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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p>General questions:</p>
18)     <ul>
19)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>
20)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></li>
21)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
22)     Tor?</a></li>
23)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
24)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on my magazine's
26)     CD?</a></li>

27)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

28)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>
29)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
30)     funding?</a></li>

31)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
32)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

33)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

34)     fingerprints?</a></li>

35)     </ul>

36) 

37)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>
38)     <ul>
39)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
40)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
41)     page?</a></li>

42)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
43)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

44)     <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></li>
45)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to
46)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>
47)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>
48)     </ul>

49) 

50)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle:</p>
51)     <ul>

52) 

53)     <li><a href="#TBBBrowserName">Why does TBB's browser window say
54)     Aurora?</a></li>
55)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
56)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

57)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I'm on OSX or Linux and I want to
58)     run another application through the Tor launched by Tor Browser

59)     Bundle. How do I predict my Socks port?</a></li>

60)     <li><a href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did Polipo
61)     go?</a></li>

62)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox
63)     extensions?</a></li>

64)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that unsafe?</a></li>
65)     <li><a href="#TBBCanIBlockJS">I'm an expert!  (No, really!)  Can I configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></li>

66)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
67)     with Tor.</a></li>
68)     <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle
69)     running but close the browser.</a></li>
70) 

71)     <li><a href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells
72)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>
73)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
74)     been compromised.</a></li>
75)     </ul>
76) 
77)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

78)     <ul>
79)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
80)     that mean?</a></li>

81)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

82)     logs?</a></li>

83)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
84)     correctly.</a></li>

85)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
86)     start.</a></li>
87)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country)
88)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

89)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
90)     ports.</a></li>

91)     </ul>

92) 

93)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>
94)     <ul>
95)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>
96)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal
97)     with abuse issues.</a></li>
98)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
99)     relay?</a></li>

100)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>
102)     <li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>

103)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
104)     run my own?</a></li>

105)     </ul>

106) 

107)     <p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>

108) 

109)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
110)     <ul>
111)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>

112)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

113)     </ul>

114) 

115)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
116)     <ul>
117)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
118)     relay.</a></li>

119)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets,
120)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

121)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
122)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

123)     </ul>

124) 

125)     <p>Abuse:</p>

126)     <ul>
127)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
128)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
129)     relay?</a></li>
130)     </ul>

131) 

132)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a

133)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

134) 

135)     <hr>

136) 

137)     <a id="General"></a>

138) 

139)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
140)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

141) 

142)     <p>
143)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
144)     </p>

145) 

146)     <p>
147)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
148)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
149)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around
150)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from
151)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit
152)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays is
153)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
154)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
155)     </p>

156) 

157)     <p>
158)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains
159)     and develops the Tor software.
160)     </p>

161) 

162)     <hr>

163) 

164)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
165)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
166)     <p>

167)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet and
168) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy to
169) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same server.
170) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs through
171) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't have to
172) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy server.
173) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections for
174) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing bad
175) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection to them.
176) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a cafe with
177) free wifi Internet.
178)     </p>
179)     <p>
180)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider
181) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your

182) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even see
183) inside your

184) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.
185) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as
186) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic

187) stream, and recording your personal details.

188)     </p>
189)     <p>
190)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending

191) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption for
192) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are

193) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through
194) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely
195) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local
196) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen through
197) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass encrypted
198) packets between themselves.</p>

199)     <p>
200)     <dl>

201)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad first of
202) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.  It
203) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It merely sees
204) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the world, so
205) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node figuring
206) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>
207)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad third
208) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know who sent
209) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or
210) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only know the
211) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic stream.  You
212) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
213) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

214)     </dl>
215)     </p>

216) 

217)     <hr>

218) 

219)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

220)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

221) 

222)     <p>
223)     There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
224)     and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on
225)     making sure the application's Internet connections get sent through Tor.
226)     This step is normally done by configuring
227)     the program to use your Tor client as a "socks" proxy, but there are
228)     other ways to do it too. For application-level anonymity, you need to
229)     make sure that the information the application sends out doesn't hurt
230)     your privacy. (Even if the connections are being routed through Tor, you
231)     still don't want to include sensitive information like your name.) This
232)     second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
233)     why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.
234)     </p>

235) 

236)     <p>
237)     Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
238)     bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> automatically

239)     install the <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton Firefox

240)     extension</a> if you have Firefox installed. As of version 1.2.0,
241)     Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
242)     application-level worries.
243)     </p>

244) 

245)     <p>
246)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
247)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
248)     issues on them well enough to be able to recommend a safe
249)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

250)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

251)     specific applications</a>. There's also a <a

252)     href="<wiki>doc/SupportPrograms">list

253)     of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
254)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
255)     </p>

256) 

257)     <hr>

258) 

259)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
260)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>

261) 

262)     <p>
263)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
264)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
265)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
266)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
267)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
268)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
269)     the Naval Research Lab.
270)     </p>

271) 

272)     <p>
273)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
274)     </p>

275) 

276)     <p>
277)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled
278)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
279)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned
280)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
281)     spell it wrong.
282)     </p>

283) 

284)     <hr>

285) 

286)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>
287)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>

288) 

289)     <p>
290)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one
291)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody
292)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
293)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
294)     </p>

295) 

296)     <p>
297)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
298)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software
299)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
300)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
301)     trust our software ever again &mdash; for excellent reason!
302)     </p>

303) 

304)     <p>
305)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
306)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
307)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you should
308)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last release)
309)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
310)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
311)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
312)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
313)     distribution sites.
314)     </p>

315) 

316)     <p>
317)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your
318)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
319)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
320)     </p>

321) 

322)     <hr>

323) 

324)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

325)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></h3>

326) 

327)     <p>
328)     Yes.
329)     </p>

330) 

331)     <p>
332)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
333)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
334)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
335)     ask us for specific permission.
336)     </p>

337) 

338)     <p>
339)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our
340)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.
341)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
342)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
343)     </p>

344) 

345)     <p>
346)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the

347)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a
348)     href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">Tor
349)     Browser</a>. This includes <a
350)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
351)     Aurora</a> and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.

352)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
353)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
354)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

355)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is
356)     to include the source code for these programs everywhere you
357)     include the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on
358)     the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and <a
359)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
360)     Aurora</a> pages.

361)     </p>

362) 

363)     <p>
364)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
365)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
366)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
367)     </p>

368) 

369)     <p>
370)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
371)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
372)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
373)     may not be supported &mdash; or even work &mdash; six months later. This
374)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
375)     </p>

376) 

377)     <hr>

378) 

379)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

380)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></h3>

381) 

382)     <p>There is no official support for Tor. Your best bet is to try the following:</p>

383)     <ol>
384)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>
385)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>
386)     <li>Read through the <a

387)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">tor-talk

388)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

389)     <li>Join our <a href="irc://irc.oftc.net#tor">irc channel</a> and
390)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

391)     <li>Send an email to <a

392)     href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.

393)     These are volunteers who may be able to help you but you may not
394)     get a response for days.</li>

395)     </ol>

396) 

397)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the
398)     mailing list and answer questions from others.</p>

399) 

400)     <hr>

401) 

402)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
403)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

404) 

405)     <p>
406)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
407)     </p>

408) 

409)     <p>
410)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
411)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
412)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network latency
413)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
414)     bandwidth through Tor.
415)     </p>

416) 

417)     <p>
418)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
419)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
420)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
421)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
422)     </p>

423) 

424)     <p>
425)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

426)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

427)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
428)     to go with it.
429)     </p>

430) 

431)     <p>
432)     What can you do to help?
433)     </p>

434) 

435)     <ul>

436) 

437)     <li>
438)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
439)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
440)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
441)     </li>

442) 

443)     <li>

444)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We

445)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
446)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
447)     walk people through setting it up.
448)     </li>

449) 

450)     <li>
451)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
452)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
453)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
454)     </li>

455) 

456)     <li>
457)     There are some steps that individuals
458)     can take to improve their Tor performance. <a

459)     href="<wiki>doc/FireFoxTorPerf">You

460)     can configure your Firefox to handle Tor better</a>, <a
461)     href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/tor.html">you can use
462)     Polipo with Tor</a>, or you can try <a href="<page download/download>">upgrading
463)     to the latest version of Tor</a>.  If this works well, please help by
464)     documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
465)     </li>

466) 

467)     <li>
468)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to
469)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
470)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
471)     get to spend more time on it.
472)     </li>

473) 

474)     <li>
475)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
476)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
477)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
478)     </li>

479) 

480)     <li>
481)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
482)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
483)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home servers
484)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your organization has
485)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
486)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
487)     </li>

488) 

489)     <li>
490)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
491)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of money to the
492)     cause</a>. It adds up!
493)     </li>

494) 

495)     </ul>

496) 

497)     <hr>

498) 

499)     <a id="Funding"></a>

500)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more funding?</a></h3>

501) 

502)     <p>

503)     The Tor network's <a
504)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several
505)     thousand</a> relays push <a
506)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
507)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a
508)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several
509)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
510)     self-sustaining.

511)     </p>

512) 

513)     <p>
514)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
515)     </p>

516) 

517)     <ul>

518) 

519)     <li>
520)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
521)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
522)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
523)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
524)     </li>

525) 

526)     <li>
527)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
528)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
529)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
530)     </li>

531) 

532)     <li>
533)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
534)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
535)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons, and
536)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators stay

537)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms — e.g.,
538)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

539)     </li>

540) 

541)     <li>
542)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
543)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
544)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all of
545)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on this

546)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much more work

547)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
548)     </li>

549) 

550)     <li>
551)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
552)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
553)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
554)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
555)     </li>

556) 

557)     <li>
558)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
559)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
560)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
561)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of
562)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor research questions</a>
563)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the variety of
564)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
565)     behind these.
566)     </li>

567) 

568)     </ul>

569) 

570)     <p>
571)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
572)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
573)     can keep up</a>.
574)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
575)     so we can continue to grow the network.
576)     </p>

577) 

578)     <p>
579)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
580)     censorship-resistance.
581)     </p>

582) 

583)     <p>
584)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
585)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
586)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
587)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
588)     </p>

589) 

590)     <p>
591)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
592)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate/donate>">donate</a>
593)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our executive
594)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
595)     </p>

596) 

597)     <hr>
598) 

599)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

600)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

601) 

602)     <p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

603)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

604)     <hr>

605) 

606)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>
607)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL

608) certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>
609)     <p>

610)     <pre>

611)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

612)     The serial number is: 02:DA:41:04:89:A5:FD:A2:B5:DB:DB:F8:ED:15:0D:BE
613)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: a7e70f8a648fe04a9677f13eedf6f91b5f7f2e25
614)     The SHA-256 fingerprint is: 23b854af6b96co224fd173382c520b46fa94f2d4e7238893f63ad2d783e27b4b
615) 

616)     blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

617)     The serial number is: 00:EF:A3
618)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f

619)     </pre>

620)     </p>
621)     <hr>
622) 

623)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

624)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>

625) 

626)     <p>
627)     This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
628)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to
629)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. The proper way to
630)     completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any
631)     version of Windows is as follows:
632)     </p>

633) 

634)     <ol>
635)     <li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
636)     and choose exit.</li>
637)     <li>Right click on the taskbar to bring up TaskManager. Look for tor.exe in the
638)     Process List. If it's running, right click and choose End Process.</li>
639)     <li>Click the Start button, go to Programs, go to Vidalia, choose Uninstall.
640)     This will remove the Vidalia bundle, which includes Tor and Polipo.</li>
641)     <li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
642)     Click the Uninstall button.</li>
643)     </ol>

644) 

645)     <p>
646)     If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall
647)     Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to
648)     reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".
649)     </p>

650) 

651)     <p>
652)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
653)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
654)     </p>

655) 

656)     <p>
657)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
658)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
659)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
660)     </p>

661) 

662)     <hr>

663) 

664)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

665)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download page?</a></h3>

666) 

667)     <p>
668)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
669)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
670)     </p>

671) 

672)     <p>
673)     Please read the <a
674)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.
675)     </p>

676) 

677) <hr>
678) 
679) <a id="GetTor"></a>
680) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
681) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
682) 
683) <p>
684) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
685) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

686) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

687) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a
688) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google cache</a>

689) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
690) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
691) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail
692) '<tt>gettor AT torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'
693) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
694) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
695) to receive very large attachments.
696) </p>
697) 
698) <p>

699) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the signature</a>

700) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
701) other than our official HTTPS website.

702) </p>
703) 
704) <hr>

705) 

706)     <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>

707)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under Windows?</a></h3>

708) 

709)     <p>
710)     Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
711)     tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.
712)     </p>

713) 

714)     <p>
715)     (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
716)     it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
717)     download/download>">download page</a>.)
718)     </p>

719) 

720)     <hr>

721) 

722)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>

723)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

724) 

725)     <p>
726)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
727)     parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false
728)     positives &mdash; after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is just a
729)     guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
730)     a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
731)     </p>

732) 

733)     <p>
734)     In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
735)     it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
736)     href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.
737)     </p>

738) 

739)     <hr>

740) 

741)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

742)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

743) 

744)     <p>

745)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

746)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor Browser
747)     Bundle</a>.

748)     </p>

749) 
750) <hr>
751) 

752) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

753) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube
754) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

755) 
756) <p>
757) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/torbutton-faq.html.en#noflash">Answer</a>
758) </p>
759) 
760) <hr>
761) 

762) <a id="TBBBrowserName"></a>
763) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBBrowserName">Why does TBB's browser window
764) say Aurora?</a></h3>
765) 
766) <p>
767) We build Firefox from source in order to include our <a
768) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/tree/maint-2.2:/src/current-patches">Firefox

769) privacy fixes</a>. The default Firefox build process calls the resulting

770) browser "Aurora".
771) </p>
772) 
773) <p>
774) Don't be confused into thinking the browser you
775) see is the same as the Firefox pre-releases that
776) were also named Aurora. A future TBB release will <a
777) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2176">probably</a>
778) have a more recognizable name like "Tor Browser".
779) </p>
780) 
781) <hr>
782) 

783) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>
784) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">I'm on OSX or Linux and
785) I want to run another application through the Tor launched by Tor

786) Browser Bundle. How do I predict my Socks port?</a></h3>

787) 
788) <p>

789) Typically Tor listens for Socks connections on port 9050. TBB

790) on OSX and Linux has an experimental feature where Tor listens
791) on random unused ports rather than a fixed port each time. The
792) goal is to avoid conflicting with a "system" Tor install,
793) so you can run a system Tor and TBB at the same time. We're <a
794) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3948">working on
795) a feature</a> where Tor will try the usual ports first and then back
796) off to a random choice if they're already in use. Until then, if you

797) want to configure some other application to use Tor as a Socks proxy,

798) here's a workaround:
799) </p>
800) 
801) <p>
802) In Vidalia, go to Settings-&gt;Advanced and uncheck the box that says
803) 'Configure ControlPort automatically'. Click OK and restart TBB. Your

804) Socks port will then be on 9050.

805) </p>
806) 
807) <hr>
808) 
809) <a id="TBBPolipo"></a>
810) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did
811) Polipo go?</a></h3>
812) 
813) <p>
814) In the past, Tor bundles included an HTTP proxy like Privoxy or Polipo,
815) solely to work around a bug in Firefox that was finally fixed in Firefox
816) 6. Now you don't need a separate HTTP proxy to use Tor, and in fact
817) leaving it out makes you safer because Torbutton has better control over
818) Firefox's interaction with websites.
819) </p>
820) 
821) <p>
822) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero

823) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set

824) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try

825) to use a Socks proxy rather than an http proxy — Tor runs a Socks

826) proxy on port 9050 on Windows, or <a href="#TBBSocksPort">see above</a>
827) for OSX and Linux.
828) </p>
829) 
830) <p>

831) If that fails, feel free to install <a
832) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a> or <a
833) href="https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/polipo/">polipo</a>.
834) You can use <a

835) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/build-scripts/config/polipo.conf">our
836) old polipo config file</a> if you like. However, please realize that

837) this approach is not recommended for novice users.

838) </p>
839) 
840) <hr>
841) 

842) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
843) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
844) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
845) 
846) <p>
847) Yes. Just install them like normal. But be sure to avoid extensions like
848) Foxyproxy that screw up your proxy settings. Also, avoid privacy-invasive
849) extensions (for example, pretty much anything with the word Toolbar in
850) its name).
851) </p>
852) 
853) <hr>
854) 

855) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>
856) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>
857) 
858) <p>
859) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
860) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
861) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
862) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
863) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
864) JavaScript might make a website work).
865) </p>
866) 
867) <hr>
868) 
869) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>
870) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CanIBlockJS">I'm an expert!  (No, really!)  Can I configure NoScript to block JavaScript by default?</a></h3>
871) 
872) <p>
873) You can configure your copies of Tor Browser Bundle however you want
874) to.  However, we recommend that even users who know how to use
875) NoScript leave JavaScript enabled if possible, because a website or
876) exit node can easily distinguish users who disable JavaScript from
877) users who use Tor Browser bundle with its default settings (thus
878) users who disable JavaScript are less anonymous).
879) </p>
880) 
881) <p>
882) Disabling JavaScript by default, then allowing a few websites to run
883) scripts, is especially bad for your anonymity: the set of websites
884) which you allow to run scripts is very likely to <em>uniquely</em>
885) identify your browser.
886) </p>
887) 
888) <hr>
889) 

890) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
891) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
892) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
893) 
894) <p>
895) Unfortunately, Torbutton only works with Firefox right now, and without
896) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/">Torbutton's
897) extensive privacy fixes</a> there are many ways for websites or other
898) attackers to recognize you, track you back to your IP address, and so on.
899) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
900) really bad idea.
901) </p>
902) 
903) <p>
904) We're working with the Chrome team to <a
905) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">fix
906) some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it will be possible to write a
907) Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any other browser is on the horizon.
908) </p>
909) 
910) <hr>
911) 
912) <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a>
913) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser
914) Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3>
915) 
916) <p>
917) We're working on a way to make this possible on all platforms. Please
918) be patient.
919) </p>
920) 
921) <hr>
922) 

923) <a id="GoogleCaptcha"></a>
924) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCaptcha">Google makes me solve a Captcha or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>
925) 
926) <p>
927) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
928) considers Tor to be spyware.
929) </p>
930) 
931) <p>
932) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are also
933) shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message
934) when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time. Google
935) interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit
936) relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website,
937) so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.
938) </p>
939) <p>
940) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
941) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
942) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
943) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
944) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
945) an infection.
946) </p>
947) 
948) <p>
949) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically
950) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
951) should clear up again after a short time.
952) </p>
953) 
954) <p>
955) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
956) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as

957) DuckDuckGo, ixquick, or Bing.

958) </p>
959) 
960) <hr />
961) 
962) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

963) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account
964) may have been compromised.</a></h3>

965) 
966) <p>
967) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
968) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
969) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
970) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
971) </p>
972) 
973) <p>
974) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from
975) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and decided
976) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
977) rightful owner.
978) </p>
979) 
980) <p>
981) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
982) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
983) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
984) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
985) </p>
986) 
987) <p>
988) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
989) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
990) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
991) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a
992) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking">
993) way more complex than that</a>.
994) </p>
995) 
996) <p>
997) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
998) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
999) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1000) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1001) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1002) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1003) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1004) </p>
1005) 
1006) <hr>
1007) 

1008) <a id="torrc"></a>

1009) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does that mean?</a></h3>

1010) 
1011) <p>
1012) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1013) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default
1014) configuration should work fine for most Tor users. Users of Vidalia can
1015) make common changes through the Vidalia interface &mdash; only advanced
1016) users should need to modify their torrc file directly.
1017) </p>

1018) <p>
1019) The preferred way to edit your torrc is through Vidalia. Open the
1020) Vidalia Control Panel. Choose Settings. Choose Advanced. Click the button
1021) labelled "Edit current torrc". Remember to make sure the checkbox for
1022) "Save Settings." is checked. Hit the Ok button and you are done.
1023) </p>

1024) <p>
1025) The location of your torrc file depends on the way you installed Tor:
1026) </p>
1027) <ul>

1028) <li>If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for
1029) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory.
1030) </li>

1031) <li>On Windows, if you installed a Tor bundle with Vidalia, you can
1032) find your torrc file in the Start menu under Programs -&gt; Vidalia
1033) Bundle -&gt; Tor, or you can find it by hand in <code>\Documents and
1034) Settings\<i>username</i>\Application Data\Vidalia\torrc</code>. If you
1035) installed Tor without Vidalia, you can find your torrc in the Start
1036) menu under Programs -&gt; Tor, or manually in either <code>\Documents
1037) and Settings\Application Data\tor\torrc</code> or <code>\Documents and
1038) Settings\<i>username</i>\Application Data\tor\torrc</code>.
1039) </li>
1040) <li>On OS X, if you use Vidalia, edit
1041) <code>~/.vidalia/torrc</code>. Otherwise, open your favorite text editor
1042) and load <code>/Library/Tor/torrc</code>.
1043) </li>
1044) <li>On Unix, if you installed a pre-built package, look for
1045) <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> or consult your
1046) package's documentation.
1047) </li>
1048) <li>Finally, if you installed from source, you may not have a torrc
1049) installed yet: look in <code>/usr/local/etc/</code> and note that you
1050) may need to manually copy <code>torrc.sample</code> to <code>torrc</code>.
1051) </li>
1052) </ul>
1053) 
1054) <p>
1055) If you use Vidalia, be sure to exit both Tor and Vidalia before you edit

1056) your torrc file manually. Otherwise Vidalia might overwrite your changes.

1057) </p>
1058) 
1059) <p>
1060) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart Tor for the
1061) changes to take effect. (For advanced users on OS X and Unix, note that
1062) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart it.)
1063) </p>
1064) 
1065) <p>
1066) For other configuration options you can use, look at the <a href="<page
1067) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Remember, all lines beginning
1068) with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect on Tor's
1069) configuration.
1070) </p>
1071) 
1072) <hr>
1073) 

1074) <a id="Logs"></a>

1075) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's logs?</a></h3>

1076) 
1077) <p>

1078) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1079) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1080) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1081) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1082) </p>
1083) 
1084) <p>
1085) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1086) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1087) </p>
1088) 
1089) <ul>
1090) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1091) </li>

1092) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1093) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1094) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1095) </li>
1096) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1097) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1098) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1099) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1100) </li>
1101) </ul>
1102) 
1103) <p>

1104) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your torrc</a>
1105) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1106) following line:

1107) </p>
1108) 
1109) <pre>

1110) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1111) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1112) </pre>

1113) 
1114) <p>

1115) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1116) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1117) of the section:
1118) </p>
1119) 
1120) <pre>
1121) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1122) </pre>
1123) 
1124) <p>

1125) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1126) and filename for your Tor log.

1127) </p>
1128) 
1129) <hr>
1130) 

1131) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1132) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not working.</a></h3>

1133) 
1134) <p>

1135) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1136) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1137) </p>
1138) 
1139) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1140) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it will
1141) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the Vidalia

1142) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1143) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1144) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1145) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1146) client functionality is working."
1147) </p>
1148) 
1149) <p>
1150) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1151) </p>
1152) 
1153) <ol>
1154) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1155) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1156) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1157) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1158) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1159) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1160) zone is correct.</li>

1161) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1162) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1163) href="<wikifaq>#MyInternetconnectionrequiresanHTTPorSOCKSproxy.">proxy</a>?

1164) </li>
1165) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux that
1166) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
1167) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
1168) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
1169) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

1170) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

1171) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
1172) about what's going wrong?</li>

1173) </ol>
1174) 
1175) <hr />
1176) 
1177) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>

1178) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at start.</a></h3>

1179) 
1180) <p>
1181) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
1182) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
1183) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
1184) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
1185) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
1186) compromising your anonymity.
1187) </p>
1188) 
1189) <p>
1190) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
1191) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
1192) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
1193) </p>
1194) 
1195) <ol>
1196) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
1197) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
1198) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
1199) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
1200) </li>
1201) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
1202) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,
1203) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are different.
1204) <br />
1205) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset button,
1206) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
1207) control password.
1208) <br />
1209) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
1210) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
1211) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
1212) to restart Tor and all will work again.
1213) </li>
1214) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a Windows NT service. When Tor
1215) is set to
1216) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
1217) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
1218) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
1219) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
1220) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
1221) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
1222) <br />
1223) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on

1224) <a href="<wikifaq>#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice">running Tor as a Windows NT service</a>

1225) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
1226) </li>
1227) </ol>
1228) 

1229)     <hr>

1230) 

1231)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
1232)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

1233) 

1234)     <p>

1235)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
1236)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

1237)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
1238)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

1239)     </p>
1240)     <dl>
1241)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
1242)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
1243)         </dd>
1244)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1245)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.

1246)         </dd>
1247)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1248)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

1249)         </dd>
1250)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1251)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.
1252)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list.

1253)         </dd>
1254)     </dl>
1255)     <p>

1256)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>
1257)     &mdash; they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions.
1258)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
1259)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
1260)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

1261)     </p>
1262)     <p>

1263)     The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are
1264)     treated as a request, meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow,
1265)     Tor will still avoid them. You can make the option mandatory by
1266)     setting <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt>
1267)     &mdash; but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working
1268)     if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable.
1269)     See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a>

1270)     for some nodes you might pick.
1271)     </p>
1272)     <p>

1273)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a
1274)     href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2">2
1275)     letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example {de}),
1276)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node
1277)     nickname. Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the
1278)     list items.

1279)     </p>
1280)     <p>

1281)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks interface

1282)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an
1283)     internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

1284)     See the manual page for details.
1285)     </p>

1286) 

1287)     <hr>

1288) 

1289) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

1290) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

1291) 
1292) <p>
1293) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only
1294) use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1" to

1295) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

1296) configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect
1297) to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window.
1298) </p>
1299) 
1300) <p>
1301) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
1302) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
1303) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
1304) </p>
1305) 
1306) <p>
1307) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
1308) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
1309) </p>
1310) 
1311) <pre>
1312)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
1313)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
1314) </pre>
1315) 
1316) <hr>

1317) 

1318)     <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>

1319)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></h3>

1320) 

1321)     <p>
1322)     We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
1323)     </p>

1324) 

1325)     <ul>
1326)     <li>Tor has built-in support for <a

1327)     href="<wikifaq>#WhatbandwidthshapingoptionsareavailabletoTorrelays">

1328)     rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
1329)     link but want to limit the number of bytes per
1330)     day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a

1331)     href="<wikifaq>#HowcanIlimitthetotalamountofbandwidthusedbymyTorrelay">hibernation

1332)     feature</a>.
1333)     </li>
1334)     <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a> that
1335)     specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused from
1336)     that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from your
1337)     relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor relays.
1338)     </li>
1339)     <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
1340)     notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
1341)     sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
1342)     disconnects will break.
1343)     </li>
1344)     <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
1345)     leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
1346)     </li>
1347)     <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
1348)     IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port

1349)     forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but

1350)     <a href="<wikifaq>#ImbehindaNATFirewall">this FAQ entry</a>

1351)     offers some examples on how to do this.
1352)     </li>
1353)     <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
1354)     bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users than
1355)     low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
1356)     </li>
1357)     </ul>

1358) 

1359)     <hr>

1360) 

1361)     <a id="RunARelayBut"></a>
1362)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>

1363)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>

1364) 

1365)     <p>
1366)     Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
1367)     </p>

1368) 

1369)     <p>
1370)     Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
1371)     outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit
1372)     policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients
1373)     will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
1374)     exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
1375)     the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,

1376)     based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on
1377)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a>
1378)     if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's

1379)     <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

1380)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
1381)     </p>

1382) 

1383)     <p>

1384)     The default exit policy allows access to many popular services

1385)     (e.g. web browsing), but <a href="<wikifaq>#Istherealistofdefaultexitports">restricts</a>

1386)     some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
1387)     the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
1388)     file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy

1389)     using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your

1390)     <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc</a>

1391)     file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to
1392)     "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
1393)     that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
1394)     but not for connections to external websites or other services.
1395)     </p>

1396) 

1397)     <p>
1398)     If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
1399)     (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).
1400)     If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for example,
1401)     you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please
1402)     explicitly reject them in your exit policy &mdash; otherwise Tor users
1403)     will be impacted too.
1404)     </p>

1405) 

1406)     <hr>

1407) 

1408)     <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>

1409)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge relay?</a></h3>

1410) 

1411)     <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)
1412)     are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
1413)     in the main Tor directory. That means
1414)     that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
1415)     network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
1416)     </p>

1417) 

1418)     <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
1419)     configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
1420)     publically or not.
1421)     </p>

1422) 

1423)     <p>Right now, China is the main place in the world that filters
1424)     connections to the Tor network. So bridges are useful a) for users in
1425)     China, b) as a backup measure in case the Tor network gets blocked in
1426)     more places, and c) for people who want an extra layer of security
1427)     because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a public
1428)     Tor relay IP address they're contacting.

1429)     </p>

1430) 

1431)     <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have lots
1432)     of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay &mdash; the
1433)     average bridge doesn't see much load these days. If you're willing
1434)     to <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely
1435)     run a normal relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an
1436)     exit and only have a little bit of bandwidth, be a bridge. Thanks
1437)     for volunteering!

1438)     </p>

1439) 

1440)     <hr>

1441) 

1442) <a id="MultipleRelays"></a>
1443) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one relay.</a></h3>

1444) 
1445) <p>
1446) Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
1447) we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on
1448) the same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal
1449) and diversity.
1450) </p>
1451) 
1452) <p>
1453) If you do decide to run more than one relay, please set the "MyFamily"

1454) config option in the <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> of each relay, listing
1455) all the relays (comma-separated) that are under your control:

1456) </p>
1457) 
1458) <pre>
1459)     MyFamily $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2,$fingerprint3
1460) </pre>
1461) 
1462) <p>
1463) where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without
1464) spaces). You can also list them by nickname, but fingerprint is safer. Be
1465) sure to prefix the digest strings with a dollar sign ('$') so that the
1466) digest is not confused with a nickname in the config file.
1467) </p>
1468) 
1469) <p>
1470) That way clients will know to avoid using more than one of your relays
1471) in a single circuit. You should set MyFamily if you have administrative
1472) control of the computers or of their network, even if they're not all in
1473) the same geographic location.
1474) </p>
1475) 
1476)     <hr>
1477) 

1478)     <a id="RelayMemory"></a>

1479)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></h3>

1480) 

1481)     <p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some
1482)     tips for reducing its footprint:
1483)     </p>

1484) 

1485)     <ol>
1486)     <li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation
1487)     bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory
1488)     back to the system, the pieces of memory are fragmented so they're hard
1489)     to reuse. The Tor tarball ships with OpenBSD's malloc implementation,
1490)     which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher
1491)     CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead:
1492)     <tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li>

1493) 

1494)     <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
1495)     open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
1496)     buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a

1497)     href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html">release

1498)     unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL

1499)     1.0.0 or newer, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use

1500)     this feature.</li>

1501) 

1502)     <li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or
1503)     old FreeBSD, Tor is probably forking separate processes
1504)     rather than using threads. Consider switching to a <a

1505)     href="<wikifaq>#WhydoesntmyWindowsorotherOSTorrelayrunwell">better

1506)     operating system</a>.</li>

1507) 

1508)     <li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the
1509)     amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth
1510)     means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow
1511)     as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man
1512)     page.</li>

1513) 

1514)     </ol>

1515) 

1516)     <p>
1517)     All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual
1518)     for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.
1519)     </p>

1520) 

1521)     <hr>

1522) 

1523)     <a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>

1524)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>

1525) 

1526)     <p>

1527)     We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br>

1528)     </p>
1529)     <ul>
1530)     <li>The name is not currently mapped to a different key. Existing mappings
1531)     are removed after 6 months of inactivity from a relay.</li>
1532)     <li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
1533)     <li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
1534)     </ul>

1535) 

1536)     <hr>

1537) 

1538)     <a id="RelayDonations"></a>

1539)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a
1540)     relay rather than run my own?</a></h3>

1541) 
1542)     <p>
1543)     Sure! We recommend two non-profit charities that are happy to turn
1544)     your donations into better speed and anonymity for the Tor network:
1545)     </p>
1546)     <ul>
1547)     <li><a href="https://www.torservers.net/">torservers.net</a>
1548)     is a German charitable non-profit that runs a wide variety of

1549)     exit relays. They also like donations of bandwidth from ISPs.</li>

1550)     <li><a
1551)     href="https://www.noisebridge.net/wiki/Noisebridge_Tor">Noisebridge</a>
1552)     is a US-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that collects donations and turns
1553)     them into more exit relay capacity.</li>
1554)     </ul>
1555) 
1556)     <p>
1557)     These organizations are not the same as <a href="<page
1558)     donate/donate>">The Tor Project, Inc</a>, but we consider that a

1559)     good thing. They're both run by nice people who are part of the
1560)     Tor community.

1561)     </p>
1562) 
1563)     <p>
1564)     Note that there can be a tradeoff here between anonymity and
1565)     performance. The Tor network's anonymity comes in part from diversity,
1566)     so if you are in a position to run your own relay, you will be

1567)     improving Tor's anonymity more than by donating. At the same time
1568)     though, economies

1569)     of scale for bandwidth mean that combining many small donations into

1570)     several larger relays is more efficient at improving network

1571)     performance. Improving anonymity and improving performance are both
1572)     worthwhile goals, so however you can help is great!
1573)     </p>
1574) 
1575)     <hr>
1576) 

1577)     <a id="KeyManagement"></a>

1578)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></h3>

1579) 

1580)     <p>
1581)     Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)
1582)     encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
1583)     authentication so clients know they're
1584)     talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
1585)     sure all clients know the same set of relays.
1586)     </p>

1587) 

1588)     <p>
1589)     <b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
1590)     so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
1591)     intended for. Further, the Tor client establishes an ephemeral encryption

1592)     key with each relay in the circuit; these extra layers of encryption
1593)     mean that only the exit relay can read

1594)     the cells. Both sides discard the circuit key when the circuit ends,
1595)     so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
1596)     won't work.
1597)     </p>

1598) 

1599)     <p>
1600)     <b>Authentication</b>:
1601)     Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".

1602)     Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.

1603)     When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
1604)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
1605)     that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
1606)     the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.

1607)     Because the Tor client chooses the path, it can make sure to get
1608)     Tor's "distributed trust" property: no single relay in the path can
1609)     know about both the client and what the client is doing.

1610)     </p>

1611) 

1612)     <p>
1613)     <b>Coordination</b>:
1614)     How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they
1615)     have the right keys for them? Each relay has a long-term public signing
1616)     key called the "identity key". Each directory authority additionally has a
1617)     "directory signing key". The directory authorities <a

1618)     href="<specblob>dir-spec.txt">provide a signed list</a>

1619)     of all the known relays, and in that list are a set of certificates from
1620)     each relay (self-signed by their identity key) specifying their keys,
1621)     locations, exit policies, and so on. So unless the adversary can control

1622)     a majority of the directory authorities (as of 2012 there are 8

1623)     directory authorities), he can't trick the Tor client into using
1624)     other Tor relays.

1625)     </p>

1626) 

1627)     <p>
1628)     How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
1629)     comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
1630)     authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network
1631)     is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
1632)     </p>

1633) 

1634)     <p>
1635)     How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
1636)     the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a
1637)     href="http://www.gnupg.org/">GNU Privacy Guard</a>. See the <a
1638)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">instructions
1639)     on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
1640)     </p>

1641) 

1642)     <p>
1643)     In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
1644)     met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
1645)     need to know somebody who has. If you're concerned about an attack on
1646)     this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
1647)     and start meeting people.
1648)     </p>

1649) 

1650)     <hr>

1651) 

1652) <a id="EntryGuards"></a>
1653) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></h3>
1654) 
1655) <p>
1656) Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails
1657) when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For

1658) example, suppose the attacker controls or watches the Tor relay you choose
1659) to enter the network, and also controls or watches the website you visit. In

1660) this case, the research community knows no practical low-latency design
1661) that can reliably stop the attacker from correlating volume and timing
1662) information on the two sides.
1663) </p>
1664) 
1665) <p>
1666) So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,

1667) <i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select
1668) new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker
1669) will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability
1670) <i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad
1671) as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without
1672) an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the
1673) attacker noticing more often. Thus, choosing many random entries and exits
1674) gives the user no chance of escaping profiling by this kind of attacker.

1675) </p>
1676) 
1677) <p>

1678) The solution is "entry guards": each Tor client selects a few relays at random

1679) to use as entry points, and uses only those relays for her first hop. If
1680) those relays are not controlled or observed, the attacker can't win,
1681) ever, and the user is secure. If those relays <i>are</i> observed or
1682) controlled by the attacker, the attacker sees a larger <i>fraction</i>
1683) of the user's traffic &mdash; but still the user is no more profiled than
1684) before. Thus, the user has some chance (on the order of <i>(n-c)/n</i>)
1685) of avoiding profiling, whereas she had none before.

1686) </p>
1687) 
1688) <p>

1689) You can read more at <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright02">An
1690) Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols</a>, <a
1691) href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#wright03">Defending Anonymous
1692) Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks</a>, and especially
1693) <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06">Locating Hidden
1694) Servers</a>.

1695) </p>
1696) 
1697) <p>
1698) Restricting your entry nodes may also help against attackers who want
1699) to run a few Tor nodes and easily enumerate all of the Tor user IP
1700) addresses. (Even though they can't learn what destinations the users
1701) are talking to, they still might be able to do bad things with just a

1702) list of users.) However, that feature won't really become useful until
1703) we move to a "directory guard" design as well.

1704) </p>
1705) 
1706)     <hr>
1707) 

1708)     <a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>

1709)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a relay.</a></h3>

1710) 

1711)     <p>
1712)     Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the

1713)     network to handle all our users, and <a
1714)     href="<wikifaq>#DoIgetbetteranonymityifIrunarelay">running a Tor

1715)     relay may help your anonymity</a>. However, many Tor users cannot be good
1716)     relays &mdash; for example, some Tor clients operate from behind restrictive
1717)     firewalls, connect via modem, or otherwise aren't in a position where they
1718)     can relay traffic. Providing service to these clients is a critical
1719)     part of providing effective anonymity for everyone, since many Tor users
1720)     are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
1721)     increases the size of the anonymity set.
1722)     </p>

1723) 

1724)     <p>
1725)     That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
1726)     really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining
1727)     a relay. We've made a lot of progress with easy configuration in the past
1728)     few years: Vidalia has an easy relay configuration interface, and supports
1729)     uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
1730)     how much bandwidth it can offer.
1731)     </p>

1732) 

1733)     <p>
1734)     There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
1735)     </p>

1736) 

1737)     <p>
1738)     First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
1739)     operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
1740)     and we plan to finally address that in 2009. See Section 4.1 of <a
1741)     href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
1742)     development roadmap</a>.
1743)     </p>

1744) 

1745)     <p>
1746)     Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
1747)     the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
1748)     <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">research section of the
1749)     volunteer page</a>: "Tor doesn't work very well when relays
1750)     have asymmetric bandwidth (e.g. cable or DSL)". It might be that <a

1751)     href="<page docs/faq>#TransportIPnotTCP">switching

1752)     to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here &mdash; which alas is
1753)     not a very simple answer at all.
1754)     </p>

1755) 

1756)     <p>
1757)     Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
1758)     stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
1759)     relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
1760)     users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
1761)     impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
1762)     href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
1763)     for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
1764)     </p>

1765) 

1766)     <p>
1767)     Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
1768)     letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
1769)     you're also initiating your own anonymized traffic. <a
1770)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#back01">Three</a> <a
1771)     href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue">different</a>
1772)     <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05">research</a> papers
1773)     describe ways to identify the relays in a circuit by running traffic
1774)     through candidate relays and looking for dips in the traffic while the
1775)     circuit is active. These clogging attacks are not that scary in the Tor
1776)     context so long as relays are never clients too. But if we're trying to
1777)     encourage more clients to turn on relay functionality too (whether as
1778)     <a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
1779)     we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
1780)     </p>

1781) 

1782)     <p>
1783)     Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
1784)     to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our

1785)     <a href="<blog>two-incentive-designs-tor">current

1786)     thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.
1787)     </p>

1788) 

1789)     <p>
1790)     Please help on all of these!
1791)     </p>

1792) 

1793) <hr>
1794) 
1795) <a id="TransportIPnotTCP"></a>

1796) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets, not just TCP packets.</a></h3>

1797) 
1798) <p>

1799) This would be handy, because it would make Tor better able to handle
1800) new protocols like VoIP, it could solve the whole need to socksify
1801) applications, and it would solve the fact that exit relays need to
1802) allocate a lot of file descriptors to hold open all the exit connections.

1803) </p>
1804) 
1805) <p>

1806) We're heading in this direction: see <a
1807) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1855">this trac
1808) ticket</a> for directions we should investigate. Some of the hard
1809) problems are:

1810) </p>
1811) 

1812) <ol>

1813) <li>IP packets reveal OS characteristics. We would still need to do
1814) IP-level packet normalization, to stop things like TCP fingerprinting
1815) attacks. Given the diversity and complexity of TCP stacks, along with <a

1816) href="<wikifaq>#DoesTorresistremotephysicaldevicefingerprinting">device

1817) fingerprinting attacks</a>, it looks like our best bet is shipping our
1818) own user-space TCP stack.

1819) </li>

1820) <li>Application-level streams still need scrubbing. We will still need
1821) user-side applications like Torbutton. So it won't become just a matter
1822) of capturing packets and anonymizing them at the IP layer.

1823) </li>
1824) <li>Certain protocols will still leak information. For example, we must
1825) rewrite DNS requests so they are delivered to an unlinkable DNS server
1826) rather than the DNS server at a user's ISP; thus, we must understand
1827) the protocols we are transporting.
1828) </li>
1829) <li><a
1830) href="http://crypto.stanford.edu/~nagendra/projects/dtls/dtls.html">DTLS</a>

1831) (datagram TLS) basically has no users, and IPsec sure is big. Once we've
1832) picked a transport mechanism, we need to design a new end-to-end Tor
1833) protocol for avoiding tagging attacks and other potential anonymity and
1834) integrity issues now that we allow drops, resends, et cetera.

1835) </li>
1836) <li>Exit policies for arbitrary IP packets mean building a secure
1837) IDS. Our node operators tell us that exit policies are one of the main
1838) reasons they're willing to run Tor. Adding an Intrusion Detection System
1839) to handle exit policies would increase the security complexity of Tor,
1840) and would likely not work anyway, as evidenced by the entire field of IDS
1841) and counter-IDS papers. Many potential abuse issues are resolved by the
1842) fact that Tor only transports valid TCP streams (as opposed to arbitrary
1843) IP including malformed packets and IP floods), so exit policies become
1844) even <i>more</i> important as we become able to transport IP packets. We
1845) also need to compactly describe exit policies in the Tor directory,
1846) so clients can predict which nodes will allow their packets to exit &mdash;
1847) and clients need to predict all the packets they will want to send in
1848) a session before picking their exit node!
1849) </li>

1850) <li>The Tor-internal name spaces would need to be redesigned. We support
1851) hidden service ".onion" addresses by intercepting the addresses when
1852) they are passed to the Tor client. Doing so at the IP level will require
1853) a more complex interface between Tor and the local DNS resolver.

1854) </li>

1855) </ol>
1856) 
1857) <hr>
1858) 
1859) <a id="HideExits"></a>
1860) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor
1861) relays, so people can't block the exits.</a></h3>
1862) 
1863) <p>
1864) There are a few reasons we don't:
1865) </p>
1866) 
1867) <ol>
1868) <li>We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
1869) need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they
1870) can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the
1871) list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
1872) through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
1873) </li>
1874) 
1875) <li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to
1876) do so.  Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to
1877) connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services
1878) should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users,
1879) they can.
1880) </li>
1881) 
1882) <li>Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive

1883) response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them
1884) the option may inspire them to <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#Bans">stop
1885) and think</a> about whether they really want to eliminate private access
1886) to their system, and if not, what other options they might have. The
1887) time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead
1888) spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.

1889) </li>

1890) </ol>
1891) 

1892)     <hr>

1893) 

1894)     <a id="Criminals"></a>

1895)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></h3>

1896) 

1897)     <p>
1898)     For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a
1899)     href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.
1900)     </p>

1901) 

1902)     <hr>

1903) 

1904)     <a id="RespondISP"></a>

1905)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit relay?</a></h3>

1906) 

1907)     <p>
1908)     A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a

1909)     href="<wiki>doc/TorAbuseTemplates">collected

1910)     here</a>.
1911)     </p>

1912) 

1913)     <hr>

1914) 

1915)   </div>
1916)   <!-- END MAINCOL -->
1917)   <div id = "sidecol">
1918) #include "side.wmi"
1919) #include "info.wmi"
1920)   </div>
1921)   <!-- END SIDECOL -->
1922) </div>
1923) <!-- END CONTENT -->