tor-webwml.git

1) ## translation metadata

2) # Revision: $Revision$

3) # Translation-Priority: 2-medium

4) 

5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"

6) 
7) <div class="main-column">
8) 
9) <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
10) 

11) <h2>Tor FAQ</h2>
12) <hr />

13) 

14) <p>General questions:</p>

15) <ul>

16) <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

17) <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>

18) <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
19) Tor?</a></li>
20) <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
21) <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>
22) <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's
23) CD?</a></li>
24) <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
25) Tor support mail?</a></li>
26) <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>
27) <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
28) funding?</a></li>

29) </ul>
30) 

31) <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

32) <ul>
33) <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>

34) <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
35) page?</a></li>

36) <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li>

37) <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to
38) have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

39) <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>

40) </ul>

41) 
42) <p>Running Tor:</p>
43) 
44) <p>Running a Tor client:</p>

45) <ul>

46) <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at start</a></li>

47) <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></li>
48) </ul>

49) 
50) <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

51) <ul>

52) <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>

53) <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

54) with abuse issues.</a></li>

55) <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
56) relay?</a></li>

57) <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>

58) <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>

59) </ul>

60) 
61) <p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>
62) 

63) <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
64) <ul>

65) <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>

66) </ul>
67) 

68) <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
69) <ul>
70) <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
71) relay.</a></li>
72) </ul>
73) 

74) <p>Abuse</p>
75) <ul>
76) <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
77) <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
78) relay?</a></li>
79) </ul>
80) 

81) <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a

82) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ">wiki

83) FAQ</a> for now.</p>
84) 

85) <hr />
86) 
87) <a id="General"></a>
88) 

89) <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
90) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>
91) 
92) <p>
93) The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
94) </p>
95) 
96) <p>
97) The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
98) you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
99) around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around
100) the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from
101) learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
102) from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is
103) called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
104) href="<page overview>">overview page</a>.
105) </p>
106) 
107) <p>
108) The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains

109) and develops the Tor software.

110) </p>
111) 

112) <hr />
113) 

114) <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
115) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
116) <p>
117) A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy to maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same server.  The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't have to install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy server.  Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them.  This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with free wifi Internet.
118) </p>
119) <p>
120) Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can see your encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.  You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic stream, and isn't recording your personal details.
121) </p>
122) <p>
123) Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending it on to the destination.  Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted packets between themselves.</p>
124) <p>

125) <dl>

126) <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.  It still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It merely sees "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

127) <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad third of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know who sent this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream.  You are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

128) </dl>

129) </p>
130) 

131) <hr />
132) 

133) <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

134) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can
135) I use with Tor?</a></h3>

136) 
137) <p>
138) There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
139) and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on

140) making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor.
141) This step is normally done by configuring

142) the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are
143) other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to
144) make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt
145) your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you
146) still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This
147) second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
148) why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.

149) </p>
150) 
151) <p>

152) Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
153) bundles on the <a href="<page download>">download page</a> automatically
154) install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox
155) extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0,
156) Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
157) application-level worries.

158) </p>
159) 
160) <p>

161) There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
162) but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
163) issues on them well enough to be able to recommend a safe
164) configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

165) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

166) specific applications</a>. There's also a <a

167) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms">list

168) of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
169) Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!

170) </p>
171) 

172) <hr />
173) 

174) <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
175) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>
176) 
177) <p>

178) Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
179) new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
180) 2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
181) and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
182) become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
183) href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
184) the Naval Research Lab.

185) </p>
186) 
187) <p>

188) (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)

189) </p>
190) 
191) <p>

192) Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled

193) "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
194) spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned
195) everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
196) spell it wrong.

197) </p>
198) 

199) <hr />
200) 

201) <a id="Backdoor"></a>
202) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>
203) 
204) <p>

205) There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one

206) in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody

207) will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do

208) ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
209) </p>
210) 
211) <p>
212) We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
213) irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software

214) in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
215) software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would

216) trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
217) </p>
218) 
219) <p>
220) But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks

221) people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
222) computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should

223) always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release)

224) for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you

225) source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You

226) should also check the <a href="<page verifying-signatures>">PGP

227) signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
228) distribution sites.

229) </p>
230) 
231) <p>
232) Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

233) anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
234) sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.

235) </p>
236) 

237) <hr />
238) 

239) <a id="DistributingTor"></a>
240) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on

241) my magazine's CD?</a></h3>

242) 
243) <p>
244) Yes.
245) </p>
246) 
247) <p>

248) The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This

249) means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
250) modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
251) ask us for specific permission.
252) </p>
253) 
254) <p>
255) However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our

256) <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

257) Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
258) with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
259) </p>
260) 
261) <p>
262) Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the
263) Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor bundles, which

264) typically include <a href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo</a>

265) and <a href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia</a>.

266) You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
267) as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a

268) href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

269) Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to
270) include the source code for these programs everywhere you include
271) the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on the <a

272) href="<page vidalia/index>">Vidalia page</a> and the <a

273) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo

274) download page</a>.
275) </p>
276) 
277) <p>

278) Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,

279) who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
280) our <a href="<page trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
281) </p>
282) 
283) <p>
284) Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
285) Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
286) changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
287) may not be supported &mdash; or even work &mdash; six months later. This
288) is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
289) </p>
290) 

291) <hr />
292) 

293) <a id="SupportMail"></a>
294) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
295) Tor support mail?</a></h3>
296) 
297) <p>
298) Many people send the Tor developers mail privately, or send mail to

299) our internal <a href="<page contact>">lists</a>, with questions about their

300) specific setup — they can't get their firewall working right,

301) they can't configure Polipo correctly, or so on. Sometimes our

302) volunteers can answer these mails, but typically they need to spend
303) most of their time on development tasks that will benefit more people.
304) This is especially true if your question is already covered in the <a

305) href="<page documentation>">documentation</a> or on this FAQ.

306) </p>
307) 
308) <p>
309) So if we don't answer your mail, first check the <a href="<page
310) documentation>">documentation</a> page, along with this FAQ,
311) to make sure your question isn't already answered.  Then read <a
312) href="http://www.catb.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html">"How to ask
313) questions the smart way"</a>. If this doesn't help you, note that we
314) have <a href="<page documentation>#Support">an IRC channel</a> where you
315) can ask your questions (but if they are still open-ended, ill-formed,
316) or not about Tor, you likely won't get much help there either). Lastly,
317) people on the <a href="<page documentation>#MailingLists">or-talk
318) mailing list</a> may be able to provide some hints for you, if
319) others have experienced your problems too. Be sure to look over <a
320) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/">the archives</a> first.
321) </p>
322) 
323) <p>
324) Another strategy is to <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">run a Tor
325) relay for a while</a>, and/or <a href="<page donate>">donate money</a>
326) <a href="<page volunteer>">or time</a> to the effort. We're more likely
327) to pay attention to people who have demonstrated interest and commitment
328) to giving back to the Tor community.
329) </p>
330) 
331) <p>

332) If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the

333) mailing list and answer questions from others.
334) </p>
335) 

336) <hr />
337) 

338) <a id="WhySlow"></a>
339) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>
340) 
341) <p>
342) There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
343) </p>
344) 
345) <p>
346) Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
347) be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
348) in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency
349) will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
350) bandwidth through Tor.
351) </p>
352) 
353) <p>
354) But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
355) is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
356) many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
357) handle file-sharing traffic load.
358) </p>
359) 

360) <p>
361) For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

362) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

363) post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
364) to go with it.
365) </p>
366) 

367) <p>
368) What can you do to help?
369) </p>
370) 
371) <ul>
372) 
373) <li>
374) <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
375) for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
376) all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
377) </li>
378) 
379) <li>
380) <a href="<page gui/index>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We
381) especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
382) as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
383) walk people through setting it up.
384) </li>
385) 
386) <li>
387) There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
388) experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
389) then we can focus better on fixing them.
390) </li>
391) 
392) <li>
393) There are some steps that individuals
394) can take to improve their Tor performance. <a

395) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/FireFoxTorPerf">You

396) can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a
397) href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use
398) Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download>">upgrading
399) to the latest version of Tor</a>.  If this works well, please help by
400) documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
401) </li>
402) 
403) <li>
404) Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

405) start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
406) relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
407) get to spend more time on it.

408) </li>
409) 
410) <li>
411) Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
412) to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
413) volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
414) </li>
415) 
416) <li>
417) Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
418) that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
419) competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers
420) when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has
421) an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
422) supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
423) </li>
424) 
425) <li>
426) If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
427) individually by <a href="<page donate>">donating a bit of money to the
428) cause</a>. It adds up!
429) </li>
430) 
431) </ul>
432) 

433) <hr />
434) 

435) <a id="Funding"></a>

436) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with

437) more funding?</a></h3>
438) 
439) <p>

440) We have about 1800 relays right now, pushing over 150 MB/s average

441) traffic. We have several hundred thousand active users. But the Tor
442) network is not yet self-sustaining.
443) </p>
444) 
445) <p>
446) There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
447) </p>
448) 
449) <ul>
450) 
451) <li>
452) Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
453) architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
454) users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
455) lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
456) </li>
457) 
458) <li>
459) User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
460) all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
461) clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
462) </li>
463) 
464) <li>
465) Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
466) attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
467) reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and
468) somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay
469) happy. We also need to work on <a href="#RelayOS">stability</a> on some
470) platforms &mdash; e.g., Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.
471) </li>
472) 
473) <li>
474) Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
475) software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
476) to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of
477) the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this
478) with the <a href="<page gui/index>">GUI Contest</a>, but much more work
479) remains &mdash; usability for privacy software has never been easy.
480) </li>
481) 
482) <li>
483) Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
484) their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
485) <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
486) and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
487) </li>
488) 
489) <li>
490) Research: The anonymous communications field is full
491) of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
492) also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
493) href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of
494) critical <a href="<page volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a>
495) that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of
496) attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
497) behind these.
498) </li>
499) 
500) </ul>
501) 
502) <p>
503) We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
504) <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
505) can keep up</a>.
506) Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
507) so we can continue to grow the network.
508) </p>
509) 
510) <p>
511) We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
512) censorship-resistance.
513) </p>
514) 
515) <p>
516) We are proud to have <a href="<page sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
517) from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
518) Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
519) agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
520) </p>
521) 
522) <p>
523) However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
524) Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate>">donate</a>
525) to the project, or <a href="<page contact>">contact</a> our executive
526) director for information on making grants or major donations.
527) </p>
528) 
529) <hr />
530) 

531) <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>
532) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>
533) 
534) <p>
535) This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
536) have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to

537) uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to

538) completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any

539) version of Windows is as follows:
540) </p>
541) 
542) <ol>
543) <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
544) and choose exit.</li>
545) <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the
546) Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li>
547) <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall.

548) This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li>

549) <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
550) Click the Uninstall button.</li>

551) </ol>

552) 
553) <p>

554) If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall

555) Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to

556) reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".

557) </p>
558) 
559) <p>
560) For Mac OS X, follow the <a

561) href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.

562) </p>
563) 
564) <p>
565) If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
566) on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
567) be pretty easy to notice things there.
568) </p>
569) 
570) <hr />
571) 

572) <a id="PGPSigs"></a>
573) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the
574) download page?</a></h3>

575) 
576) <p>
577) These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
578) exactly the one that we intended you to get.
579) </p>
580) 
581) <p>
582) Please read the <a

583) href="<page verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.

584) </p>
585) 
586) <hr />
587) 
588) <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>
589) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under
590) Windows?</a></h3>
591) 
592) <p>

593) Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
594) tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.

595) </p>
596) 

597) <p>
598) (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
599) it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
600) download>">download page</a>.)
601) </p>
602) 

603) <hr />
604) 

605) <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
606) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor
607) executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

608) 
609) <p>
610) Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
611) parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false

612) positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a

613) guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
614) a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
615) </p>
616) 
617) <p>

618) In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
619) it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
620) href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.

621) </p>
622) 
623) <hr />
624) 
625) <a id="LiveCD"></a>
626) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
627) includes Tor?</a></h3>
628) 
629) <p>
630) There isn't any official LiveCD at this point. We're still trying to find good
631) solutions and trying to understand the security and anonymity implications of
632) the various options. In the mean time, feel free to check out the list below
633) and use your best judgement:
634) </p>
635) 
636) <p>

637) LiveCDs:

638) </p>
639) 
640) <ol>

641) <li><a href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">The (Amnesic) Incognito Live
642) System</a> is a Live System aimed at preserving your privacy and
643) anonymity:

644) <ul>
645) <li> All outgoing connections to the Internet are forced to go through
646) the Tor network.</li>
647) <li> No trace is left on local storage devices unless explicitely asked.</li>
648) <li> It includes Firefox, Tor, Torbutton, Vidalia graphical Tor
649) controller, Pidgin Instant Messaging client, and lots of other
650) software.</li>
651) <li> It's based upon Debian gnu/linux and comes with the GNOME desktop
652) environment.</li>
653) </ul>

654) <li><a href="http://tork.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LiveCD">TorK LiveCD</a>
655) is Knoppix-based with an emphasis on user-friendliness. You can work
656) anonymously or non-anonymously while TorK tries to keep you informed of the
657) consequences of your activity. The TorK LiveCD is experimental, so the aim is
658) to provide regular releases through 2007 and beyond.</li>

659) <li><a href="http://mandalka.name/privatix/">Privatix LiveCD/USB</a> is a
660) debian based live-system including tor, firefox and torbutton which can save
661) bookmarks and other settings or data on an encrypted usb-key</li>

662) </li>

663) </ol>
664) 
665) <p>
666) Windows bundles:
667) </p>
668) 
669) <ol>

670) <li><a href="<page torbrowser/index>">Tor Browser Bundle</a>

671) for Windows comes with a pre-configured web browser and is self contained
672) so you can run it from a USB stick.</li>
673) <li><a href="http://www.janusvm.com/tor_vm/">Tor VM</a> is a successor
674) to JanusVM. It needs testing from you!</li>
675) <li><a href="http://janusvm.com/">JanusVM</a> is a Linux kernel and software
676) running in VMWare that sits between your Windows computer and the Internet,
677) making sure that your Internet traffic is scrubbed and anonymized.</li>
678) <li><a href="http://www.xerobank.com/xB_browser.html">xB Browser</a>,
679) previously known as Torpark, is a Firefox+Tor package for Win32 that can
680) installed on a USB key. It needs a host Win32 operating system.</li>

681) </ol>
682) 
683) <p>
684) Not currently maintained as far as we know:
685) </p>
686) 
687) <ol>

688) <li>Polippix / Privatlivets Fred is a Danish Knoppix-based LiveCD with Tor
689) and utilities to encrypt IP-telephony. <a href="http://polippix.org/">Info and
690) download</a>.</li>

691) <li>ELE is a Linux LiveCD which is focused on privacy related
692) software. It includes Tor and you can download it at
693) <a
694) href="http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/">http://www.northernsecurity.net/download/ele/</a>.</li>
695) <li>Virtual Privacy Machine is a Linux LiveCD that includes Firefox, Privoxy,
696) Tor, some IRC and IM applications, and a set of ipchains rules aimed to prevent
697) non-Tor traffic from accidentally leaving your computer. More information at
698) <a

699) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/VirtualPrivacyMachine">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/VirtualPrivacyMachine</a>.</li>

700) <li>Anonym.OS is a LiveCD similar to the above but is based on OpenBSD rather
701) than Linux for maximum security. It was designed to be anonymous and secure
702) from the ground up, and thus has some features and limitations not found in
703) other LiveCDs (Tor related or otherwise). You can obtain more information and

704) download Anonym.OS from <a href="http://theory.kaos.to/projects.html">Kaos.Theory</a>.</li>

705) <li>Phantomix is a LiveCD for anonymous surfing and chatting based on the most

706) recent KNOPPIX release. It comes preconfigured with Privoxy, Tor and Polipo. You can

707) get it from the <a href="http://phantomix.ytternhagen.de/">Phantomix
708) Website</a>.</li>
709) </ol>
710) 

711) <p>
712) Please contact us if you know any others.
713) </p>
714) 

715) <hr />
716) 

717) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>
718) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for
719) a password at start</a></h3>
720) 
721) <p>

722) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
723) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
724) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
725) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
726) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
727) compromising your anonymity.
728) </p>
729) 
730) <p>
731) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password

732) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,

733) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:

734) </p>
735) 

736) <ol>

737) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
738) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
739) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
740) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
741) </li>

742) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
743) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,
744) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are different.
745) <br />
746) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset button,
747) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
748) control password.
749) <br />
750) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
751) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
752) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
753) to restart Tor and all will work again.
754) </li>
755) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a service. When Tor is set to
756) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
757) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
758) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
759) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
760) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
761) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
762) <br />
763) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on
764) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a service</a>
765) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
766) </li>

767) </ol>

768) 
769) <hr />
770) 

771) <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
772) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>
773) 
774) <p>
775) Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as 
776) inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use. 
777) The following options can be added to your config file "torrc" 
778) or specified on the command line:
779) </p>
780) <dl>
781)   <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
782)     <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
783)     </dd>
784)   <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
785)     <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible. 
786)     </dd>
787)   <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
788)     <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit. 
789)     </dd>
790)   <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
791)     <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit. 
792)         Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list. 
793)     </dd>
794) </dl>
795) <p>
796) <em>We recommend you do not use these</em> 

797) — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions. 

798) You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor; 
799) overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.
800) </p>
801) <p>
802) The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are treated as a request, 
803) meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow, Tor will still avoid them. 
804) You can make the option mandatory by setting 
805) <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt> 

806) — but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working 

807) if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable. 
808) See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html.en#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a> 
809) for some nodes you might pick.
810) </p>
811) <p>
812) Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify 
813) a 2 letter ISO3166 country code in curly braces 
814) (for example {de}), 
815) or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), 
816) or a node nickname. 
817) Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items. 
818) </p>
819) <p>
820) If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface 
821) (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to 
822) set up an internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>. 
823) See the manual page for details.
824) </p>
825) 
826) <hr />
827) 

828) <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>
829) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay
830) need to be?</a></h3>
831) 
832) <p>
833) We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
834) </p>
835) 
836) <ul>
837) <li>Tor has built-in support for <a

838) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#LimitBandwidth">

839) rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
840) link but want to limit the number of bytes per
841) day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a

842) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#Hibernation">hibernation

843) feature</a>.
844) </li>

845) <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that
846) specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from
847) that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your
848) relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.

849) </li>
850) <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
851) notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
852) sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
853) disconnects will break.
854) </li>
855) <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
856) leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
857) </li>
858) <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
859) IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port

860) forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but 

861) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ServerForFirewalledClients">this FAQ entry</a> 

862) offers some examples on how to do this.

863) </li>
864) <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
865) bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than
866) low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
867) </li>
868) </ul>
869) 
870) <hr />
871) 

872) <a id="RunARelayBut"></a>

873) <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
874) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't

875) want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>
876) 
877) <p>
878) Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
879) </p>
880) 
881) <p>

882) Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
883) outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit

884) policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients

885) will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
886) exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
887) the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,

888) based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on 
889) <a href="<page faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a> 
890) if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's 

891) <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

892) for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
893) </p>
894) 
895) <p>

896) The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but 

897) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#DefaultPorts">restricts</a>

898) some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
899) the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
900) file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy

901) using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your 

902) <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#torrc">torrc</a>

903) file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to

904) "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
905) that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
906) but not for connections to external websites or other services.

907) </p>
908) 
909) <p>

910) If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
911) (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).

912) If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example,
913) you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please
914) explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor users
915) will be impacted too.

916) </p>
917) 
918) <hr />
919) 

920) <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>
921) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay
922) or bridge relay?</a></h3>
923) 
924) <p><a href="<page bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)

925) are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
926) in the main Tor directory. That means

927) that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
928) network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
929) </p>
930) 
931) <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
932) configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
933) publically or not.
934) </p>
935) 

936) <p>Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter

937) connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
938) right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
939) get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
940) security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a

941) public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.

942) </p>
943) 
944) <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
945) lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay &mdash;

946) bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to 
947) <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely run a normal

948) relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and only have
949) a little bit of bandwidth, then flip a coin. Thanks for volunteering!
950) </p>
951) 
952) <hr />
953) 

954) <a id="RelayMemory"></a>
955) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so
956) much memory?</a></h3>
957) 

958) <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some
959) tips for reducing its footprint:
960) </p>
961) 
962) <ol>
963) <li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation
964) bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory
965) back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard
966) to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation,
967) which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher
968) CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead:
969) <tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li>
970) 
971) <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
972) open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal

973) buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a
974) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jun-2008/msg00001.html">release
975) unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
976) 1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
977) this feature.</li>

978) 
979) <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or
980) old FreeBSD, Tor is probably forking separate processes
981) rather than using threads. Consider switching to a <a

982) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#RelayOS">better

983) operating system</a>.</li>
984) 
985) <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the
986) amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth
987) means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow
988) as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man
989) page.</li>
990) 
991) </ol>
992) 
993) <p>
994) All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual
995) for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.

996) </p>
997) 
998) <hr />
999) 

1000) <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>
1001) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>
1002) 
1003) <p>
1004) We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br />
1005) </p>
1006) <ul>
1007) <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings
1008) are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li>
1009) <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
1010) <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
1011) </ul>
1012) 
1013) <hr />
1014) 

1015) <a id="KeyManagement"></a>

1016) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys
1017) Tor uses.</a></h3>

1018) 
1019) <p>

1020) Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)

1021) encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
1022) authentication so clients know they're
1023) talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
1024) sure all clients know the same set of relays.

1025) </p>
1026) 
1027) <p>
1028) <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
1029) so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
1030) intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption
1031) key with each relay in the circuit, so only the exit relay can read
1032) the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
1033) so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
1034) won't work.
1035) </p>
1036) 
1037) <p>
1038) <b>Authentication</b>:
1039) Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
1040) When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a

1041) href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands

1042) that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way

1043) the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.

1044) Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.

1045) </p>
1046) 
1047) <p>

1048) <b>Coordination</b>:

1049) How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they

1050) have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
1051) key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a

1052) "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a

1053) href="<gitblob>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>

1054) of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
1055) each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
1056) locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control
1057) a threshold of the directory authorities, he can't trick the Tor client
1058) into using other Tor relays.

1059) </p>
1060) 
1061) <p>

1062) How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
1063) comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
1064) authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network

1065) is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
1066) </p>

1067) 

1068) <p>
1069) How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
1070) the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a

1071) href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. See the <a

1072) href="<page verifying-signatures>">instructions

1073) on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
1074) </p>

1075) 

1076) <p>

1077) In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
1078) met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
1079) need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on
1080) this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
1081) and start meeting people.

1082) </p>

1083) 

1084) <hr />
1085) 

1086) <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>
1087) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor
1088) user be a relay.</a></h3>
1089) 
1090) <p>
1091) Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the

1092) network to handle all our users, and <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#RelayAnonymity">running a Tor

1093) relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good
1094) relays &mdash; for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive
1095) firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they
1096) can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical

1097) part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users
1098) are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
1099) increases the size of the anonymity set.
1100) </p>
1101) 
1102) <p>
1103) That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
1104) really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining

1105) a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past
1106) few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports
1107) uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
1108) how much bandwidth it can offer.

1109) </p>
1110) 
1111) <p>
1112) There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
1113) </p>
1114) 
1115) <p>

1116) First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
1117) operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
1118) and we plan to finally address that in 2009. See Section 4.1 of <a
1119) href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
1120) development roadmap</a>.

1121) </p>
1122) 
1123) <p>

1124) Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
1125) the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
1126) <a href="<page volunteer>#Research">research section of the
1127) volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays
1128) have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a

1129) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#TransportIPnotTCP">switching

1130) to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here &mdash; which alas is
1131) not a very simple answer at all.

1132) </p>
1133) 
1134) <p>

1135) Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
1136) stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
1137) relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
1138) users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
1139) impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a

1140) href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper

1141) for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.

1142) </p>
1143) 
1144) <p>

1145) Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
1146) letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
1147) you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. <a
1148) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Three</a> <a
1149) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a>
1150) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers
1151) describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic
1152) through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the
1153) circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor
1154) context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to
1155) encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as
1156) <a href="<page bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
1157) we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.

1158) </p>
1159) 
1160) <p>
1161) Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
1162) to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our

1163) <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/two-incentive-designs-tor">current
1164) thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.

1165) </p>
1166) 
1167) <p>
1168) Please help on all of these!
1169) </p>
1170) 
1171) <hr />
1172) 

1173) <a id="Criminals"></a>
1174) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
1175) things?</a></h3>
1176) 
1177) <p>

1178) For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a

1179) href="<page faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.

1180) </p>
1181) 
1182) <hr />
1183) 
1184) <a id="RespondISP"></a>
1185) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my
1186) exit relay?</a></h3>
1187) 
1188) <p>
1189) A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a

1190) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorAbuseTemplates">collected

1191) here</a>.
1192) </p>
1193) 

1194) <hr />

1195) 

1196)   </div><!-- #main -->

1197) 
1198) #include <foot.wmi>