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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p><a href="#General">General questions:</a><br />
18)     <a href="#CompilationAndInstallation">Compilation and Installation:</a><br />
19)     <a href="#TBBGeneral">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a><br />

20)     <a href="#TBB3.x">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a><br />

21)     <a href="#AdvancedTorUsage">Advanced Tor usage:</a><br />
22)     <a href="#RunningATorRelay">Running a Tor relay:</a><br />
23)     <a href="#TorHiddenServices">Tor hidden services:</a><br />
24)     <a href="#Development">Development:</a><br />
25)     <a href="#AnonymityAndSecurity">Anonymity and Security:</a><br />
26)     <a href="#AlternateDesigns">Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</a><br />
27)     <a href="#Abuse">Abuse:</a></p>

28) 

29) <hr>
30) 
31)     <p>General questions:</p>

32)     <ul>
33)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

34)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
35) proxies?</a></li>

36)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
37)     Tor?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

40)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

42)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

44)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
45)     </a></li>

46)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
47)     funding?</a></li>

48)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my

49)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

50)     <li><a href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile device?</a></li>

51)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these outbound ports

52)     on my firewall?</a></li>

53)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

54)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information

55)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

56)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
57)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

58)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

59)     fingerprints?</a></li>

60)     </ul>

61) 

62)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

63) 

64)     <ul>
65)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
66)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
67)     page?</a></li>

68)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
69)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

70)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

71)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

72)     <li><a href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

73)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
74) includes Tor?</a></li>

75)     </ul>

76) 

77)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (general):</p>

78)     <ul>

79) 

80)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
81)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

82)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

83)     </a></li>

84)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
85)     software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></li>

86)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to

87)     run another application through the Tor launched by Tor Browser

88)     Bundle.</a></li>

89)     <li><a href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did Polipo
90)     go?</a></li>

91)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

92)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

93)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to
94) allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that
95) unsafe?</a></li>

96)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
97)     with Tor.</a></li>

98)     <li><a href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">Will Torbutton be available

99)     for other browsers?</a></li>

100)     <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle
101)     running but close the browser.</a></li>

102)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

103)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

104)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign

105)     languages?</a></li>

106)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
107)     been compromised.</a></li>

108)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP

109)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

110)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy

111)     with my application?</a></li>

112)     </ul>
113) 

114)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</p>

115) 
116)     <ul>

117)     <li><a href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map (Vidalia)

118)     go?</a></li>
119)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>

120)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download

121)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

122)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close

123)     all my open tabs?</a></li>

124)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay

125)     or bridge?</a></li>
126)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>

127)     <li><a href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do

128)     I verify a build?</a></li>

129)     </ul>
130) 

131)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

132) 

133)     <ul>
134)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
135)     that mean?</a></li>

136)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

137)     logs?</a></li>

138)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

139)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
140)     correctly.</a></li>

141)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

142)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or
143) country)

144)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

145)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
146)     ports.</a></li>

147)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

148)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing
149)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I

150)     worry?</a></li>

151)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

152)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

153)     </ul>

154) 

155)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

156)     <ul>

157) 
158)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
159)     </a></li>

160)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being

161)     used more?</a></li>

162)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static IP.</a></li>

163)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often

164)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>

165)     <li><a href="#MoreThanOneCPU">I have more than one CPU. Does this

166)     help?</a></li>

167)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully

168)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

169)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
170) be?</a></li>

171)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are

172)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>

173)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount

174)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

175)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write

176)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>

177)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after

178)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

180)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor

182)     relay run well?</a></li>

183)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li>

184)     <li><a href="#IGotTheBadExitFlagWhyDidThatHappen">I got the BadExit flag.

185)     Why did that happen?</a></li>

186)     <li><a href="#MyRelayRecentlyGotTheGuardFlagAndTrafficDroppedByHalf">My

187)     relay recently got the Guard flag and traffic dropped by half.</a></li>

188)     <li><a href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I want to run my Tor client on a

189)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>

190)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and

191)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>

192)     <li><a href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a nickname and

193)     ORPort and join the network?</a></li>

194)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
195)     relay?</a></li>

196)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I

197)     keep the same key?</a></li>

198)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
199) relay.</a></li>

200)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
201)     </a></li>

202)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server

203)     account?</a></li>

204)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
205)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

206)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
207)     </a></li>
208)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
209)     </a></li>

210)     <li><a href="#FacingLegalTrouble">I'm facing legal trouble. How do I

211)     prove that my server was a Tor relay at a given time?</a></li>

212)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
213)     run my own?</a></li>

214)     </ul>

215) 

216)     <p>Tor hidden services:</p>

217) 

218)     <ul>
219)     <li><a href="#AccessHiddenServices">How do I access hidden services?</a></li>

220)     <li><a href="#ProvideAHiddenService">How do I provide a hidden service?</a></li>

221)     </ul>

222) 

223)     <p>Development:</p>

224) 

225)     <ul>

226)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers

227)     mean?</a></li>
228)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
229)     Tor network?</a></li>

230)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the

231)     Tor network?</a></li>
232)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>

233)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature

234)     into Tor?</a></li>
235)     </ul>
236) 

237)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>

238)     <ul>

239)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor

240)     provide?</a></li>

241)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on

242)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

243)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use

244)     Tor?</a></li>

245)     <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li>

246)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
247) uses.</a></li>

248)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

249)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

250)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I

251)     can't afford that!</a></li>

252)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound

253)     connections?</a></li>
254)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
255)     </a></li>

256)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist

257)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

258)     <li><a href="#IsTorLikeAVPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>

259)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than

260)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

261)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion

262)     routing?</a></li>

263)     <li><a href="#LearnMoreAboutAnonymity">Where can I learn more about anonymity?</a></li>

264)     </ul>

265) 

266)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>

267) 

268)     <ul>
269)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
270)     relay.</a></li>

271)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
272) packets,

273)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

274)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
275)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

276)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path

277)     length.</a></li>

278)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over

279)     many paths.</a></li>

280)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate

281)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>

282)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick

283)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

284)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block

285)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>

286)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block

287)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>

288)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from

289)     posting certain content.</a></li>

290)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
291)     </a></li>

292)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor

293)     traffic.</a></li>

294)     </ul>

295) 

296)     <p>Abuse:</p>

297)     <ul>

298)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
299) things?</a></li>

300)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
301)     relay?</a></li>

302)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
303)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

304)     </ul>

305) 

306)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
307) <a

308)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

309) 

310)     <hr>

311) 

312)     <a id="General"></a>

313)     <h2><a class="anchor">General:</a></h2>

314) 

315)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
316)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

317) 

318)     <p>
319)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
320)     </p>

321) 

322)     <p>

323)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that
324) helps keep
325)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your
326) communications

327)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

328)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection
329) from

330)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

331)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays
332) is
333)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the
334) <a

335)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
336)     </p>

337) 

338)     <p>

339)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that
340) maintains

341)     and develops the Tor software.
342)     </p>

343) 

344)     <hr>

345) 

346)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

347)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
348) from other proxies?</a></h3>
349)     <p>
350)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
351) and
352) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
353) to
354) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
355) server.
356) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
357) through
358) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
359) have to
360) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
361) server.
362) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
363) for
364) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing
365) bad
366) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection
367) to them.
368) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
369) cafe with

370) free wifi Internet.
371)     </p>
372)     <p>

373)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
374) provider
375) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see
376) your
377) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
378) see

379) inside your

380) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
381) stores.

382) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as

383) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
384) traffic

385) stream, and recording your personal details.

386)     </p>
387)     <p>

388)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
389) sending
390) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
391) for
392) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you
393) are
394) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted
395) through
396) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world,
397) completely
398) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your
399) local
400) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen
401) through
402) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass
403) encrypted

404) packets between themselves.</p>

405)     <p>
406)     <dl>

407)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
408) first of
409) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
410) It
411) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
412) merely sees
413) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
414) world, so
415) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
416) figuring

417) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

418)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
419) third
420) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
421) who sent

422) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or

423) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only
424) know the
425) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic
426) stream.  You

427) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
428) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

429)     </dl>
430)     </p>

431) 

432)     <hr>

433) 

434) 

435)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

436)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
437) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

438) 

439)     <p>

440)     If you want to use Tor with a web browser, we provide the Tor Browser
441)     Bundle, which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using
442)     Tor. If you want to use another web browser with Tor, see <a
443)     href="#TBBOtherBrowser">Other web browsers</a>.

444)     </p>
445)     <p>
446)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
447)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

448)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

449)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

450)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

451)     specific applications</a>.

452)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
453)     </p>

454) 

455)     <hr>

456) 

457)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

458)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
459) Tor?</a></h3>

460) 

461)     <p>
462)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
463)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
464)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
465)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
466)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
467)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
468)     the Naval Research Lab.
469)     </p>

470) 

471)     <p>
472)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
473)     </p>

474) 

475)     <p>

476)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
477) spelled

478)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

479)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
480) learned
481)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
482) they

483)     spell it wrong.
484)     </p>

485) 

486)     <hr>

487) 

488)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

489)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
490) Tor?</a></h3>

491) 

492)     <p>

493)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put
494) one
495)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that
496) anybody

497)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
498)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
499)     </p>

500) 

501)     <p>
502)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

503)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security
504) software

505)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
506)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
507)     trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
508)     </p>

509) 

510)     <p>
511)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
512)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

513)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you
514) should
515)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
516) release)

517)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
518)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
519)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
520)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
521)     distribution sites.
522)     </p>

523) 

524)     <p>
525)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

526)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so
527) make

528)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
529)     </p>

530) 

531)     <hr>

532) 

533)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

534)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
535) Tor?</a></h3>

536) 

537)     <p>
538)     Yes.
539)     </p>

540) 

541)     <p>

542)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
543)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
544)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to

545)     ask us for specific permission.
546)     </p>

547) 

548)     <p>

549)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our

550)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

551)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along

552)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
553)     </p>

554) 

555)     <p>

556)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the

557)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

558)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

559)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/">Firefox
560)     Extended Support Release</a>, and the NoScript and HTTPS-Everywhere 

561)     extensions. You will need to follow the license for those programs as 

562)     well. Both of those Firefox extensions are distributed under 
563)     the <a href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General
564)     Public License</a>, while Firefox ESR is released under the Mozilla Public 
565)     License. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to include the source 
566)     code for these programs everywhere you include the bundles themselves. 

567)     </p>

568) 

569)     <p>

570)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
571)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
572)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.

573)     </p>

574) 

575)     <p>
576)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
577)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible

578)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
579)     may not be supported — or even work — six months later. This

580)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
581)     </p>

582) 

583)     <hr>

584) 

585)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

586)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
587) support?</a></h3>

588) 

589)     <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p>

590)     <ol>
591)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>

592)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page
593) docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>

594)     <li>Read through the <a

595) 
596) href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">
597) tor-talk

598)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

599)     <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a>
600) and

601)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

602)     <li>Send an email to <a

603) 
604) href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li>
605)     <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting
606) us</a> directly.</li>

607)     </ol>

608) 

609)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel
610) or the

611)     mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p>

612) 

613)     <hr>

614) 

615)     <a id="Forum"></a>
616)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
617) 

618)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange

619)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

620)     </p>
621) 
622)     <hr>
623) 

624)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
625)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

626) 

627)     <p>
628)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
629)     </p>

630) 

631)     <p>

632)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
633) to
634)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
635) computers
636)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
637) latency

638)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
639)     bandwidth through Tor.
640)     </p>

641) 

642)     <p>

643)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
644) network
645)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
646) and
647)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
648) currently

649)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
650)     </p>

651) 

652)     <p>
653)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

654)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

655)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
656) video

657)     to go with it.
658)     </p>

659) 

660)     <p>
661)     What can you do to help?
662)     </p>

663) 

664)     <ul>

665) 

666)     <li>

667)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
668) traffic
669)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
670) handle

671)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
672)     </li>

673) 

674)     <li>

675)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>.
676) We

677)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
678)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
679)     walk people through setting it up.
680)     </li>

681) 

682)     <li>

683)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
684) design
685)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
686) and

687)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
688)     </li>

689) 

690)     <li>
691)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

692)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
693) who
694)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
695) we

696)     get to spend more time on it.
697)     </li>

698) 

699)     <li>

700)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
701) moment
702)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
703) href="<page

704)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
705)     </li>

706) 

707)     <li>

708)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
709) agency

710)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

711)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
712) servers
713)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
714) organization has
715)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
716) about
717)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
718) slower.

719)     </li>

720) 

721)     <li>
722)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

723)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
724) money to the

725)     cause</a>. It adds up!
726)     </li>

727) 

728)     </ul>

729) 

730)     <hr>

731) 

732)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

733)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files

734)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

735) 
736)     <p>

737)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network,
738)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default.
739)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows
740)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a

741)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
742)     is not anonymous</a>!

743)     </p>
744) 
745)     <hr>
746) 

747)     <a id="Funding"></a>

748)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
749) with more funding?</a></h3>

750) 

751)     <p>

752)     The Tor network's <a

753) 
754) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several

755)     thousand</a> relays push <a
756)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
757)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a

758) 
759) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several

760)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
761)     self-sustaining.

762)     </p>

763) 

764)     <p>

765)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
766) attention:

767)     </p>

768) 

769)     <ul>

770) 

771)     <li>
772)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
773)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

774)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
775) there's

776)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
777)     </li>

778) 

779)     <li>

780)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
781) questions
782)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
783) good
784)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
785) volunteers.

786)     </li>

787) 

788)     <li>

789)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
790) need

791)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

792)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
793) and
794)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
795) stay
796)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
797) e.g.,

798)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

799)     </li>

800) 

801)     <li>

802)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
803) of the
804)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
805) configuration
806)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
807) of
808)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on
809) this
810)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much
811) more work

812)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
813)     </li>

814) 

815)     <li>
816)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
817)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

818)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
819) relay,

820)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
821)     </li>

822) 

823)     <li>
824)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
825)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
826)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
827)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

828)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
829) research questions</a>
830)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
831) variety of
832)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
833) waiting

834)     behind these.
835)     </li>

836) 

837)     </ul>

838) 

839)     <p>
840)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

841)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
842) developers

843)     can keep up</a>.

844)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
845) effort

846)     so we can continue to grow the network.
847)     </p>

848) 

849)     <p>
850)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
851)     censorship-resistance.
852)     </p>

853) 

854)     <p>

855)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
856) support</a>
857)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
858) Bell
859)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
860) government

861)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
862)     </p>

863) 

864)     <p>

865)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
866) in the
867)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
868) donate/donate>">donate</a>
869)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
870) executive

871)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
872)     </p>

873) 

874)     <hr>
875) 
876) 
877)     <a id="Mobile"></a>
878)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile 
879)     device?</a></h3>
880) 
881)     <p>
882)     Tor on Android devices is maintained by the <a 
883)     href="https://guardianproject.info">Guardian Project</a>. Currently, there 
884)     is no supported way of using Tor on iOS; the Guardian Project is 
885)     working to make this a reality in the future.
886)     </p>
887) 

888)     <hr>
889) 

890)      <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>

891)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these

892)     outbound ports on my firewall?</a></h3>

893) 
894)     <p>

895)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the
896)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for
897)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports,

898)     but many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030.

899)     </p>
900)     <p>

901)     So as a client, you could probably get away with opening only those four
902)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry
903)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as
904)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most
905)     diversity in your entry nodes -- and thus the most security -- as well as
906)     the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll want to let it connect

907)     to all of them.

908)     </p>
909)     <p>

910)     If you really need to connect to only a small set of ports, see the FAQ

911)     entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a>.

912)     </p>
913)     <p>

914)     Note that if you're running Tor as a relay, you must allow outgoing
915)     connections to every other relay and to anywhere your exit policy
916)     advertises that you allow. The cleanest way to do that is simply to allow
917)     all outgoing connections at your firewall. If you don't, clients will try
918)     to use these connections and things won't work.

919)     </p>

920)  

921)     <hr>

922)  

923)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

924)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is

925)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

926) 
927)     <p>

928)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be

929)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
930)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

931)     </p>

932)  

933)     <hr>

934)  

935)     <a id="FTP"></a>
936)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
937)     </a></h3>
938) 

939)     <p>

940)     Use the <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor
941)     Browser Bundle</a>. If you want a separate application for an
942)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can
943)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port
944)     "9050".

945)     </p>

946) 

947)     <hr>

948)  

949)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>

950)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal

951)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
952) 

953)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands
954)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data
955)     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
956)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
957)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

958)     href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

959)     careful and be smart.</a>
960)     </p>
961) 
962)     <hr>
963) 

964)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

965)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

966)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

967) 

968)     <p>
969)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

970)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

971)     <hr>

972) 

973)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>

974)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL

975)     certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>

976)     <p>

977)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

978)     </p>
979)     <pre>
980) Issued Certificate
981) Version: 3
982) Serial Number: 09 48 B1 A9 3B 25 1D 0D B1 05 10 59 E2 C2 68 0A
983) Not Valid Before: 2013-10-22
984) Not Valid After: 2016-05-03
985) Certificate Fingerprints
986) SHA1: 84 24 56 56 8E D7 90 43 47 AA 89 AB 77 7D A4 94 3B A1 A7 D5
987) MD5: A4 16 66 80 AE B9 A4 EC AA 88 01 1B 6F B9 EB CB

988)     </pre>

989) <br>
990)     <p>
991) blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

992)     </p>

993)     <pre>
994) Issued Certificate
995) Version: 3
996) Serial Number: 05 CA 2A A9 A5 D6 ED 44 C7 2D 88 1A 18 B0 E7 DC
997) Not Valid Before: 2014-04-09
998) Not Valid After: 2017-06-14
999) Certificate Fingerprints
1000) SHA1: DE 20 3D 46 FD C3 68 EB BA 40 56 39 F5 FA FD F5 4E 3A 1F 83
1001) MD5: 8A 8A A2 5E D9 7F 84 4C 8F 00 3B 43 E0 2D E6 4D
1002)     </pre>

1003)     <hr>
1004) 

1005)     <a id="CompilationAndInstallation"></a>
1006)     <h2><a class="anchor">Compilation And Installation:</a></h2>
1007) 

1008)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

1009)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
1010) Tor?</a></h3>
1011) 
1012)     <p>
1013)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
1014) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
1015) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
1016)     </p>

1017) 

1018)     <p>

1019)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
1020) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
1021)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
1022) way to

1023)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers.

1024)     </p>

1025) 

1026)     <p>
1027)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
1028)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
1029)     </p>

1030) 

1031)     <p>

1032)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
1033) method. But
1034)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
1035) it should

1036)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
1037)     </p>

1038) 

1039)     <hr>

1040) 

1041)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

1042)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
1043) the download page?</a></h3>

1044) 

1045)     <p>

1046)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
1047) downloaded is

1048)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
1049)     </p>

1050) 

1051)     <p>
1052)     Please read the <a

1053)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
1054) page for details.

1055)     </p>

1056) 

1057) <hr>
1058) 
1059) <a id="GetTor"></a>
1060) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
1061) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
1062) 
1063) <p>
1064) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
1065) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

1066) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

1067) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

1068) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
1069) cache</a>

1070) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
1071) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
1072) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail

1073) '<tt>gettor@gettor.torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'

1074) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
1075) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
1076) to receive very large attachments.
1077) </p>
1078) 
1079) <p>

1080) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
1081) signature</a>

1082) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
1083) other than our official HTTPS website.

1084) </p>
1085) 

1086)     <hr>

1087) 

1088)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
1089)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives"></a></h3>
1090)     <p>

1091)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on
1092)     some parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
1093)     false positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is
1094)     just a guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
1095)     that you have a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or

1096)     pick a better vendor.
1097)     </p>

1098)     <p>In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for it.
1099)     Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do

1100)     recompile it yourself.</p>
1101) 
1102)     <hr>
1103) 

1104)     <a id="tarballs"></a>

1105)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz

1106)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1107) 
1108)     <p>
1109)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your

1110)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking.
1111)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute</p>

1112)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1113)     <p>

1114)     as documented on tar's man page.

1115)     </p>
1116) 
1117)     <hr>
1118) 

1119)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1120)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1121) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1122) 

1123)     <p>

1124)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1125)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor
1126) Browser

1127)     Bundle</a>.

1128)     </p>

1129) 
1130) <hr>
1131) 

1132) <a id="TBBGeneral"></a>
1133) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a></h2>
1134) 

1135) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1136) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on
1137) YouTube

1138) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1139) 
1140) <p>

1141) YouTube and similar sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.
1142) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1143) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes
1144) but is not limited to: <a href="http://decloak.net">completely disregarding
1145) proxy settings</a>, querying your <a

1146) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1147) local IP address</a>, and <a

1148) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1149) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1150) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a>
1151) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass,
1152) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain.

1153) </p>

1154) 
1155) <p>

1156) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/html5">YouTube offers experimental HTML5 video

1157) support</a> for many of their videos. Often you can get the HTML5 version of
1158) videos that don't want to play by grabbing the YouTube URL from the "Embed"

1159) code under a video's "Share" option. The link switches out a URL that looks</p>
1160) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>
1161) <p>to something that looks like</p>
1162) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/embed/CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>

1163) 

1164) <hr>
1165) 

1166) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1167) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1168) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1169) <p>

1170) You'll need to tell Ubuntu that you want the ability to execute shell scripts 
1171) from the graphical interface. Open "Files" (Unity's explorer), open 

1172) Preferences-> Behavior Tab -> Set "Run executable text files when they are 
1173) opened" to "Ask every time", then OK.

1174) </p>
1175) <p>You can also start the Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1176) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1177) <p>
1178) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1179) </p>
1180) 

1181) <hr>
1182) 

1183) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1184) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
1185) software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></h3>
1186) <p>

1187) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the
1188) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off

1189) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1190) </p>
1191) 

1192) <hr>
1193) 

1194) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>

1195) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">

1196) I want to run another application through the Tor launched by Tor

1197) Browser Bundle.</a></h3>

1198) 
1199) <p>

1200) Typically Tor listens for Socks connections on port 9050. TBB listens

1201) on port 9150.

1202) The goal is to avoid conflicting with a "system" Tor install,

1203) so you can run a system Tor and TBB at the same time. We're <a
1204) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3948">working on
1205) a feature</a> where Tor will try the usual ports first and then back

1206) off to a random choice if they're already in use.

1207) </p>
1208) 
1209) <hr>
1210) 
1211) <a id="TBBPolipo"></a>
1212) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did
1213) Polipo go?</a></h3>
1214) 
1215) <p>
1216) In the past, Tor bundles included an HTTP proxy like Privoxy or Polipo,
1217) solely to work around a bug in Firefox that was finally fixed in Firefox
1218) 6. Now you don't need a separate HTTP proxy to use Tor, and in fact
1219) leaving it out makes you safer because Torbutton has better control over
1220) Firefox's interaction with websites.
1221) </p>
1222) 
1223) <p>
1224) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero

1225) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set

1226) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try

1227) to use a Socks proxy rather than an http proxy — Tor runs a Socks

1228) proxy on port 9050 on Windows, or <a href="#TBBSocksPort">see above</a>
1229) for OSX and Linux.
1230) </p>
1231) 
1232) <p>

1233) If that fails, feel free to install <a

1234) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1235) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1236) users. Privoxy has an <a
1237) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1238) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.

1239) </p>
1240) 
1241) <hr>
1242) 

1243) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1244) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1245) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1246) 
1247) <p>

1248) The Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from
1249) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any
1250) additional Firefox add-ons with the Tor Browser Bundle. Add-ons can break
1251) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and

1252) bypassing proxy settings.

1253) </p>

1254) <p>

1255) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or
1256) anti-tracking software with the Tor Browser Bundle. Right now, we do not
1257) think that's such a good idea. The Tor Browser Bundle aims to provide
1258) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are
1259) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which

1260) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">

1261) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that
1262) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint
1263) users.

1264) </p>

1265) 

1266) <hr>
1267) 

1268) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1269) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1270) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript
1271) configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?
1272) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1273) 
1274) <p>
1275) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
1276) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
1277) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1278) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1279) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1280) JavaScript might make a website work).
1281) </p>
1282) 

1283) <p>
1284) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1285) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1286) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1287) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1288) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1289) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1290) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1291) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1292) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1293) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1294) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1295) </p>

1296) 
1297) <p>

1298) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1299) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1300) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1301) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1302) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1303) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1304) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1305) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1306) partitioning concern will remain.

1307) </p>
1308) 
1309) <p>

1310) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1311) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1312) </p>
1313) 
1314) <hr>
1315) 

1316) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1317) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1318) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1319) 
1320) <p>
1321) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
1322) really bad idea.
1323) </p>
1324) 
1325) <p>
1326) We're working with the Chrome team to <a

1327) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">fix some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it

1328) will be possible to write a Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any
1329) other browser is on the horizon.

1330) </p>
1331) 
1332) <hr>
1333) 

1334) <a id="TorbuttonOtherBrowser"></a>

1335) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">

1336) Will Torbutton be available for other browsers?</a></h3>

1337) 
1338) <p>

1339)  We don't support IE, Opera or Safari and never plan to. There are
1340)  too many ways that your privacy can go wrong with those browsers, and
1341)  because of their closed design it is really hard for us to do anything
1342)  to change these privacy problems.

1343) </p>
1344) <p>

1345) We are working with the Chrome people to modify Chrome's internals so that we can eventually support it. But for now, Firefox is the only safe choice.

1346) </p>
1347) 

1348) <hr>

1349) 

1350) <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a>

1351) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor
1352) Browser

1353) Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3>
1354) 
1355) <p>
1356) We're working on a way to make this possible on all platforms. Please
1357) be patient.
1358) </p>
1359) 
1360) <hr>
1361) 

1362) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1363) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1364) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1365) 
1366) <p>
1367) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1368) considers Tor to be spyware.
1369) </p>
1370) 
1371) <p>

1372) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are

1373) also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this
1374) message when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1375) Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address
1376) (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their
1377) website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.

1378) </p>
1379) <p>
1380) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1381) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1382) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1383) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1384) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1385) an infection.
1386) </p>
1387) 
1388) <p>

1389) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically

1390) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1391) should clear up again after a short time.
1392) </p>
1393) 
1394) <p>
1395) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
1396) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as

1397) DuckDuckGo, ixquick, or Bing.

1398) </p>
1399) 
1400) <hr />
1401) 

1402) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1403) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1404) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1405) 
1406) <p>

1407)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it
1408)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language
1409)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results

1410)  on your queries.

1411) </p>
1412) <p>

1413) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that
1414) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the
1415) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on

1416) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact. 

1417) </p>
1418) <p>

1419) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one
1420) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return
1421) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been
1422) sent to. On a query this looks like:

1423) </p>

1424) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1425) <p>

1426) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google.
1427) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

1428) </p>
1429) <hr />

1430) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1431) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1432) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1433) 
1434) <p>
1435) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1436) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1437) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1438) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1439) </p>
1440) 
1441) <p>
1442) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1443) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1444) decided

1445) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1446) rightful owner.
1447) </p>
1448) 
1449) <p>
1450) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1451) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1452) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1453) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1454) </p>
1455) 
1456) <p>
1457) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1458) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1459) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1460) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1461) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1462) hijacking">

1463) way more complex than that</a>.
1464) </p>
1465) 
1466) <p>
1467) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1468) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1469) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1470) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1471) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1472) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1473) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1474) </p>
1475) 
1476) <hr>
1477) 

1478) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1479) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection

1480) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1481) 
1482) <p>

1483) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
1484) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
1485) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

1486) href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

1487) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
1488) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
1489) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
1490) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options
1491) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

1492) </p>
1493) <p>

1494) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
1495) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently,
1496) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a
1497) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post
1498) in the archives</a> useful.

1499) </p>
1500) <p>

1501) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the
1502) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how
1503) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

1504) </p>
1505) 
1506) <hr>
1507) 

1508) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>

1509) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't

1510) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1511) 
1512) <p>

1513) On Unix, we recommend you give <a
1514) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try.
1515) Alternative proxifying tools like <a
1516) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a
1517) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also

1518) available.</p>

1519) <p>
1520) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a
1521) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a
1522) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a

1523) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

1524) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here.

1525) </p>
1526) 
1527) <hr>
1528) 

1529) <a id="TBB3.x"></a>
1530) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a></h2>

1531)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>

1532)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map

1533)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1534) 

1535)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox
1536)     extension that provides similar functionality. Unfortunately, circuit
1537)     status reporting is still missing, but we are <a
1538)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8641">working

1539)     on providing it</a>. </p>
1540) 

1541)     <p>In the meantime, we are providing standalone Vidalia packages for
1542)     people who still want the map. Windows and Linux versions are <a

1543)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~erinn/vidalia-standalone-bundles/">

1544)     available here</a>.</p>

1545) 

1546)     <p>To use these packages, extract them, then run the startup script.
1547)     On Windows, this is "Start Vidalia.exe". On Linux, it is start-vidalia.
1548)     They can be placed in a different directory from TBB (and likely should

1549)     be). </p>
1550) 

1551)     <p>This Vidalia package will only run properly if Tor Browser has already

1552)     been launched. You cannot start it before launching Tor Browser. </p>
1553) 

1554)     <p>MacOS is still under development, but in the mean time you can modify
1555)     your TBB 2.x to be a standalone Vidalia (and then use it after starting
1556)     TBB 3.x) by opening your TBB 2.x vidalia.conf file in an editor and

1557)     replacing its contents with just these lines:</p>
1558) 
1559)     <pre>
1560)     [General]
1561)     LanguageCode=en
1562) 
1563)     [Tor]
1564)     ControlPort=9151
1565)     TorExecutable=.
1566)     Torrc=.
1567)     DataDirectory=.
1568)     AuthenticationMethod=cookie

1569)     </pre>

1570) 
1571)     <hr>
1572) 
1573)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1574)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1575)     </h3>
1576) 

1577)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript
1578)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24
1579)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config

1580)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1581) 

1582)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the
1583)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select
1584)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists
1585)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas

1586)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1587) 

1588)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config,

1589)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1590) 
1591)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1592)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled

1593)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon,
1594)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and

1595)     provides a button for it. </p>
1596) 

1597)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and

1598)     NoScript. </p>
1599) 

1600)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a

1601)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1602) 
1603)     <hr>
1604) 
1605)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1606)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1607)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1608) 

1609)     <p>Instructions are on the <a 

1610)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>#BuildVerification">verifying 

1611)     signatures</a> page.</p>

1612) 
1613)     <hr>

1614)     

1615)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>

1616)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New

1617)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1618) 
1619)     <p>

1620)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level
1621)     browser data too. But it sure is a surprising feature, for people who

1622)     are used to Vidalia's "new identity" behavior.
1623)     </p>
1624) 
1625)     <p>

1626)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1627)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1628)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1629)     ticket <a
1630)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1631)     to follow progress there.

1632)     </p>
1633) 
1634)     <p>

1635)     In the mean time, you can get Vidalia's old "newnym" functionality by
1636)     attaching a Vidalia to your TBB 3.x. See the instructions <a
1637)     href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">above</a>.

1638)     </p>
1639) 
1640)     <hr>
1641) 
1642)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1643)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1644) 
1645)     <p>

1646)     You've got three options.

1647)     </p>
1648) 
1649)     <p>

1650)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system
1651)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay
1652)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>).

1653)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1654)     </p>
1655) 
1656)     <p>

1657)     Second (simpler option), if you're on Windows, you can fetch the separate
1658)     "Vidalia relay bundle" or "Vidalia bridge bundle" from the download page
1659)     and then use that (again you can use TBB independent of it).

1660)     </p>
1661) 
1662)     <p>

1663)     Third (complex option), you can either hook your Vidalia up to TBB (as
1664)     described in the FAQ above) or edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc)
1665)     directly to add the following lines:

1666)     </p>
1667)     <pre>
1668)     ORPort 443
1669)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1670)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1671)     </pre>
1672)     <p>

1673)     If you've installed <a

1674)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

1675)     you'll need to add one more line:
1676)     </p>
1677)     <pre>
1678)     ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
1679)     </pre>
1680)     <p>

1681)     This third option is pretty klunky right now; see e.g. <a
1682)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10449">this bug</a>;
1683)     but we're hoping it will become an easy option in the future.

1684)     </p>
1685) 
1686)     <hr>
1687) 
1688)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>

1689)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps

1690)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1691) 

1692)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build"
1693)     process, which allows many people to build the Tor Browser Bundle and
1694)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a
1695)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first
1696)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a

1697)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second

1698)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it.

1699)     </p>
1700) 

1701)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same
1702)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason

1703)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1704) 
1705)     <hr>
1706) 

1707)     <a id="TBBSourceCode"></a>
1708)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>

1709) 
1710)     <p>
1711)     Start with <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git</a> and <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build</a>.
1712)     </p>
1713) 
1714) 

1715) <hr>
1716) 

1717) <a id="AdvancedTorUsage"></a>
1718) <h2><a class="anchor">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h2>
1719) 

1720) <a id="torrc"></a>

1721) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1722) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1723) 
1724) <p>
1725) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1726) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1727) configuration should work fine for most Tor users.

1728) </p>

1729) <p>

1730) If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for

1731) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory.
1732) On OS X, you must right-click or command-click on the browser bundle icon,
1733) and select "Show Package Contents" before the Tor Browser directories become
1734) visible.

1735) </p>
1736) <p>

1737) Tor puts the torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> if you installed a pre-built package.</p>

1738) 
1739) <p>

1740) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart tor for the
1741) changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1742) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1743) it.)

1744) </p>
1745) 
1746) <p>

1747) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page

1748) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a

1749) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/config/torrc.sample.in">

1750) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all
1751) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect

1752) on Tor's configuration.

1753) </p>
1754) 
1755) <hr>
1756) 

1757) <a id="Logs"></a>

1758) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1759) logs?</a></h3>

1760) 
1761) <p>

1762) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1763) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1764) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1765) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1766) </p>
1767) 
1768) <p>
1769) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1770) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1771) </p>
1772) 
1773) <ul>
1774) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1775) </li>

1776) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1777) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1778) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1779) </li>
1780) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1781) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1782) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1783) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1784) </li>
1785) </ul>
1786) 
1787) <p>

1788) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1789) torrc</a>

1790) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1791) following line:

1792) </p>
1793) 
1794) <pre>

1795) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1796) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1797) </pre>

1798) 
1799) <p>

1800) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1801) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1802) of the section:
1803) </p>
1804) 
1805) <pre>
1806) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1807) </pre>
1808) 
1809) <p>

1810) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1811) and filename for your Tor log.

1812) </p>
1813) 
1814) <hr>
1815) 

1816) 
1817) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1818) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1819) 
1820) <p>

1821) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in

1822) Tor's logs:

1823) </p>
1824) 
1825) <ul>

1826)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will

1827)     exit.</li>

1828)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad
1829)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something
1830)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to

1831)     correct the problem.</li>

1832)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1833)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's

1834)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1835)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li>

1836) </ul>
1837) 
1838) <p>

1839) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the
1840) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react

1841) correctly for each situation.

1842) </p>
1843) 
1844) <p>

1845) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about

1846) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1847) </p>
1848) 
1849) <p>

1850) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal
1851) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in
1852) their logs.

1853) </p>
1854) 

1855) <hr>
1856) 

1857) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1858) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1859) working.</a></h3>

1860) 
1861) <p>

1862) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1863) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1864) </p>
1865) 
1866) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1867) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it
1868) will
1869) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the
1870) Vidalia

1871) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1872) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1873) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1874) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1875) client functionality is working."
1876) </p>
1877) 
1878) <p>
1879) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1880) </p>
1881) 
1882) <ol>
1883) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1884) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1885) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1886) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1887) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1888) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1889) zone is correct.</li>

1890) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1891) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1892) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

1893) </li>

1894) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
1895) that

1896) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
1897) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
1898) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
1899) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

1900) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

1901) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
1902) about what's going wrong?</li>

1903) </ol>
1904) 
1905) <hr />
1906) 

1907) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
1908) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
1909) <p>

1910)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor.
1911)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even
1912)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so
1913)  we can help you track it down.

1914) </p>
1915) <p>

1916) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest
1917) stable or the latest development version).

1918) </p>
1919) <p>

1920) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at
1921) least libevent 1.3a.

1922) </p>
1923) <p>

1924) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a
1925) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so,
1926) check if there are any new details that you can add.

1927) </p>
1928) <p>

1929) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can
1930) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that
1931) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up?
1932) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for
1933) example the latest stable release?

1934) </p>
1935) <p>

1936) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get?

1937) </p>
1938) <ul>
1939) <li>

1940) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please
1941) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on.
1942) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially
1943) if they seem important.

1944) </li>
1945) <li>

1946) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to
1947) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or
1948) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your
1949) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt",
1950) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c
1951) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core
1952) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows
1953) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate

1954) your bug on Unix?)
1955) </li>
1956) <li>

1957) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation
1958) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you
1959) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a
1960) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should
1961) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can
1962) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground,
1963) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default
1964) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a>
1965) for details.

1966) </li>
1967) <li>

1968) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it?
1969) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes
1970) sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running
1971) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will
1972) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases
1973) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware
1974) problems could also be the culprit.

1975) </li>
1976) </ul>
1977) <p>

1978) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your
1979) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ
1980) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually
1981) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole
1982) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send
1983) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then
1984) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed.
1985) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down
1986) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise
1987) to keep logs like this sitting around.)

1988) </p>
1989) 
1990) <hr />
1991) 

1992)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>

1993)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which
1994) nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

1995) 

1996)     <p>

1997)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
1998)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

1999)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
2000)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

2001)     </p>
2002)     <dl>
2003)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2004)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the
2005) circuit, if possible.

2006)         </dd>
2007)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2008)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the
2009) circuit, if possible.

2010)         </dd>
2011)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2012)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

2013)         </dd>
2014)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

2015)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.

2016)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in
2017) this list.

2018)         </dd>
2019)     </dl>
2020)     <p>

2021)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>

2022)     — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future
2023) versions.

2024)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
2025)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
2026)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

2027)     </p>
2028)     <p>

2029)     Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
2030)     the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
2031)     used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
2032)     those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at
2033)     a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see
2034)     <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> and <tt>StrictNodes</tt> in the

2035)     <a href="<page docs/tor-manual>">manual</a>.

2036)     </p>
2037)     <p>

2038)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a

2039) 
2040) href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2"
2041) >2

2042)     letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example <tt>{de}</tt>),

2043)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node
2044)     nickname. Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the
2045)     list items.

2046)     </p>
2047)     <p>

2048)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks
2049) interface

2050)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an

2051)     internal mapping in your configuration file using
2052) <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

2053)     See the manual page for details.
2054)     </p>

2055) 

2056)     <hr>

2057) 

2058) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

2059) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a
2060) few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

2061) 
2062) <p>
2063) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only

2064) use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1"
2065) to

2066) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

2067) configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect
2068) to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window.
2069) </p>
2070) 
2071) <p>
2072) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
2073) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
2074) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
2075) </p>
2076) 
2077) <p>
2078) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
2079) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
2080) </p>
2081) 
2082) <pre>
2083)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
2084)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
2085) </pre>
2086) 
2087) <hr>

2088) 

2089)     <a id="DefaultExitPorts"></a>

2090)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit

2091)     ports?</a></h3>

2092)     <p>

2093) The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or
2094) ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or
2095) modifying the source code. But the default according to src/or/policies.c
2096) from the source code release tor-0.2.4.16-rc is: