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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p><a href="#General">General questions:</a><br />
18)     <a href="#CompilationAndInstallation">Compilation and Installation:</a><br />
19)     <a href="#TBBGeneral">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a><br />

20)     <a href="#TBB3.x">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a><br />

21)     <a href="#AdvancedTorUsage">Advanced Tor usage:</a><br />
22)     <a href="#RunningATorRelay">Running a Tor relay:</a><br />
23)     <a href="#TorHiddenServices">Tor hidden services:</a><br />
24)     <a href="#Development">Development:</a><br />
25)     <a href="#AnonymityAndSecurity">Anonymity and Security:</a><br />
26)     <a href="#AlternateDesigns">Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</a><br />
27)     <a href="#Abuse">Abuse:</a></p>

28) 

29) <hr>
30) 
31)     <p>General questions:</p>

32)     <ul>
33)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

34)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
35) proxies?</a></li>

36)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
37)     Tor?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

40)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

42)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

44)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
45)     </a></li>

46)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
47)     funding?</a></li>

48)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my

49)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

50)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these outbound ports

51)     on my firewall?</a></li>

52)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

53)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information

54)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

55)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
56)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

57)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

58)     fingerprints?</a></li>

59)     </ul>

60) 

61)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

62) 

63)     <ul>
64)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
65)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
66)     page?</a></li>

67)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
68)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

69)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

70)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

71)     <li><a href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

72)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
73) includes Tor?</a></li>

74)     </ul>

75) 

76)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (general):</p>

77)     <ul>

78) 

79)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
80)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

81)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

82)     </a></li>

83)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
84)     software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></li>

85)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to

86)     run another application through the Tor launched by Tor Browser

87)     Bundle.</a></li>

88)     <li><a href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did Polipo
89)     go?</a></li>

90)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

91)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

92)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to
93) allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that
94) unsafe?</a></li>

95)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
96)     with Tor.</a></li>

97)     <li><a href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">Will Torbutton be available

98)     for other browsers?</a></li>

99)     <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle
100)     running but close the browser.</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

102)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

103)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign

104)     languages?</a></li>

105)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
106)     been compromised.</a></li>

107)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP

108)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

109)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy

110)     with my application?</a></li>

111)     </ul>
112) 

113)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</p>

114) 
115)     <ul>

116)     <li><a href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map (Vidalia)

117)     go?</a></li>
118)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>

119)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download

120)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

121)     <li><a href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></li>

122)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close

123)     all my open tabs?</a></li>

124)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay

125)     or bridge?</a></li>
126)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>

127)     <li><a href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do

128)     I verify a build?</a></li>

129)     </ul>
130) 

131)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

132) 

133)     <ul>
134)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
135)     that mean?</a></li>

136)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

137)     logs?</a></li>

138)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

139)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
140)     correctly.</a></li>

141)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

142)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
143)     start.</a></li>

144)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or
145) country)

146)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

147)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
148)     ports.</a></li>

149)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

150)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing
151)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I

152)     worry?</a></li>

153)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

154)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

155)     </ul>

156) 

157)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

158)     <ul>

159) 
160)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
161)     </a></li>

162)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being

163)     used more?</a></li>

164)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static IP.</a></li>

165)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often

166)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>

167)     <li><a href="#MoreThanOneCPU">I have more than one CPU. Does this

168)     help?</a></li>

169)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully

170)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

171)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
172) be?</a></li>

173)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are

174)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>

175)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount

176)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

177)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write

178)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after

180)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

182)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

183)     <li><a href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor

184)     relay run well?</a></li>

185)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li>

186)     <li><a href="#IGotTheBadExitFlagWhyDidThatHappen">I got the BadExit flag.

187)     Why did that happen?</a></li>

188)     <li><a href="#MyRelayRecentlyGotTheGuardFlagAndTrafficDroppedByHalf">My

189)     relay recently got the Guard flag and traffic dropped by half.</a></li>

190)     <li><a href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I want to run my Tor client on a

191)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>

192)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and

193)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>

194)     <li><a href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a nickname and

195)     ORPort and join the network?</a></li>

196)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
197)     relay?</a></li>

198)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I

199)     keep the same key?</a></li>

200)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
201) relay.</a></li>

202)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
203)     </a></li>

204)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server

205)     account?</a></li>

206)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
207)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

208)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
209)     </a></li>
210)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
211)     </a></li>

212)     <li><a href="#FacingLegalTrouble">I'm facing legal trouble. How do I

213)     prove that my server was a Tor relay at a given time?</a></li>

214)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
215)     run my own?</a></li>

216)     </ul>

217) 

218)     <p>Tor hidden services:</p>

219) 

220)     <ul>
221)     <li><a href="#AccessHiddenServices">How do I access hidden services?</a></li>

222)     <li><a href="#ProvideAHiddenService">How do I provide a hidden service?</a></li>

223)     </ul>

224) 

225)     <p>Development:</p>

226) 

227)     <ul>

228)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers

229)     mean?</a></li>
230)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
231)     Tor network?</a></li>

232)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the

233)     Tor network?</a></li>
234)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>

235)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature

236)     into Tor?</a></li>
237)     </ul>
238) 

239)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>

240)     <ul>

241)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor

242)     provide?</a></li>

243)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on

244)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

245)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use

246)     Tor?</a></li>

247)     <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li>

248)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
249) uses.</a></li>

250)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

251)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

252)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I

253)     can't afford that!</a></li>

254)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound

255)     connections?</a></li>
256)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
257)     </a></li>

258)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist

259)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

260)     <li><a href="#IsTorLikeAVPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>
261)     <li><a href="#ShouldIUseTorWithAVPN">Should I use Tor with a VPN?</a></li>

262)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than

263)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

264)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion

265)     routing?</a></li>

266)     <li><a href="#LearnMoreAboutAnonymity">Where can I learn more about anonymity?</a></li>

267)     </ul>

268) 

269)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>

270) 

271)     <ul>
272)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
273)     relay.</a></li>

274)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
275) packets,

276)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

277)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
278)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

279)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path

280)     length.</a></li>

281)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over

282)     many paths.</a></li>

283)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate

284)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>

285)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick

286)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

287)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block

288)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>

289)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block

290)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>

291)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from

292)     posting certain content.</a></li>

293)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
294)     </a></li>

295)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor

296)     traffic.</a></li>

297)     </ul>

298) 

299)     <p>Abuse:</p>

300)     <ul>

301)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
302) things?</a></li>

303)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
304)     relay?</a></li>

305)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
306)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

307)     </ul>

308) 

309)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
310) <a

311)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

312) 

313)     <hr>

314) 

315)     <a id="General"></a>

316)     <h2><a class="anchor">General:</a></h2>

317) 

318)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
319)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

320) 

321)     <p>
322)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
323)     </p>

324) 

325)     <p>

326)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that
327) helps keep
328)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your
329) communications

330)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

331)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection
332) from

333)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

334)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays
335) is
336)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the
337) <a

338)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
339)     </p>

340) 

341)     <p>

342)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that
343) maintains

344)     and develops the Tor software.
345)     </p>

346) 

347)     <hr>

348) 

349)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

350)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
351) from other proxies?</a></h3>
352)     <p>
353)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
354) and
355) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
356) to
357) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
358) server.
359) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
360) through
361) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
362) have to
363) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
364) server.
365) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
366) for
367) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing
368) bad
369) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection
370) to them.
371) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
372) cafe with

373) free wifi Internet.
374)     </p>
375)     <p>

376)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
377) provider
378) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see
379) your
380) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
381) see

382) inside your

383) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
384) stores.

385) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as

386) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
387) traffic

388) stream, and recording your personal details.

389)     </p>
390)     <p>

391)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
392) sending
393) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
394) for
395) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you
396) are
397) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted
398) through
399) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world,
400) completely
401) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your
402) local
403) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen
404) through
405) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass
406) encrypted

407) packets between themselves.</p>

408)     <p>
409)     <dl>

410)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
411) first of
412) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
413) It
414) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
415) merely sees
416) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
417) world, so
418) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
419) figuring

420) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

421)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
422) third
423) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
424) who sent

425) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or

426) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only
427) know the
428) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic
429) stream.  You

430) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
431) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

432)     </dl>
433)     </p>

434) 

435)     <hr>

436) 

437) 

438)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

439)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
440) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

441) 

442)     <p>

443)     If you want to use Tor with a web browser, we provide the Tor Browser
444)     Bundle, which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using
445)     Tor. If you want to use another web browser with Tor, see <a
446)     href="#TBBOtherBrowser">Other web browsers</a>.

447)     </p>
448)     <p>
449)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
450)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

451)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

452)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

453)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

454)     specific applications</a>.

455)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
456)     </p>

457) 

458)     <hr>

459) 

460)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

461)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
462) Tor?</a></h3>

463) 

464)     <p>
465)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
466)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
467)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
468)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
469)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
470)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
471)     the Naval Research Lab.
472)     </p>

473) 

474)     <p>
475)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
476)     </p>

477) 

478)     <p>

479)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
480) spelled

481)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

482)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
483) learned
484)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
485) they

486)     spell it wrong.
487)     </p>

488) 

489)     <hr>

490) 

491)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

492)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
493) Tor?</a></h3>

494) 

495)     <p>

496)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put
497) one
498)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that
499) anybody

500)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
501)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
502)     </p>

503) 

504)     <p>
505)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

506)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security
507) software

508)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
509)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
510)     trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
511)     </p>

512) 

513)     <p>
514)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
515)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

516)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you
517) should
518)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
519) release)

520)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
521)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
522)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
523)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
524)     distribution sites.
525)     </p>

526) 

527)     <p>
528)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

529)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so
530) make

531)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
532)     </p>

533) 

534)     <hr>

535) 

536)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

537)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
538) Tor?</a></h3>

539) 

540)     <p>
541)     Yes.
542)     </p>

543) 

544)     <p>

545)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free
546) software</a>. This
547)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software,
548) either
549)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have
550) to

551)     ask us for specific permission.
552)     </p>

553) 

554)     <p>

555)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must
556) follow our

557)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

558)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file
559) along

560)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
561)     </p>

562) 

563)     <p>

564)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just
565) the

566)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

567)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

568)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
569)     Aurora</a> and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.

570)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
571)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
572)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

573)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is
574)     to include the source code for these programs everywhere you
575)     include the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on
576)     the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and <a
577)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
578)     Aurora</a> pages.

579)     </p>

580) 

581)     <p>

582)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what
583) Tor is,
584)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide).
585) See
586)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for
587) details.

588)     </p>

589) 

590)     <p>
591)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
592)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible

593)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor
594) software, it
595)     may not be supported — or even work — six months later.
596) This

597)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
598)     </p>

599) 

600)     <hr>

601) 

602)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

603)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
604) support?</a></h3>

605) 

606)     <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p>

607)     <ol>
608)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>

609)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page
610) docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>

611)     <li>Read through the <a

612) 
613) href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">
614) tor-talk

615)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

616)     <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a>
617) and

618)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

619)     <li>Send an email to <a

620) 
621) href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li>
622)     <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting
623) us</a> directly.</li>

624)     </ol>

625) 

626)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel
627) or the

628)     mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p>

629) 

630)     <hr>

631) 

632)     <a id="Forum"></a>
633)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
634) 

635)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange

636)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

637)     </p>
638) 
639)     <hr>
640) 

641)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
642)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

643) 

644)     <p>
645)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
646)     </p>

647) 

648)     <p>

649)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
650) to
651)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
652) computers
653)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
654) latency

655)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
656)     bandwidth through Tor.
657)     </p>

658) 

659)     <p>

660)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
661) network
662)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
663) and
664)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
665) currently

666)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
667)     </p>

668) 

669)     <p>
670)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

671)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

672)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
673) video

674)     to go with it.
675)     </p>

676) 

677)     <p>
678)     What can you do to help?
679)     </p>

680) 

681)     <ul>

682) 

683)     <li>

684)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
685) traffic
686)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
687) handle

688)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
689)     </li>

690) 

691)     <li>

692)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>.
693) We

694)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
695)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
696)     walk people through setting it up.
697)     </li>

698) 

699)     <li>

700)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
701) design
702)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
703) and

704)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
705)     </li>

706) 

707)     <li>
708)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

709)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
710) who
711)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
712) we

713)     get to spend more time on it.
714)     </li>

715) 

716)     <li>

717)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
718) moment
719)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
720) href="<page

721)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
722)     </li>

723) 

724)     <li>

725)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
726) agency

727)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

728)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
729) servers
730)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
731) organization has
732)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
733) about
734)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
735) slower.

736)     </li>

737) 

738)     <li>
739)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

740)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
741) money to the

742)     cause</a>. It adds up!
743)     </li>

744) 

745)     </ul>

746) 

747)     <hr>

748) 

749)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

750)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files

751)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

752) 
753)     <p>

754)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network,
755)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default.
756)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows
757)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a

758)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
759)     is not anonymous</a>!

760)     </p>
761) 
762)     <hr>
763) 

764)     <a id="Funding"></a>

765)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
766) with more funding?</a></h3>

767) 

768)     <p>

769)     The Tor network's <a

770) 
771) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several

772)     thousand</a> relays push <a
773)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
774)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a

775) 
776) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several

777)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
778)     self-sustaining.

779)     </p>

780) 

781)     <p>

782)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
783) attention:

784)     </p>

785) 

786)     <ul>

787) 

788)     <li>
789)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
790)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

791)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
792) there's

793)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
794)     </li>

795) 

796)     <li>

797)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
798) questions
799)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
800) good
801)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
802) volunteers.

803)     </li>

804) 

805)     <li>

806)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
807) need

808)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

809)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
810) and
811)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
812) stay
813)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
814) e.g.,

815)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

816)     </li>

817) 

818)     <li>

819)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
820) of the
821)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
822) configuration
823)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
824) of
825)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on
826) this
827)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much
828) more work

829)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
830)     </li>

831) 

832)     <li>
833)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
834)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

835)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
836) relay,

837)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
838)     </li>

839) 

840)     <li>
841)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
842)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
843)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
844)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

845)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
846) research questions</a>
847)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
848) variety of
849)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
850) waiting

851)     behind these.
852)     </li>

853) 

854)     </ul>

855) 

856)     <p>
857)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

858)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
859) developers

860)     can keep up</a>.

861)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
862) effort

863)     so we can continue to grow the network.
864)     </p>

865) 

866)     <p>
867)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
868)     censorship-resistance.
869)     </p>

870) 

871)     <p>

872)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
873) support</a>
874)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
875) Bell
876)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
877) government

878)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
879)     </p>

880) 

881)     <p>

882)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
883) in the
884)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
885) donate/donate>">donate</a>
886)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
887) executive

888)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
889)     </p>

890) 

891)     <hr>
892) 

893)      <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>

894)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these

895)     outbound ports on my firewall?</a></h3>

896) 
897)     <p>

898)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the
899)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for
900)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports,

901)     but many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030.

902)     </p>
903)     <p>

904)     So as a client, you could probably get away with opening only those four
905)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry
906)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as
907)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most
908)     diversity in your entry nodes -- and thus the most security -- as well as
909)     the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll want to let it connect

910)     to all of them.

911)     </p>
912)     <p>

913)     If you really need to connect to only a small set of ports, see the FAQ

914)     entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a>.

915)     </p>
916)     <p>

917)     Note that if you're running Tor as a relay, you must allow outgoing
918)     connections to every other relay and to anywhere your exit policy
919)     advertises that you allow. The cleanest way to do that is simply to allow
920)     all outgoing connections at your firewall. If you don't, clients will try
921)     to use these connections and things won't work.

922)     </p>

923)  

924)     <hr>

925)  

926)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

927)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is

928)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

929) 
930)     <p>

931)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be

932)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
933)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

934)     </p>
935)     <p>

936)     If that site is down, you can still test, but it will involve more effort.
937)     Sites like <a href="http://ipid.shat.net">http://ipid.shat.net</a> and
938)     <a href="http://www.showmyip.com/">http://www.showmyip.com/</a> will tell
939)     you what your IP address appears to be, but you'll need to know your
940)     current IP address so you can compare and decide whether you're using Tor

941)     correctly.

942)     </p>
943)     <p>

944)     To learn your IP address on OS X, Linux, BSD, etc, run "ifconfig". On
945)     Windows, go to the Start menu, click Run and enter "cmd". At the command

946)     prompt, enter "ipconfig /a".

947)     </p>
948)     <p>

949)     If you are behind a NAT or firewall, though, your IP address will be
950)     within the range of 10.XXX.XXX.XXX, 192.168.XXX.XXX, or 172.16.XXX.XXX -
951)     172.31.XXX.XXX, which is not your public IP address. In this case, you
952)     should check your IP address with one of the sites above without using
953)     Tor, and then check again using Tor to see whether your IP address has
954)     changed.

955)     </p>

956)  

957)     <hr>

958)  

959)     <a id="FTP"></a>
960)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
961)     </a></h3>
962) 

963)     <p>

964)     Use the <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor
965)     Browser Bundle</a>. If you want a separate application for an
966)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can
967)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port
968)     "9050".

969)     </p>

970) 

971)     <hr>

972)  

973)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>

974)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal

975)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
976) 

977)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands
978)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data
979)     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
980)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
981)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

982)     href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

983)     careful and be smart.</a>
984)     </p>
985) 
986)     <hr>
987) 

988)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

989)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

990)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

991) 

992)     <p>
993)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

994)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

995)     <hr>

996) 

997)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>

998)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL

999)     certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>

1000)     <p>

1001)     <pre>

1002)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

1003)     The serial number is:

1004) 06:DE:97:E5:1D:C3:9D:C2:64:8D:AC:72:DD:41:01:FC
1005)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 1f9d306e8bfccfcb03981a71a27a9f5d1e0876ce

1006)     The SHA-256 fingerprint is:

1007) 3613d2b22a750094760c41ad19db52a4f05bdea80172e2578761ad967f7ed9aa

1008) 

1009)     blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

1010)     The serial number is: 00:EF:A3
1011)     The SHA-1 fingerprint is: 50af43db8438e67f305a3257d8ef198e8c42f13f

1012)     </pre>

1013)     </p>
1014)     <hr>
1015) 

1016)     <a id="CompilationAndInstallation"></a>
1017)     <h2><a class="anchor">Compilation And Installation:</a></h2>
1018) 

1019)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

1020)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
1021) Tor?</a></h3>
1022) 
1023)     <p>
1024)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
1025) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
1026) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
1027)     </p>

1028) 

1029)     <p>

1030)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
1031) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
1032)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
1033) way to

1034)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers.

1035)     </p>

1036) 

1037)     <p>
1038)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
1039)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
1040)     </p>

1041) 

1042)     <p>

1043)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
1044) method. But
1045)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
1046) it should

1047)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
1048)     </p>

1049) 

1050)     <hr>

1051) 

1052)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

1053)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
1054) the download page?</a></h3>

1055) 

1056)     <p>

1057)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
1058) downloaded is

1059)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
1060)     </p>

1061) 

1062)     <p>
1063)     Please read the <a

1064)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
1065) page for details.

1066)     </p>

1067) 

1068) <hr>
1069) 
1070) <a id="GetTor"></a>
1071) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
1072) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
1073) 
1074) <p>
1075) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
1076) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

1077) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

1078) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

1079) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
1080) cache</a>

1081) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
1082) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
1083) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail

1084) '<tt>gettor@gettor.torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'

1085) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
1086) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
1087) to receive very large attachments.
1088) </p>
1089) 
1090) <p>

1091) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
1092) signature</a>

1093) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
1094) other than our official HTTPS website.

1095) </p>
1096) 

1097)     <hr>

1098) 

1099)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
1100)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives"></a></h3>
1101)     <p>

1102)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on
1103)     some parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
1104)     false positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is
1105)     just a guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
1106)     that you have a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or

1107)     pick a better vendor.
1108)     </p>

1109)     <p>In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for it.
1110)     Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do

1111)     recompile it yourself.</p>
1112) 
1113)     <hr>
1114) 

1115)     <a id="tarballs"></a>

1116)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz

1117)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1118) 
1119)     <p>
1120)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your

1121)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking.
1122)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute</p>

1123)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1124)     <p>

1125)     as documented on tar's man page.

1126)     </p>
1127) 
1128)     <hr>
1129) 

1130)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1131)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1132) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1133) 

1134)     <p>

1135)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1136)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor
1137) Browser

1138)     Bundle</a>.

1139)     </p>

1140) 
1141) <hr>
1142) 

1143) <a id="TBBGeneral"></a>
1144) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a></h2>
1145) 

1146) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1147) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on
1148) YouTube

1149) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1150) 
1151) <p>

1152) YouTube and similar sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.
1153) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1154) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes
1155) but is not limited to: <a href="http://decloak.net">completely disregarding
1156) proxy settings</a>, querying your <a

1157) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1158) local IP address</a>, and <a

1159) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1160) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1161) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a>
1162) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass,
1163) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain.

1164) </p>

1165) 
1166) <p>

1167) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/html5">YouTube offers experimental HTML5 video

1168) support</a> for many of their videos. Often you can get the HTML5 version of
1169) videos that don't want to play by grabbing the YouTube URL from the "Embed"

1170) code under a video's "Share" option. The link switches out a URL that looks</p>
1171) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>
1172) <p>to something that looks like</p>
1173) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/embed/CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>

1174) 

1175) <hr>
1176) 

1177) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1178) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1179) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1180) <p>

1181) Ubuntu prevents its users from executing shell scripts by clicking them,
1182) even when the file permissions are set correctly. For now you need to

1183) start the Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1184) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1185) <p>
1186) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1187) </p>
1188) 

1189) <hr>
1190) 

1191) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1192) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
1193) software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></h3>
1194) <p>

1195) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the
1196) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off

1197) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1198) </p>
1199) 

1200) <hr>
1201) 

1202) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>

1203) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">

1204) I want to run another application through the Tor launched by Tor

1205) Browser Bundle.</a></h3>

1206) 
1207) <p>

1208) Typically Tor listens for Socks connections on port 9050. TBB listens

1209) on port 9150.

1210) The goal is to avoid conflicting with a "system" Tor install,

1211) so you can run a system Tor and TBB at the same time. We're <a
1212) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3948">working on
1213) a feature</a> where Tor will try the usual ports first and then back

1214) off to a random choice if they're already in use.

1215) </p>
1216) 
1217) <hr>
1218) 
1219) <a id="TBBPolipo"></a>
1220) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did
1221) Polipo go?</a></h3>
1222) 
1223) <p>
1224) In the past, Tor bundles included an HTTP proxy like Privoxy or Polipo,
1225) solely to work around a bug in Firefox that was finally fixed in Firefox
1226) 6. Now you don't need a separate HTTP proxy to use Tor, and in fact
1227) leaving it out makes you safer because Torbutton has better control over
1228) Firefox's interaction with websites.
1229) </p>
1230) 
1231) <p>
1232) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero

1233) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set

1234) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try

1235) to use a Socks proxy rather than an http proxy — Tor runs a Socks

1236) proxy on port 9050 on Windows, or <a href="#TBBSocksPort">see above</a>
1237) for OSX and Linux.
1238) </p>
1239) 
1240) <p>

1241) If that fails, feel free to install <a

1242) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1243) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1244) users. Privoxy has an <a
1245) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1246) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.

1247) </p>
1248) 
1249) <hr>
1250) 

1251) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1252) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1253) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1254) 
1255) <p>

1256) The Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from
1257) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any
1258) additional Firefox add-ons with the Tor Browser Bundle. Add-ons can break
1259) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and

1260) bypassing proxy settings.

1261) </p>

1262) <p>

1263) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or
1264) anti-tracking software with the Tor Browser Bundle. Right now, we do not
1265) think that's such a good idea. The Tor Browser Bundle aims to provide
1266) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are
1267) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which

1268) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">

1269) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that
1270) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint
1271) users.

1272) </p>

1273) 

1274) <hr>
1275) 

1276) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1277) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1278) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript
1279) configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?
1280) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1281) 
1282) <p>
1283) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
1284) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
1285) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1286) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1287) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1288) JavaScript might make a website work).
1289) </p>
1290) 

1291) <p>
1292) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1293) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1294) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1295) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1296) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1297) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1298) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1299) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1300) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1301) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1302) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1303) </p>

1304) 
1305) <p>

1306) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1307) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1308) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1309) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1310) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1311) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1312) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1313) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1314) partitioning concern will remain.

1315) </p>
1316) 
1317) <p>

1318) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1319) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1320) </p>
1321) 
1322) <hr>
1323) 

1324) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1325) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1326) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1327) 
1328) <p>
1329) Unfortunately, Torbutton only works with Firefox right now, and without
1330) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/en/design/">Torbutton's
1331) extensive privacy fixes</a> there are many ways for websites or other

1332) attackers to recognize you, track you back to your IP address, and so
1333) on.

1334) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
1335) really bad idea.
1336) </p>
1337) 
1338) <p>
1339) We're working with the Chrome team to <a

1340) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-
1341) and-fingerprinting">fix
1342) some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it will be possible to write
1343) a
1344) Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any other browser is on the
1345) horizon.

1346) </p>
1347) 
1348) <hr>
1349) 

1350) <a id="TorbuttonOtherBrowser"></a>

1351) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">

1352) Will Torbutton be available for other browsers?</a></h3>

1353) 
1354) <p>

1355)  We don't support IE, Opera or Safari and never plan to. There are too many ways that your privacy can go wrong with those browsers, and because of their closed design it is really hard for us to do anything to change these privacy problems.

1356) </p>
1357) <p>

1358) We are working with the Chrome people to modify Chrome's internals so that we can eventually support it. But for now, Firefox is the only safe choice.

1359) </p>
1360) 

1361) <hr>

1362) 

1363) <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a>

1364) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor
1365) Browser

1366) Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3>
1367) 
1368) <p>
1369) We're working on a way to make this possible on all platforms. Please
1370) be patient.
1371) </p>
1372) 
1373) <hr>
1374) 

1375) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1376) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1377) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1378) 
1379) <p>
1380) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1381) considers Tor to be spyware.
1382) </p>
1383) 
1384) <p>

1385) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are
1386) also

1387) shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this message

1388) when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1389) Google

1390) interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address (the exit
1391) relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their website,
1392) so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.
1393) </p>
1394) <p>
1395) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1396) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1397) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1398) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1399) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1400) an infection.
1401) </p>
1402) 
1403) <p>

1404) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally
1405) specifically

1406) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1407) should clear up again after a short time.
1408) </p>
1409) 
1410) <p>
1411) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
1412) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as

1413) DuckDuckGo, ixquick, or Bing.

1414) </p>
1415) 
1416) <hr />
1417) 

1418) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1419) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1420) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1421) 
1422) <p>

1423)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it
1424)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language
1425)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results

1426)  on your queries.

1427) </p>
1428) <p>

1429) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that
1430) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the
1431) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on
1432) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact. The easy way to
1433) avoid this "feature" is to use

1434) <a href="https://google.com/ncr">https://google.com/ncr</a>.

1435) </p>
1436) <p>

1437) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one
1438) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return
1439) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been
1440) sent to. On a query this looks like:

1441) </p>

1442) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1443) <p>

1444) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google.
1445) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

1446) </p>
1447) <hr />

1448) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1449) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1450) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1451) 
1452) <p>
1453) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1454) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1455) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1456) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1457) </p>
1458) 
1459) <p>
1460) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1461) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1462) decided

1463) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1464) rightful owner.
1465) </p>
1466) 
1467) <p>
1468) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1469) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1470) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1471) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1472) </p>
1473) 
1474) <p>
1475) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1476) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1477) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1478) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1479) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1480) hijacking">

1481) way more complex than that</a>.
1482) </p>
1483) 
1484) <p>
1485) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1486) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1487) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1488) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1489) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1490) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1491) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1492) </p>
1493) 
1494) <hr>
1495) 

1496) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1497) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection

1498) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1499) 
1500) <p>

1501) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
1502) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
1503) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

1504) href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

1505) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
1506) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
1507) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
1508) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options
1509) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

1510) </p>
1511) <p>

1512) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
1513) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently,
1514) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a
1515) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post
1516) in the archives</a> useful.

1517) </p>
1518) <p>

1519) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the
1520) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how
1521) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

1522) </p>
1523) 
1524) <hr>
1525) 

1526) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>

1527) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't

1528) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1529) 
1530) <p>

1531) On Unix, we recommend you give <a
1532) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try.
1533) Alternative proxifying tools like <a
1534) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a
1535) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also

1536) available.</p>

1537) <p>
1538) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a
1539) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a
1540) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a

1541) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

1542) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here.

1543) </p>
1544) 
1545) <hr>
1546) 

1547) <a id="TBB3.x"></a>
1548) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a></h2>

1549)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>

1550)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map

1551)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1552) 

1553)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox
1554)     extension that provides similar functionality. Unfortunately, circuit
1555)     status reporting is still missing, but we are <a
1556)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8641">working

1557)     on providing it</a>. </p>
1558) 

1559)     <p>In the meantime, we are providing standalone Vidalia packages for
1560)     people who still want the map. Windows and Linux versions are <a

1561)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~erinn/vidalia-standalone-bundles/">

1562)     available here</a>.</p>

1563) 

1564)     <p>To use these packages, extract them, then run the startup script.
1565)     On Windows, this is "Start Vidalia.exe". On Linux, it is start-vidalia.
1566)     They can be placed in a different directory from TBB (and likely should

1567)     be). </p>
1568) 

1569)     <p>This Vidalia package will only run properly if Tor Browser has already

1570)     been launched. You cannot start it before launching Tor Browser. </p>
1571) 

1572)     <p>MacOS is still under development, but in the mean time you can modify
1573)     your TBB 2.x to be a standalone Vidalia (and then use it after starting
1574)     TBB 3.x) by opening your TBB 2.x vidalia.conf file in an editor and

1575)     replacing its contents with just these lines:</p>
1576) 
1577)     <pre>
1578)     [General]
1579)     LanguageCode=en
1580) 
1581)     [Tor]
1582)     ControlPort=9151
1583)     TorExecutable=.
1584)     Torrc=.
1585)     DataDirectory=.
1586)     AuthenticationMethod=cookie

1587)     </pre>

1588) 
1589)     <hr>
1590) 
1591)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1592)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1593)     </h3>
1594) 

1595)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript
1596)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24
1597)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config

1598)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1599) 

1600)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the
1601)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select
1602)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists
1603)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas

1604)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1605) 

1606)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config,

1607)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1608) 
1609)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1610)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled

1611)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon,
1612)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and

1613)     provides a button for it. </p>
1614) 

1615)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and

1616)     NoScript. </p>
1617) 

1618)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a

1619)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1620) 
1621)     <hr>
1622) 
1623)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1624)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1625)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1626) 

1627)     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the
1628)     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a

1629)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">

1630)     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional
1631)     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as

1632)     the download.</p>
1633) 
1634)     <ul>
1635)       <li>Download the Tor Browser package, the sha256sums.txt file, and the

1636)       sha256sums signature files. They can all be found in the same directory

1637)       under <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/">

1638)       https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/</a>, for example in 3.5

1639)       for TBB 3.5.</li>

1640)       <li>Retrieve the signers' GPG keys. This can be done from the command
1641)       line by entering something like

1642)       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>

1643)       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other

1644)       developers' key IDs can be found on

1645)       <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this

1646)       page</a>.)</li>
1647)       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
1648)       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>

1649)       <li>You should see a message like "Good signature from &lt;DEVELOPER

1650)       NAME&gt;". If you don't, there is a problem. Try these steps again.</li>

1651)       <li>Now you can take the sha256sum of the Tor Browser package. On

1652)       Windows you can use the <a href="http://md5deep.sourceforge.net/">
1653)       hashdeep utility</a> and run
1654)       <pre>C:\location\where\you\saved\hashdeep -c sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.exe</pre>
1655)       On Mac or Linux you can run <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.zip</pre> or <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> without having to download a utility.</li>
1656)       <li>You will see a string of letters and numbers.</li>
1657)       <li>Open sha256sums.txt in a text editor.</li>
1658)       <li>Locate the name of the Tor Browser file you downloaded.</li>
1659)       <li>Compare the string of letters and numbers to the left of your

1660)       filename with the string of letters and numbers that appeared
1661)       on your command line. If they match, you've successfully verified the
1662)       build.</li>

1663)     </ul>
1664) 
1665)     <p><a href="https://github.com/isislovecruft/scripts/blob/master/verify-gitian-builder-signatures">

1666)     Scripts</a> to <a

1667)     href="http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/648/how-to-verify-tor-browser-bundle-tbb-3-x">automate

1668)     </a> these steps have been written, but to use them you will need to

1669)     modify them yourself with the latest Tor Browser Bundle filename.</p>
1670) 
1671)     <hr>
1672) 
1673)     <a id="PluggableTransports"></a>
1674)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></h3>
1675) 
1676)     <p>

1677)     For now, the Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is still a separate
1678)     unofficial package. Download them <a

1679)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.5-pt20131217/">
1680)     here</a>. We hope to have combined packages available in a beta soon.
1681)     </p>
1682) 
1683)     <p>

1684)     The separate Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is different from the
1685)     Pluggable Transports bundles that have been released in the past.
1686)     They include the programs necessary to use obfsproxy and flash proxy,
1687)     but the pluggable transports are not enabled by default. You must
1688)     enable them manually by adding Bridge lines to the torrc file.
1689)     (Please see ticket <a
1690)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10418">#10418</a>

1691)     for how we hope to make it easier to do in the future.)
1692)     </p>
1693) 
1694)     <p>

1695)     To enable <b>obfsproxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the
1696)     bundle and add the lines:

1697)     </p>
1698) 
1699)     <pre>

1700) Bridge obfs3 83.212.101.3:60475 A09D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298239

1701) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.74:31493 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9
1702) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.75:46328 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9

1703) Bridge obfs3 209.141.36.236:45496 58D91C3A631F910F32E18A55441D5A0463BA66E2
1704) Bridge obfs3 208.79.90.242:35658 BA61757846841D64A83EA2514C766CB92F1FB41F

1705) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:38980 9D7259A696F7DAB073043B28114112A46D36CFFD
1706) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:47779 844B1F53FFD548C998F8D3B01B7E19FA07C3396E
1707) Bridge obfs2 83.212.100.216:47870 1F01A7BB60F49FC96E0850A6BAD6D076DFEFAF80
1708) Bridge obfs2 83.212.96.182:46602 6F058CBEF888EB20D1DEB9886909F1E812245D41
1709) Bridge obfs2 70.182.182.109:54542 94C9E691688FAFDEC701A0788BD15BE8AD34ED35
1710) Bridge obfs2 128.31.0.34:1051 CA7434F14A898C7D3427B8295A7F83446BC7F496
1711)     </pre>
1712)     <p>

1713)     To enable <b>flash proxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the
1714)     bundle and add the line:

1715)     </p>
1716)     <pre>
1717) Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
1718)     </pre>
1719) 
1720)     <hr>
1721) 
1722)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>

1723)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New

1724)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1725) 
1726)     <p>

1727)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level
1728)     browser data too. But it sure is a surprising feature, for people who

1729)     are used to Vidalia's "new identity" behavior.
1730)     </p>
1731) 
1732)     <p>

1733)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1734)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1735)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1736)     ticket <a
1737)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1738)     to follow progress there.

1739)     </p>
1740) 
1741)     <p>

1742)     In the mean time, you can get Vidalia's old "newnym" functionality by
1743)     attaching a Vidalia to your TBB 3.x. See the instructions <a
1744)     href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">above</a>.

1745)     </p>
1746) 
1747)     <hr>
1748) 
1749)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1750)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1751) 
1752)     <p>

1753)     You've got three options.

1754)     </p>
1755) 
1756)     <p>

1757)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system
1758)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay
1759)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>).

1760)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1761)     </p>
1762) 
1763)     <p>

1764)     Second (simpler option), if you're on Windows, you can fetch the separate
1765)     "Vidalia relay bundle" or "Vidalia bridge bundle" from the download page
1766)     and then use that (again you can use TBB independent of it).

1767)     </p>
1768) 
1769)     <p>

1770)     Third (complex option), you can either hook your Vidalia up to TBB (as
1771)     described in the FAQ above) or edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc)
1772)     directly to add the following lines:

1773)     </p>
1774)     <pre>
1775)     ORPort 443
1776)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1777)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1778)     </pre>
1779)     <p>

1780)     If you've installed <a

1781)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

1782)     you'll need to add one more line:
1783)     </p>
1784)     <pre>
1785)     ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
1786)     </pre>
1787)     <p>

1788)     This third option is pretty klunky right now; see e.g. <a
1789)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10449">this bug</a>;
1790)     but we're hoping it will become an easy option in the future.

1791)     </p>
1792) 
1793)     <hr>
1794) 
1795)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>

1796)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps

1797)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1798) 

1799)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build"
1800)     process, which allows many people to build the Tor Browser Bundle and
1801)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a
1802)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first
1803)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a

1804)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second

1805)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it.

1806)     </p>
1807) 

1808)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same
1809)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason

1810)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1811) 
1812)     <hr>
1813) 

1814)     <a id="TBBSourceCode"></a>
1815)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>

1816) 
1817)     <p>
1818)     Start with <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git</a> and <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build</a>.
1819)     </p>
1820) 
1821) 

1822) <hr>
1823) 

1824) <a id="AdvancedTorUsage"></a>
1825) <h2><a class="anchor">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h2>
1826) 

1827) <a id="torrc"></a>

1828) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1829) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1830) 
1831) <p>
1832) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1833) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1834) configuration should work fine for most Tor users.

1835) </p>

1836) <p>

1837) If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for

1838) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory.
1839) On OS X, you must right-click or command-click on the browser bundle icon,
1840) and select "Show Package Contents" before the Tor Browser directories become
1841) visible.

1842) </p>
1843) <p>

1844) Tor puts the torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> if you installed a pre-built package.</p>

1845) 
1846) <p>

1847) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart tor for the
1848) changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1849) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1850) it.)

1851) </p>
1852) 
1853) <p>

1854) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page

1855) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a

1856) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/config/torrc.sample.in">

1857) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all
1858) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect

1859) on Tor's configuration.

1860) </p>
1861) 
1862) <hr>
1863) 

1864) <a id="Logs"></a>

1865) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1866) logs?</a></h3>

1867) 
1868) <p>

1869) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1870) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1871) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1872) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1873) </p>
1874) 
1875) <p>
1876) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1877) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1878) </p>
1879) 
1880) <ul>
1881) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1882) </li>

1883) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1884) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1885) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1886) </li>
1887) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1888) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1889) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1890) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1891) </li>
1892) </ul>
1893) 
1894) <p>

1895) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1896) torrc</a>

1897) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1898) following line:

1899) </p>
1900) 
1901) <pre>

1902) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1903) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1904) </pre>

1905) 
1906) <p>

1907) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1908) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1909) of the section:
1910) </p>
1911) 
1912) <pre>
1913) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1914) </pre>
1915) 
1916) <p>

1917) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1918) and filename for your Tor log.

1919) </p>
1920) 
1921) <hr>
1922) 

1923) 
1924) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1925) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1926) 
1927) <p>

1928) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in

1929) Tor's logs:

1930) </p>
1931) 
1932) <ul>

1933)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will

1934)     exit.</li>

1935)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad
1936)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something
1937)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to

1938)     correct the problem.</li>

1939)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1940)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's

1941)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1942)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li>

1943) </ul>
1944) 
1945) <p>

1946) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the
1947) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react

1948) correctly for each situation.

1949) </p>
1950) 
1951) <p>

1952) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about

1953) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1954) </p>
1955) 
1956) <p>

1957) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal
1958) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in
1959) their logs.

1960) </p>
1961) 

1962) <hr>
1963) 

1964) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1965) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1966) working.</a></h3>

1967) 
1968) <p>

1969) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1970) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1971) </p>
1972) 
1973) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1974) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it
1975) will
1976) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the
1977) Vidalia

1978) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1979) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1980) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1981) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1982) client functionality is working."
1983) </p>
1984) 
1985) <p>
1986) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1987) </p>
1988) 
1989) <ol>
1990) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1991) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1992) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1993) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1994) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1995) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1996) zone is correct.</li>

1997) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1998) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1999) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

2000) </li>

2001) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
2002) that

2003) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
2004) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
2005) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
2006) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

2007) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

2008) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
2009) about what's going wrong?</li>

2010) </ol>
2011) 
2012) <hr />
2013) 

2014) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
2015) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
2016) <p>

2017)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor.
2018)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even
2019)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so
2020)  we can help you track it down.

2021) </p>
2022) <p>

2023) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest
2024) stable or the latest development version).

2025) </p>
2026) <p>

2027) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at
2028) least libevent 1.3a.

2029) </p>
2030) <p>

2031) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a
2032) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so,
2033) check if there are any new details that you can add.

2034) </p>
2035) <p>

2036) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can
2037) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that
2038) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up?
2039) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for
2040) example the latest stable release?

2041) </p>
2042) <p>

2043) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get?

2044) </p>
2045) <ul>
2046) <li>

2047) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please
2048) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on.
2049) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially
2050) if they seem important.

2051) </li>
2052) <li>

2053) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to
2054) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or
2055) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your
2056) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt",
2057) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c
2058) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core
2059) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows
2060) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate

2061) your bug on Unix?)
2062) </li>
2063) <li>

2064) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation
2065) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you
2066) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a
2067) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should
2068) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can
2069) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground,
2070) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default
2071) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a>
2072) for details.

2073) </li>
2074) <li>

2075) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it?
2076) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes
2077) sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running
2078) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will
2079) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases
2080) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware
2081) problems could also be the culprit.

2082) </li>
2083) </ul>
2084) <p>

2085) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your
2086) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ
2087) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually
2088) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole
2089) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send
2090) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then
2091) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed.
2092) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down
2093) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise
2094) to keep logs like this sitting around.)

2095) </p>
2096) 
2097) <hr />
2098) 

2099) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>

2100) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a
2101) password at start.</a></h3>

2102) 
2103) <p>
2104) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
2105) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
2106) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
2107) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
2108) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
2109) compromising your anonymity.
2110) </p>
2111) 
2112) <p>
2113) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
2114) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
2115) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
2116) </p>
2117) 
2118) <ol>
2119) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
2120) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
2121) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
2122) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
2123) </li>
2124) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
2125) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,

2126) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are
2127) different.