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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"

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7) <div class="main-column">
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9) <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
10) 

11) <h2>Tor FAQ</h2>
12) <hr />

13) 

14) <p>General questions:</p>

15) <ul>

16) <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

17) <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>

18) <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
19) Tor?</a></li>
20) <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
21) <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>
22) <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's
23) CD?</a></li>
24) <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
25) Tor support mail?</a></li>
26) <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>
27) <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
28) funding?</a></li>

29) </ul>
30) 

31) <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

32) <ul>
33) <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>

34) <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
35) page?</a></li>

36) <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li>

37) <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to
38) have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

39) <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>

40) </ul>

41) 
42) <p>Running Tor:</p>
43) 
44) <p>Running a Tor client:</p>

45) <ul>
46) <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></li>
47) </ul>

48) 
49) <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

50) <ul>

51) <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>

52) <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

53) with abuse issues.</a></li>

54) <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
55) relay?</a></li>

56) <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>

57) <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>

58) </ul>

59) 
60) <p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>
61) 

62) <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
63) <ul>

64) <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>

65) </ul>
66) 

67) <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
68) <ul>
69) <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
70) relay.</a></li>
71) </ul>
72) 

73) <p>Abuse</p>
74) <ul>
75) <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
76) <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
77) relay?</a></li>
78) </ul>
79) 

80) <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a
81) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ">wiki
82) FAQ</a> for now.</p>
83) 

84) <hr />
85) 
86) <a id="General"></a>
87) 

88) <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
89) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>
90) 
91) <p>
92) The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
93) </p>
94) 
95) <p>
96) The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
97) you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
98) around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around
99) the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from
100) learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
101) from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is
102) called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
103) href="<page overview>">overview page</a>.
104) </p>
105) 
106) <p>
107) The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains

108) and develops the Tor software.

109) </p>
110) 

111) <hr />
112) 

113) <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
114) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
115) <p>
116) A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy to maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same server.  The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't have to install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy server.  Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them.  This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with free wifi Internet.
117) </p>
118) <p>
119) Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can see your encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.  You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic stream, and isn't recording your personal details.
120) </p>
121) <p>
122) Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending it on to the destination.  Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted packets between themselves.</p>
123) <p>

124) <dl>

125) <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.  It still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It merely sees "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

126) <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad third of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know who sent this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream.  You are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

127) </dl>

128) </p>
129) 

130) <hr />
131) 

132) <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

133) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can
134) I use with Tor?</a></h3>

135) 
136) <p>
137) There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
138) and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on

139) making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor.
140) This step is normally done by configuring

141) the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are
142) other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to
143) make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt
144) your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you
145) still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This
146) second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
147) why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.

148) </p>
149) 
150) <p>

151) Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
152) bundles on the <a href="<page download>">download page</a> automatically
153) install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox
154) extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0,
155) Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
156) application-level worries.

157) </p>
158) 
159) <p>

160) There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
161) but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
162) issues on them well enough to be able to recommend a safe
163) configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

164) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

165) specific applications</a>. There's also a <a
166) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">list
167) of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
168) Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!

169) </p>
170) 

171) <hr />
172) 

173) <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
174) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>
175) 
176) <p>

177) Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
178) new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
179) 2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
180) and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
181) become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
182) href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
183) the Naval Research Lab.

184) </p>
185) 
186) <p>

187) (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)

188) </p>
189) 
190) <p>

191) Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled

192) "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
193) spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned
194) everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
195) spell it wrong.

196) </p>
197) 

198) <hr />
199) 

200) <a id="Backdoor"></a>
201) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>
202) 
203) <p>

204) There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one

205) in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody

206) will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do

207) ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
208) </p>
209) 
210) <p>
211) We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
212) irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software

213) in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
214) software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would

215) trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
216) </p>
217) 
218) <p>
219) But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks

220) people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
221) computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should

222) always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release)

223) for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you

224) source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You

225) should also check the <a href="<page verifying-signatures>">PGP

226) signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
227) distribution sites.

228) </p>
229) 
230) <p>
231) Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

232) anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
233) sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.

234) </p>
235) 

236) <hr />
237) 

238) <a id="DistributingTor"></a>
239) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on

240) my magazine's CD?</a></h3>

241) 
242) <p>
243) Yes.
244) </p>
245) 
246) <p>

247) The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This

248) means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
249) modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
250) ask us for specific permission.
251) </p>
252) 
253) <p>
254) However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our

255) <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

256) Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
257) with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
258) </p>
259) 
260) <p>
261) Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the
262) Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor bundles, which

263) typically include <a href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a>

264) and <a href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia</a>.

265) You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
266) as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a

267) href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

268) Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to
269) include the source code for these programs everywhere you include
270) the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on the <a

271) href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia page</a> and the <a

272) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo

273) download page</a>.
274) </p>
275) 
276) <p>

277) Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,

278) who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
279) our <a href="<page trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
280) </p>
281) 
282) <p>
283) Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
284) Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
285) changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
286) may not be supported &mdash; or even work &mdash; six months later. This
287) is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
288) </p>
289) 

290) <hr />
291) 

292) <a id="SupportMail"></a>
293) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
294) Tor support mail?</a></h3>
295) 
296) <p>
297) Many people send the Tor developers mail privately, or send mail to

298) our internal <a href="<page contact>">lists</a>, with questions about their

299) specific setup — they can't get their firewall working right,

300) they can't configure Polipo correctly, or so on. Sometimes our

301) volunteers can answer these mails, but typically they need to spend
302) most of their time on development tasks that will benefit more people.
303) This is especially true if your question is already covered in the <a

304) href="<page documentation>">documentation</a> or on this FAQ.

305) </p>
306) 
307) <p>
308) So if we don't answer your mail, first check the <a href="<page
309) documentation>">documentation</a> page, along with this FAQ,
310) to make sure your question isn't already answered.  Then read <a
311) href="http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html">"How to ask
312) questions the smart way"</a>. If this doesn't help you, note that we
313) have <a href="<page documentation>#Support">an IRC channel</a> where you
314) can ask your questions (but if they are still open-ended, ill-formed,
315) or not about Tor, you likely won't get much help there either). Lastly,
316) people on the <a href="<page documentation>#MailingLists">or-talk
317) mailing list</a> may be able to provide some hints for you, if
318) others have experienced your problems too. Be sure to look over <a
319) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/">the archives</a> first.
320) </p>
321) 
322) <p>
323) Another strategy is to <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">run a Tor
324) relay for a while</a>, and/or <a href="<page donate>">donate money</a>
325) <a href="<page volunteer>">or time</a> to the effort. We're more likely
326) to pay attention to people who have demonstrated interest and commitment
327) to giving back to the Tor community.
328) </p>
329) 
330) <p>

331) If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the

332) mailing list and answer questions from others.
333) </p>
334) 

335) <hr />
336) 

337) <a id="WhySlow"></a>
338) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>
339) 
340) <p>
341) There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
342) </p>
343) 
344) <p>
345) Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
346) be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
347) in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency
348) will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
349) bandwidth through Tor.
350) </p>
351) 
352) <p>
353) But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
354) is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
355) many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
356) handle file-sharing traffic load.
357) </p>
358) 

359) <p>
360) For the much more in-depth answer, see <a
361) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog
362) post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
363) to go with it.
364) </p>
365) 

366) <p>
367) What can you do to help?
368) </p>
369) 
370) <ul>
371) 
372) <li>
373) <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
374) for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
375) all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
376) </li>
377) 
378) <li>
379) <a href="<page gui/index>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We
380) especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
381) as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
382) walk people through setting it up.
383) </li>
384) 
385) <li>
386) There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
387) experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
388) then we can focus better on fixing them.
389) </li>
390) 
391) <li>
392) There are some steps that individuals
393) can take to improve their Tor performance. <a
394) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/FireFoxTorPerf">You
395) can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a
396) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use
397) Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download>">upgrading
398) to the latest version of Tor</a>.  If this works well, please help by
399) documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
400) </li>
401) 
402) <li>
403) Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

404) start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
405) relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
406) get to spend more time on it.

407) </li>
408) 
409) <li>
410) Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
411) to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
412) volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
413) </li>
414) 
415) <li>
416) Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
417) that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
418) competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers
419) when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has
420) an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
421) supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
422) </li>
423) 
424) <li>
425) If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
426) individually by <a href="<page donate>">donating a bit of money to the
427) cause</a>. It adds up!
428) </li>
429) 
430) </ul>
431) 

432) <hr />
433) 

434) <a id="Funding"></a>

435) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with

436) more funding?</a></h3>
437) 
438) <p>

439) We have about 1800 relays right now, pushing over 150 MB/s average

440) traffic. We have several hundred thousand active users. But the Tor
441) network is not yet self-sustaining.
442) </p>
443) 
444) <p>
445) There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
446) </p>
447) 
448) <ul>
449) 
450) <li>
451) Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
452) architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
453) users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
454) lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
455) </li>
456) 
457) <li>
458) User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
459) all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
460) clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
461) </li>
462) 
463) <li>
464) Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
465) attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
466) reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and
467) somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay
468) happy. We also need to work on <a href="#RelayOS">stability</a> on some
469) platforms &mdash; e.g., Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.
470) </li>
471) 
472) <li>
473) Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
474) software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
475) to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of
476) the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this
477) with the <a href="<page gui/index>">GUI Contest</a>, but much more work
478) remains &mdash; usability for privacy software has never been easy.
479) </li>
480) 
481) <li>
482) Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
483) their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
484) <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
485) and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
486) </li>
487) 
488) <li>
489) Research: The anonymous communications field is full
490) of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
491) also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
492) href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of
493) critical <a href="<page volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a>
494) that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of
495) attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
496) behind these.
497) </li>
498) 
499) </ul>
500) 
501) <p>
502) We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
503) <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
504) can keep up</a>.
505) Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
506) so we can continue to grow the network.
507) </p>
508) 
509) <p>
510) We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
511) censorship-resistance.
512) </p>
513) 
514) <p>
515) We are proud to have <a href="<page sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
516) from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
517) Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
518) agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
519) </p>
520) 
521) <p>
522) However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
523) Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate>">donate</a>
524) to the project, or <a href="<page contact>">contact</a> our executive
525) director for information on making grants or major donations.
526) </p>
527) 
528) <hr />
529) 

530) <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>
531) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>
532) 
533) <p>
534) This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
535) have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to

536) uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to

537) completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any

538) version of Windows is as follows:
539) </p>
540) 
541) <ol>
542) <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
543) and choose exit.</li>
544) <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the
545) Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li>
546) <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall.

547) This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li>

548) <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
549) Click the Uninstall button.</li>

550) </ol>

551) 
552) <p>

553) If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall

554) Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to

555) reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".

556) </p>
557) 
558) <p>
559) For Mac OS X, follow the <a

560) href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.

561) </p>
562) 
563) <p>
564) If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
565) on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
566) be pretty easy to notice things there.
567) </p>
568) 
569) <hr />
570) 

571) <a id="PGPSigs"></a>
572) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the
573) download page?</a></h3>

574) 
575) <p>
576) These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
577) exactly the one that we intended you to get.
578) </p>
579) 
580) <p>
581) Please read the <a

582) href="<page verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.

583) </p>
584) 
585) <hr />
586) 
587) <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>
588) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under
589) Windows?</a></h3>
590) 
591) <p>

592) Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
593) tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.

594) </p>
595) 

596) <p>
597) (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
598) it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
599) download>">download page</a>.)
600) </p>
601) 

602) <hr />
603) 

604) <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
605) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor
606) executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

607) 
608) <p>
609) Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
610) parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false

611) positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a

612) guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
613) a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
614) </p>
615) 
616) <p>

617) In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
618) it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
619) href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.

620) </p>
621) 
622) <hr />
623) 
624) <a id="LiveCD"></a>
625) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
626) includes Tor?</a></h3>
627) 
628) <p>
629) There isn't any official LiveCD at this point. We're still trying to find good
630) solutions and trying to understand the security and anonymity implications of
631) the various options. In the mean time, feel free to check out the list below
632) and use your best judgement:
633) </p>
634) 
635) <p>

636) LiveCDs:

637) </p>
638) 
639) <ol>

640) <li><a href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">amnesia LiveCD/USB</a> is a Live
641) System aimed at preserving your privacy and anonymity:
642) <ul>
643) <li> All outgoing connections to the Internet are forced to go through
644) the Tor network.</li>
645) <li> No trace is left on local storage devices unless explicitely asked.</li>
646) <li> It includes Firefox, Tor, Torbutton, Vidalia graphical Tor
647) controller, Pidgin Instant Messaging client, and lots of other
648) software.</li>
649) <li> It's based upon Debian gnu/linux and comes with the GNOME desktop
650) environment.</li>
651) </ul>

652) <li><a href="http://incognito.anonymityanywhere.com/">Incognito LiveCD/USB</a>
653) is a CD you can boot that has several Internet applications (Firefox, IRC,
654) Mail, etc) pre-configured to use Tor. For most computers everything is
655) automatically configured and you're ready to go. You can even copy the CD to a
656) USB drive. Includes TorK.</li>

657) <li><a href="http://tork.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LiveCD">TorK LiveCD</a>
658) is Knoppix-based with an emphasis on user-friendliness. You can work
659) anonymously or non-anonymously while TorK tries to keep you informed of the
660) consequences of your activity. The TorK LiveCD is experimental, so the aim is
661) to provide regular releases through 2007 and beyond.</li>

662) <li><a href="http://mandalka.name/privatix/">Privatix LiveCD/USB</a> is a
663) debian based live-system including tor, firefox and torbutton which can save
664) bookmarks and other settings or data on an encrypted usb-key</li>

665) </li>

666) </ol>
667) 
668) <p>
669) Windows bundles:
670) </p>
671) 
672) <ol>

673) <li><a href="<page torbrowser/index>">Tor Browser Bundle</a>

674) for Windows comes with a pre-configured web browser and is self contained
675) so you can run it from a USB stick.</li>
676) <li><a href="http://www.janusvm.com/tor_vm/">Tor VM</a> is a successor
677) to JanusVM. It needs testing from you!</li>
678) <li><a href="http://janusvm.com/">JanusVM</a> is a Linux kernel and software
679) running in VMWare that sits between your Windows computer and the Internet,
680) making sure that your Internet traffic is scrubbed and anonymized.</li>
681) <li><a href="http://www.xerobank.com/xB_browser.html">xB Browser</a>,
682) previously known as Torpark, is a Firefox+Tor package for Win32 that can
683) installed on a USB key. It needs a host Win32 operating system.</li>

684) </ol>
685) 
686) <p>
687) Not currently maintained as far as we know:
688) </p>
689) 
690) <ol>

691) <li>Polippix / Privatlivets Fred is a Danish Knoppix-based LiveCD with Tor
692) and utilities to encrypt IP-telephony. <a href="http://polippix.org/">Info and
693) download</a>.</li>

694) <li>ELE is a Linux LiveCD which is focused on privacy related
695) software. It includes Tor and you can download it at
696) <a
697) href="http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/">http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/</a>.</li>
698) <li>Virtual Privacy Machine is a Linux LiveCD that includes Firefox, Privoxy,
699) Tor, some IRC and IM applications, and a set of ipchains rules aimed to prevent
700) non-Tor traffic from accidentally leaving your computer. More information at
701) <a

702) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/VirtualPrivacyMachine">https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/VirtualPrivacyMachine</a>.</li>

703) <li>Anonym.OS is a LiveCD similar to the above but is based on OpenBSD rather
704) than Linux for maximum security. It was designed to be anonymous and secure
705) from the ground up, and thus has some features and limitations not found in
706) other LiveCDs (Tor related or otherwise). You can obtain more information and

707) download Anonym.OS from <a href="http://theory.kaos.to/projects.html">Kaos.Theory</a>.</li>

708) <li>Phantomix is a LiveCD for anonymous surfing and chatting based on the most

709) recent KNOPPIX release. It comes preconfigured with Privoxy, Tor and Polipo. You can

710) get it from the <a href="http://phantomix.ytternhagen.de/">Phantomix
711) Website</a>.</li>
712) </ol>
713) 

714) <p>
715) Please contact us if you know any others.
716) </p>
717) 

718) <hr />
719) 

720) <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
721) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>
722) 
723) <p>
724) Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as 
725) inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use. 
726) The following options can be added to your config file "torrc" 
727) or specified on the command line:
728) </p>
729) <dl>
730)   <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
731)     <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
732)     </dd>
733)   <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
734)     <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible. 
735)     </dd>
736)   <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
737)     <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit. 
738)     </dd>
739)   <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
740)     <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit. 
741)         Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list. 
742)     </dd>
743) </dl>
744) <p>
745) <em>We recommend you do not use these</em> 

746) — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions. 

747) You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; 
748) overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.
749) </p>
750) <p>
751) The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are treated as a request, 
752) meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow, Tor will still avoid them. 
753) You can make the option mandatory by setting 
754) <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt> 

755) — but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working 

756) if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable. 
757) See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html.en#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a> 
758) for some nodes you might pick.
759) </p>
760) <p>
761) Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify 
762) a 2 letter ISO3166 country code in curly braces 
763) (for example {de}), 
764) or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), 
765) or a node nickname. 
766) Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items. 
767) </p>
768) <p>
769) If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface 
770) (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to 
771) set up an internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>. 
772) See the manual page for details.
773) </p>
774) 
775) <hr />
776) 

777) <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>
778) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay
779) need to be?</a></h3>
780) 
781) <p>
782) We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
783) </p>
784) 
785) <ul>
786) <li>Tor has built-in support for <a
787) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#LimitBandwidth">

788) rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
789) link but want to limit the number of bytes per
790) day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a
791) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#Hibernation">hibernation

792) feature</a>.
793) </li>

794) <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that
795) specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from
796) that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your
797) relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.

798) </li>
799) <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
800) notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
801) sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
802) disconnects will break.
803) </li>
804) <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
805) leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
806) </li>
807) <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
808) IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port

809) forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but 
810) <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerForFirewalledClients">this FAQ entry</a> 
811) offers some examples on how to do this.

812) </li>
813) <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
814) bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than
815) low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
816) </li>
817) </ul>
818) 
819) <hr />
820) 

821) <a id="RunARelayBut"></a>

822) <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
823) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't

824) want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>
825) 
826) <p>
827) Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
828) </p>
829) 
830) <p>

831) Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
832) outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit

833) policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients

834) will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
835) exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
836) the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,

837) based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on 
838) <a href="<page faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a> 
839) if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's 

840) <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

841) for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
842) </p>
843) 
844) <p>

845) The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but 
846) <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#DefaultPorts">restricts</a>

847) some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
848) the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
849) file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy

850) using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your 
851) <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#torrc">torrc</a>

852) file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to

853) "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
854) that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
855) but not for connections to external websites or other services.

856) </p>
857) 
858) <p>

859) If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
860) (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).

861) If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example,
862) you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please
863) explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor users
864) will be impacted too.

865) </p>
866) 
867) <hr />
868) 

869) <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>
870) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay
871) or bridge relay?</a></h3>
872) 
873) <p><a href="<page bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)

874) are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
875) in the main Tor directory. That means

876) that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
877) network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
878) </p>
879) 
880) <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
881) configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
882) publically or not.
883) </p>
884) 
885) <p>Right now, there are roughly zero places in the world that filter
886) connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
887) right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
888) get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
889) security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a

890) public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.

891) </p>
892) 
893) <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
894) lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay &mdash;

895) bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to 
896) <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely run a normal

897) relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and only have
898) a little bit of bandwidth, then flip a coin. Thanks for volunteering!
899) </p>
900) 
901) <hr />
902) 

903) <a id="RelayMemory"></a>
904) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so
905) much memory?</a></h3>
906) 
907) <p>There are three reasons for this.
908) </p>
909) 
910) <p>The first is that Tor uses threads, so many of the measurements (such
911) as the output of top or ps) are inaccurate: they add up all the library
912) memory used by each thread, so the total "virtual" memory size will be
913) much larger than the actual amount of ram Tor is using. So this isn't
914) actually a problem &mdash; looking at the "resident" memory size instead should
915) be much more accurate (unless you're swapping a lot). (Note that on <a
916) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#RelayOS">OpenBSD,
917) NetBSD, and old FreeBSD</a>, Tor uses a separate process for each thread,
918) since threading is broken on these platforms, so in these cases it
919) actually <i>is</i> using this much memory!)
920) </p>
921) 
922) <p>The second reason is that Tor relays really do use quite a bit of
923) memory. Each connection that you hold open has a pair of memory buffers
924) that it uses for reading and writing from the network, and when many
925) connections are active at once, these buffers might grow quite large. We
926) used to have them shrink again immediately once they weren't full, but we
927) found that was using too much CPU &mdash; so now they stick around for a short
928) amount of time in case we need to use them again soon after. It is not
929) unusual for a fast exit relay to use several hundred megabytes of memory
930) (i.e.: you need about 768 MB RAM for a 10 MBit connected dedicated exit
931) node on Linux with Tor 0.1.2.14).
932) </p>
933) 
934) <p>The third reason is that we may have some bugs somewhere. They fall
935) into the categories of "things we keep around in memory that are big
936) and we should probably get rid of", and "actual memory leaks". We're
937) working on these, but we'd love some help. We believe the 0.1.1.x stable
938) release was pretty good about this, but 0.1.2.x and 0.2.0.x are so far
939) quite bad. Please help!
940) </p>
941) 
942) <p>Many linux users have found that in the 0.2.0.x series, <tt>configure
943) --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt> fixes many of the linux malloc fragmentation
944) bugs.
945) </p>
946) 
947) <hr />
948) 

949) <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>
950) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>
951) 
952) <p>
953) We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br />
954) </p>
955) <ul>
956) <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings
957) are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li>
958) <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
959) <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
960) </ul>
961) 
962) <hr />
963) 

964) <a id="KeyManagement"></a>

965) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys
966) Tor uses.</a></h3>

967) 
968) <p>

969) Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)

970) encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
971) authentication so clients know they're
972) talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
973) sure all clients know the same set of relays.

974) </p>
975) 
976) <p>
977) <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
978) so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
979) intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption
980) key with each relay in the circuit, so only the exit relay can read
981) the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
982) so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
983) won't work.
984) </p>
985) 
986) <p>
987) <b>Authentication</b>:
988) Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
989) When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a

990) href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands

991) that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way

992) the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.

993) Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.

994) </p>
995) 
996) <p>

997) <b>Coordination</b>:

998) How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they

999) have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
1000) key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a

1001) "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a

1002) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>

1003) of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
1004) each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
1005) locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
1006) a threshold of the directory authorities, he can't trick the Tor client
1007) into using other Tor relays.

1008) </p>
1009) 
1010) <p>

1011) How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
1012) comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
1013) authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network

1014) is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
1015) </p>

1016) 

1017) <p>
1018) How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
1019) the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a

1020) href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. See the <a

1021) href="<page verifying-signatures>">instructions

1022) on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
1023) </p>

1024) 

1025) <p>

1026) In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
1027) met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
1028) need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on
1029) this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
1030) and start meeting people.

1031) </p>

1032) 

1033) <hr />
1034) 

1035) <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>
1036) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor
1037) user be a relay.</a></h3>
1038) 
1039) <p>
1040) Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the

1041) network to handle all our users, and <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#RelayAnonymity">running a Tor

1042) relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good
1043) relays &mdash; for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive
1044) firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they
1045) can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical

1046) part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users
1047) are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
1048) increases the size of the anonymity set.
1049) </p>
1050) 
1051) <p>
1052) That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
1053) really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining

1054) a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past
1055) few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports
1056) uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
1057) how much bandwidth it can offer.

1058) </p>
1059) 
1060) <p>
1061) There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
1062) </p>
1063) 
1064) <p>

1065) First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
1066) operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
1067) and we plan to finally address that in 2009. See Section 4.1 of <a
1068) href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
1069) development roadmap</a>.

1070) </p>
1071) 
1072) <p>

1073) Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
1074) the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
1075) <a href="<page volunteer>#Research">research section of the
1076) volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays
1077) have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a
1078) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#TransportIPnotTCP">switching
1079) to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here &mdash; which alas is
1080) not a very simple answer at all.

1081) </p>
1082) 
1083) <p>

1084) Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
1085) stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
1086) relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
1087) users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
1088) impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a

1089) href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper

1090) for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.

1091) </p>
1092) 
1093) <p>

1094) Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
1095) letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
1096) you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. <a
1097) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Three</a> <a
1098) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a>
1099) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers
1100) describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic
1101) through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the
1102) circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor
1103) context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to
1104) encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as
1105) <a href="<page bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
1106) we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.

1107) </p>
1108) 
1109) <p>
1110) Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
1111) to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our

1112) <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/two-incentive-designs-tor">current
1113) thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.

1114) </p>
1115) 
1116) <p>
1117) Please help on all of these!
1118) </p>
1119) 
1120) <hr />
1121) 

1122) <a id="Criminals"></a>
1123) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
1124) things?</a></h3>
1125) 
1126) <p>

1127) For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a

1128) href="<page faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.

1129) </p>
1130) 
1131) <hr />
1132) 
1133) <a id="RespondISP"></a>
1134) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my
1135) exit relay?</a></h3>
1136) 
1137) <p>
1138) A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a
1139) href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorAbuseTemplates">collected
1140) here</a>.
1141) </p>
1142) 

1143) <hr />

1144) 

1145)   </div><!-- #main -->

1146) 
1147) #include <foot.wmi>