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volunteer.html     4) 

en/volunteer.wml   5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Volunteer" CHARSET="UTF-8"

volunteer.html     6) 
volunteer.html     7) <div class="main-column">
volunteer.html     8) 
volunteer.html     9) <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->

en/volunteer.wml  10) <h2>A few things everyone can do now:</h2>

volunteer.html    11) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  12) <li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
en/volunteer.wml  13) a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  14) <li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden

volunteer.html    15) services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>

en/volunteer.wml  16) <li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate>">take a moment
en/volunteer.wml  17) to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
en/volunteer.wml  18) for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
en/volunteer.wml  19) or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
en/volunteer.wml  20) security, let them know about us.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  21) <li>We're looking for more <a href="<page torusers>">good examples of Tor
en/volunteer.wml  22) users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
en/volunteer.wml  23) yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
en/volunteer.wml  24) we'd love to hear from you.</li>

volunteer.html    25) </ol>
volunteer.html    26) 

en/volunteer.wml  27) <p>Tor has <a href="<page open-positions>">two open positions</a>.
en/volunteer.wml  28) Please <a href="<page contact>">contact us</a> if you are qualified!</p>

en/volunteer.wml  29) 

en/volunteer.wml  30) <a id="Documentation"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  31) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>

volunteer.html    32) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  33) <li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
en/volunteer.wml  34) languages. See the <a href="<page translation>">translation
en/volunteer.wml  35) guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
en/volunteer.wml  36) Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  37) <li>Evaluate and document
en/volunteer.wml  38) <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">our
en/volunteer.wml  39) list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
en/volunteer.wml  40) <li>We have a huge list of <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">potentially useful
en/volunteer.wml  41) programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
en/volunteer.wml  42) situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>

volunteer.html    43) </ol>
volunteer.html    44) 

en/volunteer.wml  45) <a id="Advocacy"></a>

en/volunteer.wml  46) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Advocacy">Advocacy</a></h2>
en/volunteer.wml  47) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml  48) <li>Create a <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/CommunityLogos">community logo</a> under a Creative Commons license that all can use and modify</li>

en/volunteer.wml  49) <li>Create a presentation that can be used for various user group meetings around the world</li>

en/volunteer.wml  50) <li>Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is, or how
en/volunteer.wml  51) to use it.  Some have already

en/volunteer.wml  52) started on <a href="http://media.torproject.org/video/">Tor's Media

en/volunteer.wml  53) server</a>, <a
en/volunteer.wml  54) href="http://www.howcast.com/videos/90601-How-To-Circumvent-an-Internet-Proxy">Howcast</a>,
en/volunteer.wml  55) and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/freedom4internet">Youtube</a>.</li> 

en/volunteer.wml  56) <li>Create a poster, or a set of posters, around a theme,
en/volunteer.wml  57) such as "Tor for Freedom!"</li>

en/volunteer.wml  58) </ol>
en/volunteer.wml  59) 

en/volunteer.wml  60) <a id="Coding"></a>

en/volunteer.wml  61) <a id="Summer"></a>
en/volunteer.wml  62) <a id="Projects"></a>

en/volunteer.wml  63) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Good Coding Projects</a></h2>

en/volunteer.wml  64) 
en/volunteer.wml  65) <p>

en/volunteer.wml  66) You may find some of these projects to be good <a href="<page

en/volunteer.wml  67) gsoc>">Google Summer of Code 2010</a> ideas. We have labelled each idea

en/volunteer.wml  68) with how useful it would be to the overall Tor project (priority), how
en/volunteer.wml  69) much work we expect it would be (effort level), how much clue you should
en/volunteer.wml  70) start with (skill level), and which of our <a href="<page
en/volunteer.wml  71) people>#Core">core developers</a> would be good mentors.
en/volunteer.wml  72) If one or more of these ideas looks promising to you, please <a
en/volunteer.wml  73) href="<page contact>">contact us</a> to discuss your plans rather than
en/volunteer.wml  74) sending blind applications. You may also want to propose your own project
en/volunteer.wml  75) idea which often results in the best applications.

en/volunteer.wml  76) </p>
en/volunteer.wml  77) 

en/volunteer.wml  78) <ol>
en/volunteer.wml  79) 

en/volunteer.wml  80) <li>

en/volunteer.wml  81) <b>Tor Browser Bundle for Linux/Mac OS X</b>

en/volunteer.wml  82) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  83) Priority: <i>High</i>

en/volunteer.wml  84) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  85) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml  86) <br />
en/volunteer.wml  87) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml  88) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  89) Likely Mentors: <i>Steven, Erinn, Jacob, Andrew</i>

en/volunteer.wml  90) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  91) The Tor Browser Bundle incorporates Tor, Firefox, Polipo, and the Vidalia
en/volunteer.wml  92) user interface (and optionally the <a href="http://pidgin.im/">Pidgin</a>
en/volunteer.wml  93) Instant Messaging client). Components are pre-configured to operate in a
en/volunteer.wml  94) secure way, and it has very few dependencies on the installed operating
en/volunteer.wml  95) system. It has therefore become one of the most easy to use, and popular,
en/volunteer.wml  96) ways to use Tor on Windows.

en/volunteer.wml  97) <br />

en/volunteer.wml  98) However, there is currently no released package for Linux and Mac OS
en/volunteer.wml  99) X, so this project would be to implement Tor Browser Bundle for OS X and
en/volunteer.wml 100) continue work on the Tor Browser Bundle for Linux. This will involve modifications to Vidalia (C++), possibly

en/volunteer.wml 101) Firefox (C) then creating and testing the launcher on a range of

en/volunteer.wml 102) operating system versions and configurations to verify portability.
en/volunteer.wml 103) Some work on this was completed as part of the Google Summer of Code
en/volunteer.wml 104) 2009. Another part of this project is to identify all of the traces left
en/volunteer.wml 105) behind by using a Tor Browser Bundle on Mac OS X or Linux.  Developing
en/volunteer.wml 106) ways to stop, counter, or remove these traces is a final step.

en/volunteer.wml 107) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 108) Students should be familiar with application development on one or
en/volunteer.wml 109) preferably both of Linux and Mac OS X, and be comfortable with C/C++
en/volunteer.wml 110) and shell scripting.
en/volunteer.wml 111) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 112) Part of this project could be usability testing of Tor Browser Bundle,

en/volunteer.wml 113) ideally amongst our target demographic.  That would help a lot in knowing
en/volunteer.wml 114) what needs to be done in terms of bug fixes or new features. We get this
en/volunteer.wml 115) informally at the moment, but a more structured process would be better.

en/volunteer.wml 116) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 117) 

en/volunteer.wml 118) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 119) <b>Help track the overall Tor Network status</b>

en/volunteer.wml 120) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 121) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 122) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 123) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 124) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 125) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 126) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 127) Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Roger</i>

en/volunteer.wml 128) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 129) It would be great to set up an automated system for tracking network
en/volunteer.wml 130) health over time, graphing it, etc. Part of this project would involve
en/volunteer.wml 131) inventing better metrics for assessing network health and growth. Is the
en/volunteer.wml 132) average uptime of the network increasing? How many relays are qualifying
en/volunteer.wml 133) for Guard status this month compared to last month? What's the turnover
en/volunteer.wml 134) in terms of new relays showing up and relays shutting off? Periodically
en/volunteer.wml 135) people collect brief snapshots, but where it gets really interesting is
en/volunteer.wml 136) when we start tracking data points over time.
en/volunteer.wml 137) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 138) Data could be collected from the Tor Network Scanners in <a
en/volunteer.wml 139) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>, from

en/volunteer.wml 140) the server descriptors that each relay publishes, and from other
en/volunteer.wml 141) sources. Results over time could be integrated into one of the <a
en/volunteer.wml 142) href="https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/">Tor Status</a> web pages, or be
en/volunteer.wml 143) kept separate. Speaking of the Tor Status pages, take a look at Roger's
en/volunteer.wml 144) <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2008/msg00300.html">Tor
en/volunteer.wml 145) Status wish list</a>.
en/volunteer.wml 146) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 147) 
en/volunteer.wml 148) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 149) <b>Improving Tor's ability to resist censorship</b>
en/volunteer.wml 150) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 151) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml 152) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 153) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml 154) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 155) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 156) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 157) Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>

en/volunteer.wml 158) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 159) The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a

en/volunteer.wml 160) href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant

en/volunteer.wml 161) improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
en/volunteer.wml 162) But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
en/volunteer.wml 163) anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
en/volunteer.wml 164) single address/port combination at a time.  There's

en/volunteer.wml 165) <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a

en/volunteer.wml 166) proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
en/volunteer.wml 167) to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more

en/volunteer.wml 168) work.  Another anti-censorship project is to try to make Tor
en/volunteer.wml 169) more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify <a
en/volunteer.wml 170) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
en/volunteer.wml 171) just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
en/volunteer.wml 172) and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
en/volunteer.wml 173) href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like

en/volunteer.wml 174) webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
en/volunteer.wml 175) and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
en/volunteer.wml 176) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 177) This project involves a lot of research and design. One of the big
en/volunteer.wml 178) challenges will be identifying and crafting approaches that can still
en/volunteer.wml 179) resist an adversary even after the adversary knows the design, and
en/volunteer.wml 180) then trading off censorship resistance with usability and robustness.
en/volunteer.wml 181) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 182) 

en/volunteer.wml 183) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml 184) <b>Tuneup Tor!</b>

en/volunteer.wml 185) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 186) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml 187) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 188) Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml 189) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 190) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 191) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 192) Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Mike, Karsten</i>
en/volunteer.wml 193) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 194) Right now, Tor relays measure and report their own bandwidth, and Tor
en/volunteer.wml 195) clients choose which relays to use in part based on that bandwidth.
en/volunteer.wml 196) This approach is vulnerable to
en/volunteer.wml 197) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#bauer:wpes2007">attacks where
en/volunteer.wml 198) relays lie about their bandwidth</a>;
en/volunteer.wml 199) to address this, Tor currently caps the maximum bandwidth
en/volunteer.wml 200) it's willing to believe any relay provides.  This is a limited fix, and
en/volunteer.wml 201) a waste of bandwidth capacity to boot.  Instead,
en/volunteer.wml 202) Tor should possibly measure bandwidth in a more distributed way, perhaps
en/volunteer.wml 203) as described in the
en/volunteer.wml 204) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/author.html#snader08">"A Tune-up for
en/volunteer.wml 205) Tor"</a> paper
en/volunteer.wml 206) by Snader and Borisov. One could use current testing code to
en/volunteer.wml 207) double-check this paper's findings and verify the extent to which they
en/volunteer.wml 208) dovetail with Tor as deployed in the wild, and determine good ways to
en/volunteer.wml 209) incorporate them into their suggestions Tor network without adding too
en/volunteer.wml 210) much communications overhead between relays and directory
en/volunteer.wml 211) authorities.

en/volunteer.wml 212) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml 213) 
en/volunteer.wml 214) <li>

en/volunteer.wml 215) <b>Improving Polipo on Windows</b>

en/volunteer.wml 216) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 217) Priority: <i>Medium to High</i>

en/volunteer.wml 218) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 219) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 220) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 221) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 222) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 223) Likely Mentors: <i>Chris</i>

en/volunteer.wml 224) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 225) Help port <a
en/volunteer.wml 226) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a> to
en/volunteer.wml 227) Windows. Example topics to tackle include:

en/volunteer.wml 228) <ol><li> the ability to asynchronously query name servers, find the
en/volunteer.wml 229) system nameservers, and manage netbios and dns queries.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 230) <li> manage events and buffers natively (i.e. in Unix-like OSes,
en/volunteer.wml 231) Polipo defaults to 25% of ram, in Windows it's whatever the config
en/volunteer.wml 232) specifies).</li>
en/volunteer.wml 233) <li> some sort of GUI config and reporting tool, bonus if it has a
en/volunteer.wml 234) systray icon with right clickable menu options. Double bonus if it's
en/volunteer.wml 235) cross-platform compatible.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 236) <li> allow the software to use the Windows Registry and handle proper
en/volunteer.wml 237) Windows directory locations, such as "C:\Program Files\Polipo"</li>
en/volunteer.wml 238) </ol>

en/volunteer.wml 239) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 240) 

en/volunteer.wml 241) <li>

en/volunteer.wml 242) <b>Tor Controller Status Event Interface for Vidalia</b>

en/volunteer.wml 243) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 244) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 245) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 246) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 247) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 248) Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml 249) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 250) Likely Mentors: <i>Matt</i>
en/volunteer.wml 251) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 252) There are a number of status changes inside Tor of which the user may need

en/volunteer.wml 253) to be informed. For example, if the user is trying to set up his Tor as a
en/volunteer.wml 254) relay and Tor decides that its ports are not reachable from outside

en/volunteer.wml 255) the user's network, we should alert the user. Currently, all the user

en/volunteer.wml 256) gets is a couple log messages in Vidalia's 'message log' window, which they

en/volunteer.wml 257) likely never see since they don't receive a notification that something
en/volunteer.wml 258) has gone wrong. Even if the user does actually look at the message log,
en/volunteer.wml 259) most of the messages make little sense to the novice user.
en/volunteer.wml 260) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 261) Tor has the ability to inform Vidalia of many such status changes, and
en/volunteer.wml 262) we recently implemented support for a couple of these events. Still,
en/volunteer.wml 263) there are many more status events the user should be informed of and we
en/volunteer.wml 264) need a better UI for actually displaying them to the user.
en/volunteer.wml 265) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 266) The goal of this project then is to design and implement a UI for
en/volunteer.wml 267) displaying Tor status events to the user. For example, we might put a
en/volunteer.wml 268) little badge on Vidalia's tray icon that alerts the user to new status
en/volunteer.wml 269) events they should look at. Double-clicking the icon could bring up a
en/volunteer.wml 270) dialog that summarizes recent status events in simple terms and maybe

en/volunteer.wml 271) suggests a remedy for any negative events if they can be corrected by

en/volunteer.wml 272) the user. Of course, this is just an example and one is free to

en/volunteer.wml 273) suggest another approach.
en/volunteer.wml 274) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 275) A person undertaking this project should have good UI design and layout

en/volunteer.wml 276) and some C++ development experience. Previous experience with Qt and

en/volunteer.wml 277) Qt's Designer will be very helpful, but are not required. Some

en/volunteer.wml 278) English writing ability will also be useful, since this project will
en/volunteer.wml 279) likely involve writing small amounts of help documentation that should
en/volunteer.wml 280) be understandable by non-technical users. Bonus points for some graphic
en/volunteer.wml 281) design/Photoshop fu, since we might want/need some shiny new icons too.
en/volunteer.wml 282) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 283) 

en/volunteer.wml 284) <li>

en/volunteer.wml 285) <b>Improve our unit testing process</b>

en/volunteer.wml 286) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 287) Priority: <i>Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml 288) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 289) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 290) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 291) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 292) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 293) Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger</i>
en/volunteer.wml 294) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 295) Tor needs to be far more tested. This is a multi-part effort. To start
en/volunteer.wml 296) with, our unit test coverage should rise substantially, especially in
en/volunteer.wml 297) the areas outside the utility functions. This will require significant
en/volunteer.wml 298) refactoring of some parts of Tor, in order to dissociate as much logic
en/volunteer.wml 299) as possible from globals.
en/volunteer.wml 300) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 301) Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing. We've got
en/volunteer.wml 302) buildbot to automate our regular integration and compile testing already
en/volunteer.wml 303) (though we need somebody to set it up on Windows),
en/volunteer.wml 304) but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in <a
en/volunteer.wml 305) href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/torflow/trunk/README">TorFlow</a>)
en/volunteer.wml 306) updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
en/volunteer.wml 307) network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
en/volunteer.wml 308) changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.
en/volunteer.wml 309) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 310) 
en/volunteer.wml 311) <li>

en/volunteer.wml 312) <b>Help with independent Tor client implementations</b>

en/volunteer.wml 313) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 314) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 315) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 316) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 317) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 318) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 319) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 320) Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Nick</i>
en/volunteer.wml 321) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 322) Others are currently working on Tor clients for Java, Android, and Maemo

en/volunteer.wml 323) environments.  The first step is to get a handle on the current state of

en/volunteer.wml 324) the project in which you are interested in helping; <a

en/volunteer.wml 325) href="http://github.com/brl/JTor">Tor for Java</a>,
en/volunteer.wml 326) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/android/trunk/">Android/Orbot</a>
en/volunteer.wml 327) , or Tor for Maemo. Check out the repository and familiarlize yourself
en/volunteer.wml 328) with the source code.  Further, support for requesting or even providing
en/volunteer.wml 329) Tor hidden services would be neat, but not required.

en/volunteer.wml 330) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 331) A prospective developer should be able to understand and write new Java

en/volunteer.wml 332) code, including a Java cryptography API. Being able to read C code would be helpful,

en/volunteer.wml 333) too. One should be willing to read the existing documentation,
en/volunteer.wml 334) implement code based on it, and refine the documentation
en/volunteer.wml 335) when things are underdocumented. This project is mostly about coding and
en/volunteer.wml 336) to a small degree about design.
en/volunteer.wml 337) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 338) 
en/volunteer.wml 339) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 340) <b>New Torbutton Features</b>
en/volunteer.wml 341) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 342) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 343) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 344) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 345) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 346) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 347) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 348) Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
en/volunteer.wml 349) <br/>
en/volunteer.wml 350) There are several <a
en/volunteer.wml 351) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&amp;project=5&amp;type=2">good
en/volunteer.wml 352) feature requests</a> on the Torbutton Flyspray section. In particular, <a
en/volunteer.wml 353) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=523">Integrating
en/volunteer.wml 354) 'New Identity' with Vidalia</a>,
en/volunteer.wml 355) <a href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=940">ways of
en/volunteer.wml 356) managing multiple cookie jars/identities</a>, <a
en/volunteer.wml 357) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=637">preserving
en/volunteer.wml 358) specific cookies</a> when cookies are cleared,
en/volunteer.wml 359) <a
en/volunteer.wml 360) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=524">better
en/volunteer.wml 361) referrer spoofing</a>, <a
en/volunteer.wml 362) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=564">correct
en/volunteer.wml 363) Tor status reporting</a>, and <a
en/volunteer.wml 364) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&amp;id=462">"tor://"
en/volunteer.wml 365) and "tors://" urls</a> are all interesting
en/volunteer.wml 366) features that could be added.
en/volunteer.wml 367) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 368) This work would be independent coding in Javascript and the fun world of <a
en/volunteer.wml 369) href="http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul">XUL</a>,
en/volunteer.wml 370) with not too much involvement in the Tor internals.
en/volunteer.wml 371) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 372) 

en/volunteer.wml 373) <!-- <li>

en/volunteer.wml 374) <b>New Thandy Features</b>
en/volunteer.wml 375) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 376) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 377) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 378) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 379) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 380) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 381) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 382) Likely Mentors: <i>Martin</i>
en/volunteer.wml 383) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 384) Additional capabilities are needed for assisted updates of all the Tor
en/volunteer.wml 385) related software for Windows and other operating systems. Some of the
en/volunteer.wml 386) features to consider include:

en/volunteer.wml 387) <ol>
en/volunteer.wml 388) <li> Integration of the <a

en/volunteer.wml 389) href="http://chandlerproject.org/Projects/MeTooCrypto">MeTooCrypto
en/volunteer.wml 390) Python library</a>

en/volunteer.wml 391) for authenticated HTTPS downloads.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 392) <li> Adding a level of indirection

en/volunteer.wml 393) between the timestamp signatures and the package files included in an

en/volunteer.wml 394) update. See the "Thandy attacks / suggestions" thread on or-dev.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 395) <li> Support locale specific installation and configuration of assisted

en/volunteer.wml 396) updates based on preference, host, or user account language settings.
en/volunteer.wml 397) Familiarity with Windows codepages, unicode, and other character sets
en/volunteer.wml 398) is helpful in addition to general win32 and posix API experience and

en/volunteer.wml 399) Python proficiency.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 400) </ol>

en/volunteer.wml 401) </li> -->

en/volunteer.wml 402) 
en/volunteer.wml 403) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 404) <b>Simulator for slow Internet connections</b>
en/volunteer.wml 405) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 406) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 407) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 408) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 409) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 410) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 411) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 412) Likely Mentors: <i>Steven</i>
en/volunteer.wml 413) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 414) Many users of Tor have poor-quality Internet connections, giving low
en/volunteer.wml 415) bandwidth, high latency, and high packet loss/re-ordering. User
en/volunteer.wml 416) experience is that Tor reacts badly to these conditions, but it is
en/volunteer.wml 417) difficult to improve the situation without being able to repeat the
en/volunteer.wml 418) problems in the lab.
en/volunteer.wml 419) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 420) This project would be to build a simulation environment which
en/volunteer.wml 421) replicates the poor connectivity so that the effect on Tor performance
en/volunteer.wml 422) can be measured. Other components would be a testing utility to
en/volunteer.wml 423) establish what are the properties of connections available, and to
en/volunteer.wml 424) measure the effect of performance-improving modifications to Tor.
en/volunteer.wml 425) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 426) The tools used would be up to the student, but dummynet (for FreeBSD)
en/volunteer.wml 427) and nistnet (for Linux) are two potential components on which this
en/volunteer.wml 428) project could be built. Students should be experienced with network
en/volunteer.wml 429) programming/debugging and TCP/IP, and preferably familiar with C and a
en/volunteer.wml 430) scripting language.
en/volunteer.wml 431) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 432) 
en/volunteer.wml 433) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 434) <b>An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</b>
en/volunteer.wml 435) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 436) Priority: <i>Low to Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 437) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 438) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 439) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 440) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 441) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 442) Likely Mentors: <i>Matt</i>
en/volunteer.wml 443) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 444) One of Vidalia's existing features is a network map that shows the user
en/volunteer.wml 445) the approximate geographic location of relays in the Tor network and
en/volunteer.wml 446) plots the paths the user's traffic takes as it is tunneled through the
en/volunteer.wml 447) Tor network. The map is currently not very interactive and has rather
en/volunteer.wml 448) poor graphics. Instead, we implemented KDE's Marble widget such
en/volunteer.wml 449) that it gives us a better quality map and enables improved interactivity,
en/volunteer.wml 450) such as allowing the user to click on individual relays or circuits to
en/volunteer.wml 451) display additional information. We want to add the ability
en/volunteer.wml 452) for users to click on a particular relay or a country containing one or
en/volunteer.wml 453) more Tor exit relays and say, "I want my connections to exit
en/volunteer.wml 454) from here."
en/volunteer.wml 455) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 456) This project will first involve getting familiar with Vidalia
en/volunteer.wml 457) and the Marble widget's API. One will then integrate the widget
en/volunteer.wml 458) into Vidalia and customize Marble to be better suited for our application,
en/volunteer.wml 459) such as making circuits clickable, storing cached map data in Vidalia's
en/volunteer.wml 460) own data directory, and customizing some of the widget's dialogs.
en/volunteer.wml 461) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 462) A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
en/volunteer.wml 463) experience. Previous experience with Qt and CMake is helpful, but not
en/volunteer.wml 464) required.
en/volunteer.wml 465) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 466) 
en/volunteer.wml 467) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 468) <b>Torbutton equivalent for Thunderbird</b>
en/volunteer.wml 469) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 470) Priority: <i>Medium</i>

en/volunteer.wml 471) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 472) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 473) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 474) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 475) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 476) Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
en/volunteer.wml 477) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 478) We're hearing from an increasing number of users that they want to use
en/volunteer.wml 479) Thunderbird with Tor. However, there are plenty of application-level
en/volunteer.wml 480) concerns, for example, by default Thunderbird will put your hostname in
en/volunteer.wml 481) the outgoing mail that it sends. At some point we should start a new
en/volunteer.wml 482) push to build a Thunderbird extension similar to Torbutton.
en/volunteer.wml 483) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 484) 

en/volunteer.wml 485) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml 486) <b>Intermediate Level Network Device Driver</b>
en/volunteer.wml 487) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 488) Priority: <i>Low</i>
en/volunteer.wml 489) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 490) Effort Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 491) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 492) Skill Level: <i>High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 493) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 494) Likely Mentors: <i>Martin</i>
en/volunteer.wml 495) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 496) The WinPCAP device driver used by Tor VM for bridged networking does
en/volunteer.wml 497) not support a number of wireless and non-Ethernet network adapters.
en/volunteer.wml 498) Implementation of a intermediate level network device driver for win32
en/volunteer.wml 499) and 64bit would provide a way to intercept and route traffic over such
en/volunteer.wml 500) networks. This project will require knowledge of and experience with
en/volunteer.wml 501) Windows kernel device driver development and testing. Familiarity with
en/volunteer.wml 502) Winsock and Qemu would also be helpful.

en/volunteer.wml 503) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml 504) 

en/volunteer.wml 505) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 506) <b>Improve Tor Weather</b>
en/volunteer.wml 507) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 508) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 509) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 510) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 511) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 512) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 513) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 514) Likely Mentors: <i>Christian, Roger</i>

en/volunteer.wml 515) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 516) <a href="https://weather.torproject.org/">Tor weather</a> is a tool
en/volunteer.wml 517) that allows signing up to receive notifications via email when the
en/volunteer.wml 518) tracked Tor relay is down. Currently, it isn't really useful for
en/volunteer.wml 519) people who use the hibernation feature of Tor, or for those who
en/volunteer.wml 520) have to shut down their relay regularly. During the project, Tor

en/volunteer.wml 521) weather could be extended to allow more flexible configurations.

en/volunteer.wml 522) Other enhancements are also possible: Weather could send out warnings

en/volunteer.wml 523) when your relay runs an out-of-date version of Tor, or when its

en/volunteer.wml 524) observed bandwith drops below a certain value. It might also be a
en/volunteer.wml 525) nice tool that allows for checking whether your relay has earned

en/volunteer.wml 526) you a <a href="<page tshirt>">T-Shirt</a>, or sending reminders to
en/volunteer.wml 527) directory authorities that
en/volunteer.wml 528) their keys are about to expire. Be creative, and consider how the
en/volunteer.wml 529) above project to track overall network status can help you get your job
en/volunteer.wml 530) done more quickly! See also its
en/volunteer.wml 531) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/weather/trunk/README">README</a>
en/volunteer.wml 532) and <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/weather/trunk/TODO">TODO</a>.

en/volunteer.wml 533) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 534) 

en/volunteer.wml 535) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 536) <b>Better Debian/Ubuntu Packaging for Tor+Vidalia</b>
en/volunteer.wml 537) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 538) Vidalia currently doesn't play nicely on Debian and Ubuntu with the
en/volunteer.wml 539) default Tor packages. The current Tor packages automatically start Tor
en/volunteer.wml 540) as a daemon running as the debian-tor user and (sensibly) do not have a

en/volunteer.wml 541) <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a> defined

en/volunteer.wml 542) in the default torrc. Consequently, Vidalia will try
en/volunteer.wml 543) to start its own Tor process since it could not connect to the existing
en/volunteer.wml 544) Tor, and Vidalia's Tor process will then exit with an error message
en/volunteer.wml 545) the user likely doesn't understand since Tor cannot bind its listening
en/volunteer.wml 546) ports — they're already in use by the original Tor daemon.
en/volunteer.wml 547) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 548) The current solution involves either telling the user to stop the
en/volunteer.wml 549) existing Tor daemon and let Vidalia start its own Tor process, or
en/volunteer.wml 550) explaining to the user how to set a control port and password in their
en/volunteer.wml 551) torrc. A better solution on Debian would be to use Tor's ControlSocket,
en/volunteer.wml 552) which allows Vidalia to talk to Tor via a Unix domain socket, and could
en/volunteer.wml 553) possibly be enabled by default in Tor's Debian packages. Vidalia can
en/volunteer.wml 554) then authenticate to Tor using filesystem-based (cookie) authentication
en/volunteer.wml 555) if the user running Vidalia is also in the debian-tor group.
en/volunteer.wml 556) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 557) This project will first involve adding support for Tor's ControlSocket
en/volunteer.wml 558) to Vidalia. The student will then develop and test Debian and Ubuntu
en/volunteer.wml 559) packages for Vidalia that conform to Debian's packaging standards and
en/volunteer.wml 560) make sure they work well with the existing Tor packages. We can also
en/volunteer.wml 561) set up an apt repository to host the new Vidalia packages.
en/volunteer.wml 562) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 563) The next challenge would be to find an intuitive usable way for Vidalia
en/volunteer.wml 564) to be able to change Tor's configuration (torrc) even though it is
en/volunteer.wml 565) located in <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> and thus immutable. The best
en/volunteer.wml 566) idea we've come up with so far is to feed Tor a new configuration via
en/volunteer.wml 567) the ControlSocket when Vidalia starts, but that's bad because Tor starts
en/volunteer.wml 568) each boot with a different configuration than the user wants. The second
en/volunteer.wml 569) best idea
en/volunteer.wml 570) we've come up with is for Vidalia to write out a temporary torrc file
en/volunteer.wml 571) and ask the user to manually move it to <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code>,
en/volunteer.wml 572) but that's bad because users shouldn't have to mess with files directly.
en/volunteer.wml 573) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 574) A person undertaking this project should have prior knowledge of
en/volunteer.wml 575) Debian package management and some C++ development experience. Previous
en/volunteer.wml 576) experience with Qt is helpful, but not required.
en/volunteer.wml 577) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 578) 

en/volunteer.wml 579) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml 580) <b>Tor/Polipo/Vidalia Auto-Update Framework</b>
en/volunteer.wml 581) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 582) We're in need of a good authenticated-update framework.
en/volunteer.wml 583) Vidalia already has the ability to notice when the user is running an
en/volunteer.wml 584) outdated or unrecommended version of Tor, using signed statements inside
en/volunteer.wml 585) the Tor directory information. Currently, Vidalia simply pops
en/volunteer.wml 586) up a little message box that lets the user know they should manually
en/volunteer.wml 587) upgrade. The goal of this project would be to extend Vidalia with the
en/volunteer.wml 588) ability to also fetch and install the updated Tor software for the
en/volunteer.wml 589) user. We should do the fetches via Tor when possible, but also fall back
en/volunteer.wml 590) to direct fetches in a smart way. Time permitting, we would also like
en/volunteer.wml 591) to be able to update other
en/volunteer.wml 592) applications included in the bundled installers, such as Polipo and
en/volunteer.wml 593) Vidalia itself.
en/volunteer.wml 594) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 595) To complete this project, the student will first need to first investigate
en/volunteer.wml 596) the existing auto-update frameworks (e.g., Sparkle on OS X) to evaluate
en/volunteer.wml 597) their strengths, weaknesses, security properties, and ability to be
en/volunteer.wml 598) integrated into Vidalia. If none are found to be suitable, the student
en/volunteer.wml 599) will design their own auto-update framework, document the design, and
en/volunteer.wml 600) then discuss the design with other developers to assess any security
en/volunteer.wml 601) issues. The student will then implement their framework (or integrate
en/volunteer.wml 602) an existing one) and test it.
en/volunteer.wml 603) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 604) A person undertaking this project should have good C++ development
en/volunteer.wml 605) experience. Previous experience with Qt is helpful, but not required. One
en/volunteer.wml 606) should also have a good understanding of common security
en/volunteer.wml 607) practices, such as package signature verification. Good writing ability
en/volunteer.wml 608) is also important for this project, since a vital step of the project
en/volunteer.wml 609) will be producing a design document to review and discuss
en/volunteer.wml 610) with others prior to implementation.

en/volunteer.wml 611) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml 612) 

en/volunteer.wml 613) <li>

en/volunteer.wml 614) <b>Improving the Tor QA process: Continuous Integration for builds</b>

en/volunteer.wml 615) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 616) It would be useful to have automated build processes for Windows and
en/volunteer.wml 617) probably other platforms. The purpose of having a continuous integration
en/volunteer.wml 618) build environment is to ensure that Windows isn't left behind for any of
en/volunteer.wml 619) the software projects used in the Tor project or its accompanying.<br />
en/volunteer.wml 620) Buildbot may be a good choice for this as it appears to support all of

en/volunteer.wml 621) the platforms Tor does. See the

en/volunteer.wml 622) <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BuildBot">wikipedia entry for

en/volunteer.wml 623) buildbot</a>.<br />
en/volunteer.wml 624) There may be better options and the person undertaking this task should

en/volunteer.wml 625) evaluate other options. Any person working on this automatic build
en/volunteer.wml 626) process should have experience or be willing to learn how to build all
en/volunteer.wml 627) of the respective Tor related code bases from scratch. Furthermore, the
en/volunteer.wml 628) person should have some experience building software in Windows
en/volunteer.wml 629) environments as this is the target audience we want to ensure we do not
en/volunteer.wml 630) leave behind. It would require close work with the Tor source code but
en/volunteer.wml 631) probably only in the form of building, not authoring.<br />
en/volunteer.wml 632) Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing for all platforms.
en/volunteer.wml 633) We've got buildbot (except on Windows &mdash; as noted above) to automate
en/volunteer.wml 634) our regular integration and compile testing already,
en/volunteer.wml 635) but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in torflow)
en/volunteer.wml 636) updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
en/volunteer.wml 637) network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
en/volunteer.wml 638) changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.

en/volunteer.wml 639) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 640) 

en/volunteer.wml 641) <!--<li>

en/volunteer.wml 642) <b>Usability testing of Tor</b>
en/volunteer.wml 643) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 644) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 645) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 646) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 647) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 648) Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 649) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 650) Likely Mentors: <i>Andrew</i>
en/volunteer.wml 651) <br />

en/volunteer.wml 652) Especially the browser bundle, ideally amongst our target demographic.
en/volunteer.wml 653) That would help a lot in knowing what needs to be done in terms of bug
en/volunteer.wml 654) fixes or new features. We get this informally at the moment, but a more
en/volunteer.wml 655) structured process would be better.

en/volunteer.wml 656) </li>-->

en/volunteer.wml 657) 
en/volunteer.wml 658) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 659) <b>An authenticating IRC proxy</b>
en/volunteer.wml 660) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 661) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 662) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 663) Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 664) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 665) Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
en/volunteer.wml 666) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 667) Likely Mentors: <i>Sebastian, Weasel, Roger</i>
en/volunteer.wml 668) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 669) The world needs an authenticating irc proxy. As we're periodically
en/volunteer.wml 670) reminded from the Penny Arcade web comic, "Internet user + anonymity =
en/volunteer.wml 671) jerk". With respect to websites we're actually doing ok, since websites
en/volunteer.wml 672) can make their users log in and use other application-level authentication
en/volunteer.wml 673) approaches. But IRC servers are much worse off, because most IRC server
en/volunteer.wml 674) code is poorly written: hard to maintain, and harder to modify. Many
en/volunteer.wml 675) IRC networks now block connections from Tor, and we're basically down to
en/volunteer.wml 676) two holdouts (OFTC and Freenode). This state of affairs means that a lot
en/volunteer.wml 677) of people around the world are thinking "I told you so" about anonymity
en/volunteer.wml 678) online, when in fact the problem is simply lack of technology to make the
en/volunteer.wml 679) problem manageable. We need some way to let the IRC networks distinguish
en/volunteer.wml 680) which users have developed a reputation as not being jerks, so they can
en/volunteer.wml 681) treat the two groups separately. There are some really cool research
en/volunteer.wml 682) designs like <a href="http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~nymble/">Nymble</a>,
en/volunteer.wml 683) which aim to let websites blacklist users without needing to learn who
en/volunteer.wml 684) they are.  But Nymble is designed around web interactions. We need to
en/volunteer.wml 685) build the glue around the IRC protocol that would let us plug in a project
en/volunteer.wml 686) like Nymble (or a simpler one to start, as a proof-of-concept). One way
en/volunteer.wml 687) to do that would be to build an IRC proxy that knows how to hear from
en/volunteer.wml 688) IRC clients, knows how to talk to IRC servers, and has an additional
en/volunteer.wml 689) layer that requires the users to authenticate.
en/volunteer.wml 690) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 691) 

en/volunteer.wml 692) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 693) <b>Make torsocks/dsocks work on OS X</b>
en/volunteer.wml 694) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 695) Priority: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 696) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 697) Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 698) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 699) Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
en/volunteer.wml 700) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 701) Likely Mentors: <i>?</i>
en/volunteer.wml 702) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 703) <a href="http://code.google.com/p/torsocks/">Torsocks</a> and <a
en/volunteer.wml 704) href="http://code.google.com/p/dsocks/">dsocks</a> are wrappers that will
en/volunteer.wml 705) run applications, intercept their outgoing network connections, and push
en/volunteer.wml 706) those connections through Tor. The goal is to handle applications that
en/volunteer.wml 707) don't support proxies (or don't supporting them well). To get it right,
en/volunteer.wml 708) they need to intercept many system calls. The syscalls you need to
en/volunteer.wml 709) intercept on Linux differ dramatically from those on BSD. So Torsocks
en/volunteer.wml 710) works fine on Linux, dsocks works ok on BSD (though it may be less
en/volunteer.wml 711) maintained and thus might miss more syscalls), and nothing works well
en/volunteer.wml 712) on both. First, we should patch dsocks to use Tor's <i>mapaddress</i>
en/volunteer.wml 713) commands from the controller interface, so we don't waste a whole
en/volunteer.wml 714) round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before connecting. Second,
en/volunteer.wml 715) we should make our <i>torify</i> script detect which of torsocks or
en/volunteer.wml 716) dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
en/volunteer.wml 717) unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
en/volunteer.wml 718) or discarding one entirely.
en/volunteer.wml 719) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 720) 

en/volunteer.wml 721) <li>
en/volunteer.wml 722) <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>
en/volunteer.wml 723) <br />
en/volunteer.wml 724) Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
en/volunteer.wml 725) href="<gitblob>doc/roadmaps/2008-12-19-roadmap-full.pdf">Tor development
en/volunteer.wml 726) roadmap</a> for more ideas.
en/volunteer.wml 727) Some of the <a href="<gittree>doc/spec/proposals">current proposals</a>
en/volunteer.wml 728) might also be short on developers.
en/volunteer.wml 729) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 730) 

en/volunteer.wml 731) </ol>
en/volunteer.wml 732) 

en/volunteer.wml 733) <a id="OtherCoding"></a>
en/volunteer.wml 734) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#OtherCoding">Other Coding and Design related ideas</a></h2>

volunteer.html   735) <ol>

en/volunteer.wml 736) <li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On

en/volunteer.wml 737) Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system

en/volunteer.wml 738) call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means

en/volunteer.wml 739) that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a

en/volunteer.wml 740) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems">causing

en/volunteer.wml 741) havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO

en/volunteer.wml 742) instead. One solution would be to teach <a
en/volunteer.wml 743) href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/">libevent</a> how to use
en/volunteer.wml 744) overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to

en/volunteer.wml 745) the new libevent interface. Christian King made a

en/volunteer.wml 746) <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/">good

en/volunteer.wml 747) start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 748) 

en/volunteer.wml 749) <li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
en/volunteer.wml 750) documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves

en/volunteer.wml 751) fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting

en/volunteer.wml 752) <a href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia</a> so it supports the

en/volunteer.wml 753) new features, and planning for deployment.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 754) 

en/volunteer.wml 755) <li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
en/volunteer.wml 756) traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
en/volunteer.wml 757) simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
en/volunteer.wml 758) really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
en/volunteer.wml 759) that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
en/volunteer.wml 760) giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
en/volunteer.wml 761) See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
en/volunteer.wml 762) details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
en/volunteer.wml 763) done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 764) 

en/volunteer.wml 765) <li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto accelerators

en/volunteer.wml 766) via OpenSSL. It has been lightly tested and is possibly very buggy.  We're looking for more rigorous testing, performance analysis, and optimally, code fixes to openssl and Tor if needed.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 767) 

volunteer.html   768) <li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a
volunteer.html   769) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing">"fuzz"</a>. Determine

en/volunteer.wml 770) if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by

volunteer.html   771) getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>

en/volunteer.wml 772) 

volunteer.html   773) <li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
volunteer.html   774) encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
volunteer.html   775) on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
volunteer.html   776) it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a

en/volunteer.wml 777) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#TransportIPnotTCP">list

en/volunteer.wml 778) of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
en/volunteer.wml 779) be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a

en/volunteer.wml 780) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification

en/volunteer.wml 781) for Tor and

en/volunteer.wml 782) UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 783) 

volunteer.html   784) <li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
volunteer.html   785) (at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
volunteer.html   786) first place to start.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 787) 
en/volunteer.wml 788) <li>We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
en/volunteer.wml 789) Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page overview>">overview page</a>
en/volunteer.wml 790) from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
en/volunteer.wml 791) them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
en/volunteer.wml 792) integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
en/volunteer.wml 793) generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website.</li>
en/volunteer.wml 794) 

en/volunteer.wml 795) <li>How can we make the various LiveCD/USB systems easier
en/volunteer.wml 796) to maintain, improve, and document?  Some examples are <a

en/volunteer.wml 797) href="http://amnesia.boum.org/">amnesia LiveCD/USB</a> and the <a

en/volunteer.wml 798) href="http://anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/">Incognito LiveCD</a>

en/volunteer.wml 799) </li>

volunteer.html   800) </ol>
volunteer.html   801) 

en/volunteer.wml 802) <a id="Research"></a>
en/volunteer.wml 803) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>

volunteer.html   804) <ol>

volunteer.html   805) <li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
volunteer.html   806) hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
volunteer.html   807) "signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
volunteer.html   808) you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
volunteer.html   809) (if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
volunteer.html   810) this attack on the deployed Tor codebase? Then start exploring
volunteer.html   811) defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 512
volunteer.html   812) bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a
volunteer.html   813) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive dropping</a>,
volunteer.html   814) or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
volunteer.html   815) and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
volunteer.html   816) a successful defense in each case?</li>

volunteer.html   817) <li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
volunteer.html   818) by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
volunteer.html   819) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004">compare
volunteer.html   820) traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
volunteer.html   821) stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
volunteer.html   822) attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
volunteer.html   823) much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
volunteer.html   824) is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
volunteer.html   825) that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
volunteer.html   826) schemes work better than others?</li>

en/volunteer.wml 827) <li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
en/volunteer.wml 828) protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't

en/volunteer.wml 829) see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?

en/volunteer.wml 830) Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
en/volunteer.wml 831) client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
en/volunteer.wml 832) that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
en/volunteer.wml 833) look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
en/volunteer.wml 834) timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
en/volunteer.wml 835) href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06">adaptive padding</a>,
en/volunteer.wml 836) but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
en/volunteer.wml 837) client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
en/volunteer.wml 838) strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
en/volunteer.wml 839) asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
en/volunteer.wml 840) natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
en/volunteer.wml 841) symmetric links for some other reason?</li>

en/volunteer.wml 842) <li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
en/volunteer.wml 843) href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta">attack from
en/volunteer.wml 844) Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
en/volunteer.wml 845) works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
en/volunteer.wml 846) fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
en/volunteer.wml 847) then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
en/volunteer.wml 848) options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
en/volunteer.wml 849) attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
en/volunteer.wml 850) attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
en/volunteer.wml 851) actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
en/volunteer.wml 852) much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
en/volunteer.wml 853) or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
en/volunteer.wml 854) orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
en/volunteer.wml 855) sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">Don't
en/volunteer.wml 856) Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>

volunteer.html   857) <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
volunteer.html   858) the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
volunteer.html   859) exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
volunteer.html   860) though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
volunteer.html   861) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004">it's not uncommon
volunteer.html   862) that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
volunteer.html   863) Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
volunteer.html   864) exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
volunteer.html   865) routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
volunteer.html   866) approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>

en/volunteer.wml 867) <li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
en/volunteer.wml 868) the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random

en/volunteer.wml 869) circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a

en/volunteer.wml 870) href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf">position
en/volunteer.wml 871) paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting

en/volunteer.wml 872) anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
en/volunteer.wml 873) thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 874) <li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth

volunteer.html   875) (e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
volunteer.html   876) each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
volunteer.html   877) bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
volunteer.html   878) don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
volunteer.html   879) Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
volunteer.html   880) and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
volunteer.html   881) a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
volunteer.html   882) slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
volunteer.html   883) need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
volunteer.html   884) solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
volunteer.html   885) degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
volunteer.html   886) <li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
volunteer.html   887) current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
volunteer.html   888) we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
volunteer.html   889) than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
volunteer.html   890) href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php">ssh
volunteer.html   891) throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
volunteer.html   892) overhaul if the results are good.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 893) <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
en/volunteer.wml 894) an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a

en/volunteer.wml 895) href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing

en/volunteer.wml 896) it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
en/volunteer.wml 897) steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
en/volunteer.wml 898) block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
en/volunteer.wml 899) the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
en/volunteer.wml 900) bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
en/volunteer.wml 901) How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
en/volunteer.wml 902) wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
en/volunteer.wml 903) a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>

volunteer.html   904) <li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
volunteer.html   905) ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
volunteer.html   906) third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting

en/volunteer.wml 907) streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,

volunteer.html   908) the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
volunteer.html   909) the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
volunteer.html   910) tradeoff.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 911) <li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client

volunteer.html   912) puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
volunteer.html   913) if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>

en/volunteer.wml 914) <li>Programs like <a

en/volunteer.wml 915) href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a> aim to hide

en/volunteer.wml 916) your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
en/volunteer.wml 917) every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
en/volunteer.wml 918) by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
en/volunteer.wml 919) by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
en/volunteer.wml 920) do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
en/volunteer.wml 921) that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
en/volunteer.wml 922) anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
en/volunteer.wml 923) Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
en/volunteer.wml 924) of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
en/volunteer.wml 925) in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
en/volunteer.wml 926) UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
en/volunteer.wml 927) hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
en/volunteer.wml 928) by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
en/volunteer.wml 929) browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
en/volunteer.wml 930) </li>

en/volunteer.wml 931) <li>Right now Tor clients are willing to reuse a given circuit for ten
en/volunteer.wml 932) minutes after it's first used. The goal is to avoid loading down the
en/volunteer.wml 933) network with too many circuit extend operations, yet to also avoid having
en/volunteer.wml 934) clients use the same circuit for so long that the exit node can build a
en/volunteer.wml 935) useful pseudonymous profile of them. Alas, ten minutes is probably way
en/volunteer.wml 936) too long, especially if connections from multiple protocols (e.g. IM and
en/volunteer.wml 937) web browsing) are put on the same circuit. If we keep fixed the overall
en/volunteer.wml 938) number of circuit extends that the network needs to do, are there more
en/volunteer.wml 939) efficient and/or safer ways for clients to allocate streams to circuits,
en/volunteer.wml 940) or for clients to build preemptive circuits? Perhaps this research item
en/volunteer.wml 941) needs to start with gathering some traces of what connections typical
en/volunteer.wml 942) clients try to launch, so you have something realistic to try to optimize.
en/volunteer.wml 943) </li>
en/volunteer.wml 944) <li>How many bridge relays do you need to know to maintain
en/volunteer.wml 945) reachability? We should measure the churn in our bridges. If there is
en/volunteer.wml 946) lots of churn, are there ways to keep bridge users more likely to stay
en/volunteer.wml 947) connected?
en/volunteer.wml 948) </li>

volunteer.html   949) </ol>
volunteer.html   950) 

en/volunteer.wml 951) <p>

en/volunteer.wml 952) <a href="<page contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
en/volunteer.wml 953) of these!

en/volunteer.wml 954) </p>

volunteer.html   955) 

en/volunteer.wml 956)   </div><!-- #main -->

volunteer.html   957)