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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p><a href="#General">General questions:</a><br />
18)     <a href="#CompilationAndInstallation">Compilation and Installation:</a><br />
19)     <a href="#TBBGeneral">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a><br />

20)     <a href="#TBB3.x">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a><br />

21)     <a href="#AdvancedTorUsage">Advanced Tor usage:</a><br />
22)     <a href="#RunningATorRelay">Running a Tor relay:</a><br />
23)     <a href="#TorHiddenServices">Tor hidden services:</a><br />
24)     <a href="#Development">Development:</a><br />
25)     <a href="#AnonymityAndSecurity">Anonymity and Security:</a><br />
26)     <a href="#AlternateDesigns">Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</a><br />
27)     <a href="#Abuse">Abuse:</a></p>

28) 

29) <hr>
30) 
31)     <p>General questions:</p>

32)     <ul>
33)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

34)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
35) proxies?</a></li>

36)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
37)     Tor?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

40)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

42)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

44)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
45)     </a></li>

46)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
47)     funding?</a></li>

48)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my

49)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

50)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these outbound ports

51)     on my firewall?</a></li>

52)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

53)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information

54)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

55)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
56)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

57)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

58)     fingerprints?</a></li>

59)     </ul>

60) 

61)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

62) 

63)     <ul>
64)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
65)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
66)     page?</a></li>

67)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
68)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

69)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

70)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

71)     <li><a href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

72)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
73) includes Tor?</a></li>

74)     </ul>

75) 

76)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (general):</p>

77)     <ul>

78) 

79)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
80)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

81)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

82)     </a></li>

83)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
84)     software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></li>

85)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to

86)     run another application through the Tor launched by Tor Browser

87)     Bundle.</a></li>

88)     <li><a href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did Polipo
89)     go?</a></li>

90)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

91)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

92)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to
93) allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that
94) unsafe?</a></li>

95)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
96)     with Tor.</a></li>

97)     <li><a href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">Will Torbutton be available

98)     for other browsers?</a></li>

99)     <li><a href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor Browser Bundle
100)     running but close the browser.</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

102)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

103)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign

104)     languages?</a></li>

105)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
106)     been compromised.</a></li>

107)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP

108)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

109)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy

110)     with my application?</a></li>

111)     </ul>
112) 

113)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</p>

114) 
115)     <ul>

116)     <li><a href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map (Vidalia)

117)     go?</a></li>
118)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>

119)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download

120)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

121)     <li><a href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></li>

122)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close

123)     all my open tabs?</a></li>

124)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay

125)     or bridge?</a></li>
126)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>

127)     <li><a href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do

128)     I verify a build?</a></li>

129)     </ul>
130) 

131)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

132) 

133)     <ul>
134)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
135)     that mean?</a></li>

136)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

137)     logs?</a></li>

138)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

139)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
140)     correctly.</a></li>

141)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

142)     <li><a href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a password at
143)     start.</a></li>

144)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or
145) country)

146)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

147)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
148)     ports.</a></li>

149)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

150)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing
151)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I

152)     worry?</a></li>

153)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

154)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

155)     </ul>

156) 

157)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

158)     <ul>

159) 
160)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
161)     </a></li>

162)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being

163)     used more?</a></li>

164)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static IP.</a></li>

165)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often

166)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>

167)     <li><a href="#MoreThanOneCPU">I have more than one CPU. Does this

168)     help?</a></li>

169)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully

170)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

171)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
172) be?</a></li>

173)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are

174)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>

175)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount

176)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

177)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write

178)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after

180)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

182)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

183)     <li><a href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor

184)     relay run well?</a></li>

185)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li>

186)     <li><a href="#IGotTheBadExitFlagWhyDidThatHappen">I got the BadExit flag.

187)     Why did that happen?</a></li>

188)     <li><a href="#MyRelayRecentlyGotTheGuardFlagAndTrafficDroppedByHalf">My

189)     relay recently got the Guard flag and traffic dropped by half.</a></li>

190)     <li><a href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I want to run my Tor client on a

191)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>

192)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and

193)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>

194)     <li><a href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a nickname and

195)     ORPort and join the network?</a></li>

196)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
197)     relay?</a></li>

198)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I

199)     keep the same key?</a></li>

200)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
201) relay.</a></li>

202)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
203)     </a></li>

204)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server

205)     account?</a></li>

206)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
207)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

208)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
209)     </a></li>
210)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
211)     </a></li>

212)     <li><a href="#FacingLegalTrouble">I'm facing legal trouble. How do I

213)     prove that my server was a Tor relay at a given time?</a></li>

214)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
215)     run my own?</a></li>

216)     </ul>

217) 

218)     <p>Tor hidden services:</p>

219) 

220)     <ul>
221)     <li><a href="#AccessHiddenServices">How do I access hidden services?</a></li>

222)     <li><a href="#ProvideAHiddenService">How do I provide a hidden service?</a></li>

223)     </ul>

224) 

225)     <p>Development:</p>

226) 

227)     <ul>

228)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers

229)     mean?</a></li>
230)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
231)     Tor network?</a></li>

232)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the

233)     Tor network?</a></li>
234)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>

235)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature

236)     into Tor?</a></li>
237)     </ul>
238) 

239)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>

240)     <ul>

241)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor

242)     provide?</a></li>

243)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on

244)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

245)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use

246)     Tor?</a></li>

247)     <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li>

248)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
249) uses.</a></li>

250)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

251)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

252)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I

253)     can't afford that!</a></li>

254)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound

255)     connections?</a></li>
256)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
257)     </a></li>

258)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist

259)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

260)     <li><a href="#IsTorLikeAVPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>

261)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than

262)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

263)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion

264)     routing?</a></li>

265)     <li><a href="#LearnMoreAboutAnonymity">Where can I learn more about anonymity?</a></li>

266)     </ul>

267) 

268)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>

269) 

270)     <ul>
271)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
272)     relay.</a></li>

273)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
274) packets,

275)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

276)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
277)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

278)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path

279)     length.</a></li>

280)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over

281)     many paths.</a></li>

282)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate

283)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>

284)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick

285)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

286)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block

287)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>

288)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block

289)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>

290)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from

291)     posting certain content.</a></li>

292)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
293)     </a></li>

294)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor

295)     traffic.</a></li>

296)     </ul>

297) 

298)     <p>Abuse:</p>

299)     <ul>

300)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
301) things?</a></li>

302)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
303)     relay?</a></li>

304)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
305)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

306)     </ul>

307) 

308)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
309) <a

310)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

311) 

312)     <hr>

313) 

314)     <a id="General"></a>

315)     <h2><a class="anchor">General:</a></h2>

316) 

317)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
318)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

319) 

320)     <p>
321)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
322)     </p>

323) 

324)     <p>

325)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that
326) helps keep
327)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your
328) communications

329)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

330)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection
331) from

332)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

333)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays
334) is
335)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the
336) <a

337)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
338)     </p>

339) 

340)     <p>

341)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that
342) maintains

343)     and develops the Tor software.
344)     </p>

345) 

346)     <hr>

347) 

348)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

349)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
350) from other proxies?</a></h3>
351)     <p>
352)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
353) and
354) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
355) to
356) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
357) server.
358) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
359) through
360) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
361) have to
362) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
363) server.
364) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
365) for
366) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing
367) bad
368) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection
369) to them.
370) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
371) cafe with

372) free wifi Internet.
373)     </p>
374)     <p>

375)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
376) provider
377) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see
378) your
379) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
380) see

381) inside your

382) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
383) stores.

384) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as

385) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
386) traffic

387) stream, and recording your personal details.

388)     </p>
389)     <p>

390)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
391) sending
392) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
393) for
394) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you
395) are
396) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted
397) through
398) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world,
399) completely
400) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your
401) local
402) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen
403) through
404) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass
405) encrypted

406) packets between themselves.</p>

407)     <p>
408)     <dl>

409)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
410) first of
411) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
412) It
413) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
414) merely sees
415) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
416) world, so
417) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
418) figuring

419) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

420)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
421) third
422) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
423) who sent

424) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or

425) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only
426) know the
427) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic
428) stream.  You

429) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
430) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

431)     </dl>
432)     </p>

433) 

434)     <hr>

435) 

436) 

437)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

438)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
439) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

440) 

441)     <p>

442)     If you want to use Tor with a web browser, we provide the Tor Browser
443)     Bundle, which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using
444)     Tor. If you want to use another web browser with Tor, see <a
445)     href="#TBBOtherBrowser">Other web browsers</a>.

446)     </p>
447)     <p>
448)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
449)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

450)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

451)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

452)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

453)     specific applications</a>.

454)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
455)     </p>

456) 

457)     <hr>

458) 

459)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

460)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
461) Tor?</a></h3>

462) 

463)     <p>
464)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
465)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
466)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
467)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
468)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
469)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
470)     the Naval Research Lab.
471)     </p>

472) 

473)     <p>
474)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
475)     </p>

476) 

477)     <p>

478)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
479) spelled

480)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

481)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
482) learned
483)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
484) they

485)     spell it wrong.
486)     </p>

487) 

488)     <hr>

489) 

490)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

491)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
492) Tor?</a></h3>

493) 

494)     <p>

495)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put
496) one
497)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that
498) anybody

499)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
500)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
501)     </p>

502) 

503)     <p>
504)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

505)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security
506) software

507)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
508)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
509)     trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
510)     </p>

511) 

512)     <p>
513)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
514)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

515)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you
516) should
517)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
518) release)

519)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
520)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
521)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
522)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
523)     distribution sites.
524)     </p>

525) 

526)     <p>
527)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

528)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so
529) make

530)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
531)     </p>

532) 

533)     <hr>

534) 

535)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

536)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
537) Tor?</a></h3>

538) 

539)     <p>
540)     Yes.
541)     </p>

542) 

543)     <p>

544)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free
545) software</a>. This
546)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software,
547) either
548)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have
549) to

550)     ask us for specific permission.
551)     </p>

552) 

553)     <p>

554)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must
555) follow our

556)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

557)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file
558) along

559)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
560)     </p>

561) 

562)     <p>

563)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just
564) the

565)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

566)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

567)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
568)     Aurora</a> and <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia</a>.

569)     You will need to follow the licenses for those programs
570)     as well. Both of them are distributed under the <a
571)     href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

572)     Public License</a>. The simplest way to obey their licenses is
573)     to include the source code for these programs everywhere you
574)     include the bundles themselves. Look for "source" packages on
575)     the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia page</a> and <a
576)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/all-aurora.html">Mozilla
577)     Aurora</a> pages.

578)     </p>

579) 

580)     <p>

581)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what
582) Tor is,
583)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide).
584) See
585)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for
586) details.

587)     </p>

588) 

589)     <p>
590)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
591)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible

592)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor
593) software, it
594)     may not be supported — or even work — six months later.
595) This

596)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
597)     </p>

598) 

599)     <hr>

600) 

601)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

602)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
603) support?</a></h3>

604) 

605)     <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p>

606)     <ol>
607)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>

608)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page
609) docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>

610)     <li>Read through the <a

611) 
612) href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">
613) tor-talk

614)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

615)     <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a>
616) and

617)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

618)     <li>Send an email to <a

619) 
620) href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li>
621)     <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting
622) us</a> directly.</li>

623)     </ol>

624) 

625)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel
626) or the

627)     mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p>

628) 

629)     <hr>

630) 

631)     <a id="Forum"></a>
632)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
633) 

634)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange

635)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

636)     </p>
637) 
638)     <hr>
639) 

640)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
641)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

642) 

643)     <p>
644)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
645)     </p>

646) 

647)     <p>

648)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
649) to
650)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
651) computers
652)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
653) latency

654)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
655)     bandwidth through Tor.
656)     </p>

657) 

658)     <p>

659)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
660) network
661)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
662) and
663)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
664) currently

665)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
666)     </p>

667) 

668)     <p>
669)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

670)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

671)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
672) video

673)     to go with it.
674)     </p>

675) 

676)     <p>
677)     What can you do to help?
678)     </p>

679) 

680)     <ul>

681) 

682)     <li>

683)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
684) traffic
685)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
686) handle

687)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
688)     </li>

689) 

690)     <li>

691)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>.
692) We

693)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
694)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
695)     walk people through setting it up.
696)     </li>

697) 

698)     <li>

699)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
700) design
701)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
702) and

703)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
704)     </li>

705) 

706)     <li>
707)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

708)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
709) who
710)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
711) we

712)     get to spend more time on it.
713)     </li>

714) 

715)     <li>

716)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
717) moment
718)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
719) href="<page

720)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
721)     </li>

722) 

723)     <li>

724)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
725) agency

726)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

727)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
728) servers
729)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
730) organization has
731)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
732) about
733)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
734) slower.

735)     </li>

736) 

737)     <li>
738)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

739)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
740) money to the

741)     cause</a>. It adds up!
742)     </li>

743) 

744)     </ul>

745) 

746)     <hr>

747) 

748)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

749)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files

750)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

751) 
752)     <p>

753)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network,
754)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default.
755)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows
756)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a

757)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
758)     is not anonymous</a>!

759)     </p>
760) 
761)     <hr>
762) 

763)     <a id="Funding"></a>

764)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
765) with more funding?</a></h3>

766) 

767)     <p>

768)     The Tor network's <a

769) 
770) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several

771)     thousand</a> relays push <a
772)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
773)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a

774) 
775) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several

776)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
777)     self-sustaining.

778)     </p>

779) 

780)     <p>

781)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
782) attention:

783)     </p>

784) 

785)     <ul>

786) 

787)     <li>
788)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
789)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

790)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
791) there's

792)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
793)     </li>

794) 

795)     <li>

796)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
797) questions
798)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
799) good
800)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
801) volunteers.

802)     </li>

803) 

804)     <li>

805)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
806) need

807)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

808)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
809) and
810)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
811) stay
812)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
813) e.g.,

814)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

815)     </li>

816) 

817)     <li>

818)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
819) of the
820)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
821) configuration
822)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
823) of
824)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on
825) this
826)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much
827) more work

828)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
829)     </li>

830) 

831)     <li>
832)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
833)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

834)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
835) relay,

836)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
837)     </li>

838) 

839)     <li>
840)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
841)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
842)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
843)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

844)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
845) research questions</a>
846)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
847) variety of
848)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
849) waiting

850)     behind these.
851)     </li>

852) 

853)     </ul>

854) 

855)     <p>
856)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

857)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
858) developers

859)     can keep up</a>.

860)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
861) effort

862)     so we can continue to grow the network.
863)     </p>

864) 

865)     <p>
866)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
867)     censorship-resistance.
868)     </p>

869) 

870)     <p>

871)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
872) support</a>
873)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
874) Bell
875)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
876) government

877)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
878)     </p>

879) 

880)     <p>

881)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
882) in the
883)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
884) donate/donate>">donate</a>
885)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
886) executive

887)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
888)     </p>

889) 

890)     <hr>
891) 

892)      <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>

893)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these

894)     outbound ports on my firewall?</a></h3>

895) 
896)     <p>

897)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the
898)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for
899)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports,

900)     but many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030.

901)     </p>
902)     <p>

903)     So as a client, you could probably get away with opening only those four
904)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry
905)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as
906)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most
907)     diversity in your entry nodes -- and thus the most security -- as well as
908)     the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll want to let it connect

909)     to all of them.

910)     </p>
911)     <p>

912)     If you really need to connect to only a small set of ports, see the FAQ

913)     entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a>.

914)     </p>
915)     <p>

916)     Note that if you're running Tor as a relay, you must allow outgoing
917)     connections to every other relay and to anywhere your exit policy
918)     advertises that you allow. The cleanest way to do that is simply to allow
919)     all outgoing connections at your firewall. If you don't, clients will try
920)     to use these connections and things won't work.

921)     </p>

922)  

923)     <hr>

924)  

925)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

926)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is

927)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

928) 
929)     <p>

930)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be

931)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
932)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

933)     </p>

934)  

935)     <hr>

936)  

937)     <a id="FTP"></a>
938)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
939)     </a></h3>
940) 

941)     <p>

942)     Use the <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor
943)     Browser Bundle</a>. If you want a separate application for an
944)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can
945)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port
946)     "9050".

947)     </p>

948) 

949)     <hr>

950)  

951)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>

952)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal

953)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
954) 

955)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands
956)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data
957)     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
958)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
959)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

960)     href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

961)     careful and be smart.</a>
962)     </p>
963) 
964)     <hr>
965) 

966)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

967)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

968)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

969) 

970)     <p>
971)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

972)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

973)     <hr>

974) 

975)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>

976)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL

977)     certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>

978)     <p>

979)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

980)     </p>
981)     <pre>
982) Issued Certificate
983) Version: 3
984) Serial Number: 09 48 B1 A9 3B 25 1D 0D B1 05 10 59 E2 C2 68 0A
985) Not Valid Before: 2013-10-22
986) Not Valid After: 2016-05-03
987) Certificate Fingerprints
988) SHA1: 84 24 56 56 8E D7 90 43 47 AA 89 AB 77 7D A4 94 3B A1 A7 D5
989) MD5: A4 16 66 80 AE B9 A4 EC AA 88 01 1B 6F B9 EB CB

990)     </pre>

991) <br>
992)     <p>
993) blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

994)     </p>

995)     <pre>
996) Issued Certificate
997) Version: 3
998) Serial Number: 05 CA 2A A9 A5 D6 ED 44 C7 2D 88 1A 18 B0 E7 DC
999) Not Valid Before: 2014-04-09
1000) Not Valid After: 2017-06-14
1001) Certificate Fingerprints
1002) SHA1: DE 20 3D 46 FD C3 68 EB BA 40 56 39 F5 FA FD F5 4E 3A 1F 83
1003) MD5: 8A 8A A2 5E D9 7F 84 4C 8F 00 3B 43 E0 2D E6 4D
1004)     </pre>

1005)     <hr>
1006) 

1007)     <a id="CompilationAndInstallation"></a>
1008)     <h2><a class="anchor">Compilation And Installation:</a></h2>
1009) 

1010)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

1011)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
1012) Tor?</a></h3>
1013) 
1014)     <p>
1015)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
1016) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
1017) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
1018)     </p>

1019) 

1020)     <p>

1021)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
1022) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
1023)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
1024) way to

1025)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers.

1026)     </p>

1027) 

1028)     <p>
1029)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
1030)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
1031)     </p>

1032) 

1033)     <p>

1034)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
1035) method. But
1036)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
1037) it should

1038)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
1039)     </p>

1040) 

1041)     <hr>

1042) 

1043)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

1044)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
1045) the download page?</a></h3>

1046) 

1047)     <p>

1048)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
1049) downloaded is

1050)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
1051)     </p>

1052) 

1053)     <p>
1054)     Please read the <a

1055)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
1056) page for details.

1057)     </p>

1058) 

1059) <hr>
1060) 
1061) <a id="GetTor"></a>
1062) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
1063) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
1064) 
1065) <p>
1066) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
1067) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

1068) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

1069) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

1070) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
1071) cache</a>

1072) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
1073) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
1074) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail

1075) '<tt>gettor@gettor.torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'

1076) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
1077) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
1078) to receive very large attachments.
1079) </p>
1080) 
1081) <p>

1082) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
1083) signature</a>

1084) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
1085) other than our official HTTPS website.

1086) </p>
1087) 

1088)     <hr>

1089) 

1090)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
1091)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives"></a></h3>
1092)     <p>

1093)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on
1094)     some parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
1095)     false positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is
1096)     just a guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
1097)     that you have a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or

1098)     pick a better vendor.
1099)     </p>

1100)     <p>In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for it.
1101)     Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do

1102)     recompile it yourself.</p>
1103) 
1104)     <hr>
1105) 

1106)     <a id="tarballs"></a>

1107)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz

1108)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1109) 
1110)     <p>
1111)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your

1112)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking.
1113)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute</p>

1114)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1115)     <p>

1116)     as documented on tar's man page.

1117)     </p>
1118) 
1119)     <hr>
1120) 

1121)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1122)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1123) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1124) 

1125)     <p>

1126)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1127)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor
1128) Browser

1129)     Bundle</a>.

1130)     </p>

1131) 
1132) <hr>
1133) 

1134) <a id="TBBGeneral"></a>
1135) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a></h2>
1136) 

1137) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1138) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on
1139) YouTube

1140) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1141) 
1142) <p>

1143) YouTube and similar sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.
1144) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1145) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes
1146) but is not limited to: <a href="http://decloak.net">completely disregarding
1147) proxy settings</a>, querying your <a

1148) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1149) local IP address</a>, and <a

1150) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1151) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1152) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a>
1153) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass,
1154) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain.

1155) </p>

1156) 
1157) <p>

1158) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/html5">YouTube offers experimental HTML5 video

1159) support</a> for many of their videos. Often you can get the HTML5 version of
1160) videos that don't want to play by grabbing the YouTube URL from the "Embed"

1161) code under a video's "Share" option. The link switches out a URL that looks</p>
1162) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>
1163) <p>to something that looks like</p>
1164) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/embed/CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>

1165) 

1166) <hr>
1167) 

1168) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1169) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1170) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1171) <p>

1172) You'll need to tell Ubuntu that you want the ability to execute shell scripts 
1173) from the graphical interface. Open "Files" (Unity's explorer), open 

1174) Preferences-> Behavior Tab -> Set "Run executable text files when they are 
1175) opened" to "Ask every time", then OK.

1176) </p>
1177) <p>You can also start the Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1178) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1179) <p>
1180) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1181) </p>
1182) 

1183) <hr>
1184) 

1185) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1186) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus
1187) software on my Mac, and Tor Browser won't start.</a></h3>
1188) <p>

1189) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the
1190) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off

1191) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1192) </p>
1193) 

1194) <hr>
1195) 

1196) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>

1197) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">

1198) I want to run another application through the Tor launched by Tor

1199) Browser Bundle.</a></h3>

1200) 
1201) <p>

1202) Typically Tor listens for Socks connections on port 9050. TBB listens

1203) on port 9150.

1204) The goal is to avoid conflicting with a "system" Tor install,

1205) so you can run a system Tor and TBB at the same time. We're <a
1206) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3948">working on
1207) a feature</a> where Tor will try the usual ports first and then back

1208) off to a random choice if they're already in use.

1209) </p>
1210) 
1211) <hr>
1212) 
1213) <a id="TBBPolipo"></a>
1214) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBPolipo">I need an HTTP proxy. Where did
1215) Polipo go?</a></h3>
1216) 
1217) <p>
1218) In the past, Tor bundles included an HTTP proxy like Privoxy or Polipo,
1219) solely to work around a bug in Firefox that was finally fixed in Firefox
1220) 6. Now you don't need a separate HTTP proxy to use Tor, and in fact
1221) leaving it out makes you safer because Torbutton has better control over
1222) Firefox's interaction with websites.
1223) </p>
1224) 
1225) <p>
1226) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero

1227) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set

1228) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try

1229) to use a Socks proxy rather than an http proxy — Tor runs a Socks

1230) proxy on port 9050 on Windows, or <a href="#TBBSocksPort">see above</a>
1231) for OSX and Linux.
1232) </p>
1233) 
1234) <p>

1235) If that fails, feel free to install <a

1236) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1237) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1238) users. Privoxy has an <a
1239) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1240) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.

1241) </p>
1242) 
1243) <hr>
1244) 

1245) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1246) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1247) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1248) 
1249) <p>

1250) The Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from
1251) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any
1252) additional Firefox add-ons with the Tor Browser Bundle. Add-ons can break
1253) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and

1254) bypassing proxy settings.

1255) </p>

1256) <p>

1257) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or
1258) anti-tracking software with the Tor Browser Bundle. Right now, we do not
1259) think that's such a good idea. The Tor Browser Bundle aims to provide
1260) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are
1261) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which

1262) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">

1263) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that
1264) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint
1265) users.

1266) </p>

1267) 

1268) <hr>
1269) 

1270) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1271) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1272) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript
1273) configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?
1274) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1275) 
1276) <p>
1277) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
1278) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
1279) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1280) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1281) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1282) JavaScript might make a website work).
1283) </p>
1284) 

1285) <p>
1286) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1287) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1288) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1289) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1290) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1291) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1292) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1293) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1294) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1295) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1296) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1297) </p>

1298) 
1299) <p>

1300) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1301) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1302) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1303) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1304) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1305) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1306) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1307) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1308) partitioning concern will remain.

1309) </p>
1310) 
1311) <p>

1312) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1313) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1314) </p>
1315) 
1316) <hr>
1317) 

1318) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1319) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1320) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1321) 
1322) <p>
1323) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
1324) really bad idea.
1325) </p>
1326) 
1327) <p>
1328) We're working with the Chrome team to <a

1329) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-

1330) and-fingerprinting">fix some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it
1331) will be possible to write a Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any
1332) other browser is on the horizon.

1333) </p>
1334) 
1335) <hr>
1336) 

1337) <a id="TorbuttonOtherBrowser"></a>

1338) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorbuttonOtherBrowser">

1339) Will Torbutton be available for other browsers?</a></h3>

1340) 
1341) <p>

1342)  We don't support IE, Opera or Safari and never plan to. There are
1343)  too many ways that your privacy can go wrong with those browsers, and
1344)  because of their closed design it is really hard for us to do anything
1345)  to change these privacy problems.

1346) </p>
1347) <p>

1348) We are working with the Chrome people to modify Chrome's internals so that we can eventually support it. But for now, Firefox is the only safe choice.

1349) </p>
1350) 

1351) <hr>

1352) 

1353) <a id="TBBCloseBrowser"></a>

1354) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBCloseBrowser">I want to leave Tor
1355) Browser

1356) Bundle running but close the browser.</a></h3>
1357) 
1358) <p>
1359) We're working on a way to make this possible on all platforms. Please
1360) be patient.
1361) </p>
1362) 
1363) <hr>
1364) 

1365) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1366) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1367) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1368) 
1369) <p>
1370) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1371) considers Tor to be spyware.
1372) </p>
1373) 
1374) <p>

1375) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are

1376) also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this
1377) message when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1378) Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address
1379) (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their
1380) website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.

1381) </p>
1382) <p>
1383) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1384) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1385) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1386) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1387) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1388) an infection.
1389) </p>
1390) 
1391) <p>

1392) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically

1393) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1394) should clear up again after a short time.
1395) </p>
1396) 
1397) <p>
1398) Torbutton 1.2.5 (released in mid 2010) detects Google captchas and can
1399) automatically redirect you to a more Tor-friendly search engine such as

1400) DuckDuckGo, ixquick, or Bing.

1401) </p>
1402) 
1403) <hr />
1404) 

1405) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1406) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1407) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1408) 
1409) <p>

1410)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it
1411)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language
1412)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results

1413)  on your queries.

1414) </p>
1415) <p>

1416) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that
1417) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the
1418) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on

1419) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact. 

1420) </p>
1421) <p>

1422) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one
1423) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return
1424) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been
1425) sent to. On a query this looks like:

1426) </p>

1427) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1428) <p>

1429) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google.
1430) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

1431) </p>
1432) <hr />

1433) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1434) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1435) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1436) 
1437) <p>
1438) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1439) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1440) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1441) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1442) </p>
1443) 
1444) <p>
1445) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1446) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1447) decided

1448) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1449) rightful owner.
1450) </p>
1451) 
1452) <p>
1453) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1454) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1455) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1456) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1457) </p>
1458) 
1459) <p>
1460) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1461) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1462) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1463) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1464) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1465) hijacking">

1466) way more complex than that</a>.
1467) </p>
1468) 
1469) <p>
1470) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1471) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1472) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1473) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1474) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1475) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1476) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1477) </p>
1478) 
1479) <hr>
1480) 

1481) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1482) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection

1483) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1484) 
1485) <p>

1486) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
1487) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
1488) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

1489) href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

1490) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
1491) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
1492) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
1493) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options
1494) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

1495) </p>
1496) <p>

1497) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
1498) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently,
1499) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a
1500) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post
1501) in the archives</a> useful.

1502) </p>
1503) <p>

1504) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the
1505) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how
1506) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

1507) </p>
1508) 
1509) <hr>
1510) 

1511) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>

1512) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't

1513) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1514) 
1515) <p>

1516) On Unix, we recommend you give <a
1517) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try.
1518) Alternative proxifying tools like <a
1519) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a
1520) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also

1521) available.</p>

1522) <p>
1523) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a
1524) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a
1525) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a

1526) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

1527) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here.

1528) </p>
1529) 
1530) <hr>
1531) 

1532) <a id="TBB3.x"></a>
1533) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a></h2>

1534)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>

1535)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map

1536)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1537) 

1538)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox
1539)     extension that provides similar functionality. Unfortunately, circuit
1540)     status reporting is still missing, but we are <a
1541)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8641">working

1542)     on providing it</a>. </p>
1543) 

1544)     <p>In the meantime, we are providing standalone Vidalia packages for
1545)     people who still want the map. Windows and Linux versions are <a

1546)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~erinn/vidalia-standalone-bundles/">

1547)     available here</a>.</p>

1548) 

1549)     <p>To use these packages, extract them, then run the startup script.
1550)     On Windows, this is "Start Vidalia.exe". On Linux, it is start-vidalia.
1551)     They can be placed in a different directory from TBB (and likely should

1552)     be). </p>
1553) 

1554)     <p>This Vidalia package will only run properly if Tor Browser has already

1555)     been launched. You cannot start it before launching Tor Browser. </p>
1556) 

1557)     <p>MacOS is still under development, but in the mean time you can modify
1558)     your TBB 2.x to be a standalone Vidalia (and then use it after starting
1559)     TBB 3.x) by opening your TBB 2.x vidalia.conf file in an editor and

1560)     replacing its contents with just these lines:</p>
1561) 
1562)     <pre>
1563)     [General]
1564)     LanguageCode=en
1565) 
1566)     [Tor]
1567)     ControlPort=9151
1568)     TorExecutable=.
1569)     Torrc=.
1570)     DataDirectory=.
1571)     AuthenticationMethod=cookie

1572)     </pre>

1573) 
1574)     <hr>
1575) 
1576)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1577)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1578)     </h3>
1579) 

1580)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript
1581)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24
1582)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config

1583)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1584) 

1585)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the
1586)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select
1587)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists
1588)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas

1589)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1590) 

1591)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config,

1592)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1593) 
1594)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1595)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled

1596)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon,
1597)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and

1598)     provides a button for it. </p>
1599) 

1600)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and

1601)     NoScript. </p>
1602) 

1603)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a

1604)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1605) 
1606)     <hr>
1607) 
1608)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1609)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1610)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1611) 

1612)     <p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the
1613)     signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a

1614)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">

1615)     checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional
1616)     verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as

1617)     the download.</p>
1618) 
1619)     <ul>
1620)       <li>Download the Tor Browser package, the sha256sums.txt file, and the

1621)       sha256sums signature files. They can all be found in the same directory

1622)       under <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/">

1623)       https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/</a>, for example in 3.5

1624)       for TBB 3.5.</li>

1625)       <li>Retrieve the signers' GPG keys. This can be done from the command
1626)       line by entering something like

1627)       <pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>

1628)       (This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other

1629)       developers' key IDs can be found on

1630)       <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this

1631)       page</a>.)</li>
1632)       <li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
1633)       <pre>gpg --verify &lt;NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE&gt;.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>

1634)       <li>You should see a message like "Good signature from &lt;DEVELOPER

1635)       NAME&gt;". If you don't, there is a problem. Try these steps again.</li>

1636)       <li>Now you can take the sha256sum of the Tor Browser package. On

1637)       Windows you can use the <a href="http://md5deep.sourceforge.net/">
1638)       hashdeep utility</a> and run
1639)       <pre>C:\location\where\you\saved\hashdeep -c sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.exe</pre>
1640)       On Mac or Linux you can run <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.zip</pre> or <pre>sha256sum &lt;TOR BROWSER FILE NAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> without having to download a utility.</li>
1641)       <li>You will see a string of letters and numbers.</li>
1642)       <li>Open sha256sums.txt in a text editor.</li>
1643)       <li>Locate the name of the Tor Browser file you downloaded.</li>
1644)       <li>Compare the string of letters and numbers to the left of your

1645)       filename with the string of letters and numbers that appeared
1646)       on your command line. If they match, you've successfully verified the
1647)       build.</li>

1648)     </ul>
1649) 
1650)     <p><a href="https://github.com/isislovecruft/scripts/blob/master/verify-gitian-builder-signatures">

1651)     Scripts</a> to <a

1652)     href="http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/648/how-to-verify-tor-browser-bundle-tbb-3-x">automate

1653)     </a> these steps have been written, but to use them you will need to

1654)     modify them yourself with the latest Tor Browser Bundle filename.</p>
1655) 
1656)     <hr>
1657) 
1658)     <a id="PluggableTransports"></a>
1659)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PluggableTransports">How do I use pluggable transports?</a></h3>
1660) 
1661)     <p>

1662)     For now, the Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is still a separate
1663)     unofficial package. Download them <a

1664)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.5-pt20131217/">
1665)     here</a>. We hope to have combined packages available in a beta soon.
1666)     </p>
1667) 
1668)     <p>

1669)     The separate Pluggable Transports-capable TBB is different from the
1670)     Pluggable Transports bundles that have been released in the past.
1671)     They include the programs necessary to use obfsproxy and flash proxy,
1672)     but the pluggable transports are not enabled by default. You must
1673)     enable them manually by adding Bridge lines to the torrc file.
1674)     (Please see ticket <a
1675)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10418">#10418</a>

1676)     for how we hope to make it easier to do in the future.)
1677)     </p>
1678) 
1679)     <p>

1680)     To enable <b>obfsproxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the
1681)     bundle and add the lines:

1682)     </p>
1683) 
1684)     <pre>

1685) Bridge obfs3 83.212.101.3:60475 A09D536DD1752D542E1FBB3C9CE4449D51298239

1686) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.74:31493 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9
1687) Bridge obfs3 169.229.59.75:46328 AF9F66B7B04F8FF6F32D455F05135250A16543C9

1688) Bridge obfs3 209.141.36.236:45496 58D91C3A631F910F32E18A55441D5A0463BA66E2
1689) Bridge obfs3 208.79.90.242:35658 BA61757846841D64A83EA2514C766CB92F1FB41F

1690) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:38980 9D7259A696F7DAB073043B28114112A46D36CFFD
1691) Bridge obfs3 109.105.109.163:47779 844B1F53FFD548C998F8D3B01B7E19FA07C3396E
1692) Bridge obfs2 83.212.100.216:47870 1F01A7BB60F49FC96E0850A6BAD6D076DFEFAF80
1693) Bridge obfs2 83.212.96.182:46602 6F058CBEF888EB20D1DEB9886909F1E812245D41
1694) Bridge obfs2 70.182.182.109:54542 94C9E691688FAFDEC701A0788BD15BE8AD34ED35
1695) Bridge obfs2 128.31.0.34:1051 CA7434F14A898C7D3427B8295A7F83446BC7F496
1696)     </pre>
1697)     <p>

1698)     To enable <b>flash proxy</b>, edit the file called Data/Tor/torrc inside the
1699)     bundle and add the line:

1700)     </p>
1701)     <pre>
1702) Bridge flashproxy 0.0.1.0:1
1703)     </pre>
1704) 
1705)     <hr>
1706) 
1707)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>

1708)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New

1709)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1710) 
1711)     <p>

1712)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level
1713)     browser data too. But it sure is a surprising feature, for people who

1714)     are used to Vidalia's "new identity" behavior.
1715)     </p>
1716) 
1717)     <p>

1718)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1719)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1720)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1721)     ticket <a
1722)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1723)     to follow progress there.

1724)     </p>
1725) 
1726)     <p>

1727)     In the mean time, you can get Vidalia's old "newnym" functionality by
1728)     attaching a Vidalia to your TBB 3.x. See the instructions <a
1729)     href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">above</a>.

1730)     </p>
1731) 
1732)     <hr>
1733) 
1734)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1735)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1736) 
1737)     <p>

1738)     You've got three options.

1739)     </p>
1740) 
1741)     <p>

1742)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system
1743)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay
1744)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>).

1745)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1746)     </p>
1747) 
1748)     <p>

1749)     Second (simpler option), if you're on Windows, you can fetch the separate
1750)     "Vidalia relay bundle" or "Vidalia bridge bundle" from the download page
1751)     and then use that (again you can use TBB independent of it).

1752)     </p>
1753) 
1754)     <p>

1755)     Third (complex option), you can either hook your Vidalia up to TBB (as
1756)     described in the FAQ above) or edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc)
1757)     directly to add the following lines:

1758)     </p>
1759)     <pre>
1760)     ORPort 443
1761)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1762)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1763)     </pre>
1764)     <p>

1765)     If you've installed <a

1766)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

1767)     you'll need to add one more line:
1768)     </p>
1769)     <pre>
1770)     ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
1771)     </pre>
1772)     <p>

1773)     This third option is pretty klunky right now; see e.g. <a
1774)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10449">this bug</a>;
1775)     but we're hoping it will become an easy option in the future.

1776)     </p>
1777) 
1778)     <hr>
1779) 
1780)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>

1781)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps

1782)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1783) 

1784)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build"
1785)     process, which allows many people to build the Tor Browser Bundle and
1786)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a
1787)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first
1788)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a

1789)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second

1790)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it.

1791)     </p>
1792) 

1793)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same
1794)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason

1795)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1796) 
1797)     <hr>
1798) 

1799)     <a id="TBBSourceCode"></a>
1800)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>

1801) 
1802)     <p>
1803)     Start with <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git</a> and <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build</a>.
1804)     </p>
1805) 
1806) 

1807) <hr>
1808) 

1809) <a id="AdvancedTorUsage"></a>
1810) <h2><a class="anchor">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h2>
1811) 

1812) <a id="torrc"></a>

1813) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1814) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1815) 
1816) <p>
1817) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1818) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1819) configuration should work fine for most Tor users.

1820) </p>

1821) <p>

1822) If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for

1823) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory.
1824) On OS X, you must right-click or command-click on the browser bundle icon,
1825) and select "Show Package Contents" before the Tor Browser directories become
1826) visible.

1827) </p>
1828) <p>

1829) Tor puts the torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> if you installed a pre-built package.</p>

1830) 
1831) <p>

1832) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart tor for the
1833) changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1834) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1835) it.)

1836) </p>
1837) 
1838) <p>

1839) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page

1840) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a

1841) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/config/torrc.sample.in">

1842) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all
1843) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect

1844) on Tor's configuration.

1845) </p>
1846) 
1847) <hr>
1848) 

1849) <a id="Logs"></a>

1850) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1851) logs?</a></h3>

1852) 
1853) <p>

1854) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1855) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1856) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1857) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1858) </p>
1859) 
1860) <p>
1861) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1862) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1863) </p>
1864) 
1865) <ul>
1866) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1867) </li>

1868) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1869) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1870) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1871) </li>
1872) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1873) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1874) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1875) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1876) </li>
1877) </ul>
1878) 
1879) <p>

1880) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1881) torrc</a>

1882) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1883) following line:

1884) </p>
1885) 
1886) <pre>

1887) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1888) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1889) </pre>

1890) 
1891) <p>

1892) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1893) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1894) of the section:
1895) </p>
1896) 
1897) <pre>
1898) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1899) </pre>
1900) 
1901) <p>

1902) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1903) and filename for your Tor log.

1904) </p>
1905) 
1906) <hr>
1907) 

1908) 
1909) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1910) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1911) 
1912) <p>

1913) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in

1914) Tor's logs:

1915) </p>
1916) 
1917) <ul>

1918)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will

1919)     exit.</li>

1920)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad
1921)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something
1922)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to

1923)     correct the problem.</li>

1924)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1925)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's

1926)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1927)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li>

1928) </ul>
1929) 
1930) <p>

1931) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the
1932) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react

1933) correctly for each situation.

1934) </p>
1935) 
1936) <p>

1937) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about

1938) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1939) </p>
1940) 
1941) <p>

1942) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal
1943) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in
1944) their logs.

1945) </p>
1946) 

1947) <hr>
1948) 

1949) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1950) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1951) working.</a></h3>

1952) 
1953) <p>

1954) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1955) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1956) </p>
1957) 
1958) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1959) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it
1960) will
1961) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the
1962) Vidalia

1963) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1964) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1965) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1966) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1967) client functionality is working."
1968) </p>
1969) 
1970) <p>
1971) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1972) </p>
1973) 
1974) <ol>
1975) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1976) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1977) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1978) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1979) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1980) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1981) zone is correct.</li>

1982) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1983) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1984) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

1985) </li>

1986) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
1987) that

1988) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
1989) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
1990) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
1991) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

1992) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

1993) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
1994) about what's going wrong?</li>

1995) </ol>
1996) 
1997) <hr />
1998) 

1999) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
2000) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
2001) <p>

2002)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor.
2003)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even
2004)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so
2005)  we can help you track it down.

2006) </p>
2007) <p>

2008) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest
2009) stable or the latest development version).

2010) </p>
2011) <p>

2012) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at
2013) least libevent 1.3a.

2014) </p>
2015) <p>

2016) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a
2017) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so,
2018) check if there are any new details that you can add.

2019) </p>
2020) <p>

2021) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can
2022) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that
2023) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up?
2024) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for
2025) example the latest stable release?

2026) </p>
2027) <p>

2028) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get?

2029) </p>
2030) <ul>
2031) <li>

2032) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please
2033) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on.
2034) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially
2035) if they seem important.

2036) </li>
2037) <li>

2038) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to
2039) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or
2040) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your
2041) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt",
2042) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c
2043) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core
2044) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows
2045) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate

2046) your bug on Unix?)
2047) </li>
2048) <li>

2049) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation
2050) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you
2051) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a
2052) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should
2053) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can
2054) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground,
2055) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default
2056) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a>
2057) for details.

2058) </li>
2059) <li>

2060) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it?
2061) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes
2062) sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running
2063) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will
2064) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases
2065) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware
2066) problems could also be the culprit.

2067) </li>
2068) </ul>
2069) <p>

2070) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your
2071) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ
2072) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually
2073) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole
2074) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send
2075) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then
2076) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed.
2077) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down
2078) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise
2079) to keep logs like this sitting around.)

2080) </p>
2081) 
2082) <hr />
2083) 

2084) <a id="VidaliaPassword"></a>

2085) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VidaliaPassword">Tor/Vidalia prompts for a
2086) password at start.</a></h3>

2087) 
2088) <p>
2089) Vidalia interacts with the Tor software via Tor's "control port". The
2090) control port lets Vidalia receive status updates from Tor, request a new
2091) identity, configure Tor's settings, etc. Each time Vidalia starts Tor,
2092) Vidalia sets a random password for Tor's control port to prevent other
2093) applications from also connecting to the control port and potentially
2094) compromising your anonymity.
2095) </p>
2096) 
2097) <p>
2098) Usually this process of generating and setting a random control password
2099) happens in the background. There are three common situations, though,
2100) where Vidalia may prompt you for a password:
2101) </p>
2102) 
2103) <ol>
2104) <li>You're already running Vidalia and Tor. For example, this situation
2105) can happen if you installed the Vidalia bundle and now you're trying to
2106) run the Tor Browser Bundle. In that case, you'll need to close the old
2107) Vidalia and Tor before you can run this one.
2108) </li>
2109) <li>Vidalia crashed, but left Tor running with the last known random
2110) password. After you restart Vidalia, it generates a new random password,

2111) but Vidalia can't talk to Tor, because the random passwords are
2112) different.

2113) <br />

2114) If the dialog that prompts you for a control password has a Reset
2115) button,

2116) you can click the button and Vidalia will restart Tor with a new random
2117) control password.
2118) <br />
2119) If you do not see a Reset button, or if Vidalia is unable to restart
2120) Tor for you, you can still fix the problem manually. Simply go into your
2121) process or task manager, and terminate the Tor process. Then use Vidalia
2122) to restart Tor and all will work again.
2123) </li>
2124) <li>You had previously set Tor to run as a Windows NT service. When Tor
2125) is set to
2126) run as a service, it starts up when the system boots. If you configured
2127) Tor to start as a service through Vidalia, a random password was set
2128) and saved in Tor. When you reboot, Tor starts up and uses the random
2129) password it saved. You login and start up Vidalia. Vidalia attempts to
2130) talk to the already running Tor. Vidalia generates a random password,
2131) but it is different than the saved password in the Tor service.
2132) <br />
2133) You need to reconfigure Tor to not be a service. See the FAQ entry on

2134) <a href="#NTservice">running Tor as a

2135) Windows NT service</a>

2136) for more information on how to remove the Tor service.
2137) </li>
2138) </ol>
2139) 

2140)     <hr>

2141) 

2142)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>

2143)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which
2144) nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

2145) 

2146)     <p>

2147)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
2148)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.