.wml   23) yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
en/volunteer.wml   24) we'd love to hear from you.</li>

volunteer.html     25) </ol>
volunteer.html     26) 

en/volunteer.wml   27) <p>Tor has <a href="<page open-positions>">two open positions</a>.
en/volunteer.wml   28) Please <a href="<page contact>">contact us</a> if you are qualified!</p>

en/volunteer.wml   29) 

en/volunteer.wml   30) <a id="Documentation"></a>
en/volunteer.wml   31) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>

volunteer.html     32) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml   33) <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
en/volunteer.wml   34) languages. See the <a href="<page translation>">translation
en/volunteer.wml   35) guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
en/volunteer.wml   36) Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
en/volunteer.wml   37) <li>Evaluate and document

en/volunteer.wml   38) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">our

en/volunteer.wml   39) list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>

en/volunteer.wml   40) <li>We have a huge list of <a
en/volunteer.wml   41) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">potentially useful

en/volunteer.wml   42) programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
en/volunteer.wml   43) situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>

volunteer.html     44) </ol>
volunteer.html     45) 

en/volunteer.wml   46) <a id="Advocacy"></a>

en/volunteer.wml   47) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
en/volunteer.wml   48) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml   49) <li>Create a <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/CommunityLogos">community logo</a> under a Creative Commons license that all can use and modify</li>

en/volunteer.wml   50) <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group meetings around the world</li>

en/volunteer.wml   51) <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is, or how
en/volunteer.wml   52) to use it.  Some have already

en/volunteer.wml   53) started on <a href="http://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media

en/volunteer.wml   54) server</a>, <a
en/volunteer.wml   55) href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,

en/volunteer.wml   56) and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/thetorproject">Youtube</a>.</li> 

en/volunteer.wml   57) <li>Create a poster, or a set of posters, around a theme,
en/volunteer.wml   58) such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>

en/volunteer.wml   59) </ol>
en/volunteer.wml   60) 

en/volunteer.wml   61) <a id="Coding"></a>

en/volunteer.wml   62) <a id="Summer"></a>
en/volunteer.wml   63) <a id="Projects"></a>

en/volunteer.wml   64) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Good Coding Projects</a></h2>

en/volunteer.wml   65) 
en/volunteer.wml   66) <p>

en/volunteer.wml   67) You may find some of these projects to be good <a href="<page

en/volunteer.wml   68) gsoc>">Google Summer of Code 2010</a> ideas. We have labelled each idea

en/volunteer.wml   69) with how useful it would be to the overall Tor project (priority), how
en/volunteer.wml   70) much work we expect it would be (effort level), how much clue you should
en/volunteer.wml   71) start with (skill level), and which of our <a href="<page
en/volunteer.wml   72) people>#Core">core developers</a> would be good mentors.
en/volunteer.wml   73) If one or more of these ideas looks promising to you, please <a
en/volunteer.wml   74) href="<page contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your plans rather than
en/volunteer.wml   75) sending blind applications. You may also want to propose your own project

en/volunteer.wml   76) idea — which often results in the best applications.

en/volunteer.wml   77) </p>
en/volunteer.wml   78) 

en/volunteer.wml   79) <ol>
en/volunteer.wml   80) 

en/volunteer.wml   81) <li>

en/volunteer.wml   82) <b>Tor Browser Bundle for Mac OS X</b>

en/volunteer.wml   83) <br />

en/volunteer.wml   84) Priority: <i>High</i>

en/volunteer.wml   85) <br />

en/volunteer.wml   86) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml   87) <br />
en/volunteer.wml   88) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml   89) <br />

en/volunteer.wml   90) Likely Mentors: <i>Steven, Erinn, Jacob, Andrew</i>

en/volunteer.wml   91) <br />

en/volunteer.wml   92) The Tor Browser Bundle incorporates Tor, Firefox, Polipo, and the Vidalia
en/volunteer.wml   93) user interface (and optionally the <a href="http://pidgin.im/">Pidgin</a>
en/volunteer.wml   94) Instant Messaging client). Components are pre-configured to operate in a
en/volunteer.wml   95) secure way, and it has very few dependencies on the installed operating
en/volunteer.wml   96) system. It has therefore become one of the most easy to use, and popular,
en/volunteer.wml   97) ways to use Tor on Windows.

en/volunteer.wml   98) <br />

en/volunteer.wml   99) However, there is currently no released package for Mac OS X, so this project
en/volunteer.wml  100) would be to implement Tor Browser Bundle for OS X. This will involve
en/volunteer.wml  101) modifications to Vidalia (C++), possibly Firefox (C) then creating and testing
en/volunteer.wml  102) the launcher on a range of operating system versions and configurations to
en/volunteer.wml  103) verify portability.  Some work on this was completed as part of the Google
en/volunteer.wml  104) Summer of Code 2009. Another part of this project is to identify all of the
en/volunteer.wml  105) traces left behind by using a Tor Browser Bundle on Mac OS X or Linux.
en/volunteer.wml  106) Developing ways to stop, counter, or remove these traces is a final step.

en/volunteer.wml  107) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  108) Students should be familiar with application development on one or
en/volunteer.wml  109) preferably both of Linux and Mac OS X, and be comfortable with C/C++
en/volunteer.wml  110) and shell scripting.
en/volunteer.wml  111) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  112) Part of this project could be usability testing of Tor Browser Bundle,

en/volunteer.wml  113) ideally amongst our target demographic.  That would help a lot in knowing
en/volunteer.wml  114) what needs to be done in terms of bug fixes or new features. We get this
en/volunteer.wml  115) informally at the moment, but a more structured process would be better.

en/volunteer.wml  116) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  117) A beta version of the Tor Browser Bundle has been released for GNU/Linux, but
en/volunteer.wml  118) work is still required for the Tor IM Browser bundle. Work is currently being
en/volunteer.wml  119) done on the Mac OS X version as well. If you would like to help extend or do
en/volunteer.wml  120) security auditing for either (or both) of these, please contact Erinn.

en/volunteer.wml  121) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  122) 

en/volunteer.wml  123) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  124) <b>Help track the overall Tor Network status</b>

en/volunteer.wml  125) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  126) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  127) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  128) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  129) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  130) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  131) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  132) Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Roger</i>

en/volunteer.wml  133) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  134) It would be great to set up an automated system for tracking network
en/volunteer.wml  135) health over time, graphing it, etc. Part of this project would involve
en/volunteer.wml  136) inventing better metrics for assessing network health and growth. Is the
en/volunteer.wml  137) average uptime of the network increasing? How many relays are qualifying
en/volunteer.wml  138) for Guard status this month compared to last month? What's the turnover
en/volunteer.wml  139) in terms of new relays showing up and relays shutting off? Periodically
en/volunteer.wml  140) people collect brief snapshots, but where it gets really interesting is
en/volunteer.wml  141) when we start tracking data points over time.
en/volunteer.wml  142) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  143) Data could be collected from the Tor Network Scanners in <a
en/volunteer.wml  144) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>, from

en/volunteer.wml  145) the server descriptors that each relay publishes, and from other
en/volunteer.wml  146) sources. Results over time could be integrated into one of the <a
en/volunteer.wml  147) href="https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/">Tor Status</a> web pages, or be
en/volunteer.wml  148) kept separate. Speaking of the Tor Status pages, take a look at Roger's
en/volunteer.wml  149) <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2008/msg00300.html">Tor
en/volunteer.wml  150) Status wish list</a>.
en/volunteer.wml  151) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  152) 

en/volunteer.wml  153) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  154) <b>Rewrite TorDNSEL, this time with a spec!</b>
en/volunteer.wml  155) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  156) Priority: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  157) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  158) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  159) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  160) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  161) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  162) Likely Mentors: <i>Mike, Roger, Sebastian, Damian</i>

en/volunteer.wml  163) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  164) The <a href="<page tordnsel/index>">Tor DNS Exit List</a> is an
en/volunteer.wml  165) unmaintained Haskell

en/volunteer.wml  166) program that serves three purposes. First, it provides an rbl-style DNS
en/volunteer.wml  167) interface for people to look up whether a given IP address is (or has
en/volunteer.wml  168) recently been) a Tor exit relay. Second, it actively builds circuits over
en/volunteer.wml  169) the Tor network and connects back to itself, to learn the actual exit
en/volunteer.wml  170) IP address of each relay — some Tor relays exit from a different
en/volunteer.wml  171) address than they advertise in their descriptor. Third, it exports a <a
en/volunteer.wml  172) href="http://exitlist.torproject.org/exitAddresses">set of conclusions</a>
en/volunteer.wml  173) so that <a href="https://check.torproject.org/">check.torproject.org</a>
en/volunteer.wml  174) can guess for you whether your browser is configured to point to Tor.
en/volunteer.wml  175) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  176) This project would make use of <a
en/volunteer.wml  177) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>,

en/volunteer.wml  178) a set of Python scripts to interact with Tor,

en/volunteer.wml  179) to figure out how our Tor Exit Checker should actually work, and then
en/volunteer.wml  180) build it — probably in Python since Torflow is in Python. The main
en/volunteer.wml  181) goal is to reduce false positives as much as possible, by making sure
en/volunteer.wml  182) that it learns about new relays as soon as possible, making sure that
en/volunteer.wml  183) the testing phase concludes quickly, and making sure the answers get
en/volunteer.wml  184) passed to the Check script quickly. As a bonus, we should standardize
en/volunteer.wml  185) (specify) the format of the exitAddresses file, and rewrite the <a
en/volunteer.wml  186) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/check/trunk/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">Tor

en/volunteer.wml  187) Bulk Exit List</a> script to use that file rather than its current <a

en/volunteer.wml  188) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1019">horrible

en/volunteer.wml  189) DNS hacks</a>. As an extra bonus, we should work with Freenode, OFTC,
en/volunteer.wml  190) and/or other IRC networks to make sure that the scripts we offer are
en/volunteer.wml  191) actually the scripts they want, in terms of accurately identifying which
en/volunteer.wml  192) of their users are coming from the Tor network.

en/volunteer.wml  193) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  194) You can fetch the <a href="git://git.torproject.org/git/tordnsel">latest
en/volunteer.wml  195) tordnsel</a> via git.
en/volunteer.wml  196) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  197) 

en/volunteer.wml  198) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  199) <b>Improving Tor's ability to resist censorship</b>
en/volunteer.wml  200) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  201) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  202) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  203) Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  204) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  205) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  206) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  207) Likely Mentors: <i>Roger, Nick, Steven</i>

en/volunteer.wml  208) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  209) The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a

en/volunteer.wml  210) href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant

en/volunteer.wml  211) improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
en/volunteer.wml  212) But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its

en/volunteer.wml  213) anti-censorship design.
en/volunteer.wml  214) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  215) One huge category of work is adding features to our <a
en/volunteer.wml  216) href="http://gitweb.torproject.org//bridgedb.git?a=tree">bridgedb</a>
en/volunteer.wml  217) service (Python). Tor aims to give out <a href="<page bridges>">bridge
en/volunteer.wml  218) relay addresses</a> to users that can't reach the Tor network
en/volunteer.wml  219) directly, but there's an arms race between algorithms for distributing
en/volunteer.wml  220) addresses and algorithms for gathering and blocking them. See <a
en/volunteer.wml  221) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bridge-distribution-strategies">our
en/volunteer.wml  222) blog post on the topic</a> as an overview, and then look at <a
en/volunteer.wml  223) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Dec-2009/msg00000.html">Roger's
en/volunteer.wml  224) or-dev post</a> from December for more recent thoughts &mdash; lots of
en/volunteer.wml  225) design work remains.
en/volunteer.wml  226) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  227) If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem

en/volunteer.wml  228) we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single
en/volunteer.wml  229) address/port combination at a time. There's

en/volunteer.wml  230) <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a

en/volunteer.wml  231) proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
en/volunteer.wml  232) to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more

en/volunteer.wml  233) work.
en/volunteer.wml  234) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  235) This project could involve a lot of research and design. One of the big

en/volunteer.wml  236) challenges will be identifying and crafting approaches that can still
en/volunteer.wml  237) resist an adversary even after the adversary knows the design, and
en/volunteer.wml  238) then trading off censorship resistance with usability and robustness.
en/volunteer.wml  239) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  240) 

en/volunteer.wml  241) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml  242) <b>Tuneup Tor!</b>

en/volunteer.wml  243) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  244) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  245) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  246) Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  247) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  248) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  249) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  250) Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Mike, Karsten</i>
en/volunteer.wml  251) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  252) Right now, Tor relays measure and report their own bandwidth, and Tor
en/volunteer.wml  253) clients choose which relays to use in part based on that bandwidth.
en/volunteer.wml  254) This approach is vulnerable to
en/volunteer.wml  255) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#bauer:wpes2007">attacks where
en/volunteer.wml  256) relays lie about their bandwidth</a>;
en/volunteer.wml  257) to address this, Tor currently caps the maximum bandwidth
en/volunteer.wml  258) it's willing to believe any relay provides.  This is a limited fix, and
en/volunteer.wml  259) a waste of bandwidth capacity to boot.  Instead,
en/volunteer.wml  260) Tor should possibly measure bandwidth in a more distributed way, perhaps
en/volunteer.wml  261) as described in the
en/volunteer.wml  262) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/author.html#snader08">"A Tune-up for
en/volunteer.wml  263) Tor"</a> paper
en/volunteer.wml  264) by Snader and Borisov. One could use current testing code to
en/volunteer.wml  265) double-check this paper's findings and verify the extent to which they
en/volunteer.wml  266) dovetail with Tor as deployed in the wild, and determine good ways to
en/volunteer.wml  267) incorporate them into their suggestions Tor network without adding too
en/volunteer.wml  268) much communications overhead between relays and directory
en/volunteer.wml  269) authorities.

en/volunteer.wml  270) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml  271) 
en/volunteer.wml  272) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  273) <b>Improving Polipo on Windows</b>

en/volunteer.wml  274) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  275) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  276) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  277) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  278) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  279) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  280) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  281) Likely Mentors: <i>Chris</i>

en/volunteer.wml  282) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  283) Help port <a
en/volunteer.wml  284) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a> to
en/volunteer.wml  285) Windows. Example topics to tackle include:

en/volunteer.wml  286) <ol><li> the ability to asynchronously query name servers, find the
en/volunteer.wml  287) system nameservers, and manage netbios and dns queries.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  288) <li> manage events and buffers natively (i.e. in Unix-like OSes,
en/volunteer.wml  289) Polipo defaults to 25% of ram, in Windows it's whatever the config
en/volunteer.wml  290) specifies).</li>
en/volunteer.wml  291) <li> some sort of GUI config and reporting tool, bonus if it has a
en/volunteer.wml  292) systray icon with right clickable menu options. Double bonus if it's
en/volunteer.wml  293) cross-platform compatible.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  294) <li> allow the software to use the Windows Registry and handle proper
en/volunteer.wml  295) Windows directory locations, such as "C:\Program Files\Polipo"</li>
en/volunteer.wml  296) </ol>

en/volunteer.wml  297) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  298) 

en/volunteer.wml  299) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  300) <b>Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia</b>

en/volunteer.wml  301) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  302) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  303) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  304) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  305) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  306) Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml  307) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  308) Likely Mentors: <i>Matt</i>
en/volunteer.wml  309) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  310) There are a number of status changes inside Tor of which the user may need

en/volunteer.wml  311) to be informed. For example, if the user is trying to set up his Tor as a
en/volunteer.wml  312) relay and Tor decides that its ports are not reachable from outside

en/volunteer.wml  313) the user's network, we should alert the user. Currently, all the user

en/volunteer.wml  314) gets is a couple log messages in Vidalia's 'message log' window, which they

en/volunteer.wml  315) likely never see since they don't receive a notification that something
en/volunteer.wml  316) has gone wrong. Even if the user does actually look at the message log,
en/volunteer.wml  317) most of the messages make little sense to the novice user.
en/volunteer.wml  318) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  319) Tor has the ability to inform Vidalia of many such status changes, and
en/volunteer.wml  320) we recently implemented support for a couple of these events. Still,
en/volunteer.wml  321) there are many more status events the user should be informed of and we
en/volunteer.wml  322) need a better UI for actually displaying them to the user.
en/volunteer.wml  323) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  324) The goal of this project then is to design and implement a UI for
en/volunteer.wml  325) displaying Tor status events to the user. For example, we might put a
en/volunteer.wml  326) little badge on Vidalia's tray icon that alerts the user to new status
en/volunteer.wml  327) events they should look at. Double-clicking the icon could bring up a
en/volunteer.wml  328) dialog that summarizes recent status events in simple terms and maybe

en/volunteer.wml  329) suggests a remedy for any negative events if they can be corrected by

en/volunteer.wml  330) the user. Of course, this is just an example and one is free to

en/volunteer.wml  331) suggest another approach.
en/volunteer.wml  332) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  333) A person undertaking this project should have good UI design and layout

en/volunteer.wml  334) and some C++ development experience. Previous experience with Qt and

en/volunteer.wml  335) Qt's Designer will be very helpful, but are not required. Some

en/volunteer.wml  336) English writing ability will also be useful, since this project will
en/volunteer.wml  337) likely involve writing small amounts of help documentation that should
en/volunteer.wml  338) be understandable by non-technical users. Bonus points for some graphic
en/volunteer.wml  339) design/Photoshop fu, since we might want/need some shiny new icons too.
en/volunteer.wml  340) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  341) 

en/volunteer.wml  342) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  343) <b>Improve our unit testing process</b>

en/volunteer.wml  344) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  345) Priority: <i>Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml  346) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  347) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  348) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  349) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  350) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  351) Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Erinn</i>

en/volunteer.wml  352) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  353) Tor needs to be far more tested. This is a multi-part effort. To start
en/volunteer.wml  354) with, our unit test coverage should rise substantially, especially in
en/volunteer.wml  355) the areas outside the utility functions. This will require significant
en/volunteer.wml  356) refactoring of some parts of Tor, in order to dissociate as much logic
en/volunteer.wml  357) as possible from globals.
en/volunteer.wml  358) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  359) Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing. We've got
en/volunteer.wml  360) buildbot to automate our regular integration and compile testing already
en/volunteer.wml  361) (though we need somebody to set it up on Windows),
en/volunteer.wml  362) but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in <a
en/volunteer.wml  363) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>)
en/volunteer.wml  364) updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
en/volunteer.wml  365) network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
en/volunteer.wml  366) changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.
en/volunteer.wml  367) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  368) 
en/volunteer.wml  369) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  370) <b>Help with independent Tor client implementations</b>

en/volunteer.wml  371) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  372) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  373) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  374) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  375) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  376) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  377) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  378) Likely Mentors: <i>Bruce, Nathan</i>

en/volunteer.wml  379) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  380) Others are currently working on Tor clients for Java, Android, and Maemo

en/volunteer.wml  381) environments.  The first step is to get a handle on the current state of

en/volunteer.wml  382) the project in which you are interested in helping; <a

en/volunteer.wml  383) href="http://github.com/brl/JTor">Tor for Java</a>,
en/volunteer.wml  384) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/">Android/Orbot</a>

en/volunteer.wml  385) , or <a href="<page docs/N900>">Tor for Maemo</a>. Check out the
en/volunteer.wml  386) repository and familiarize yourself

en/volunteer.wml  387) with the source code.  Further, support for requesting or even providing
en/volunteer.wml  388) Tor hidden services would be neat, but not required.

en/volunteer.wml  389) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  390) A prospective developer should be able to understand and write new Java

en/volunteer.wml  391) code, including a Java cryptography API. Being able to read C code would be helpful,

en/volunteer.wml  392) too. One should be willing to read the existing documentation,
en/volunteer.wml  393) implement code based on it, and refine the documentation
en/volunteer.wml  394) when things are underdocumented. This project is mostly about coding and
en/volunteer.wml  395) to a small degree about design.
en/volunteer.wml  396) </li>

en/volunteer.wml  397) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  398) <b>More on Orbot &amp; Android OS-specific development</b>
en/volunteer.wml  399) <br/>
en/volunteer.wml  400) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  401) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  402) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  403) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  404) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  405) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  406) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  407) Likely Mentors: <i>Nathan</i>
en/volunteer.wml  408) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  409) 
en/volunteer.wml  410) <b>Android Java UI work:</b> Improved home screen to show better statistics about data transferred (up/down), number of circuits connected, quality of connection and so on. The "Tether Wifi" Android application is a good model to follow in how it shows a realtime count of bytes transferred as well as notifications when wifi client connect. In addition, better display/handling of Tor system/error messages would also be very helpful. Finally, the addition of a wizard or tutorial walkthrough for novice users to explain to them exactly what or what is not anonymized or protected would greatly improve the likelihood they will use Orbot correctly.
en/volunteer.wml  411) <br/><br/>
en/volunteer.wml  412) 
en/volunteer.wml  413) <b>Android Java OS/Core app work:</b> Better system-wide indicator either via the notification bar, "Toast" pop-up dialogs or some other indicator that an application's traffic is indeed moving through Orbot/Tor. For instance, right now you need to first go to a torcheck web service to ensure your browser is routing via Tor. Orbot should be able to notify you that circuits are being opened, used, etc. The aforementioned data transfer tracker might provide this type of awareness as well.
en/volunteer.wml  414) 
en/volunteer.wml  415) <br/><br/>
en/volunteer.wml  416) <b>Android Java Library/Community Outreach work:</b> We need to package a simple library for use with third-party application to easily enable them to support "Torification" on non-root devices (aka w/o transparent proxying). This library should include a wrapper for the Apache HTTPClient library, a utility class for detecting the state of Orbot connectivity, and other relevant/useful things an Android app might need to anonymize itself. This work would include the creation of the library, documentation, and sample code. Outreach or effort to implement the library within other open-source apps would follow.
en/volunteer.wml  417) 
en/volunteer.wml  418) <br/><br/>
en/volunteer.wml  419) <b>Android OS/C/Linux work:</b> The port of Tor to Android is basically a straight cross-compile to Linux ARM. There has been no work done in looking the optimization of Tor within a mobile hardware environment, on the ARM processor or other Android hardware, or on mobile networks. It should be noted, that even without optimization, Tor is handling the mobile network environment very well, automatically detecting change in IP addresses, reconnecting circuits, etc across switching from 2G to 3G to Wifi, and so forth. 
en/volunteer.wml  420) </li>

en/volunteer.wml  421) 

en/volunteer.wml  422) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml  423) <b>New Torbutton Features</b>
en/volunteer.wml  424) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  425) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  426) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  427) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  428) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  429) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  430) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  431) Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
en/volunteer.wml  432) <br/>
en/volunteer.wml  433) There are several <a

en/volunteer.wml  434) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report/14">good
en/volunteer.wml  435) feature requests</a> on the Torbutton Trac section. In particular, <a
en/volunteer.wml  436) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/523">Integrating

en/volunteer.wml  437) 'New Identity' with Vidalia</a>,

en/volunteer.wml  438) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/940">ways of
en/volunteer.wml  439) managing multiple cookie jars/identities</a>, 
en/volunteer.wml  440) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/637">preserving

en/volunteer.wml  441) specific cookies</a> when cookies are cleared,
en/volunteer.wml  442) <a

en/volunteer.wml  443) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/524">better

en/volunteer.wml  444) referrer spoofing</a>, <a

en/volunteer.wml  445) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/564">correct

en/volunteer.wml  446) Tor status reporting</a>, and <a

en/volunteer.wml  447) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/462">"tor://"

en/volunteer.wml  448) and "tors://" urls</a> are all interesting
en/volunteer.wml  449) features that could be added.
en/volunteer.wml  450) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  451) This work would be independent coding in Javascript and the fun world of <a
en/volunteer.wml  452) href="http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul">XUL</a>,
en/volunteer.wml  453) with not too much involvement in the Tor internals.

en/volunteer.wml  454) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml  455) 

en/volunteer.wml  456) <!-- <li>

en/volunteer.wml  457) <b>New Thandy Features</b>
en/volunteer.wml  458) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  459) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  460) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  461) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  462) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  463) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  464) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  465) Likely Mentors: <i>Martin</i>
en/volunteer.wml  466) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  467) Additional capabilities are needed for assisted updates of all the Tor
en/volunteer.wml  468) related software for Windows and other operating systems. Some of the
en/volunteer.wml  469) features to consider include:

en/volunteer.wml  470) <ol>
en/volunteer.wml  471) <li> Integration of the <a

en/volunteer.wml  472) href="http://chandlerproject.org/Projects/MeTooCrypto">MeTooCrypto
en/volunteer.wml  473) Python library</a>

en/volunteer.wml  474) for authenticated HTTPS downloads.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  475) <li> Adding a level of indirection

en/volunteer.wml  476) between the timestamp signatures and the package files included in an

en/volunteer.wml  477) update. See the "Thandy attacks / suggestions" thread on or-dev.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  478) <li> Support locale specific installation and configuration of assisted

en/volunteer.wml  479) updates based on preference, host, or user account language settings.
en/volunteer.wml  480) Familiarity with Windows codepages, unicode, and other character sets
en/volunteer.wml  481) is helpful in addition to general win32 and posix API experience and

en/volunteer.wml  482) Python proficiency.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  483) </ol>

en/volunteer.wml  484) </li> -->

en/volunteer.wml  485) 
en/volunteer.wml  486) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  487) <b>Simulator for slow Internet connections</b>
en/volunteer.wml  488) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  489) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  490) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  491) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  492) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  493) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  494) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  495) Likely Mentors: <i>Steven</i>
en/volunteer.wml  496) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  497) Many users of Tor have poor-quality Internet connections, giving low
en/volunteer.wml  498) bandwidth, high latency, and high packet loss/re-ordering. User
en/volunteer.wml  499) experience is that Tor reacts badly to these conditions, but it is
en/volunteer.wml  500) difficult to improve the situation without being able to repeat the
en/volunteer.wml  501) problems in the lab.
en/volunteer.wml  502) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  503) This project would be to build a simulation environment which
en/volunteer.wml  504) replicates the poor connectivity so that the effect on Tor performance
en/volunteer.wml  505) can be measured. Other components would be a testing utility to
en/volunteer.wml  506) establish what are the properties of connections available, and to
en/volunteer.wml  507) measure the effect of performance-improving modifications to Tor.
en/volunteer.wml  508) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  509) The tools used would be up to the student, but dummynet (for FreeBSD)
en/volunteer.wml  510) and nistnet (for Linux) are two potential components on which this
en/volunteer.wml  511) project could be built. Students should be experienced with network
en/volunteer.wml  512) programming/debugging and TCP/IP, and preferably familiar with C and a
en/volunteer.wml  513) scripting language.
en/volunteer.wml  514) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  515) 
en/volunteer.wml  516) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  517) <b>An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</b>
en/volunteer.wml  518) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  519) Priority: <i>Low to Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  520) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  521) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  522) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  523) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  524) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  525) Likely Mentors: <i>Matt</i>
en/volunteer.wml  526) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  527) One of Vidalia's existing features is a network map that shows the user
en/volunteer.wml  528) the approximate geographic location of relays in the Tor network and
en/volunteer.wml  529) plots the paths the user's traffic takes as it is tunneled through the
en/volunteer.wml  530) Tor network. The map is currently not very interactive and has rather
en/volunteer.wml  531) poor graphics. Instead, we implemented KDE's Marble widget such
en/volunteer.wml  532) that it gives us a better quality map and enables improved interactivity,
en/volunteer.wml  533) such as allowing the user to click on individual relays or circuits to
en/volunteer.wml  534) display additional information. We want to add the ability
en/volunteer.wml  535) for users to click on a particular relay or a country containing one or
en/volunteer.wml  536) more Tor exit relays and say, "I want my connections to exit
en/volunteer.wml  537) from here."
en/volunteer.wml  538) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  539) This project will first involve getting familiar with Vidalia
en/volunteer.wml  540) and the Marble widget's API. One will then integrate the widget
en/volunteer.wml  541) into Vidalia and customize Marble to be better suited for our application,
en/volunteer.wml  542) such as making circuits clickable, storing cached map data in Vidalia's
en/volunteer.wml  543) own data directory, and customizing some of the widget's dialogs.
en/volunteer.wml  544) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  545) A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
en/volunteer.wml  546) experience. Previous experience with Qt and CMake is helpful, but not
en/volunteer.wml  547) required.
en/volunteer.wml  548) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  549) 
en/volunteer.wml  550) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  551) <b>Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird</b>
en/volunteer.wml  552) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  553) Priority: <i>Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml  554) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  555) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  556) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  557) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  558) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  559) Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
en/volunteer.wml  560) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  561) We're hearing from an increasing number of users that they want to use
en/volunteer.wml  562) Thunderbird with Tor. However, there are plenty of application-level
en/volunteer.wml  563) concerns, for example, by default Thunderbird will put your hostname in
en/volunteer.wml  564) the outgoing mail that it sends. At some point we should start a new
en/volunteer.wml  565) push to build a Thunderbird extension similar to Torbutton.
en/volunteer.wml  566) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  567) 

en/volunteer.wml  568) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml  569) <b>Intermediate Level Network Device Driver</b>
en/volunteer.wml  570) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  571) Priority: <i>Low</i>
en/volunteer.wml  572) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  573) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  574) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  575) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  576) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  577) Likely Mentors: <i>Martin</i>
en/volunteer.wml  578) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  579) The WinPCAP device driver used by Tor VM for bridged networking does
en/volunteer.wml  580) not support a number of wireless and non-Ethernet network adapters.
en/volunteer.wml  581) Implementation of a intermediate level network device driver for win32
en/volunteer.wml  582) and 64bit would provide a way to intercept and route traffic over such
en/volunteer.wml  583) networks. This project will require knowledge of and experience with
en/volunteer.wml  584) Windows kernel device driver development and testing. Familiarity with
en/volunteer.wml  585) Winsock and Qemu would also be helpful.

en/volunteer.wml  586) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml  587) 

en/volunteer.wml  588) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  589) <b>Improve Tor Weather</b>
en/volunteer.wml  590) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  591) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  592) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  593) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  594) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  595) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  596) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  597) Likely Mentors: <i>Christian, Roger, Damian</i>

en/volunteer.wml  598) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  599) <a href="https://weather.torproject.org/">Tor weather</a> is a tool
en/volunteer.wml  600) that allows signing up to receive notifications via email when the
en/volunteer.wml  601) tracked Tor relay is down. Currently, it isn't really useful for
en/volunteer.wml  602) people who use the hibernation feature of Tor, or for those who
en/volunteer.wml  603) have to shut down their relay regularly. During the project, Tor

en/volunteer.wml  604) weather could be extended to allow more flexible configurations.

en/volunteer.wml  605) Other enhancements are also possible: Weather could send out warnings

en/volunteer.wml  606) when your relay runs an out-of-date version of Tor, or when its

en/volunteer.wml  607) observed bandwith drops below a certain value. It might also be a
en/volunteer.wml  608) nice tool that allows for checking whether your relay has earned

en/volunteer.wml  609) you a <a href="<page tshirt>">T-Shirt</a>, or sending reminders to
en/volunteer.wml  610) directory authorities that
en/volunteer.wml  611) their keys are about to expire. Be creative, and consider how the
en/volunteer.wml  612) above project to track overall network status can help you get your job
en/volunteer.wml  613) done more quickly! See also its
en/volunteer.wml  614) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/weather/trunk/README">README</a>
en/volunteer.wml  615) and <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/weather/trunk/TODO">TODO</a>.

en/volunteer.wml  616) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  617) 

en/volunteer.wml  618) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  619) <b>Improvements for Tor+Vidalia interaction on Linux/Unix platforms</b>

en/volunteer.wml  620) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  621) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  622) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  623) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  624) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  625) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  626) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  627) Likely Mentors: <i>Erinn, Peter</i>
en/volunteer.wml  628) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  629) Vidalia currently doesn't play nicely with Tor on Linux and Unix platforms.
en/volunteer.wml  630) Currently, on Debian and Ubuntu, there is a configuration mechanism which
en/volunteer.wml  631) allows Vidalia to override Tor's ability to start on boot (by sourcing
en/volunteer.wml  632) <code>/etc/default/tor.vidalia</code> which sets <code>RUN_DAEMON=no</code> at the user's
en/volunteer.wml  633) request), but full implementation of <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a> 
en/volunteer.wml  634) communication is still required.
en/volunteer.wml  635) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  636) A better solution on Linux and Unix platforms would be to use Tor's
en/volunteer.wml  637) ControlSocket, which allows Vidalia to talk to Tor via a Unix domain socket,
en/volunteer.wml  638) and could possibly be enabled by default in Tor's distribution packages.
en/volunteer.wml  639) Vidalia can then authenticate to Tor using filesystem-based (cookie)
en/volunteer.wml  640) authentication if the user running Vidalia is also in the distribution-specific
en/volunteer.wml  641) tor group.
en/volunteer.wml  642) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  643) This project will first involve adding support for Tor's ControlSocket to
en/volunteer.wml  644) Vidalia. The student will then develop and test this support on various
en/volunteer.wml  645) distributions to make sure it behaves in a predictable and consistent manner on
en/volunteer.wml  646) all of them.
en/volunteer.wml  647) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  648) The next challenge would be to find an intuitive and usable way for Vidalia to be
en/volunteer.wml  649) able to change Tor's configuration (torrc) even though it is located in
en/volunteer.wml  650) <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> and thus immutable. In Debian and Ubuntu we handle
en/volunteer.wml  651) this with the aforementioned <code>/etc/default/tor.vidalia</code> but this
en/volunteer.wml  652) functionality could (or should) be less distribution-specific. 
en/volunteer.wml  653) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  654) The best idea we've come up with so far is to feed Tor a new configuration via
en/volunteer.wml  655) the ControlSocket when Vidalia starts, but that's bad because if the user is not
en/volunteer.wml  656) using the latest Debian/Ubuntu packages, they may not have disabled Tor's
en/volunteer.wml  657) ability to run on boot and will end up with a configuration that is different
en/volunteer.wml  658) from what they want. The second best idea we've come up with is for Vidalia to
en/volunteer.wml  659) write out a temporary torrc file and ask the user to manually move it to
en/volunteer.wml  660) <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code>, but that's bad because users shouldn't have to
en/volunteer.wml  661) mess with files directly.
en/volunteer.wml  662) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  663) A person undertaking this project should have prior knowledge of various Linux
en/volunteer.wml  664) distributions and their packaging mechanisms as well as some C++ development
en/volunteer.wml  665) experience. Previous experience with Qt is helpful, but not required.

en/volunteer.wml  666) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  667) 

en/volunteer.wml  668) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml  669) <b>Tor/Polipo/Vidalia Auto-Update Framework</b>
en/volunteer.wml  670) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  671) We're in need of a good authenticated-update framework.
en/volunteer.wml  672) Vidalia already has the ability to notice when the user is running an
en/volunteer.wml  673) outdated or unrecommended version of Tor, using signed statements inside
en/volunteer.wml  674) the Tor directory information. Currently, Vidalia simply pops
en/volunteer.wml  675) up a little message box that lets the user know they should manually
en/volunteer.wml  676) upgrade. The goal of this project would be to extend Vidalia with the
en/volunteer.wml  677) ability to also fetch and install the updated Tor software for the
en/volunteer.wml  678) user. We should do the fetches via Tor when possible, but also fall back
en/volunteer.wml  679) to direct fetches in a smart way. Time permitting, we would also like
en/volunteer.wml  680) to be able to update other
en/volunteer.wml  681) applications included in the bundled installers, such as Polipo and
en/volunteer.wml  682) Vidalia itself.
en/volunteer.wml  683) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  684) To complete this project, the student will first need to first investigate
en/volunteer.wml  685) the existing auto-update frameworks (e.g., Sparkle on OS X) to evaluate
en/volunteer.wml  686) their strengths, weaknesses, security properties, and ability to be
en/volunteer.wml  687) integrated into Vidalia. If none are found to be suitable, the student
en/volunteer.wml  688) will design their own auto-update framework, document the design, and
en/volunteer.wml  689) then discuss the design with other developers to assess any security
en/volunteer.wml  690) issues. The student will then implement their framework (or integrate
en/volunteer.wml  691) an existing one) and test it.
en/volunteer.wml  692) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  693) A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
en/volunteer.wml  694) experience. Previous experience with Qt is helpful, but not required. One
en/volunteer.wml  695) should also have a good understanding of common security
en/volunteer.wml  696) practices, such as package signature verification. Good writing ability
en/volunteer.wml  697) is also important for this project, since a vital step of the project
en/volunteer.wml  698) will be producing a design document to review and discuss
en/volunteer.wml  699) with others prior to implementation.

en/volunteer.wml  700) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml  701) 

en/volunteer.wml  702) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  703) <b>Improving the Tor QA process: Continuous Integration for builds</b>

en/volunteer.wml  704) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  705) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  706) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  707) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  708) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  709) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  710) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  711) Likely Mentors: <i>Erinn</i>
en/volunteer.wml  712) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  713) It would be useful to have automated build processes for Windows and
en/volunteer.wml  714) probably other platforms. The purpose of having a continuous integration
en/volunteer.wml  715) build environment is to ensure that Windows isn't left behind for any of
en/volunteer.wml  716) the software projects used in the Tor project or its accompanying.<br />
en/volunteer.wml  717) Buildbot may be a good choice for this as it appears to support all of

en/volunteer.wml  718) the platforms Tor does. See the

en/volunteer.wml  719) <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BuildBot">wikipedia entry for

en/volunteer.wml  720) buildbot</a>.<br />
en/volunteer.wml  721) There may be better options and the person undertaking this task should

en/volunteer.wml  722) evaluate other options. Any person working on this automatic build
en/volunteer.wml  723) process should have experience or be willing to learn how to build all
en/volunteer.wml  724) of the respective Tor related code bases from scratch. Furthermore, the
en/volunteer.wml  725) person should have some experience building software in Windows
en/volunteer.wml  726) environments as this is the target audience we want to ensure we do not
en/volunteer.wml  727) leave behind. It would require close work with the Tor source code but
en/volunteer.wml  728) probably only in the form of building, not authoring.<br />
en/volunteer.wml  729) Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing for all platforms.
en/volunteer.wml  730) We've got buildbot (except on Windows &mdash; as noted above) to automate
en/volunteer.wml  731) our regular integration and compile testing already,
en/volunteer.wml  732) but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in torflow)
en/volunteer.wml  733) updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
en/volunteer.wml  734) network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
en/volunteer.wml  735) changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.

en/volunteer.wml  736) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  737) 

en/volunteer.wml  738) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml  739) <b>Usability testing of Tor</b>
en/volunteer.wml  740) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  741) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  742) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  743) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  744) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  745) Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  746) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  747) Likely Mentors: <i>Andrew</i>
en/volunteer.wml  748) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  749) Especially the browser bundle, ideally amongst our target demographic.
en/volunteer.wml  750) That would help a lot in knowing what needs to be done in terms of bug
en/volunteer.wml  751) fixes or new features. We get this informally at the moment, but a more
en/volunteer.wml  752) structured process would be better.

en/volunteer.wml  753) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml  754) 
en/volunteer.wml  755) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  756) <b>An authenticating IRC proxy</b>
en/volunteer.wml  757) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  758) Priority: <i>Low</i>

en/volunteer.wml  759) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  760) Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  761) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  762) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  763) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  764) Likely Mentors: <i>Sebastian, Weasel, Roger</i>
en/volunteer.wml  765) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  766) The world needs an authenticating irc proxy. As we're periodically
en/volunteer.wml  767) reminded from the Penny Arcade web comic, "Internet user + anonymity =
en/volunteer.wml  768) jerk". With respect to websites we're actually doing ok, since websites
en/volunteer.wml  769) can make their users log in and use other application-level authentication
en/volunteer.wml  770) approaches. But IRC servers are much worse off, because most IRC server
en/volunteer.wml  771) code is poorly written: hard to maintain, and harder to modify. Many
en/volunteer.wml  772) IRC networks now block connections from Tor, and we're basically down to
en/volunteer.wml  773) two holdouts (OFTC and Freenode). This state of affairs means that a lot
en/volunteer.wml  774) of people around the world are thinking "I told you so" about anonymity
en/volunteer.wml  775) online, when in fact the problem is simply lack of technology to make the
en/volunteer.wml  776) problem manageable. We need some way to let the IRC networks distinguish
en/volunteer.wml  777) which users have developed a reputation as not being jerks, so they can
en/volunteer.wml  778) treat the two groups separately. There are some really cool research
en/volunteer.wml  779) designs like <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~nymble/">Nymble</a>,
en/volunteer.wml  780) which aim to let websites blacklist users without needing to learn who
en/volunteer.wml  781) they are.  But Nymble is designed around web interactions. We need to
en/volunteer.wml  782) build the glue around the IRC protocol that would let us plug in a project
en/volunteer.wml  783) like Nymble (or a simpler one to start, as a proof-of-concept). One way
en/volunteer.wml  784) to do that would be to build an IRC proxy that knows how to hear from
en/volunteer.wml  785) IRC clients, knows how to talk to IRC servers, and has an additional

en/volunteer.wml  786) layer that requires the users to authenticate.  Some work on this has
en/volunteer.wml  787) begun by other volunteers, see their progress at <a
en/volunteer.wml  788) href="http://github.com/anonirc/orc">http://github.com/anonirc/orc</a>.

en/volunteer.wml  789) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  790) 

en/volunteer.wml  791) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  792) <b>Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X</b>
en/volunteer.wml  793) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  794) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  795) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  796) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  797) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  798) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  799) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  800) Likely Mentors: <i>?</i>
en/volunteer.wml  801) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  802) <a href="http://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> and <a
en/volunteer.wml  803) href="http://code.google.com/p/dsocks/">dsocks</a> are wrappers that will
en/volunteer.wml  804) run applications, intercept their outgoing network connections, and push
en/volunteer.wml  805) those connections through Tor. The goal is to handle applications that
en/volunteer.wml  806) don't support proxies (or don't supporting them well). To get it right,
en/volunteer.wml  807) they need to intercept many system calls. The syscalls you need to
en/volunteer.wml  808) intercept on Linux differ dramatically from those on BSD. So Torsocks
en/volunteer.wml  809) works fine on Linux, dsocks works ok on BSD (though it may be less
en/volunteer.wml  810) maintained and thus might miss more syscalls), and nothing works well
en/volunteer.wml  811) on both. First, we should patch dsocks to use Tor's <i>mapaddress</i>
en/volunteer.wml  812) commands from the controller interface, so we don't waste a whole
en/volunteer.wml  813) round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before connecting. Second,
en/volunteer.wml  814) we should make our <i>torify</i> script detect which of torsocks or
en/volunteer.wml  815) dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
en/volunteer.wml  816) unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
en/volunteer.wml  817) or discarding one entirely.
en/volunteer.wml  818) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  819) 

en/volunteer.wml  820) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  821) <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>
en/volunteer.wml  822) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  823) Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
en/volunteer.wml  824) href="<gitblob>doc/roadmaps/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development

en/volunteer.wml  825) roadmap</a> for more ideas, or just try out Tor, Vidalia, and Torbutton,
en/volunteer.wml  826) and find out what you think needs fixing.

en/volunteer.wml  827) Some of the <a href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">current proposals</a>
en/volunteer.wml  828) might also be short on developers.
en/volunteer.wml  829) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  830) 

en/volunteer.wml  831) </ol>
en/volunteer.wml  832) 

en/volunteer.wml  833) <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  834) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>

volunteer.html    835) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  836) <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On

en/volunteer.wml  837) Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system

en/volunteer.wml  838) call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means

en/volunteer.wml  839) that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

en/volunteer.wml  840) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

en/volunteer.wml  841) havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO

en/volunteer.wml  842) instead. One solution would be to teach <a
en/volunteer.wml  843) href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
en/volunteer.wml  844) overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to

en/volunteer.wml  845) the new libevent interface. Christian King made a

en/volunteer.wml  846) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good

en/volunteer.wml  847) start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  848) 

en/volunteer.wml  849) <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
en/volunteer.wml  850) documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves

en/volunteer.wml  851) fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting

en/volunteer.wml  852) <a href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the

en/volunteer.wml  853) new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  854) 

en/volunteer.wml  855) <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
en/volunteer.wml  856) traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
en/volunteer.wml  857) simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
en/volunteer.wml  858) really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
en/volunteer.wml  859) that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
en/volunteer.wml  860) giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
en/volunteer.wml  861) See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
en/volunteer.wml  862) details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
en/volunteer.wml  863) done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  864) 

en/volunteer.wml  865) <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto accelerators

en/volunteer.wml  866) via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing, performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to openssl and Tor if needed.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  867) 

volunteer.html    868) <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a
volunteer.html    869) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine

en/volunteer.wml  870) if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by

volunteer.html    871) getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

en/volunteer.wml  872) 

volunteer.html    873) <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
volunteer.html    874) encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
volunteer.html    875) on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
volunteer.html    876) it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

en/volunteer.wml  877) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#YoushouldtransportallIPpacketsnotjustTCPpackets.">list

en/volunteer.wml  878) of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
en/volunteer.wml  879) be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

en/volunteer.wml  880) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

en/volunteer.wml  881) for Tor and

en/volunteer.wml  882) UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  883) 

volunteer.html    884) <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
volunteer.html    885) (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
volunteer.html    886) first place to start.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  887) 
en/volunteer.wml  888) <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
en/volunteer.wml  889) Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page overview>">overview page</a>
en/volunteer.wml  890) from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit

en/volunteer.wml  891) them by hand with image editors. We might want to integrate this as an
en/volunteer.wml  892) wml file so translations are easy and images are generated in multiple
en/volunteer.wml  893) languages whenever we build the website.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  894) 

en/volunteer.wml  895) <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier

en/volunteer.wml  896) to maintain, improve, and document?  One example is <a
en/volunteer.wml  897) href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">The (Amnesic) Incognito Live
en/volunteer.wml  898) System</a>.

en/volunteer.wml  899) </li>

en/volunteer.wml  900) 
en/volunteer.wml  901) <li>
en/volunteer.wml  902) Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
en/volunteer.wml  903) more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a
en/volunteer.wml  904) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
en/volunteer.wml  905) just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
en/volunteer.wml  906) and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a

en/volunteer.wml  907) href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like

en/volunteer.wml  908) webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
en/volunteer.wml  909) and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
en/volunteer.wml  910) To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
en/volunteer.wml  911) href="http://dl.dropbox.com/u/37735/index.html">thesis and prototype</a>.
en/volunteer.wml  912) </li>
en/volunteer.wml  913) 

volunteer.html    914) </ol>
volunteer.html    915) 

en/volunteer.wml  916) <a id="Research"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  917) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>

volunteer.html    918) <ol>

volunteer.html    919) <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
volunteer.html    920) by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
volunteer.html    921) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
volunteer.html    922) traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
volunteer.html    923) stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
volunteer.html    924) attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
volunteer.html    925) much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
volunteer.html    926) is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
volunteer.html    927) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
volunteer.html    928) schemes work better than others?</li>

en/volunteer.wml  929) <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
en/volunteer.wml  930) protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't

en/volunteer.wml  931) see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?

en/volunteer.wml  932) Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
en/volunteer.wml  933) client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
en/volunteer.wml  934) that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
en/volunteer.wml  935) look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
en/volunteer.wml  936) timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
en/volunteer.wml  937) href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
en/volunteer.wml  938) but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
en/volunteer.wml  939) client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
en/volunteer.wml  940) strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
en/volunteer.wml  941) asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
en/volunteer.wml  942) natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
en/volunteer.wml  943) symmetric links for some other reason?</li>

en/volunteer.wml  944) <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
en/volunteer.wml  945) href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
en/volunteer.wml  946) Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
en/volunteer.wml  947) works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
en/volunteer.wml  948) fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
en/volunteer.wml  949) then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
en/volunteer.wml  950) options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
en/volunteer.wml  951) attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
en/volunteer.wml  952) attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
en/volunteer.wml  953) actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
en/volunteer.wml  954) much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
en/volunteer.wml  955) or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
en/volunteer.wml  956) orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
en/volunteer.wml  957) sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
en/volunteer.wml  958) Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>

volunteer.html    959) <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
volunteer.html    960) the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
volunteer.html    961) exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
volunteer.html    962) though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
volunteer.html    963) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
volunteer.html    964) that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
volunteer.html    965) Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
volunteer.html    966) exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
volunteer.html    967) routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
volunteer.html    968) approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>

en/volunteer.wml  969) <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
en/volunteer.wml  970) the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random

en/volunteer.wml  971) circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a

en/volunteer.wml  972) href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
en/volunteer.wml  973) paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting

en/volunteer.wml  974) anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
en/volunteer.wml  975) thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  976) <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth

volunteer.html    977) (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
volunteer.html    978) each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
volunteer.html    979) bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
volunteer.html    980) don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
volunteer.html    981) Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
volunteer.html    982) and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
volunteer.html    983) a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
volunteer.html    984) slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
volunteer.html    985) need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
volunteer.html    986) solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
volunteer.html    987) degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
volunteer.html    988) <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
volunteer.html    989) current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
volunteer.html    990) we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
volunteer.html    991) than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
volunteer.html    992) href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh
volunteer.html    993) throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
volunteer.html    994) overhaul if the results are good.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  995) <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
en/volunteer.wml  996) an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a

en/volunteer.wml  997) href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing

en/volunteer.wml  998) it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
en/volunteer.wml  999) steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
en/volunteer.wml 1000) block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
en/volunteer.wml 1001) the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
en/volunteer.wml 1002) bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
en/volunteer.wml 1003) How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
en/volunteer.wml 1004) wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
en/volunteer.wml 1005) a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>

volunteer.html   1006) <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
volunteer.html   1007) ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
volunteer.html   1008) third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting

en/volunteer.wml 1009) streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,

volunteer.html   1010) the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
volunteer.html   1011) the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
volunteer.html   1012) tradeoff.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 1013) <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client

volunteer.html   1014) puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
volunteer.html   1015) if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 1016) <li>Programs like <a

en/volunteer.wml 1017) href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

en/volunteer.wml 1018) your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
en/volunteer.wml 1019) every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
en/volunteer.wml 1020) by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
en/volunteer.wml 1021) by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
en/volunteer.wml 1022) do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
en/volunteer.wml 1023) that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
en/volunteer.wml 1024) anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
en/volunteer.wml 1025) Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
en/volunteer.wml 1026) of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
en/volunteer.wml 1027) in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
en/volunteer.wml 1028) UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
en/volunteer.wml 1029) hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
en/volunteer.wml 1030) by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
en/volunteer.wml 1031) browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
en/volunteer.wml 1032) </li>

en/volunteer.wml 1033) <li>Right now Tor clients are willing to reuse a given circuit for ten
en/volunteer.wml 1034) minutes after it's first used. The goal is to avoid loading down the
en/volunteer.wml 1035) network with too many circuit extend operations, yet to also avoid having
en/volunteer.wml 1036) clients use the same circuit for so long that the exit node can build a
en/volunteer.wml 1037) useful pseudonymous profile of them. Alas, ten minutes is probably way
en/volunteer.wml 1038) too long, especially if connections from multiple protocols (e.g. IM and
en/volunteer.wml 1039) web browsing) are put on the same circuit. If we keep fixed the overall
en/volunteer.wml 1040) number of circuit extends that the network needs to do, are there more
en/volunteer.wml 1041) efficient and/or safer ways for clients to allocate streams to circuits,
en/volunteer.wml 1042) or for clients to build preemptive circuits? Perhaps this research item
en/volunteer.wml 1043) needs to start with gathering some traces of what connections typical
en/volunteer.wml 1044) clients try to launch, so you have something realistic to try to optimize.
en/volunteer.wml 1045) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 1046) <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
en/volunteer.wml 1047) reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
en/volunteer.wml 1048) lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
en/volunteer.wml 1049) connected?
en/volunteer.wml 1050) </li>

volunteer.html   1051) </ol>
volunteer.html   1052) 

en/volunteer.wml 1053) <p>

en/volunteer.wml 1054) <a href="<page contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
en/volunteer.wml 1055) of these!

en/volunteer.wml 1056) </p>

volunteer.html   1057) 

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volunteer.html   1059)