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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p>General questions:</p>
18)     <ul>
19)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

20)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
21) proxies?</a></li>

22)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
23)     Tor?</a></li>
24)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

26)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

27)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

28)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

29)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

30)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
31)     </a></li>

32)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
33)     funding?</a></li>

34)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my 
35)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

36)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these outbound ports 
37)     on my firewall?</a></li>

38)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

39)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information 
40)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
42)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

44)     fingerprints?</a></li>

45)     </ul>

46) 

47)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>
48)     <ul>
49)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
50)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
51)     page?</a></li>

52)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
53)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

54)     <li><a href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under
55) Windows?</a></li>

56)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

57)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

58)     <li><a href="#tarFiles">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

59)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
60) includes Tor?</a></li>

61)     </ul>

62) 

63)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle:</p>
64)     <ul>

65) 

66)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
67)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

68)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

69)     </a></li>

70)     <li><a href="#UbuntuBlackedOut">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't type 
71)     anything into my browser.</a></li>
72)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
73)     software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></li>

74)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to

75)     run another application through the Tor launched by Tor Browser

76)     Bundle.</a></li>

77)     <li><a href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did Polipo
78)     go?</a></li>

79)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

80)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

81)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to
82) allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that
83) unsafe?</a></li>

84)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
85)     with Tor.</a></li>

86)     <li><a href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">Will Torbutton be available 
87)     for other browsers?</a></li>

88)     <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle
89)     running but close the browser.</a></li>
90) 

91)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

92)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

93)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign 

94)     languages?</a></li>

95)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
96)     been compromised.</a></li>

97)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP 
98)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

99)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy 
100)     with my application?</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map (Vidalia) 
102)     go?</a></li>
103)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>
104)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download 
105)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

106)     <li><a href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></li>

107)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close 
108)     all my open tabs?</a></li>
109)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay 
110)     or bridge?</a></li>
111)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>
112)     <li><a href="#SourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do 
113)     I verify a build?</a></li>

114)     </ul>
115) 
116)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

117)     <ul>
118)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
119)     that mean?</a></li>

120)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

121)     logs?</a></li>

122)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

123)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
124)     correctly.</a></li>

125)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

126)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
127)     start.</a></li>

128)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or
129) country)

130)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

131)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
132)     ports.</a></li>

133)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

134)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing 
135)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I 
136)     worry?</a></li>

137)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses 
138)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

139)     </ul>

140) 

141)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>
142)     <ul>

143) 
144)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
145)     </a></li>

146)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being 
147)     used more?</a></li>

148)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static IP.</a></li>
149)     <li><a href="#ModemKeepsCrashing">My cable/dsl modem keeps crashing. 
150)     What's going on?</a></li>
151)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often 
152)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>
153)     <li><a href="#MoreThanOneCPU">I have more than one CPU. Does this 
154)     help?</a></li>

155)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully 
156)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

157)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
158) be?</a></li>

159)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are 
160)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>
161)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount 
162)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

163)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write 
164)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>
165)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after 
166)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

167)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

168)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

169)     <li><a href="#DifferentComputer">I want to run my Tor client on a 
170)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>
171)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and 
172)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>
173)     <li><a href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a nickname and 
174)     ORPort and join the network?</a></li>

175)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
176)     relay?</a></li>

177)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I 
178)     keep the same key?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
180) relay.</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
182)     </a></li>
183)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server 
184)     account?</a></li>

185)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
186)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

187)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
188)     </a></li>
189)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
190)     </a></li>

191)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
192)     run my own?</a></li>

193)     </ul>

194) 

195)     <p>Tor hidden services:</p>
196)     <ul>
197)     <li><a href="#AccessHiddenServices">How do I access hidden services?</a></li>
198)     <li><a href="#ProvideAHiddenService">How do I provide a hidden service</a></li>
199)     </ul>

200) 

201)     <p>Development</p>
202)     <ul>
203)     <li><a href="#WhoIsResponsible">Who is responsible for Tor?</a></li>
204)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers 
205)     mean?</a></li>
206)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
207)     Tor network?</a></li>
208)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the 
209)     Tor network?</a></li>
210)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>
211)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature 
212)     into Tor?</a></li>
213)     </ul>
214) 

215)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
216)     <ul>

217)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor 
218)     provide?</a></li>
219)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on 
220)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

221)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use 
222)     Tor?</a></li>

223)     <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li>

224)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
225) uses.</a></li>

226)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

227)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

228)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I 
229)     can't afford that!</a></li>
230)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound 
231)     connections?</a></li>
232)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
233)     </a></li>
234)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist 
235)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

236)     <li><a href="#VPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>

237)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than 
238)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

239)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion 
240)     routing?</a></li>

241)     </ul>

242) 

243)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
244)     <ul>
245)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
246)     relay.</a></li>

247)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
248) packets,

249)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

250)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
251)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

252)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path 
253)     length.</a></li>
254)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over 
255)     many paths.</a></li>

256)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate 
257)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>
258)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick 
259)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

260)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block 
261)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>
262)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block 
263)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>
264)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from 
265)     posting certain content.</a></li>

266)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
267)     </a></li>
268)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor 
269)     traffic.</a></li>

270)     <li><a href="#IPv6">Tor should support IPv6.</a></li>

271)     </ul>

272) 

273)     <p>Abuse:</p>

274)     <ul>

275)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
276) things?</a></li>

277)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
278)     relay?</a></li>

279)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
280)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

281)     </ul>

282) 

283)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
284) <a

285)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

286) 

287)     <hr>

288) 

289)     <a id="General"></a>

290) 

291)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
292)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

293) 

294)     <p>
295)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
296)     </p>

297) 

298)     <p>

299)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that
300) helps keep
301)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your
302) communications

303)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

304)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection
305) from

306)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

307)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays
308) is
309)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the
310) <a

311)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
312)     </p>

313) 

314)     <p>

315)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that
316) maintains

317)     and develops the Tor software.
318)     </p>

319) 

320)     <hr>

321) 

322)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

323)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
324) from other proxies?</a></h3>
325)     <p>
326)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
327) and
328) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
329) to
330) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
331) server.
332) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
333) through
334) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
335) have to
336) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
337) server.
338) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
339) for
340) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing
341) bad
342) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection
343) to them.
344) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
345) cafe with

346) free wifi Internet.
347)     </p>
348)     <p>

349)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
350) provider
351) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see
352) your
353) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
354) see

355) inside your

356) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
357) stores.

358) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as

359) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
360) traffic

361) stream, and recording your personal details.

362)     </p>
363)     <p>

364)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
365) sending
366) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
367) for
368) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you
369) are
370) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted
371) through
372) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world,
373) completely
374) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your
375) local
376) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen
377) through
378) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass
379) encrypted

380) packets between themselves.</p>

381)     <p>
382)     <dl>

383)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
384) first of
385) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
386) It
387) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
388) merely sees
389) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
390) world, so
391) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
392) figuring

393) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

394)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
395) third
396) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
397) who sent

398) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or

399) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only
400) know the
401) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic
402) stream.  You

403) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
404) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

405)     </dl>
406)     </p>

407) 

408)     <hr>

409) 

410)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

411)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
412) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

413) 

414)     <p>

415)     If you want to use Tor with a web browser, we provide the Tor Browser 
416)     Bundle, which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using 
417)     Tor. If you want to use another web browser with Tor, see <a 
418)     href="#TBBOtherBrowser">Other web browsers</a>. 

419)     </p>
420)     <p>
421)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
422)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

423)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

424)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

425)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

426)     specific applications</a>.

427)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
428)     </p>

429) 

430)     <hr>

431) 

432)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

433)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
434) Tor?</a></h3>

435) 

436)     <p>
437)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
438)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
439)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
440)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
441)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
442)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
443)     the Naval Research Lab.
444)     </p>

445) 

446)     <p>
447)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
448)     </p>

449) 

450)     <p>

451)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
452) spelled

453)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

454)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
455) learned
456)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
457) they

458)     spell it wrong.
459)     </p>

460) 

461)     <hr>

462) 

463)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

464)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
465) Tor?</a></h3>

466) 

467)     <p>

468)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put
469) one
470)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that
471) anybody

472)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
473)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
474)     </p>

475) 

476)     <p>
477)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

478)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security
479) software

480)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
481)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
482)     trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
483)     </p>

484) 

485)     <p>
486)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
487)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

488)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you
489) should
490)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
491) release)

492)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
493)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
494)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
495)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
496)     distribution sites.
497)     </p>

498) 

499)     <p>
500)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

501)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so
502) make

503)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
504)     </p>

505) 

506)     <hr>

507) 

508)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

509)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
510) Tor?</a></h3>

511) 

512)     <p>
513)     Yes.
514)     </p>

515) 

516)     <p>

517)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free
518) software</a>. This
519)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software,
520) either
521)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have
522) to

523)     ask us for specific permission.
524)     </p>

525) 

526)     <p>

527)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must
528) follow our

529)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

530)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file
531) along

532)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
533)     </p>

534) 

535)     <p>

536)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just
537) the

538)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

539)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

540)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
541)     Aurora</a> and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.

542)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
543)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
544)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

545)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is
546)     to include the source code for these programs everywhere you
547)     include the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on
548)     the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and <a
549)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
550)     Aurora</a> pages.

551)     </p>

552) 

553)     <p>

554)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what
555) Tor is,
556)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide).
557) See
558)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for
559) details.

560)     </p>

561) 

562)     <p>
563)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
564)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible

565)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor
566) software, it
567)     may not be supported — or even work — six months later.
568) This

569)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
570)     </p>

571) 

572)     <hr>

573) 

574)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

575)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
576) support?</a></h3>

577) 

578)     <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p>

579)     <ol>
580)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>

581)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page
582) docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>

583)     <li>Read through the <a

584) 
585) href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">
586) tor-talk

587)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

588)     <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a>
589) and

590)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

591)     <li>Send an email to <a

592) 
593) href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li>
594)     <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting
595) us</a> directly.</li>

596)     </ol>

597) 

598)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel
599) or the

600)     mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p>

601) 

602)     <hr>

603) 

604)     <a id="Forum"></a>
605)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
606) 

607)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange 

608)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

609)     </p>
610) 
611)     <hr>
612) 

613)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
614)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

615) 

616)     <p>
617)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
618)     </p>

619) 

620)     <p>

621)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
622) to
623)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
624) computers
625)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
626) latency

627)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
628)     bandwidth through Tor.
629)     </p>

630) 

631)     <p>

632)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
633) network
634)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
635) and
636)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
637) currently

638)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
639)     </p>

640) 

641)     <p>
642)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

643)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

644)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
645) video

646)     to go with it.
647)     </p>

648) 

649)     <p>
650)     What can you do to help?
651)     </p>

652) 

653)     <ul>

654) 

655)     <li>

656)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
657) traffic
658)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
659) handle

660)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
661)     </li>

662) 

663)     <li>

664)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>.
665) We

666)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
667)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
668)     walk people through setting it up.
669)     </li>

670) 

671)     <li>

672)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
673) design
674)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
675) and

676)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
677)     </li>

678) 

679)     <li>
680)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

681)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
682) who
683)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
684) we

685)     get to spend more time on it.
686)     </li>

687) 

688)     <li>

689)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
690) moment
691)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
692) href="<page

693)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
694)     </li>

695) 

696)     <li>

697)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
698) agency

699)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

700)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
701) servers
702)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
703) organization has
704)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
705) about
706)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
707) slower.

708)     </li>

709) 

710)     <li>
711)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

712)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
713) money to the

714)     cause</a>. It adds up!
715)     </li>

716) 

717)     </ul>

718) 

719)     <hr>

720) 

721)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

722)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files 
723)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

724) 
725)     <p>

726)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network, 
727)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default. 
728)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows 
729)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a 
730)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
731)     is not anonymous</a>!

732)     </p>
733) 
734)     <hr>
735) 

736)     <a id="Funding"></a>

737)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
738) with more funding?</a></h3>

739) 

740)     <p>

741)     The Tor network's <a

742) 
743) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several

744)     thousand</a> relays push <a
745)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
746)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a

747) 
748) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several

749)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
750)     self-sustaining.

751)     </p>

752) 

753)     <p>

754)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
755) attention:

756)     </p>

757) 

758)     <ul>

759) 

760)     <li>
761)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
762)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

763)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
764) there's

765)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
766)     </li>

767) 

768)     <li>

769)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
770) questions
771)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
772) good
773)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
774) volunteers.

775)     </li>

776) 

777)     <li>

778)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
779) need

780)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

781)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
782) and
783)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
784) stay
785)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
786) e.g.,

787)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

788)     </li>

789) 

790)     <li>

791)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
792) of the
793)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
794) configuration
795)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
796) of
797)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on
798) this
799)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much
800) more work

801)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
802)     </li>

803) 

804)     <li>
805)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
806)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

807)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
808) relay,

809)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
810)     </li>

811) 

812)     <li>
813)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
814)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
815)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
816)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

817)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
818) research questions</a>
819)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
820) variety of
821)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
822) waiting

823)     behind these.
824)     </li>

825) 

826)     </ul>

827) 

828)     <p>
829)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

830)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
831) developers

832)     can keep up</a>.

833)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
834) effort

835)     so we can continue to grow the network.
836)     </p>

837) 

838)     <p>
839)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
840)     censorship-resistance.
841)     </p>

842) 

843)     <p>

844)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
845) support</a>
846)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
847) Bell
848)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
849) government

850)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
851)     </p>

852) 

853)     <p>

854)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
855) in the
856)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
857) donate/donate>">donate</a>
858)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
859) executive

860)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
861)     </p>

862) 

863)     <hr>
864) 

865)      <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>

866)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these 
867)     outbound ports on my firewall?</a></h3>

868) 
869)     <p>

870)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the 
871)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for 
872)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports, 
873)     but many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030.

874)     </p>
875)     <p>

876)     So as a client, you could probably get away with opening only those four 
877)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry 
878)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as 
879)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most 
880)     diversity in your entry nodes -- and thus the most security -- as well as 
881)     the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll want to let it connect 
882)     to all of them.

883)     </p>
884)     <p>

885)     If you really need to connect to only a small set of ports, see the FAQ 

886)     entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a>.

887)     </p>
888)     <p>

889)     Note that if you're running Tor as a relay, you must allow outgoing 
890)     connections to every other relay and to anywhere your exit policy 
891)     advertises that you allow. The cleanest way to do that is simply to allow 
892)     all outgoing connections at your firewall. If you don't, clients will try 
893)     to use these connections and things won't work. 

894)     </p>
895)     
896)     <hr>
897)     
898)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

899)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is 
900)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

901) 
902)     <p>

903)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be 
904)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
905)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

906)     </p>
907)     <p>

908)     If that site is down, you can still test, but it will involve more effort. 
909)     Sites like <a href="http://ipid.shat.net">http://ipid.shat.net</a> and 
910)     <a href="http://www.showmyip.com/">http://www.showmyip.com/</a> will tell 
911)     you what your IP address appears to be, but you'll need to know your 
912)     current IP address so you can compare and decide whether you're using Tor 
913)     correctly.

914)     </p>
915)     <p>

916)     To learn your IP address on OS X, Linux, BSD, etc, run "ifconfig". On 
917)     Windows, go to the Start menu, click Run and enter "cmd". At the command 
918)     prompt, enter "ipconfig /a".

919)     </p>
920)     <p>

921)     If you are behind a NAT or firewall, though, your IP address will be 
922)     within the range of 10.XXX.XXX.XXX, 192.168.XXX.XXX, or 172.16.XXX.XXX - 
923)     172.31.XXX.XXX, which is not your public IP address. In this case, you 
924)     should check your IP address with one of the sites above without using 
925)     Tor, and then check again using Tor to see whether your IP address has 
926)     changed. 

927)     </p>
928)     
929)     <hr>
930)     
931)     <a id="FTP"></a>
932)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
933)     </a></h3>
934) 

935)     <p>

936)     Use the <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor 
937)     Browser Bundle</a>. If you want a separate application for an 

938)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can 
939)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port 
940)     "9050". 
941)     </p>

942) 

943)     <hr>
944)     

945)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>
946)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal 
947)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
948) 
949)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands 
950)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data 
951)     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data, 
952)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't 
953)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a 
954)     href="https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning">Be 
955)     careful and be smart.</a>
956)     </p>
957) 
958)     <hr>
959) 

960)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

961)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

962)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

963) 

964)     <p>
965)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

966)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

967)     <hr>

968) 

969)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>

970)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL 
971)     certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>

972)     <p>

973)     <pre>

974)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

975)     The serial number is:

976) 06:DE:97:E5:1D:C3:9D:C2:64:8D:AC:72:DD:41:01:FC
977)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 1f9d306e8bfccfcb03981a71a27a9f5d1e0876ce

978)     The SHA-256 fingerprint is:

979) 3613d2b22a750094760c41ad19db52a4f05bdea80172e2578761ad967f7ed9aa

980) 

981)     blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

982)     The serial number is: 00:EF:A3
983)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f

984)     </pre>

985)     </p>
986)     <hr>
987) 

988)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

989)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
990) Tor?</a></h3>
991) 
992)     <p>
993)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
994) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
995) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
996)     </p>

997) 

998)     <p>

999)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
1000) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
1001)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
1002) way to

1003)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers. 

1004)     </p>

1005) 

1006)     <p>
1007)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
1008)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
1009)     </p>

1010) 

1011)     <p>

1012)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
1013) method. But
1014)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
1015) it should

1016)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
1017)     </p>

1018) 

1019)     <hr>

1020) 

1021)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

1022)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
1023) the download page?</a></h3>

1024) 

1025)     <p>

1026)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
1027) downloaded is

1028)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
1029)     </p>

1030) 

1031)     <p>
1032)     Please read the <a

1033)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
1034) page for details.

1035)     </p>

1036) 

1037) <hr>
1038) 
1039) <a id="GetTor"></a>
1040) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
1041) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
1042) 
1043) <p>
1044) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
1045) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

1046) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

1047) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

1048) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
1049) cache</a>

1050) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
1051) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
1052) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail

1053) '<tt>gettor@gettor.torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'

1054) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
1055) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
1056) to receive very large attachments.
1057) </p>
1058) 
1059) <p>

1060) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
1061) signature</a>

1062) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
1063) other than our official HTTPS website.

1064) </p>
1065) 
1066) <hr>

1067) 

1068)     <a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>

1069)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor
1070) under Windows?</a></h3>

1071) 

1072)     <p>

1073)     Try following the steps at <a
1074) href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">

1075)     tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.
1076)     </p>

1077) 

1078)     <p>
1079)     (Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use

1080)     it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a
1081) href="<page

1082)     download/download>">download page</a>.)
1083)     </p>

1084) 

1085)     <hr>

1086) 

1087)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>

1088)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor
1089) executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

1090) 

1091)     <p>

1092)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger
1093) on some
1094)     parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
1095) false
1096)     positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware
1097) business is just a
1098)     guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
1099) that you have
1100)     a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a
1101) better vendor.

1102)     </p>

1103) 

1104)     <p>
1105)     In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for

1106)     it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do
1107) <a

1108)     href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.
1109)     </p>

1110) 

1111)     <hr>

1112) 

1113)     <a id="tarFiles"></a>
1114)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarFiles">How do I open a .tar.gz 

1115)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1116) 
1117)     <p>
1118)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your
1119)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking. 
1120)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute 

1121)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1122)     <p>

1123)     as documented on tar's man page. 

1124)     </p>
1125) 
1126)     <hr>
1127) 

1128)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1129)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1130) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1131) 

1132)     <p>

1133)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1134)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor
1135) Browser

1136)     Bundle</a>.

1137)     </p>

1138) 
1139) <hr>
1140) 

1141) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1142) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on
1143) YouTube

1144) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1145) 
1146) <p>

1147) YouTube and similar sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.
1148) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1149) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes
1150) but is not limited to: <a href="http://decloak.net">completely disregarding
1151) proxy settings</a>, querying your <a

1152) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1153) local IP address</a>, and <a

1154) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1155) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1156) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a> 
1157) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass, 
1158) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain. 
1159) </p>

1160) 
1161) <p>

1162) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/html5">YouTube offers experimental HTML5 video

1163) support</a> for many of their videos. Often you can get the HTML5 version of 
1164) videos that don't want to play by grabbing the YouTube URL from the "Embed" 
1165) code under a video's "Share" option. The link switches out a URL that looks</p>
1166) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>
1167) <p>to something that looks like</p>
1168) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/embed/CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>

1169) 

1170) <hr>
1171) 

1172) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1173) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1174) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1175) <p>

1176) Ubuntu prevents its users from executing shell scripts by clicking them, 
1177) even when the file permissions are set correctly. For now you need to 
1178) start the Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1179) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1180) <p>
1181) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1182) </p>
1183) 

1184) <hr>
1185) 

1186) <a id="UbuntuBlackedOut"></a>
1187) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#UbuntuBlackedOut">
1188) I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't type anything into my browser.</a></h3>
1189) <p>Another issue affecting Ubuntu users is that when Tor Browser opens, text
1190) fields, including the address bar, are blacked out and can not be used.
1191) This is not so great, and we hope to include a fix in a coming release. 
1192) In the mean time, this issue can be worked around by editing the 
1193) start-tor-browser script and adding the following line below line 1:</p>

1194) <pre>export GTK_IM_MODULE=xim</pre>

1195) <p>This issue is related to the version of IBUS that ships with Ubuntu. 
1196) Some users have also reported success by executing this command</p>

1197) <pre>ibus exit</pre>

1198) <p>To follow the progress of this issue, see this <a 
1199) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9353">bug ticket.</a>
1200) </p>
1201) 
1202) <hr>
1203) 
1204) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1205) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
1206) software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></h3>
1207) <p>
1208) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the 
1209) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off 
1210) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1211) </p>
1212) 

1213) <hr>
1214) 

1215) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>

1216) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">

1217) I want to run another application through the Tor launched by Tor

1218) Browser Bundle.</a></h3>

1219) 
1220) <p>

1221) Typically Tor listens for Socks connections on port 9050. TBB listens

1222) on port 9150.

1223) The goal is to avoid conflicting with a "system" Tor install,

1224) so you can run a system Tor and TBB at the same time. We're <a
1225) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3948">working on
1226) a feature</a> where Tor will try the usual ports first and then back

1227) off to a random choice if they're already in use.

1228) </p>
1229) 
1230) <hr>
1231) 
1232) <a id="TBBPolipo"></a>
1233) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did
1234) Polipo go?</a></h3>
1235) 
1236) <p>
1237) In the past, Tor bundles included an HTTP proxy like Privoxy or Polipo,
1238) solely to work around a bug in Firefox that was finally fixed in Firefox
1239) 6. Now you don't need a separate HTTP proxy to use Tor, and in fact
1240) leaving it out makes you safer because Torbutton has better control over
1241) Firefox's interaction with websites.
1242) </p>
1243) 
1244) <p>
1245) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero

1246) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set

1247) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try

1248) to use a Socks proxy rather than an http proxy — Tor runs a Socks

1249) proxy on port 9050 on Windows, or <a href="#TBBSocksPort">see above</a>
1250) for OSX and Linux.
1251) </p>
1252) 
1253) <p>

1254) If that fails, feel free to install <a

1255) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1256) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1257) users. Privoxy has an <a
1258) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1259) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.

1260) </p>
1261) 
1262) <hr>
1263) 

1264) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1265) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1266) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1267) 
1268) <p>

1269) The Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from 
1270) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any 
1271) additional Firefox add-ons with the Tor Browser Bundle. Add-ons can break 
1272) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and 
1273) bypassing proxy settings.

1274) </p>

1275) <p>

1276) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or 
1277) anti-tracking software with the Tor Browser Bundle. Right now, we do not 
1278) think that's such a good idea. The Tor Browser Bundle aims to provide 
1279) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are 
1280) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which 
1281) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">
1282) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that 
1283) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint 
1284) users. 

1285) </p>

1286) 

1287) <hr>
1288) 

1289) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1290) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1291) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript
1292) configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?
1293) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1294) 
1295) <p>
1296) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
1297) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
1298) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1299) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1300) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1301) JavaScript might make a website work).
1302) </p>
1303) 

1304) <p>
1305) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1306) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1307) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1308) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1309) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1310) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1311) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1312) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1313) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1314) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1315) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1316) </p>

1317) 
1318) <p>

1319) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1320) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1321) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1322) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1323) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1324) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1325) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1326) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1327) partitioning concern will remain.

1328) </p>
1329) 
1330) <p>

1331) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1332) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1333) </p>
1334) 
1335) <hr>
1336) 

1337) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1338) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1339) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1340) 
1341) <p>
1342) Unfortunately, Torbutton only works with Firefox right now, and without
1343) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/">Torbutton's
1344) extensive privacy fixes</a> there are many ways for websites or other

1345) attackers to recognize you, track you back to your IP address, and so
1346) on.

1347) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
1348) really bad idea.
1349) </p>
1350) 
1351) <p>
1352) We're working with the Chrome team to <a

1353) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-
1354) and-fingerprinting">fix
1355) some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it will be possible to write
1356) a
1357) Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any other browser is on the
1358) horizon.

1359) </p>
1360) 
1361) <hr>
1362) 

1363) <a id="TorbuttonOtherBrowser"></a>

1364) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">

1365) Will ​Torbutton be available for other browsers?</a></h3>

1366) 
1367) <p>

1368)  We don't support IE, Opera or Safari and never plan to. There are too many ways that your privacy can go wrong with those browsers, and because of their closed design it is really hard for us to do anything to change these privacy problems.

1369) </p>
1370) <p>

1371) We are working with the Chrome people to modify Chrome's internals so that we can eventually support it. But for now, Firefox is the only safe choice. 

1372) </p>
1373) 

1374) <hr>

1375) 

1376) <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a>

1377) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor
1378) Browser

1379) Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3>
1380) 
1381) <p>
1382) We're working on a way to make this possible on all platforms. Please
1383) be patient.
1384) </p>
1385) 
1386) <hr>
1387) 

1388) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1389) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1390) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1391) 
1392) <p>
1393) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1394) considers Tor to be spyware.
1395) </p>
1396) 
1397) <p>

1398) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are
1399) also

1400) shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message

1401) when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1402) Google

1403) interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit
1404) relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website,
1405) so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.
1406) </p>
1407) <p>
1408) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1409) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1410) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1411) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1412) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1413) an infection.
1414) </p>
1415) 
1416) <p>

1417) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally
1418) specifically

1419) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1420) should clear up again after a short time.
1421) </p>
1422) 
1423) <p>
1424) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
1425) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as

1426) DuckDuckGo, ixquick, or Bing.

1427) </p>
1428) 
1429) <hr />
1430) 

1431) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1432) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1433) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1434) 
1435) <p>

1436)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it 
1437)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language 
1438)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results 
1439)  on your queries.

1440) </p>
1441) <p>

1442) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that 
1443) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the 
1444) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on 
1445) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact. The easy way to 
1446) avoid this "feature" is to use 
1447) <a href="https://google.com/ncr">https://google.com/ncr</a>.

1448) </p>
1449) <p>

1450) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one 
1451) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return 
1452) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been 
1453) sent to. On a query this looks like: 
1454) </p>

1455) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1456) <p>

1457) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google. 
1458) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on. 

1459) </p>
1460) <hr />

1461) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1462) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1463) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1464) 
1465) <p>
1466) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1467) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1468) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1469) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1470) </p>
1471) 
1472) <p>
1473) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1474) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1475) decided

1476) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1477) rightful owner.
1478) </p>
1479) 
1480) <p>
1481) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1482) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1483) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1484) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1485) </p>
1486) 
1487) <p>
1488) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1489) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1490) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1491) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1492) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1493) hijacking">

1494) way more complex than that</a>.
1495) </p>
1496) 
1497) <p>
1498) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1499) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1500) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1501) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1502) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1503) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1504) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1505) </p>
1506) 
1507) <hr>
1508) 

1509) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1510) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection 
1511) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1512) 
1513) <p>
1514) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in 
1515) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check 
1516) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a 
1517) href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en">man page</a>, 
1518) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for 
1519) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an 
1520) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine 
1521) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options 
1522) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy. 
1523) </p>
1524) <p>

1525) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator 
1526) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently, 
1527) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a 

1528) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post 
1529) in the archives</a> useful. 
1530) </p>
1531) <p>
1532) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the 
1533) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how 
1534) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access. 
1535) </p>
1536) 
1537) <hr>
1538) 

1539) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>
1540) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't 
1541) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1542) 
1543) <p>
1544) On Unix, we recommend you give <a 
1545) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try. 
1546) Alternative proxifying tools like <a 
1547) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a 
1548) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also 
1549) available.</p>
1550) <p> 
1551) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a 
1552) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a 
1553) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a 
1554) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed
1555) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here. 
1556) </p>
1557) 
1558) <hr>
1559) 

1560)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>
1561)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map 
1562)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1563) 
1564)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox 
1565)     extension that provides similar functionality. Unfortunately, circuit 
1566)     status reporting is still missing, but we are <a 
1567)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8641">working 
1568)     on providing it</a>. </p>
1569) 
1570)     <p>In the meantime, we are providing standalone Vidalia packages for 
1571)     people who still want the map. Windows and Linux versions are <a 

1572)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~erinn/vidalia-standalone-bundles/">

1573)     available here</a>.</p> 

1574) 
1575)     <p>To use these packages, extract them, then run the startup script. 
1576)     On Windows, this is "Start Vidalia.exe". On Linux, it is start-vidalia. 
1577)     They can be placed in a different directory from TBB (and likely should 
1578)     be). </p>
1579) 
1580)     <p>This Vidalia package will only run properly if Tor Browser has already 
1581)     been launched. You cannot start it before launching Tor Browser. </p>
1582) 
1583)     <p>MacOS is still under development, but in the mean time you can modify 
1584)     your TBB 2.x to be a standalone Vidalia (and then use it after starting 
1585)     TBB 3.x) by opening your TBB 2.x vidalia.conf file in an editor and 
1586)     replacing its contents with just these lines:</p>
1587) 
1588)     <pre>
1589)     [General]
1590)     LanguageCode=en
1591) 
1592)     [Tor]
1593)     ControlPort=9151
1594)     TorExecutable=.
1595)     Torrc=.
1596)     DataDirectory=.
1597)     AuthenticationMethod=cookie
1598)     </pre> 
1599) 
1600)     <hr>
1601) 
1602)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1603)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1604)     </h3>
1605) 
1606)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript 
1607)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24 
1608)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config 
1609)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1610) 
1611)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the 
1612)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select 
1613)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists 
1614)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas 
1615)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1616) 
1617)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config, 
1618)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1619) 
1620)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1621)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled
1622)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon, 
1623)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and 
1624)     provides a button for it. </p>
1625) 
1626)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and 
1627)     NoScript. </p>
1628) 
1629)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a 

1630)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1631) 
1632)     <hr>
1633) 
1634)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1635)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1636)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1637) 
1638)     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the 
1639)     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a 
1640)     href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en">
1641)     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional 
1642)     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as 
1643)     the download.</p>
1644) 
1645)     <ul>
1646)       <li>Download the Tor Browser package, the sha256sums.txt file, and the
1647)       sha256sums signature files. They can all be found in the same directory 
1648)       under <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/">
1649)       https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/</a>, for example in 3.5 
1650)       for TBB 3.5.</li>
1651)       <li>Retrieve the signers' GPG keys. This can be done from the command 
1652)       line by entering something like 
1653)       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>
1654)       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other 
1655)       developers' key IDs can be found on
1656)       <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en">this 
1657)       page</a>.)</li>
1658)       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
1659)       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>
1660)       <li>You should see a message like "Good signature from &lt;DEVELOPER 
1661)       NAME&gt;". If you don't, there is a problem. Try these steps again.</li>
1662)       <li>Now you can take the sha256sum of the Tor Browser package. On 
1663)       Windows you can use the <a href="http://md5deep.sourceforge.net/">
1664)       hashdeep utility</a> and run
1665)       <pre>C:\location\where\you\saved\hashdeep -c sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.exe</pre>
1666)       On Mac or Linux you can run <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.zip</pre> or <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> without having to download a utility.</li>
1667)       <li>You will see a string of letters and numbers.</li>
1668)       <li>Open sha256sums.txt in a text editor.</li>
1669)       <li>Locate the name of the Tor Browser file you downloaded.</li>
1670)       <li>Compare the string of letters and numbers to the left of your
1671)       filename with the string of letters and numbers that appeared 
1672)       on your command line. If they match, you've successfully verified the 
1673)       build.</li> 
1674)     </ul>
1675) 
1676)     <p><a href="https://github.com/isislovecruft/scripts/blob/master/verify-gitian-builder-signatures">
1677)     Scripts</a> to <a 
1678)     href="http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/648/how-to-verify-tor-browser-bundle-tbb-3-x">automate
1679)     </a> these steps have been written, but to use them you will need to 
1680)     modify them yourself with the latest Tor Browser Bundle filename.</p>
1681) 
1682)     <hr>
1683) 
1684)     <a id="PluggableTransports"></a>
1685)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></h3>
1686) 
1687)     <p>
1688)     For now, the Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is still a separate 
1689)     unofficial package. Download them <a 
1690)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.5-pt20131217/">
1691)     here</a>. We hope to have combined packages available in a beta soon.
1692)     </p>
1693) 
1694)     <p>
1695)     The separate Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is different from the 
1696)     Pluggable Transports bundles that have been released in the past. 
1697)     They include the programs necessary to use obfsproxy and flash proxy, 
1698)     but the pluggable transports are not enabled by default. You must 
1699)     enable them manually by adding Bridge lines to the torrc file. 
1700)     (Please see ticket <a 
1701)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10418">#10418</a> 
1702)     for how we hope to make it easier to do in the future.)
1703)     </p>
1704) 
1705)     <p>
1706)     To enable <b>obfsproxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the 
1707)     bundle and add the lines: 
1708)     </p>
1709) 
1710)     <pre>
1711) Bridge obfs3 83.212.101.2:42782 2ADFE7AA8D272C520D1FBFBF4E413F3A1B26313D
1712) Bridge obfs3 83.212.101.2:443 2ADFE7AA8D272C520D1FBFBF4E413F3A1B26313D
1713) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.74:31493 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9
1714) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.75:46328 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9

1715) Bridge obfs3 209.141.36.236:45496 58D91C3A631F910F32E18A55441D5A0463BA66E2
1716) Bridge obfs3 208.79.90.242:35658 BA61757846841D64A83EA2514C766CB92F1FB41F

1717) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:38980 9D7259A696F7DAB073043B28114112A46D36CFFD
1718) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:47779 844B1F53FFD548C998F8D3B01B7E19FA07C3396E
1719) Bridge obfs2 83.212.100.216:47870 1F01A7BB60F49FC96E0850A6BAD6D076DFEFAF80
1720) Bridge obfs2 83.212.96.182:46602 6F058CBEF888EB20D1DEB9886909F1E812245D41
1721) Bridge obfs2 70.182.182.109:54542 94C9E691688FAFDEC701A0788BD15BE8AD34ED35
1722) Bridge obfs2 128.31.0.34:1051 CA7434F14A898C7D3427B8295A7F83446BC7F496
1723) Bridge obfs2 83.212.101.2:45235 2ADFE7AA8D272C520D1FBFBF4E413F3A1B26313D
1724)     </pre>
1725)     <p>
1726)     To enable <b>flash proxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the 

1727)     bundle and add the line: 

1728)     </p>
1729)     <pre>
1730) Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
1731)     </pre>
1732) 
1733)     <hr>
1734) 
1735)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>
1736)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New 
1737)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1738) 
1739)     <p>
1740)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level 
1741)     browser data too. But it sure is a surprising feature, for people who 
1742)     are used to Vidalia's "new identity" behavior.
1743)     </p>
1744) 
1745)     <p>

1746)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1747)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1748)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1749)     ticket <a
1750)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1751)     to follow progress there.

1752)     </p>
1753) 
1754)     <p>

1755)     In the mean time, you can get Vidalia's old "newnym" functionality by
1756)     attaching a Vidalia to your TBB 3.x. See the instructions <a
1757)     href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">above</a>.

1758)     </p>
1759) 
1760)     <hr>
1761) 
1762)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1763)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1764) 
1765)     <p>
1766)     You've got three options. 
1767)     </p>
1768) 
1769)     <p>
1770)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system 
1771)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay 
1772)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>). 
1773)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1774)     </p>
1775) 
1776)     <p>
1777)     Second (simpler option), if you're on Windows, you can fetch the separate 
1778)     "Vidalia relay bundle" or "Vidalia bridge bundle" from the download page 
1779)     and then use that (again you can use TBB independent of it). 
1780)     </p>
1781) 
1782)     <p>
1783)     Third (complex option), you can either hook your Vidalia up to TBB (as 
1784)     described in the FAQ above) or edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc) 
1785)     directly to add the following lines: 
1786)     </p>
1787)     <pre>
1788)     ORPort 443
1789)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1790)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1791)     </pre>
1792)     <p>
1793)     If you've installed <a 
1794)     href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>, 
1795)     you'll need to add one more line:
1796)     </p>
1797)     <pre>
1798)     ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
1799)     </pre>
1800)     <p>
1801)     This third option is pretty klunky right now; see e.g. <a 
1802)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10449">this bug</a>; 
1803)     but we're hoping it will become an easy option in the future. 
1804)     </p>
1805) 
1806)     <hr>
1807) 
1808)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>
1809)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps 
1810)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1811) 
1812)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build" 
1813)     process, which allows many people to build the Tor Browser Bundle and 
1814)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a 
1815)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first 
1816)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a 
1817)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second
1818)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it. 
1819)     </p>
1820) 
1821)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same 
1822)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason 
1823)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1824) 
1825)     <hr>
1826) 
1827)     <a id="SourceCode"></a>
1828)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>
1829) 
1830)     <p>
1831)     Start with <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git</a> and <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build</a>.
1832)     </p>
1833) 
1834) 

1835) <hr>
1836) 

1837) <a id="torrc"></a>

1838) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1839) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1840) 
1841) <p>
1842) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1843) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1844) configuration should work fine for most Tor users. 

1845) </p>

1846) <p>

1847) If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for

1848) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory. 
1849) </p>
1850) <p>
1851) Core tor puts the torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> if you installed a pre-built package.</p>

1852) 
1853) <p>

1854) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart tor for the
1855) changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1856) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1857) it.)

1858) </p>
1859) 
1860) <p>

1861) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page
1862) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a 

1863) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/config/torrc.sample.in">
1864) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all 
1865) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect 
1866) on Tor's configuration.

1867) </p>
1868) 
1869) <hr>
1870) 

1871) <a id="Logs"></a>

1872) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1873) logs?</a></h3>

1874) 
1875) <p>

1876) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1877) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1878) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1879) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1880) </p>
1881) 
1882) <p>
1883) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1884) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1885) </p>
1886) 
1887) <ul>
1888) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1889) </li>

1890) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1891) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1892) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1893) </li>
1894) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1895) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1896) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1897) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1898) </li>
1899) </ul>
1900) 
1901) <p>

1902) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1903) torrc</a>

1904) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1905) following line:

1906) </p>
1907) 
1908) <pre>

1909) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1910) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1911) </pre>

1912) 
1913) <p>

1914) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1915) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1916) of the section:
1917) </p>
1918) 
1919) <pre>
1920) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1921) </pre>
1922) 
1923) <p>

1924) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1925) and filename for your Tor log.

1926) </p>
1927) 
1928) <hr>
1929) 

1930) 
1931) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1932) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1933) 
1934) <p>

1935) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in 
1936) Tor's logs:

1937) </p>
1938) 
1939) <ul>

1940)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will 
1941)     exit.</li>
1942)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad 
1943)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something 
1944)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to 
1945)     correct the problem.</li>

1946)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1947)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's 
1948)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1949)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li> 
1950) </ul>
1951) 
1952) <p>

1953) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the 
1954) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react 
1955) correctly for each situation.

1956) </p>
1957) 
1958) <p>

1959) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about 
1960) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1961) </p>
1962) 
1963) <p>

1964) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal 
1965) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in 
1966) their logs. 

1967) </p>
1968) 

1969) <hr>
1970) 

1971) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1972) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1973) working.</a></h3>

1974) 
1975) <p>

1976) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1977) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1978) </p>
1979) 
1980) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1981) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it
1982) will
1983) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the
1984) Vidalia

1985) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1986) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1987) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1988) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1989) client functionality is working."
1990) </p>
1991) 
1992) <p>
1993) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1994) </p>
1995) 
1996) <ol>
1997) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1998) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1999) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

2000) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
2001) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

2002) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
2003) zone is correct.</li>

2004) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
2005) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

2006) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

2007) </li>

2008) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
2009) that

2010) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
2011) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
2012) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
2013) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

2014) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

2015) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
2016) about what's going wrong?</li>

2017) </ol>
2018) 
2019) <hr />
2020) 

2021) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
2022) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
2023) <p>
2024)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor. 
2025)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even 
2026)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so 
2027)  we can help you track it down. 
2028) </p>
2029) <p>
2030) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest 
2031) stable or the latest development version). 
2032) </p>
2033) <p>
2034) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at 
2035) least libevent 1.3a. 
2036) </p>
2037) <p>
2038) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a 
2039) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so, 
2040) check if there are any new details that you can add. 
2041) </p>
2042) <p>
2043) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can 
2044) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that 
2045) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up? 
2046) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for 
2047) example the latest stable release? 
2048) </p>
2049) <p>
2050) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get? 
2051) </p>
2052) <ul>
2053) <li>
2054) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please 
2055) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on. 
2056) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially 
2057) if they seem important. 
2058) </li>
2059) <li>
2060) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to 
2061) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or 
2062) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your 
2063) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt", 
2064) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c 
2065) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core 
2066) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows 
2067) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate 
2068) your bug on Unix?)
2069) </li>
2070) <li>
2071) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation 
2072) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you 
2073) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a 
2074) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should 
2075) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can 
2076) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground, 
2077) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default 
2078) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a> 
2079) for details. 
2080) </li>
2081) <li>
2082) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it? 
2083) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes 
2084) sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running 
2085) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will 
2086) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases 
2087) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware 
2088) problems could also be the culprit. 
2089) </li>
2090) </ul>
2091) <p>
2092) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your 
2093) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ 
2094) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually 
2095) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole 
2096) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send 
2097) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then 
2098) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed. 
2099) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down 
2100) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise 
2101) to keep logs like this sitting around.) 
2102) </p>
2103) 
2104) <hr />
2105) 

2106) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>

2107) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a
2108) password at start.</a></h3>

2109) 
2110) <p>
2111) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
2112) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
2113) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
2114) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
2115) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
2116) compromising your anonymity.
2117) </p>
2118) 
2119) <p>
2120) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
2121) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
2122) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
2123) </p>
2124) 
2125) <ol>
2126) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
2127) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
2128) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
2129) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
2130) </li>
2131) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
2132) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,

2133) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are
2134) different.

2135) <br />

2136) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset
2137) button,

2138) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
2139) control password.
2140) <br />
2141) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
2142) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
2143) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
2144) to restart Tor and all will work again.
2145) </li>
2146) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a Windows NT service. When Tor
2147) is set to
2148) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
2149) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
2150) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
2151) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
2152) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
2153) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
2154) <br />
2155) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on

2156) <a href="#NTservice">running Tor as a

2157) Windows NT service</a>

2158) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
2159) </li>
2160) </ol>
2161) 

2162)     <hr>

2163) 

2164)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>

2165)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which
2166) nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

2167) 

2168)     <p>

2169)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
2170)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

2171)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
2172)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

2173)     </p>
2174)     <dl>
2175)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2176)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the
2177) circuit, if possible.

2178)         </dd>
2179)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2180)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the
2181) circuit, if possible.

2182)         </dd>
2183)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2184)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

2185)         </dd>
2186)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2187)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.

2188)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in
2189) this list.

2190)         </dd>
2191)     </dl>
2192)     <p>

2193)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>

2194)     — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future
2195) versions.

2196)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
2197)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
2198)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

2199)     </p>
2200)     <p>

2201)     Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of 
2202)     the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those 
2203)     used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, 
2204)     those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at 
2205)     a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see 
2206)     <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> and <tt>StrictNodes</tt> in the 
2207)     <a href="<page docs/tor-manual>">manual</a>.

2208)     </p>
2209)     <p>

2210)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a

2211) 
2212) href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2"
2213) >2

2214)     letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example <tt>{de}</tt>),

2215)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node
2216)     nickname. Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the
2217)     list items.

2218)     </p>
2219)     <p>

2220)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks
2221) interface

2222)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an

2223)     internal mapping in your configuration file using
2224) <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

2225)     See the manual page for details.
2226)     </p>

2227) 

2228)     <hr>

2229) 

2230) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

2231) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a
2232) few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

2233) 
2234) <p>
2235) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only

2236) use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1"
2237) to

2238) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

2239) configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect
2240) to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window.
2241) </p>
2242) 
2243) <p>
2244) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
2245) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
2246) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
2247) </p>
2248) 
2249) <p>
2250) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
2251) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
2252) </p>
2253) 
2254) <pre>
2255)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
2256)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
2257) </pre>
2258) 
2259) <hr>

2260) 

2261)     <a id="DefaultExitPorts"></a>
2262)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit 

2263)     ports?</a></h3>

2264)     <p>

2265) The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or 
2266) ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or 
2267) modifying the source code. But the default according to src/or/policies.c 
2268) from the source code release tor-0.2.4.16-rc is: 

2269)     </p>
2270)     <pre>
2271)   reject 0.0.0.0/8
2272)   reject 169.254.0.0/16
2273)   reject 127.0.0.0/8
2274)   reject 192.168.0.0/16
2275)   reject 10.0.0.0/8
2276)   reject 172.16.0.0/12
2277)   reject *:25
2278)   reject *:119
2279)   reject *:135-139
2280)   reject *:445
2281)   reject *:563
2282)   reject *:1214
2283)   reject *:4661-4666
2284)   reject *:6346-6429
2285)   reject *:6699
2286)   reject *:6881-6999
2287)   accept *:*
2288)     </pre>
2289)     <p>

2290)     A relay will block access to its own IP address, as well local network 
2291)     IP addresses. A relay always blocks itself by default. This prevents 
2292)     Tor users from accidentally accessing any of the exit operator's local 
2293)     services. 
2294)     </p>
2295) 
2296)     <hr>
2297) 

2298)     <a id="WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks"></a>
2299)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I 
2300)     keep seeing these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. 
2301)     Should I worry?</a></h3>
2302)     <p>
2303)     The warning is: 
2304)     </p>
2305)     <p>
2306)     Your application (using socks5 on port %d) is giving Tor only an IP 
2307)     address. Applications that do DNS resolves themselves may leak 
2308)     information. Consider using Socks4A (e.g. via Polipo or socat) instead. 
2309)     </p>
2310)     <p>
2311)     If you are running Tor to get anonymity, and you are worried about an 
2312)     attacker who is even slightly clever, then yes, you should worry. Here's why. 
2313)     </p>
2314)     <p>
2315)     <b>The Problem.</b> When your applications connect to servers on the 
2316)     Internet, they need to resolve hostnames that you can read (like 
2317)     www.torproject.org) into IP addresses that the Internet can use (like 
2318)     209.237.230.66). To do this, your application sends a request to a DNS 
2319)     server, telling it the hostname it wants to resolve. The DNS server 
2320)     replies by telling your application the IP address. 
2321)     </p>
2322)     <p>
2323)     Clearly, this is a bad idea if you plan to connect to the remote host 
2324)     anonymously: when your application sends the request to the DNS server, 
2325)     the DNS server (and anybody else who might be watching) can see what 
2326)     hostname you are asking for. Even if your application then uses Tor to 
2327)     connect to the IP anonymously, it will be pretty obvious that the user 
2328)     making the anonymous connection is probably the same person who made 
2329)     the DNS request. 
2330)     </p>
2331)     <p>
2332)     <b>Where SOCKS comes in.</b> Your application uses the SOCKS protocol 
2333)     to connect to your local Tor client. There are 3 versions of SOCKS you 
2334)     are likely to run into: SOCKS 4 (which only uses IP addresses), SOCKS 5 
2335)     (which usually uses IP addresses in practice), and SOCKS 4a (which uses 
2336)     hostnames). 
2337)     </p>
2338)     <p>
2339)     When your application uses SOCKS 4 or SOCKS 5 to give Tor an IP address, 
2340)     Tor guesses that it 'probably' got the IP address non-anonymously from a 
2341)     DNS server. That's why it gives you a warning message: you probably aren't 
2342)     as anonymous as you think. 
2343)     </p>
2344)     <p>
2345)     <b>So what can I do?</b> We describe a few solutions below. 
2346)     </p>
2347)     <ul>
2348)     <li>If your application speaks SOCKS 4a, use it. </li>
2349)     <li>If you only need one or two hosts, or you are good at programming, 
2350)     you may be able to get a socks-based port-forwarder like socat to work 
2351)     for you; see <a 
2352)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO">the 
2353)     Torify HOWTO</a> for examples. </li>
2354)     <li>Tor ships with a program called tor-resolve that can use the Tor 
2355)     network to look up hostnames remotely; if you resolve hostnames to IPs 
2356)     with tor-resolve, then pass the IPs to your applications, you'll be fine. 
2357)     (Tor will still give the warning, but now you know what it means.) </li>
2358) <!-- I'm not sure if this project is still maintained or not
2359) 
2360) <li>You can use TorDNS as a local DNS server to rectify the DNS leakage. See the Torify HOWTO for info on how to run particular applications anonymously. </li>
2361) !-->
2362)     </ul>
2363)     <p>If you think that you applied one of the solutions properly but still 
2364)     experience DNS leaks please verify there is no third-party application 
2365)     using DNS independently of Tor. Please see <a 
2366)     href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">the FAQ entry on whether you're really 
2367)     absolutely anonymous using Tor</a> for some examples. 
2368)     </p>
2369) 
2370)     <hr>
2371) 

2372)     <a id="SocksAndDNS"></a>
2373)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses 
2374)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></h3>
2375) 
2376)     <p>
2377)     These are two steps you need to take here. The first is to make sure 
2378)     that it's using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, and the 
2379)     second is to make sure that there aren't other leaks. 
2380)     </p>
2381) 
2382)     <p>
2383)     Step one: add "TestSocks 1" to your torrc file, and then watch your 
2384)     logs as you use your application. Tor will then log, for each SOCKS 
2385)     connection, whether it was using a 'good' variant or a 'bad' one. 
2386)     (If you want to automatically disable all 'bad' variants, set 
2387)     "SafeSocks 1" in your <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> file.) 
2388)     </p>
2389) 
2390)     <p>
2391)     Step two: even if your application is using the correct variant of 
2392)     the SOCKS protocol, there is still a risk that it could be leaking 
2393)     DNS queries. This problem happens in Firefox extensions that resolve 
2394)     the destination hostname themselves, for example to show you its IP 
2395)     address, what country it's in, etc. These applications may use a safe 
2396)     SOCKS variant when actually making connections, but they still do DNS 
2397)     resolves locally. If you suspect your application might behave like 
2398)     this, you should use a network sniffer like <a 
2399)     href="https://www.wireshark.org/">Wireshark</a> and look for 
2400)     suspicious outbound DNS requests. I'm afraid the details of how to look 
2401)     for these problems are beyond the scope of a FAQ entry though -- find 
2402)     a friend to help if you have problems. 

2403)     </p>
2404) 
2405)     <hr>
2406) 

2407)     <a id="HowDoIDecide"></a>
2408)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should 
2409)     run a relay?</a></h3>
2410)     <p>
2411)     We're looking for people with reasonably reliable Internet connections, 
2412)     that have at least 20 kilobytes/second each way. If that's you, please 
2413)     consider <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">helping 
2414)     out</a>. 
2415)     </p>
2416)     
2417)     <hr>
2418)     
2419)     <a id="WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore"></a>
2420)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my 
2421)     relay being used more?</a></h3>
2422)     <p>
2423)     If your relay is relatively new then give it time. Tor decides which 
2424)     relays it uses heuristically based on reports from Bandwidth 
2425)     Authorities. These authorities take measurements of your relay's 
2426)     capacity and, over time, directs more traffic there until it reaches 
2427)     an optimal load. The lifecycle of a new relay is explained in more 
2428)     depth in <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay">
2429)     this blog post</a>.
2430)     </p>
2431)     <p>
2432)     If you've been running a relay for a while and still having issues 
2433)     then try asking on the <a href=
2434)     "https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays/">
2435)     tor-relays list</a>. 
2436)     </p>
2437)     
2438)     <hr>
2439) 

2440)     <a id="IDontHaveAStaticIP"></a>
2441)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static 
2442)     IP.</a></h3>
2443) 
2444)     <p>
2445)     Tor can handle relays with dynamic IP addresses just fine. Just leave 
2446)     the "Address" line in your torrc blank, and Tor will guess. 
2447)     </p>
2448) 
2449)     <hr>
2450) 
2451)     <a id="ModemKeepsCrashing"></a>
2452)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ModemKeepsCrashing">My cable/DSL modem 
2453)     keeps crashing. What's going on?</h3></a>
2454) 
2455)     <p>
2456)     Tor relays hold many connections open at once. This is more intensive 
2457)     use than your cable modem (or other home router) would ever get normally. 
2458)     So if there are any bugs or instabilities, they might show up now. 
2459)     </p>
2460)     <p>
2461)     If your router keeps crashing, you've got two options. First, you should 
2462)     try to upgrade its firmware. If you need tips on how to do this, ask 
2463)     Google or your cable/router provider, or try the Tor IRC channel. 
2464)     </p>
2465) 
2466)     <p>
2467)     Usually the firmware upgrade will fix it. If it doesn't, you will 
2468)     probably want to get a new (better) router. 
2469)     </p>
2470) 
2471)     <hr>
2472) 
2473)     <a id="PortscannedMore"></a>
2474)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned 
2475)     more often when I run a Tor relay?</a></h3>
2476) 
2477)     <p>
2478)     If you allow exit connections, some services that people connect to 
2479)     from your relay will connect back to collect more information about you. 
2480)     For example, some IRC servers connect back to your identd port to record 
2481)     which user made the connection. (This doesn't really work for them, 
2482)     because Tor doesn't know this information, but they try anyway.) Also, 
2483)     users exiting from you might attract the attention of other users on the 
2484)     IRC server, website, etc. who want to know more about the host they're 
2485)     relaying through. 
2486)     </p>
2487)     <p>
2488)     Another reason is that groups who scan for open proxies on the Internet 
2489)     have learned that sometimes Tor relays expose their socks port to the 
2490)     world. We recommend that you bind your socksport to local networks only. 
2491)     </p>
2492)     <p>
2493)     In any case, you need to keep up to date with your security. See this <a 
2494)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OperationalSecurity">article 
2495)     on operational security for Tor relays</a> for more suggestions. 
2496)     </p>
2497) 
2498)     <hr>
2499) 
2500)     <a id="MoreThanOneCPU"></a>
2501)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#MoreThanOneCPU">I have more than one CPU. 
2502)     Does this help?</a></h3>
2503) 
2504)     <p>
2505)     Yes. You can set your NumCpus config option in torrc to the number of 
2506)     CPUs you have, and Tor will spawn this many cpuworkers to deal with 
2507)     public key operations in parallel. 
2508)     </p>
2509) 
2510)     <p>
2511)     This option has no effect for clients. 
2512)     </p>
2513) 
2514)     <hr>
2515) 

2516)     <a id="HighCapacityConnection"></a>    
2517)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully 
2518)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></h3>
2519)     
2520)     <p>
2521)     See <a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/relays/Aug-2010/msg00034.html">this 
2522)     tor-relays thread</a>.
2523)     </p>
2524)     
2525)     <hr>    
2526)     

2527)     <a id="RelayFlexible"></a>

2528)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay
2529) need to be?</a></h3>

2530) 

2531)     <p>
2532)     We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
2533)     </p>

2534) 

2535)     <ul>
2536)     <li>Tor has built-in support for <a

2537)     href="<wikifaq>#WhatbandwidthshapingoptionsareavailabletoTorrelays">

2538)     rate limiting</a>. Further, if you have a fast
2539)     link but want to limit the number of bytes per
2540)     day (or week or month) that you donate, check out the <a

2541) 
2542) href="<wikifaq>#HowcanIlimitthetotalamountofbandwidthusedbymyTorrelay">
2543) hibernation

2544)     feature</a>.
2545)     </li>

2546)     <li>Each Tor relay has an <a href="#ExitPolicies">exit policy</a>
2547) that
2548)     specifies what sort of outbound connections are allowed or refused
2549) from
2550)     that relay. If you are uncomfortable allowing people to exit from
2551) your
2552)     relay, you can set it up to only allow connections to other Tor
2553) relays.

2554)     </li>
2555)     <li>It's fine if the relay goes offline sometimes. The directories
2556)     notice this quickly and stop advertising the relay. Just try to make
2557)     sure it's not too often, since connections using the relay when it
2558)     disconnects will break.
2559)     </li>
2560)     <li>We can handle relays with dynamic IPs just fine &mdash; simply
2561)     leave the Address config option blank, and Tor will try to guess.
2562)     </li>
2563)     <li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
2564)     IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port

2565)     forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but

2566)     <a href="#BehindANAT">this FAQ entry</a>

2567)     offers some examples on how to do this.
2568)     </li>
2569)     <li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent

2570)     bandwidth capacity, so high-bandwidth relays will attract more users
2571) than
2572)     low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful
2573) too.

2574)     </li>
2575)     </ul>

2576) 

2577)     <hr>

2578)     
2579)     <a id="BandwidthShaping"></a>
2580)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping 
2581)     options are available to Tor relays?</a></h3>
2582) 
2583)     <p>
2584)     There are two options you can add to your torrc file: 
2585)     </p>
2586)     <ul>
2587)     <li>
2588)     BandwidthRate is the maximum long-term bandwidth allowed (bytes per 
2589)     second). For example, you might want to choose "BandwidthRate 2 MB" 
2590)     for 2 megabytes per second (a fast connection), or "BandwidthRate 50 
2591)     KB" for 50 kilobytes per second (a medium-speed cable connection). 
2592)     The minimum BandwidthRate is 20 kilobytes per second. 
2593)     </li>
2594)     <li>
2595)     BandwidthBurst is a pool of bytes used to fulfill requests during 
2596)     short periods of traffic above BandwidthRate but still keeps the 
2597)     average over a long period to BandwidthRate. A low Rate but a high 
2598)     Burst enforces a long-term average while still allowing more traffic 
2599)     during peak times if the average hasn't been reached lately. For example, 
2600)     if you choose "BandwidthBurst 50 KB" and also use that for your 
2601)     BandwidthRate, then you will never use more than 50 kilobytes per second; 
2602)     but if you choose a higher BandwidthBurst (like 1 MB), it will allow 
2603)     more bytes through until the pool is empty.
2604)     </li>
2605)     </ul>
2606)     <p>
2607)     If you have an asymmetric connection (upload less than download) such 
2608)     as a cable modem, you should set BandwidthRate to less than your smaller 
2609)     bandwidth (Usually that's the upload bandwidth). (Otherwise, you could 
2610)     drop many packets during periods of maximum bandwidth usage -- you may 
2611)     need to experiment with which values make your connection comfortable.) 
2612)     Then set BandwidthBurst to the same as BandwidthRate. 
2613)     </p>
2614)     <p>
2615)     Linux-based Tor nodes have another option at their disposal: they can 
2616)     prioritize Tor traffic below other traffic on their machine, so that 
2617)     their own personal traffic is not impacted by Tor load. A ​<a 
2618)     href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/contrib/linux-tor-prio.sh">script
2619)     to do this</a> can be found in the Tor source distribution's contrib 
2620)     directory. 
2621)     </p>
2622)     <p>
2623)     Additionally, there are hibernation options where you can tell Tor to 
2624)     only serve a certain amount of bandwidth per time period (such as 100 
2625)     GB per month). These are covered in the <a 
2626)     href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">hibernation entry</a> below. 
2627)     </p>
2628)     <p>
2629)     Note that BandwidthRate and BandwidthBurst are in <b>Bytes,</b>not Bits. 
2630)     </p>
2631) 
2632)     <hr>
2633) 
2634)     <a id="LimitTotalBandwidth"></a>
2635)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the 
2636)     total amount of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></h3>
2637)     <p>
2638)     The accounting options in the torrc file allow you to specify the maximum 
2639)     amount of bytes your relay uses for a time period. 
2640)     </p>
2641)     <pre>
2642)     AccountingStart day week month [day] HH:MM
2643)     </pre>
2644)     <p>
2645)     This specifies when the accounting should reset. For instance, to setup 
2646)     a total amount of bytes served for a week (that resets every Wednesday 
2647)     at 10:00am), you would use: 
2648)     </p>
2649)     <pre>
2650)     AccountingStart week 3 10:00
2651)     AccountingMax N bytes KB MB GB TB
2652)     </pre>
2653)     <p>
2654)     This specifies the maximum amount of data your relay will send during an 
2655)     accounting period, and the maximum amount of data your relay will receive 
2656)     during an account period. When the accounting period resets (from 
2657)     AccountingStart), then the counters for AccountingMax are reset to 0.
2658)     </p>
2659)     <p>
2660)     Example. Let's say you want to allow 1 GB of traffic every day in each 
2661)     direction and the accounting should reset at noon each day: 
2662)     </p>
2663)     <pre>
2664)     AccountingStart day 12:00
2665)     AccountingMax 1 GB
2666)     </pre>
2667)     <p>
2668)     Note that your relay won't wake up exactly at the beginning of each 
2669)     accounting period. It will keep track of how quickly it used its 
2670)     quota in the last period, and choose a random point in the new interval 
2671)     to wake up. This way we avoid having hundreds of relays working at the 
2672)     beginning of each month but none still up by the end. 
2673)     </p>
2674)     <p>
2675)     If you have only a small amount of bandwidth to donate compared to your 
2676)     connection speed, we recommend you use daily accounting, so you don't 
2677)     end up using your entire monthly quota in the first day. Just divide 
2678)     your monthly amount by 30. You might also consider rate limiting to 
2679)     spread your usefulness over more of the day: if you want to offer X GB 
2680)     in each direction, you could set your BandwidthRate to 20*X. For example, 
2681)     if you have 10 GB to offer each way, you might set your BandwidthRate to 
2682)     200 KB: this way your relay will always be useful for at least half of 
2683)     each day. 
2684)     </p>

2685) 
2686)     <hr>
2687) 
2688)     <a id="RelayWritesMoreThanItReads"></a>

2689)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay 
2690)     write more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></h3>

2691) 
2692)     <p>You're right, for the most part a byte into your Tor relay means a 
2693)     byte out, and vice versa. But there are a few exceptions:</p>
2694) 
2695)     <p>If you open your DirPort, then Tor clients will ask you for a copy of 
2696)     the directory. The request they make (an HTTP GET) is quite small, and the 
2697)     response is sometimes quite large. This probably accounts for most of the 
2698)     difference between your "write" byte count and your "read" byte count.</p>
2699) 
2700)     <p>Another minor exception shows up when you operate as an exit node, and 
2701)     you read a few bytes from an exit connection (for example, an instant 
2702)     messaging or ssh connection) and wrap it up into an entire 512 byte cell 
2703)     for transport through the Tor network.</p>
2704) 
2705)     <hr>
2706) 
2707)     <a id="Hibernation"></a>
2708)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore 

2709)     after limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></h3>

2710) 
2711)     <p>The parameters assigned in the <a 
2712)     href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">AccountingMax</a> and <a 
2713)     href="#BandwidthShaping">BandwidthRate</a> apply to both client and 
2714)     relay functions of the Tor process. Thus you may find that you are unable 
2715)     to browse as soon as your Tor goes into hibernation, signaled by this 
2716)     entry in the log:</p>
2717) 
2718)     <pre>Bandwidth soft limit reached; commencing hibernation. No new 
2719)     connections will be accepted</pre>
2720) 
2721)     <p>The solution is to run two Tor processes - one relay and one client, 
2722)     each with its own config. One way to do this (if you are starting from a 
2723)     working relay setup) is as follows:</p>
2724) 
2725)     <ul>
2726)         <li>In the relay Tor torrc file, simply set the SocksPort to 0.</li>
2727)         <li>Create a new client torrc file from the torrc.sample and ensure 
2728)         it uses a different log file from the relay. One naming convention 
2729)         may be torrc.client and torrc.relay.</li>
2730)         <li>Modify the Tor client and relay startup scripts to include 
2731)         '-f /path/to/correct/torrc'.</li>
2732)         <li>In Linux/BSD/OSX, changing the startup scripts to Tor.client 
2733)         and Tor.relay may make separation of configs easier.</li>
2734)     </ul>
2735) 

2736)     <hr>

2737) 

2738)     <a id="ExitPolicies"></a>

2739)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I
2740) don't want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>

2741) 

2742)     <p>
2743)     Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
2744)     </p>

2745) 

2746)     <p>
2747)     Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of

2748)     outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The
2749) exit

2750)     policies are propagated to Tor clients via the directory, so clients
2751)     will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
2752)     exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
2753)     the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,

2754)     based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry
2755) on
2756)     <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might
2757) encounter</a>

2758)     if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's

2759)     <a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips

2760)     for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
2761)     </p>

2762) 

2763)     <p>

2764)     The default exit policy allows access to many popular services

2765)     (e.g. web browsing), but <a

2766) href="#DefaultExitPorts">restricts</a>

2767)     some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
2768)     the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
2769)     file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy

2770)     using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your

2771)     <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc</a>

2772)     file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it
2773) to
2774)     "reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting
2775) means
2776)     that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor
2777) network,

2778)     but not for connections to external websites or other services.
2779)     </p>

2780) 

2781)     <p>

2782)     If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution
2783) works

2784)     (that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).

2785)     If there are any resources that your computer can't reach (for
2786) example,

2787)     you are behind a restrictive firewall or content filter), please

2788)     explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor
2789) users

2790)     will be impacted too.
2791)     </p>

2792) 

2793)     <hr>

2794) 

2795)     <a id="DifferentComputer"></a>

2796)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DifferentComputer">I want to run my 
2797)     Tor client on a different computer than my applications.</a></h3>

2798)     <p>

2799)     By default, your Tor client only listens for applications that 
2800)     connect from localhost. Connections from other computers are 
2801)     refused. If you want to torify applications on different computers 
2802)     than the Tor client, you should edit your torrc to define 

2803)     SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0 and then restart (or hup) Tor. If you 

2804)     want to get more advanced, you can configure your Tor client on a 
2805)     firewall to bind to your internal IP but not your external IP.  

2806)     </p>
2807) 
2808)     <hr>
2809) 
2810)     <a id="ServerClient"></a>

2811)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a 
2812)     central server, and have my clients connect to it?</a></h3>
2813)     <p>
2814)      Yes. Tor can be configured as a client or a relay on another 
2815)      machine, and allow other machines to be able to connect to it 
2816)      for anonymity. This is most useful in an environment where many 
2817)      computers want a gateway of anonymity to the rest of the world. 
2818)      However, be forwarned that with this configuration, anyone within 
2819)      your private network (existing between you and the Tor 
2820)      client/relay) can see what traffic you are sending in clear text. 
2821)      The anonymity doesn't start until you get to the Tor relay. 
2822)      Because of this, if you are the controller of your domain and you 
2823)      know everything's locked down, you will be OK, but this configuration 
2824)      may not be suitable for large private networks where security is 
2825)      key all around.
2826)     </p>
2827)     <p>
2828) Configuration is simple, editing your torrc file's SocksListenAddress 
2829) according to the following examples:

2830)     </p>
2831)     <pre>

2832) 
2833)   #This provides local interface access only, 
2834)   #needs SocksPort to be greater than 0
2835)   SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1 
2836) 
2837)   #This provides access to Tor on a specified interface
2838)   SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100 
2839) 
2840)   #Accept from all interfaces
2841)   SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9100
2842)    </pre>

2843)     <p>

2844) You can state multiple listen addresses, in the case that you are 
2845) part of several networks or subnets.

2846)     </p>
2847)     <pre>
2848)   SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100 #eth0
2849)   SocksListenAddress 10.x.x.x:9100 #eth1
2850)     </pre>
2851)     <p>

2852) After this, your clients on their respective networks/subnets would specify 
2853) a socks proxy with the address and port you specified SocksListenAddress 
2854) to be. 

2855)     </p>
2856)     <p>

2857) Please note that the SocksPort configuration option gives the port ONLY for 
2858) localhost (127.0.0.1). When setting up your SocksListenAddress(es), you need 
2859) to give the port with the address, as shown above.

2860)     <p>

2861) If you are interested in forcing all outgoing data through the central Tor 
2862) client/relay, instead of the server only being an optional proxy, you may find 
2863) the program iptables (for *nix) useful. 

2864)     </p>
2865) 
2866)     <hr>
2867) 

2868)     <a id="JoinTheNetwork"></a>

2869)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a 
2870)     nickname and ORPort and join the network?</a></h3>

2871) 
2872)     <p>

2873)      Yes. You can join the network and be a useful relay just by configuring 
2874)      your Tor to be a relay and making sure it's reachable from the outside.

2875)     </p>
2876)     <p>
2877) 30 Seconds to a Tor Relay:
2878)     </p>
2879)     <ul><li>
2880)     Configure a Nickname: 
2881)     </li></ul>
2882)     <pre>
2883) Nickname ididnteditheconfig
2884)     </pre>

2885)     <ul><li>

2886)     Configure ORPort: 

2887)     </li></ul>

2888)     <pre>
2889) ORPort 9001
2890)     </pre>

2891)     <ul><li>

2892)     Configure Contact Info: 

2893)     </li></ul>

2894) 
2895)     <pre>
2896) ContactInfo human@…

2897)     </pre>
2898)     <ul><li>

2899)     Start Tor. Watch the log file for a log entry that states: "Self-testing 
2900)     indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside. Excellent. Publishing 
2901)     server descriptor."

2902)     </li></ul>

2903) 
2904)     <hr />

2905) 

2906)     <a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>

2907)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal
2908) relay or bridge relay?</a></h3>

2909) 

2910)     <p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for
2911) short)
2912)     are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't

2913)     listed in the public Tor directory.

2914)     That means that ISPs or governments trying to block access to the

2915)     Tor network can't simply block all bridges.

2916)     </p>

2917) 

2918)     <p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
2919)     configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed

2920)     publicly or not.

2921)     </p>

2922) 

2923)     <p>

2924)     So bridges are useful a) for Tor users in oppressive regimes,

2925)     and b) for people who want an extra layer of security

2926)     because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a public
2927)     Tor relay IP address they're contacting.

2928)     </p>

2929) 

2930)     <p>
2931)     Several countries, including China and Iran, have found ways to

2932)     detect and block connections to Tor bridges.

2933)     <a href="<page projects/obfsproxy>">Obfsproxy</a> bridges address

2934)     this by adding another layer of obfuscation.

2935)     </p>
2936) 

2937)     <p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
2938) lots

2939)     of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay.
2940)     If you're willing

2941)     to <a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely
2942)     run a normal relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an
2943)     exit and only have a little bit of bandwidth, be a bridge. Thanks
2944)     for volunteering!

2945)     </p>

2946) 

2947)     <hr>

2948) 

2949) <a id="UpgradeOrMove"></a>

2950) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. 
2951) How do I keep the same key?</a></h3>

2952) 
2953) <p>

2954)  When upgrading your Tor relay, or running it on a different computer, 
2955)  the important part is to keep the same nickname (defined in your torrc 
2956)  file) and the same identity key (stored in "keys/secret_id_key" in 
2957)  your DataDirectory).

2958) </p>
2959) <p>

2960) This means that if you're upgrading your Tor relay and you keep the same 
2961) torrc and the same DataDirectory, then the upgrade should just work and 
2962) your relay will keep using the same key. If you need to pick a new 
2963) DataDirectory, be sure to copy your old keys/secret_id_key over. 

2964) </p>
2965) 
2966)     <hr>
2967) 
2968) <a id="NTService"></a>

2969) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT 
2970) service?</a></h3>

2971) 
2972) <p>

2973)  You can run Tor as a service on all versions of Windows except Windows 
2974)  95/98/ME. This way you can run a Tor relay without needing to always have 
2975)  Vidalia running.

2976) </p>
2977) <p>

2978) If you've already configured your Tor to be a relay, please note that when 
2979) you enable Tor as a service, it will use a different DatagDirectory, and 
2980) thus will generate a different key. If you want to keep using the old key, 
2981) see the Upgrading your Tor relay FAQ entry for how to restore the old 
2982) identity key.

2983) </p>
2984) <p>
2985) To install Tor as a service, you can simply run:
2986) </p>
2987) <pre>
2988) tor --service install
2989) </pre>
2990) <p>

2991) A service called Tor Win32 Service will be installed and started. This 
2992) service will also automatically start every time Windows boots, unless 
2993) you change the Start-up type. An easy way to check the status of Tor, 
2994) start or stop the service, and change the start-up type is by running 
2995) services.msc and finding the Tor service in the list of currently 
2996) installed services.

2997) </p>
2998) <p>

2999) Optionally, you can specify additional options for the Tor service using 
3000) the -options argument. For example, if you want Tor to use C:\tor\torrc, 
3001) instead of the default torrc, and open a control port on port 9151, you 
3002) would run:

3003) </p>
3004) <pre>
3005) tor --service install -options -f C:\tor\torrc ControlPort 9151
3006) </pre>
3007) <p>
3008) You can also start or stop the Tor service from the command line by typing:
3009) </p>
3010) <pre>
3011)  tor --service start
3012) </pre>
3013) <p>
3014) or
3015) </p>
3016) <pre>
3017)  tor --service stop
3018) </pre>
3019) <p>
3020) To remove the Tor service, you can run the following command:
3021) </p>
3022) <pre>
3023) tor --service remove
3024) </pre>
3025) <p>

3026) If you are running Tor as a service and you want to uninstall Tor entirely, 
3027) be sure to run the service removal command (shown above) first before 
3028) running the uninstaller from "Add/Remove Programs". The uninstaller is 
3029) currently not capable of removing the active service.

3030) </p>
3031) 
3032) <hr>
3033) 
3034) <a id="VirtualServer"></a>

3035) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my 
3036) virtual server account?</a></h3>

3037) 
3038) <p>

3039) Some ISPs are selling "vserver" accounts that provide what they call a 
3040) virtual server -- you can't actually interact with the hardware, and 
3041) they can artificially limit certain resources such as the number of file 
3042) descriptors you can open at once. Competent vserver admins are able to 
3043) configure your server to not hit these limits. For example, in SWSoft's 
3044) Virtuozzo, investigate /proc/user_beancounters. Look for "failcnt" in 
3045) tcpsndbuf, tcprecvbuf, numothersock, and othersockbuf. Ask for these to 
3046) be increased accordingly. Some users have seen settings work well as follows: 

3047) <p>

3048) <table border="1">

3049) <tr>
3050) <td>
3051) <i>resource</i>
3052) </td>
3053) <td>
3054) <i>held</i>
3055) </td>
3056) <td>
3057) <i>maxheld</i>
3058) </td>
3059) <td>
3060) <i>barrier</i>
3061) </td>
3062) <td>
3063) <i>limit</i>
3064) </td>
3065) <td>
3066) <i>failcnt</i>
3067) </td>
3068) </tr>
3069) <tr>
3070) <td>
3071) tcpsndbuf
3072) </td>
3073) <td>
3074) 46620
3075) </td>
3076) <td>
3077) 48840
3078) </td>
3079) <td>
3080) 3440640
3081) </td>
3082) <td>
3083) 5406720
3084) </td>
3085) <td>
3086) 0
3087) </td>
3088) </tr>
3089) <tr>
3090) <td>
3091) tcprcvbuf
3092) </td>
3093) <td>
3094) 0
3095) </td>
3096) <td>
3097) 2220
3098) </td>
3099) <td>
3100) 3440640
3101) </td>
3102) <td>
3103) 5406720
3104) </td>
3105) <td>
3106) 0
3107) </td>
3108) </tr>
3109) <tr>
3110) <td>
3111) othersockbuf
3112) </td>
3113) <td>
3114) 243516
3115) </td>
3116) <td>
3117) 260072
3118) </td>
3119) <td>
3120) 2252160
3121) </td>
3122) <td>
3123) 4194304
3124) </td>
3125) <td>
3126) 0
3127) </td>
3128) </tr>
3129) <tr>
3130) <td>
3131) numothersock
3132) </td>
3133) <td>
3134) 151
3135) </td>
3136) <td>
3137) 153
3138) </td>
3139) <td>
3140) 720
3141) </td>
3142) <td>
3143) 720
3144) </td>
3145) <td>
3146) 0
3147) </td>
3148) </tr>
3149) </table>
3150) <p>
3151)  Xen, Virtual Box and VMware virtual servers have no such limits normally.
3152) </p>
3153) <p>

3154) If the vserver admin will not increase system limits another option is 
3155) to reduce the memory allocated to the send and receive buffers on TCP 
3156) connections Tor uses. An experimental feature to constrain socket buffers 
3157) has recently been added. If your version of Tor supports it, set 
3158) "ConstrainedSockets 1" in your configuration. See the tor man page for 
3159) additional details about this option.

3160) </p>
3161) <p>

3162) Unfortunately, since Tor currently requires you to be able to connect to 
3163) all the other Tor relays, we need you to be able to use at least 1024 file 
3164) descriptors. This means we can't make use of Tor relays that are crippled 
3165) in this way.

3166) </p>
3167) <p>

3168) We hope to fix this in the future, once we know how to build a Tor network 
3169) with restricted topologies -- that is, where each node connects to only a 
3170) few other nodes. But this is still a long way off.

3171) </p>
3172) 

3173) <hr>
3174) 

3175) <a id="MultipleRelays"></a>

3176) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
3177) relay.</a></h3>

3178) 
3179) <p>
3180) Great. If you want to run several relays to donate more to the network,
3181) we're happy with that. But please don't run more than a few dozen on
3182) the same network, since part of the goal of the Tor network is dispersal
3183) and diversity.
3184) </p>
3185) 
3186) <p>
3187) If you do decide to run more than one relay, please set the "MyFamily"

3188) config option in the <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> of each relay, listing
3189) all the relays (comma-separated) that are under your control:

3190) </p>
3191) 
3192) <pre>
3193)     MyFamily $fingerprint1,$fingerprint2,$fingerprint3
3194) </pre>
3195) 
3196) <p>
3197) where each fingerprint is the 40 character identity fingerprint (without

3198) spaces). You can also list them by nickname, but fingerprint is safer.
3199) Be

3200) sure to prefix the digest strings with a dollar sign ('$') so that the
3201) digest is not confused with a nickname in the config file.
3202) </p>
3203) 
3204) <p>
3205) That way clients will know to avoid using more than one of your relays
3206) in a single circuit. You should set MyFamily if you have administrative
3207) control of the computers or of their network, even if they're not all in
3208) the same geographic location.
3209) </p>
3210) 
3211)     <hr>
3212) 

3213)     <a id="WrongIP"></a>

3214)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong 
3215)     IP address.</a></h3>

3216)     <p>

3217)  Tor guesses its IP address by asking the computer for its hostname, and 
3218)  then resolving that hostname. Often people have old entries in their 
3219)  /etc/hosts file that point to old IP addresses.

3220)     </p>
3221)     <p>

3222) If that doesn't fix it, you should use the "Address" config option to 
3223) specify the IP you want it to pick. If your computer is behind a NAT and 
3224) it only has an internal IP address, see the following FAQ entry on <a 

3225) href="#RelayFlexible">dynamic IP addresses</a>.

3226)     </p>
3227)     <p>

3228) Also, if you have many addresses, you might also want to set 
3229) "OutboundBindAddress" so external connections come from the IP you intend 
3230) to present to the world. 

3231)     </p>
3232) 
3233)     <hr>
3234) 
3235)     <a id="BehindANAT"></a>
3236)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall.</a></h3>
3237) 
3238)     <p>

3239) See <a>​http://portforward.com/</a> for directions on how to port forward with 
3240) your NAT/router device.

3241) </p>
3242) <p>

3243) If your relay is running on a internal net you need to setup port forwarding. 
3244) Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but the firewalled-clients FAQ 
3245) entry offers some examples on how to do this.

3246) </p>
3247) <p>

3248) Also, here's an example of how you would do this on GNU/Linux if you're using 
3249) iptables:

3250) </p>
3251) <pre>
3252) /sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --destination-port 9001 -j ACCEPT
3253) </pre>
3254) <p>

3255) You may have to change "eth0" if you have a different external interface 
3256) (the one connected to the Internet). Chances are you have only one (except 
3257) the loopback) so it shouldn't be too hard to figure out. 

3258)     </p>
3259)     <hr>
3260) 

3261)     <a id="RelayMemory"></a>

3262)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using
3263) so much memory?</a></h3>

3264)