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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <p><a href="#General">General questions:</a><br />
18)     <a href="#CompilationAndInstallation">Compilation and Installation:</a><br />
19)     <a href="#TBBGeneral">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a><br />

20)     <a href="#TBB3.x">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a><br />

21)     <a href="#AdvancedTorUsage">Advanced Tor usage:</a><br />
22)     <a href="#RunningATorRelay">Running a Tor relay:</a><br />
23)     <a href="#TorHiddenServices">Tor hidden services:</a><br />
24)     <a href="#Development">Development:</a><br />
25)     <a href="#AnonymityAndSecurity">Anonymity and Security:</a><br />
26)     <a href="#AlternateDesigns">Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</a><br />
27)     <a href="#Abuse">Abuse:</a></p>

28) 

29) <hr>
30) 
31)     <p>General questions:</p>

32)     <ul>
33)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

34)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
35) proxies?</a></li>

36)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
37)     Tor?</a></li>
38)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
39)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

40)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

42)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

44)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
45)     </a></li>

46)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
47)     funding?</a></li>

48)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my

49)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

50)     <li><a href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile device?</a></li>

51)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these outbound ports

52)     on my firewall?</a></li>

53)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

54)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information

55)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

56)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
57)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

58)     <li><a href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are your SSL certificate

59)     fingerprints?</a></li>

60)     </ul>

61) 

62)     <p>Compilation and Installation:</p>

63) 

64)     <ul>
65)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
66)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
67)     page?</a></li>

68)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
69)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

70)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

71)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

72)     <li><a href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

73)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
74) includes Tor?</a></li>

75)     </ul>

76) 

77)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (general):</p>

78)     <ul>

79) 

80)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
81)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

82)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

83)     </a></li>

84)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus

85)     software on my Mac, and Tor starts but I can't browse anywhere.</a></li>

86)     <li><a href="#XPCOMError">When I open the Tor Browser Bundle I get an 
87) error message from the browser: "Cannot load XPCOM".</a></li>

88)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

89)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

90)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to
91) allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?  Isn't that
92) unsafe?</a></li>

93)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
94)     with Tor.</a></li>

95)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

96)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

97)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign

98)     languages?</a></li>

99)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
100)     been compromised.</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP

102)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

103)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to
104)     run another application through Tor.</a></li>

105)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy

106)     with my application?</a></li>

107)     </ul>
108) 

109)     <p>Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</p>

110) 
111)     <ul>

112)     <li><a href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map (Vidalia)

113)     go?</a></li>
114)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>

115)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download

116)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

117)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close

118)     all my open tabs?</a></li>

119)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay

120)     or bridge?</a></li>
121)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>

122)     <li><a href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do

123)     I verify a build?</a></li>

124)     </ul>
125) 

126)     <p>Advanced Tor usage:</p>

127) 

128)     <ul>
129)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
130)     that mean?</a></li>

131)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

132)     logs?</a></li>

133)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

134)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
135)     correctly.</a></li>

136)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

137)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or
138) country)

139)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

140)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
141)     ports.</a></li>

142)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

143)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing
144)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I

145)     worry?</a></li>

146)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

147)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

148)     </ul>

149) 

150)     <p>Running a Tor relay:</p>

151)     <ul>

152) 
153)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
154)     </a></li>

155)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being

156)     used more?</a></li>

157)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">I don't have a static IP.</a></li>

158)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often

159)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>

160)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully

161)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

162)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
163) be?</a></li>

164)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are

165)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>

166)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount

167)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

168)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write

169)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>

170)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after

171)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

172)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

173)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

174)     <li><a href="#BestOSForRelay">Why doesn't my Windows (or other OS) Tor

175)     relay run well?</a></li>

176)     <li><a href="#PackagedTor">Should I install Tor from my package manager, 
177)     or build from source?</a></li>

178)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#IGotTheBadExitFlagWhyDidThatHappen">I got the BadExit flag.

180)     Why did that happen?</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#MyRelayRecentlyGotTheGuardFlagAndTrafficDroppedByHalf">My

182)     relay recently got the Guard flag and traffic dropped by half.</a></li>

183)     <li><a href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I want to run my Tor client on a

184)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>

185)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and

186)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>

187)     <li><a href="#JoinTheNetwork">So I can just configure a nickname and

188)     ORPort and join the network?</a></li>

189)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
190)     relay?</a></li>

191)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I

192)     keep the same key?</a></li>

193)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
194) relay.</a></li>

195)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
196)     </a></li>

197)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server

198)     account?</a></li>

199)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
200)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

201)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
202)     </a></li>
203)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
204)     </a></li>

205)     <li><a href="#FacingLegalTrouble">I'm facing legal trouble. How do I

206)     prove that my server was a Tor relay at a given time?</a></li>

207)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
208)     run my own?</a></li>

209)     </ul>

210) 

211)     <p>Tor hidden services:</p>

212) 

213)     <ul>
214)     <li><a href="#AccessHiddenServices">How do I access hidden services?</a></li>

215)     <li><a href="#ProvideAHiddenService">How do I provide a hidden service?</a></li>

216)     </ul>

217) 

218)     <p>Development:</p>

219) 

220)     <ul>

221)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers

222)     mean?</a></li>
223)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
224)     Tor network?</a></li>

225)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the

226)     Tor network?</a></li>
227)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>

228)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature

229)     into Tor?</a></li>
230)     </ul>
231) 

232)     <p>Anonymity and Security:</p>

233)     <ul>

234)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor

235)     provide?</a></li>

236)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on

237)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

238)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use

239)     Tor?</a></li>

240)     <li><a href="#ExitEnclaving">What is Exit Enclaving?</a></li>

241)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
242) uses.</a></li>

243)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

244)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

245)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I

246)     can't afford that!</a></li>

247)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound

248)     connections?</a></li>
249)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
250)     </a></li>

251)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist

252)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

253)     <li><a href="#IsTorLikeAVPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>

254)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than

255)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

256)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion

257)     routing?</a></li>

258)     <li><a href="#LearnMoreAboutAnonymity">Where can I learn more about anonymity?</a></li>

259)     </ul>

260) 

261)     <p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>

262) 

263)     <ul>
264)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
265)     relay.</a></li>

266)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
267) packets,

268)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

269)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
270)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

271)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path

272)     length.</a></li>

273)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over

274)     many paths.</a></li>

275)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate

276)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>

277)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick

278)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

279)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block

280)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>

281)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block

282)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>

283)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from

284)     posting certain content.</a></li>

285)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
286)     </a></li>

287)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor

288)     traffic.</a></li>

289)     </ul>

290) 

291)     <p>Abuse:</p>

292)     <ul>

293)     <li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
294) things?</a></li>

295)     <li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
296)     relay?</a></li>

297)     <li><a href="#HelpPoliceOrLawyers">I have questions about
298)    a Tor IP address for a legal case.</a></li>

299)     </ul>

300) 

301)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
302) <a

303)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

304) 

305)     <hr>

306) 

307)     <a id="General"></a>

308)     <h2><a class="anchor">General:</a></h2>

309) 

310)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
311)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

312) 

313)     <p>
314)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
315)     </p>

316) 

317)     <p>

318)     The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that
319) helps keep
320)     you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your
321) communications

322)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

323)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection
324) from

325)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

326)     from learning your physical location. This set of volunteer relays
327) is
328)     called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the
329) <a

330)     href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
331)     </p>

332) 

333)     <p>

334)     The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that
335) maintains

336)     and develops the Tor software.
337)     </p>

338) 

339)     <hr>

340) 

341)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

342)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
343) from other proxies?</a></h3>
344)     <p>
345)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
346) and
347) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
348) to
349) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
350) server.
351) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
352) through
353) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
354) have to
355) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
356) server.
357) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
358) for
359) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider from doing
360) bad
361) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection
362) to them.
363) This may protect you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
364) cafe with

365) free wifi Internet.
366)     </p>
367)     <p>

368)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
369) provider
370) knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see
371) your
372) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
373) see

374) inside your

375) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
376) stores.

377) You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as

378) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
379) traffic

380) stream, and recording your personal details.

381)     </p>
382)     <p>

383)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
384) sending
385) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
386) for
387) each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you
388) are
389) sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted
390) through
391) the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world,
392) completely
393) intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your
394) local
395) computer.  The Tor client manages the encryption and the path chosen
396) through
397) the network.  The relays located all over the world merely pass
398) encrypted

399) packets between themselves.</p>

400)     <p>
401)     <dl>

402)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
403) first of
404) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
405) It
406) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
407) merely sees
408) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
409) world, so
410) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
411) figuring

412) out who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

413)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
414) third
415) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
416) who sent

417) this traffic.  If you're using encryption, such as visiting a bank or

418) e-commerce website, or encrypted mail connections, etc, it will only
419) know the
420) destination.  It won't be able to see the data inside the traffic
421) stream.  You

422) are still protected from this node figuring out who you are and if using
423) encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>

424)     </dl>
425)     </p>

426) 

427)     <hr>

428) 

429) 

430)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

431)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
432) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

433) 

434)     <p>

435)     If you want to use Tor with a web browser, we provide the Tor Browser
436)     Bundle, which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using
437)     Tor. If you want to use another web browser with Tor, see <a
438)     href="#TBBOtherBrowser">Other web browsers</a>.

439)     </p>
440)     <p>
441)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
442)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

443)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

444)     configuration. Our wiki has a list of instructions for <a

445)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

446)     specific applications</a>.

447)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
448)     </p>

449) 

450)     <hr>

451) 

452)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

453)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
454) Tor?</a></h3>

455) 

456)     <p>
457)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
458)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
459)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
460)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
461)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
462)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
463)     the Naval Research Lab.
464)     </p>

465) 

466)     <p>
467)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
468)     </p>

469) 

470)     <p>

471)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
472) spelled

473)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

474)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
475) learned
476)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
477) they

478)     spell it wrong.
479)     </p>

480) 

481)     <hr>

482) 

483)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

484)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
485) Tor?</a></h3>

486) 

487)     <p>

488)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put
489) one
490)     in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that
491) anybody

492)     will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
493)     ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
494)     </p>

495) 

496)     <p>
497)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

498)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security
499) software

500)     in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our security
501)     software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
502)     trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
503)     </p>

504) 

505)     <p>
506)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
507)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

508)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you
509) should
510)     always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
511) release)

512)     for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't give you
513)     source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going on. You
514)     should also check the <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP
515)     signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
516)     distribution sites.
517)     </p>

518) 

519)     <p>
520)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

521)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so
522) make

523)     sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
524)     </p>

525) 

526)     <hr>

527) 

528)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

529)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
530) Tor?</a></h3>

531) 

532)     <p>
533)     Yes.
534)     </p>

535) 

536)     <p>

537)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
538)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
539)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to

540)     ask us for specific permission.
541)     </p>

542) 

543)     <p>

544)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our

545)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

546)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along

547)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
548)     </p>

549) 

550)     <p>

551)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the

552)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

553)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

554)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/">Firefox
555)     Extended Support Release</a>, and the NoScript and HTTPS-Everywhere 

556)     extensions. You will need to follow the license for those programs as 

557)     well. Both of those Firefox extensions are distributed under 
558)     the <a href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General
559)     Public License</a>, while Firefox ESR is released under the Mozilla Public 
560)     License. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to include the source 
561)     code for these programs everywhere you include the bundles themselves. 

562)     </p>

563) 

564)     <p>

565)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
566)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
567)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.

568)     </p>

569) 

570)     <p>
571)     Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
572)     Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible

573)     changes. So if you distribute a particular version of the Tor software, it
574)     may not be supported — or even work — six months later. This

575)     is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
576)     </p>

577) 

578)     <hr>

579) 

580)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

581)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
582) support?</a></h3>

583) 

584)     <p>Your best bet is to first try the following:</p>

585)     <ol>
586)     <li>Read through this <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>.</li>

587)     <li>Read through the <a href="<page
588) docs/documentation>">documentation</a>.</li>

589)     <li>Read through the <a

590) 
591) href="https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk">
592) tor-talk

593)     archives</a> and see if your question is already answered.</li>

594)     <li>Join our <a href="ircs://irc.torproject.org#tor">irc channel</a>
595) and

596)     state the issue and wait for help.</li>

597)     <li>Send an email to <a

598) 
599) href="mailto:help@rt.torproject.org">help@rt.torproject.org</a>.</li>
600)     <li>If all else fails, try <a href="<page about/contact>">contacting
601) us</a> directly.</li>

602)     </ol>

603) 

604)     <p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel
605) or the

606)     mailing list to help others who were once in your position.</p>

607) 

608)     <hr>

609) 

610)     <a id="Forum"></a>
611)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
612) 

613)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange

614)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

615)     </p>
616) 
617)     <hr>
618) 

619)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
620)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

621) 

622)     <p>
623)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
624)     </p>

625) 

626)     <p>

627)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
628) to
629)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
630) computers
631)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
632) latency

633)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
634)     bandwidth through Tor.
635)     </p>

636) 

637)     <p>

638)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
639) network
640)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
641) and
642)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
643) currently

644)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
645)     </p>

646) 

647)     <p>
648)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

649)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

650)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
651) video

652)     to go with it.
653)     </p>

654) 

655)     <p>
656)     What can you do to help?
657)     </p>

658) 

659)     <ul>

660) 

661)     <li>

662)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
663) traffic
664)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
665) handle

666)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
667)     </li>

668) 

669)     <li>

670)     <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>.
671) We

672)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
673)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
674)     walk people through setting it up.
675)     </li>

676) 

677)     <li>

678)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
679) design
680)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
681) and

682)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
683)     </li>

684) 

685)     <li>
686)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

687)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
688) who
689)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
690) we

691)     get to spend more time on it.
692)     </li>

693) 

694)     <li>

695)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
696) moment
697)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
698) href="<page

699)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
700)     </li>

701) 

702)     <li>

703)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
704) agency

705)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

706)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
707) servers
708)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
709) organization has
710)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
711) about
712)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
713) slower.

714)     </li>

715) 

716)     <li>
717)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

718)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
719) money to the

720)     cause</a>. It adds up!
721)     </li>

722) 

723)     </ul>

724) 

725)     <hr>

726) 

727)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

728)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files

729)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

730) 
731)     <p>

732)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network,
733)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default.
734)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows
735)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a

736)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
737)     is not anonymous</a>!

738)     </p>
739) 
740)     <hr>
741) 

742)     <a id="Funding"></a>

743)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
744) with more funding?</a></h3>

745) 

746)     <p>

747)     The Tor network's <a

748) 
749) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#networksize">several

750)     thousand</a> relays push <a
751)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth">over
752)     1GB per second on average</a>. We have <a

753) 
754) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#direct-users">several

755)     hundred thousand daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet
756)     self-sustaining.

757)     </p>

758) 

759)     <p>

760)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
761) attention:

762)     </p>

763) 

764)     <ul>

765) 

766)     <li>
767)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
768)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

769)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
770) there's

771)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
772)     </li>

773) 

774)     <li>

775)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
776) questions
777)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
778) good
779)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
780) volunteers.

781)     </li>

782) 

783)     <li>

784)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
785) need

786)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

787)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
788) and
789)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
790) stay
791)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
792) e.g.,

793)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

794)     </li>

795) 

796)     <li>

797)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
798) of the
799)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
800) configuration
801)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
802) of
803)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor. We've got a start on
804) this
805)     with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much
806) more work

807)     remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
808)     </li>

809) 

810)     <li>
811)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
812)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

813)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
814) relay,

815)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
816)     </li>

817) 

818)     <li>
819)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
820)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
821)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
822)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

823)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
824) research questions</a>
825)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
826) variety of
827)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
828) waiting

829)     behind these.
830)     </li>

831) 

832)     </ul>

833) 

834)     <p>
835)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

836)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
837) developers

838)     can keep up</a>.

839)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
840) effort

841)     so we can continue to grow the network.
842)     </p>

843) 

844)     <p>
845)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
846)     censorship-resistance.
847)     </p>

848) 

849)     <p>

850)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
851) support</a>
852)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
853) Bell
854)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
855) government

856)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
857)     </p>

858) 

859)     <p>

860)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
861) in the
862)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
863) donate/donate>">donate</a>
864)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
865) executive

866)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
867)     </p>

868) 

869)     <hr>
870) 
871) 
872)     <a id="Mobile"></a>
873)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile 
874)     device?</a></h3>
875) 
876)     <p>
877)     Tor on Android devices is maintained by the <a 
878)     href="https://guardianproject.info">Guardian Project</a>. Currently, there 
879)     is no supported way of using Tor on iOS; the Guardian Project is 
880)     working to make this a reality in the future.
881)     </p>
882) 

883)     <hr>
884) 

885)      <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>

886)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Do I have to open all these

887)     outbound ports on my firewall?</a></h3>

888) 
889)     <p>

890)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the
891)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for

892)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports:
893)     many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030, but many use other
894)     ports too.

895)     </p>
896)     <p>

897)     As a client: you could probably get away with opening only those four

898)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry
899)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as
900)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most

901)     diversity in your entry nodes — and thus the most security
902)     — as well as the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll
903)     want to let it connect to all of them.
904)     See the FAQ entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a> if
905)     you want to explicitly tell your Tor client which ports are reachable
906)     for you.
907)     </p>
908)     <p>
909)     As a relay: you must allow outgoing connections to every other relay
910)     and to anywhere your exit policy advertises that you allow. The
911)     cleanest way to do that is simply to allow all outgoing connections
912)     at your firewall. If you don't, clients will ask you to extend to
913)     those relays, and those connections will fail, leading to complex
914)     anonymity implications for the clients which we'd like to avoid.

915)     </p>

916)  

917)     <hr>

918)  

919)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

920)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is

921)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

922) 
923)     <p>

924)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be

925)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
926)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

927)     </p>

928)  

929)     <hr>

930)  

931)     <a id="FTP"></a>
932)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
933)     </a></h3>
934) 

935)     <p>

936)     Use the <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor
937)     Browser Bundle</a>. If you want a separate application for an
938)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can
939)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port
940)     "9050".

941)     </p>

942) 

943)     <hr>

944)  

945)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>

946)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal

947)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
948) 

949)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands
950)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data
951)     it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
952)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
953)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

954)     href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

955)     careful and be smart.</a>
956)     </p>
957) 
958)     <hr>
959) 

960)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

961)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

962)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

963) 

964)     <p>
965)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

966)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

967)     <hr>

968) 

969)     <a id="SSLcertfingerprint"></a>

970)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SSLcertfingerprint">What are the SSL

971)     certificate fingerprints for Tor's various websites?</a></h3>

972)     <p>

973)     *.torproject.org SSL certificate from Digicert:

974)     </p>
975)     <pre>
976) Issued Certificate
977) Version: 3
978) Serial Number: 09 48 B1 A9 3B 25 1D 0D B1 05 10 59 E2 C2 68 0A
979) Not Valid Before: 2013-10-22
980) Not Valid After: 2016-05-03
981) Certificate Fingerprints
982) SHA1: 84 24 56 56 8E D7 90 43 47 AA 89 AB 77 7D A4 94 3B A1 A7 D5
983) MD5: A4 16 66 80 AE B9 A4 EC AA 88 01 1B 6F B9 EB CB

984)     </pre>

985) <br>
986)     <p>
987) blog.torproject.org SSL certificate from RapidSSL:

988)     </p>

989)     <pre>
990) Issued Certificate
991) Version: 3
992) Serial Number: 05 CA 2A A9 A5 D6 ED 44 C7 2D 88 1A 18 B0 E7 DC
993) Not Valid Before: 2014-04-09
994) Not Valid After: 2017-06-14
995) Certificate Fingerprints
996) SHA1: DE 20 3D 46 FD C3 68 EB BA 40 56 39 F5 FA FD F5 4E 3A 1F 83
997) MD5: 8A 8A A2 5E D9 7F 84 4C 8F 00 3B 43 E0 2D E6 4D
998)     </pre>

999)     <hr>
1000) 

1001)     <a id="CompilationAndInstallation"></a>
1002)     <h2><a class="anchor">Compilation And Installation:</a></h2>
1003) 

1004)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

1005)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
1006) Tor?</a></h3>
1007) 
1008)     <p>
1009)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
1010) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
1011) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
1012)     </p>

1013) 

1014)     <p>

1015)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
1016) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
1017)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
1018) way to

1019)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers.

1020)     </p>

1021) 

1022)     <p>
1023)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
1024)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
1025)     </p>

1026) 

1027)     <p>

1028)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
1029) method. But
1030)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
1031) it should

1032)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
1033)     </p>

1034) 

1035)     <hr>

1036) 

1037)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

1038)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
1039) the download page?</a></h3>

1040) 

1041)     <p>

1042)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
1043) downloaded is

1044)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
1045)     </p>

1046) 

1047)     <p>
1048)     Please read the <a

1049)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
1050) page for details.

1051)     </p>

1052) 

1053) <hr>
1054) 
1055) <a id="GetTor"></a>
1056) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
1057) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
1058) 
1059) <p>
1060) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
1061) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

1062) a friend &mdash; the <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser

1063) Bundle</a> fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

1064) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
1065) cache</a>

1066) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
1067) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,
1068) you can download Tor via email: log in to your Gmail account and mail

1069) '<tt>gettor@gettor.torproject.org</tt>'. If you include the word 'help'

1070) in the body of the email, it will reply with instructions. Note that
1071) only a few webmail providers are supported, since they need to be able
1072) to receive very large attachments.
1073) </p>
1074) 
1075) <p>

1076) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
1077) signature</a>

1078) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
1079) other than our official HTTPS website.

1080) </p>
1081) 

1082)     <hr>

1083) 

1084)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>

1085)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives"></a>Why does my
1086)     Tor executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</h3>

1087)     <p>

1088)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on
1089)     some parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
1090)     false positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is
1091)     just a guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
1092)     that you have a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or

1093)     pick a better vendor.
1094)     </p>

1095)     <p>In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for it.
1096)     Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do

1097)     recompile it yourself.</p>
1098) 
1099)     <hr>
1100) 

1101)     <a id="tarballs"></a>

1102)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz

1103)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1104) 
1105)     <p>
1106)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your

1107)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking.
1108)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute</p>

1109)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1110)     <p>

1111)     as documented on tar's man page.

1112)     </p>
1113) 
1114)     <hr>
1115) 

1116)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1117)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1118) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1119) 

1120)     <p>

1121)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1122)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">the Tor
1123) Browser

1124)     Bundle</a>.

1125)     </p>

1126) 
1127) <hr>
1128) 

1129) <a id="TBBGeneral"></a>
1130) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (general):</a></h2>
1131) 

1132) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1133) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on
1134) YouTube

1135) and other Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1136) 
1137) <p>

1138) YouTube and similar sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.
1139) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1140) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes
1141) but is not limited to: <a href="http://decloak.net">completely disregarding
1142) proxy settings</a>, querying your <a

1143) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1144) local IP address</a>, and <a

1145) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1146) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1147) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a>
1148) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass,
1149) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain.

1150) </p>

1151) 
1152) <p>

1153) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/html5">YouTube offers experimental HTML5 video

1154) support</a> for many of their videos. Often you can get the HTML5 version of
1155) videos that don't want to play by grabbing the YouTube URL from the "Embed"

1156) code under a video's "Share" option. The link switches out a URL that looks</p>
1157) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>
1158) <p>to something that looks like</p>
1159) <pre>https://www.youtube.com/embed/CJNxbpbHA-I</pre>

1160) 

1161) <hr>
1162) 

1163) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1164) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1165) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1166) <p>

1167) You'll need to tell Ubuntu that you want the ability to execute shell scripts 
1168) from the graphical interface. Open "Files" (Unity's explorer), open 

1169) Preferences-> Behavior Tab -> Set "Run executable text files when they are 
1170) opened" to "Ask every time", then OK.

1171) </p>
1172) <p>You can also start the Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1173) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1174) <p>
1175) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1176) </p>
1177) 

1178) <hr>
1179) 

1180) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1181) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus

1182)     software on my Mac, and Tor starts but I can't browse anywhere.</a></h3>

1183) <p>

1184) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the
1185) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off

1186) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1187) </p>

1188) <p>
1189) We encourage affected Sophos users to contact Sophos support about 
1190) this issue.
1191) </p>

1192) 

1193) <hr>
1194) 

1195) <a id="XPCOMError"></a>
1196) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#XPCOMError">When I open the Tor Browser Bundle 
1197) I get an error message from the browser: "Cannot load XPCOM".</a></h3>
1198) 
1199) <p>
1200) This <a 
1201) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10789">problem</a> is 
1202) specifically caused by the Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus software. 
1203) Consider switching to a different antivirus program. We encourage affected 
1204) Webroot users to contact Webroot support about this issue.
1205)  </p>
1206) 
1207) <hr>
1208) 

1209) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1210) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1211) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1212) 
1213) <p>

1214) The Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from
1215) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any
1216) additional Firefox add-ons with the Tor Browser Bundle. Add-ons can break
1217) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and

1218) bypassing proxy settings.

1219) </p>

1220) <p>

1221) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or
1222) anti-tracking software with the Tor Browser Bundle. Right now, we do not
1223) think that's such a good idea. The Tor Browser Bundle aims to provide
1224) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are
1225) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which

1226) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">

1227) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that
1228) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint
1229) users.

1230) </p>

1231) 

1232) <hr>
1233) 

1234) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1235) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1236) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript
1237) configured to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor Browser Bundle?
1238) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1239) 
1240) <p>
1241) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in the Tor
1242) Browser Bundle because many websites will not work with JavaScript
1243) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1244) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1245) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1246) JavaScript might make a website work).
1247) </p>
1248) 

1249) <p>
1250) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1251) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1252) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1253) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1254) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1255) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1256) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1257) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1258) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1259) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1260) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1261) </p>

1262) 
1263) <p>

1264) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1265) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1266) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1267) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1268) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1269) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1270) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1271) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1272) partitioning concern will remain.

1273) </p>
1274) 
1275) <p>

1276) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1277) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1278) </p>
1279) 
1280) <hr>
1281) 

1282) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1283) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1284) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1285) 
1286) <p>
1287) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser Bundle with Tor is a
1288) really bad idea.
1289) </p>
1290) 
1291) <p>
1292) We're working with the Chrome team to <a

1293) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">fix some bugs and missing APIs in Chrome</a> so it

1294) will be possible to write a Torbutton for Chrome. No support for any
1295) other browser is on the horizon.

1296) </p>
1297) 
1298) <hr>
1299) 

1300) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1301) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1302) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1303) 
1304) <p>
1305) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1306) considers Tor to be spyware.
1307) </p>
1308) 
1309) <p>

1310) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are

1311) also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this
1312) message when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1313) Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address
1314) (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their
1315) website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.

1316) </p>
1317) <p>
1318) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1319) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1320) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1321) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1322) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1323) an infection.
1324) </p>
1325) 
1326) <p>

1327) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically

1328) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1329) should clear up again after a short time.
1330) </p>
1331) 
1332) <hr />
1333) 

1334) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1335) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1336) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1337) 
1338) <p>

1339)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it
1340)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language
1341)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results

1342)  on your queries.

1343) </p>
1344) <p>

1345) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that
1346) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the
1347) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on

1348) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact. 

1349) </p>
1350) <p>

1351) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one
1352) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return
1353) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been
1354) sent to. On a query this looks like:

1355) </p>

1356) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1357) <p>

1358) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google.
1359) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

1360) </p>
1361) <hr />

1362) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1363) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1364) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1365) 
1366) <p>
1367) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1368) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1369) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1370) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1371) </p>
1372) 
1373) <p>
1374) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1375) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1376) decided

1377) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1378) rightful owner.
1379) </p>
1380) 
1381) <p>
1382) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1383) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1384) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1385) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1386) </p>
1387) 
1388) <p>
1389) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1390) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1391) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1392) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1393) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1394) hijacking">

1395) way more complex than that</a>.
1396) </p>
1397) 
1398) <p>
1399) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1400) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1401) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1402) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1403) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1404) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1405) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1406) </p>
1407) 
1408) <hr>
1409) 

1410) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1411) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection

1412) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1413) 
1414) <p>

1415) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
1416) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
1417) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

1418) href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

1419) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
1420) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
1421) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
1422) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options
1423) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

1424) </p>
1425) <p>

1426) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
1427) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently,
1428) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a
1429) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post
1430) in the archives</a> useful.

1431) </p>
1432) <p>

1433) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the
1434) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how
1435) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

1436) </p>
1437) 
1438) <hr>
1439) 

1440) 
1441) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>
1442) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">
1443) I want to run another application through Tor.</a></h3>
1444) 
1445) <p>
1446) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero
1447) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set
1448) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try
1449) to use a SOCKS proxy rather than an HTTP proxy.
1450) Typically Tor listens for SOCKS connections on port 9050. Tor Browser listens
1451) on port 9150.
1452) </p>
1453) 
1454) <p>
1455) If your application doesn't support SOCKS proxies, feel free to install <a
1456) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1457) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1458) users. Privoxy has an <a
1459) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1460) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.
1461) </p>
1462) 
1463) <p>
1464) If you're unable to use the application's native proxy settings, all hope is 
1465) not lost. See <a href="#CantSetProxy">below</a>.
1466) </p>
1467) 
1468) <hr>
1469) 

1470) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>

1471) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't

1472) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1473) 
1474) <p>

1475) On Unix, we recommend you give <a
1476) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try.
1477) Alternative proxifying tools like <a
1478) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a
1479) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also

1480) available.</p>

1481) <p>
1482) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a
1483) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a
1484) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a

1485) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

1486) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here.

1487) </p>
1488) 
1489) <hr>
1490) 

1491) <a id="TBB3.x"></a>
1492) <h2><a class="anchor">Tor Browser Bundle (3.x series):</a></h2>

1493)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>

1494)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map

1495)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1496) 

1497)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox
1498)     extension that provides similar functionality. Unfortunately, circuit
1499)     status reporting is still missing, but we are <a
1500)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8641">working

1501)     on providing it</a>. </p>
1502) 

1503)     <p>In the meantime, we are providing standalone Vidalia packages for
1504)     people who still want the map. Windows and Linux versions are <a

1505)     href="https://people.torproject.org/~erinn/vidalia-standalone-bundles/">

1506)     available here</a>.</p>

1507) 

1508)     <p>To use these packages, extract them, then run the startup script.
1509)     On Windows, this is "Start Vidalia.exe". On Linux, it is start-vidalia.
1510)     They can be placed in a different directory from TBB (and likely should

1511)     be). </p>
1512) 

1513)     <p>This Vidalia package will only run properly if Tor Browser has already

1514)     been launched. You cannot start it before launching Tor Browser. </p>
1515) 

1516)     <p>MacOS is still under development, but in the mean time you can modify
1517)     your TBB 2.x to be a standalone Vidalia (and then use it after starting
1518)     TBB 3.x) by opening your TBB 2.x vidalia.conf file in an editor and

1519)     replacing its contents with just these lines:</p>
1520) 
1521)     <pre>
1522)     [General]
1523)     LanguageCode=en
1524) 
1525)     [Tor]
1526)     ControlPort=9151
1527)     TorExecutable=.
1528)     Torrc=.
1529)     DataDirectory=.
1530)     AuthenticationMethod=cookie

1531)     </pre>

1532) 
1533)     <hr>
1534) 
1535)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1536)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1537)     </h3>
1538) 

1539)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript
1540)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24
1541)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config

1542)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1543) 

1544)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the
1545)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select
1546)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists
1547)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas

1548)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1549) 

1550)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config,

1551)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1552) 
1553)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1554)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled

1555)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon,
1556)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and

1557)     provides a button for it. </p>
1558) 

1559)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and

1560)     NoScript. </p>
1561) 

1562)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a

1563)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1564) 
1565)     <hr>
1566) 
1567)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1568)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1569)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1570) 

1571)     <p>Instructions are on the <a 

1572)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>#BuildVerification">verifying 

1573)     signatures</a> page.</p>

1574) 
1575)     <hr>

1576)     

1577)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>

1578)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New

1579)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1580) 
1581)     <p>

1582)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level
1583)     browser data too. But it sure is a surprising feature, for people who

1584)     are used to Vidalia's "new identity" behavior.
1585)     </p>
1586) 
1587)     <p>

1588)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1589)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1590)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1591)     ticket <a
1592)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1593)     to follow progress there.

1594)     </p>
1595) 
1596)     <p>

1597)     In the mean time, you can get Vidalia's old "newnym" functionality by
1598)     attaching a Vidalia to your TBB 3.x. See the instructions <a
1599)     href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">above</a>.

1600)     </p>
1601) 
1602)     <hr>
1603) 
1604)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1605)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1606) 
1607)     <p>

1608)     You've got three options.

1609)     </p>
1610) 
1611)     <p>

1612)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system
1613)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay
1614)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>).

1615)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1616)     </p>
1617) 
1618)     <p>

1619)     Second (simpler option), if you're on Windows, you can fetch the separate
1620)     "Vidalia relay bundle" or "Vidalia bridge bundle" from the download page
1621)     and then use that (again you can use TBB independent of it).

1622)     </p>
1623) 
1624)     <p>

1625)     Third (complex option), you can either hook your Vidalia up to TBB (as
1626)     described in the FAQ above) or edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc)
1627)     directly to add the following lines:

1628)     </p>
1629)     <pre>
1630)     ORPort 443
1631)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1632)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1633)     </pre>
1634)     <p>

1635)     If you've installed <a

1636)     href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,

1637)     you'll need to add one more line:
1638)     </p>
1639)     <pre>
1640)     ServerTransportPlugin obfs3 exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy managed
1641)     </pre>
1642)     <p>

1643)     This third option is pretty klunky right now; see e.g. <a
1644)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10449">this bug</a>;
1645)     but we're hoping it will become an easy option in the future.

1646)     </p>
1647) 
1648)     <hr>
1649) 
1650)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>

1651)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps

1652)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1653) 

1654)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build"
1655)     process, which allows many people to build the Tor Browser Bundle and
1656)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a
1657)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first
1658)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a

1659)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second

1660)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it.

1661)     </p>
1662) 

1663)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same
1664)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason

1665)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1666) 
1667)     <hr>
1668) 

1669)     <a id="TBBSourceCode"></a>
1670)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for the bundle? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>

1671) 
1672)     <p>
1673)     Start with <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git</a> and <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build">https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-bundle.git/blob/HEAD:/gitian/README.build</a>.
1674)     </p>
1675) 
1676) 

1677) <hr>
1678) 

1679) <a id="AdvancedTorUsage"></a>
1680) <h2><a class="anchor">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h2>
1681) 

1682) <a id="torrc"></a>

1683) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1684) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1685) 
1686) <p>
1687) Tor installs a text file called torrc that contains configuration
1688) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1689) configuration should work fine for most Tor users.

1690) </p>

1691) <p>

1692) If you installed Tor Browser Bundle, look for

1693) <code>Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser Bundle directory.
1694) On OS X, you must right-click or command-click on the browser bundle icon,
1695) and select "Show Package Contents" before the Tor Browser directories become
1696) visible.

1697) </p>
1698) <p>

1699) Tor puts the torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code> if you installed a pre-built package.</p>

1700) 
1701) <p>

1702) Once you've changed your torrc, you will need to restart tor for the
1703) changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1704) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1705) it.)

1706) </p>
1707) 
1708) <p>

1709) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page

1710) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a

1711) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/src/config/torrc.sample.in">

1712) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all
1713) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect

1714) on Tor's configuration.

1715) </p>
1716) 
1717) <hr>
1718) 

1719) <a id="Logs"></a>

1720) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1721) logs?</a></h3>

1722) 
1723) <p>

1724) If you installed a Tor bundle that includes Vidalia, then Vidalia has a

1725) window called "Message Log" that will show you Tor's log messages. Click
1726) on "Advanced" to see more details. You can click on "Settings" to change
1727) your log verbosity or save the messages to a file. You're all set.

1728) </p>
1729) 
1730) <p>
1731) If you're not using Vidalia, you'll have to go find the log files by

1732) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1733) </p>
1734) 
1735) <ul>
1736) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1737) </li>

1738) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1739) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1740) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1741) </li>
1742) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1743) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1744) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1745) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1746) </li>
1747) </ul>
1748) 
1749) <p>

1750) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1751) torrc</a>

1752) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1753) following line:

1754) </p>
1755) 
1756) <pre>

1757) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1758) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1759) </pre>

1760) 
1761) <p>

1762) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1763) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1764) of the section:
1765) </p>
1766) 
1767) <pre>
1768) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1769) </pre>
1770) 
1771) <p>

1772) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1773) and filename for your Tor log.

1774) </p>
1775) 
1776) <hr>
1777) 

1778) 
1779) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1780) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1781) 
1782) <p>

1783) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in

1784) Tor's logs:

1785) </p>
1786) 
1787) <ul>

1788)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will

1789)     exit.</li>

1790)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad
1791)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something
1792)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to

1793)     correct the problem.</li>

1794)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1795)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's

1796)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1797)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li>

1798) </ul>
1799) 
1800) <p>

1801) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the
1802) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react

1803) correctly for each situation.

1804) </p>
1805) 
1806) <p>

1807) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about

1808) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1809) </p>
1810) 
1811) <p>

1812) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal
1813) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in
1814) their logs.

1815) </p>
1816) 

1817) <hr>
1818) 

1819) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1820) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1821) working.</a></h3>

1822) 
1823) <p>

1824) Once you've got the Tor bundle up and running, the first question to
1825) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1826) </p>
1827) 
1828) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, the onion icon in

1829) Vidalia will turn green (and if you're running Tor Browser Bundle, it
1830) will
1831) automatically launch a browser for you). You can also check in the
1832) Vidalia

1833) Control Panel to make sure it says "Connected to the Tor
1834) network!" under Status. For those not using Vidalia, check your <a

1835) href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1836) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1837) client functionality is working."
1838) </p>
1839) 
1840) <p>
1841) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1842) </p>
1843) 
1844) <ol>
1845) <li>Are you sure Tor is running? If you're using Vidalia, you may have
1846) to click on the onion and select "Start" to launch Tor.</li>
1847) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1848) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1849) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1850) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1851) zone is correct.</li>

1852) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1853) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1854) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

1855) </li>

1856) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
1857) that

1858) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
1859) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
1860) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
1861) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

1862) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

1863) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
1864) about what's going wrong?</li>

1865) </ol>
1866) 
1867) <hr />
1868) 

1869) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
1870) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
1871) <p>

1872)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor.
1873)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even
1874)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so
1875)  we can help you track it down.

1876) </p>
1877) <p>

1878) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest
1879) stable or the latest development version).

1880) </p>
1881) <p>

1882) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at
1883) least libevent 1.3a.

1884) </p>
1885) <p>

1886) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a
1887) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so,
1888) check if there are any new details that you can add.

1889) </p>
1890) <p>

1891) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can
1892) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that
1893) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up?
1894) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for
1895) example the latest stable release?

1896) </p>
1897) <p>

1898) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get?

1899) </p>
1900) <ul>
1901) <li>

1902) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please
1903) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on.
1904) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially
1905) if they seem important.

1906) </li>
1907) <li>

1908) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to
1909) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or
1910) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your
1911) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt",
1912) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c
1913) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core
1914) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows
1915) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate

1916) your bug on Unix?)
1917) </li>
1918) <li>

1919) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation
1920) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you
1921) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a
1922) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should
1923) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can
1924) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground,
1925) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default
1926) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a>
1927) for details.

1928) </li>
1929) <li>

1930) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it?
1931) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes
1932) sometimes? (This is especially common on OpenBSD.) On Linux, try running
1933) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will
1934) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases
1935) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware
1936) problems could also be the culprit.

1937) </li>
1938) </ul>
1939) <p>

1940) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your
1941) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ
1942) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually
1943) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole
1944) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send
1945) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then
1946) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed.
1947) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down
1948) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise
1949) to keep logs like this sitting around.)

1950) </p>
1951) 
1952) <hr />
1953) 

1954)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>

1955)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which
1956) nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

1957) 

1958)     <p>

1959)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
1960)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

1961)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
1962)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

1963)     </p>
1964)     <dl>
1965)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1966)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the
1967) circuit, if possible.

1968)         </dd>
1969)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1970)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the
1971) circuit, if possible.

1972)         </dd>
1973)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1974)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

1975)         </dd>
1976)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1977)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.

1978)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in
1979) this list.

1980)         </dd>
1981)     </dl>
1982)     <p>

1983)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>

1984)     — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future
1985) versions.

1986)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
1987)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
1988)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

1989)     </p>
1990)     <p>

1991)     Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
1992)     the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
1993)     used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
1994)     those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at
1995)     a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see
1996)     <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> and <tt>StrictNodes</tt> in the

1997)     <a href="<page docs/tor-manual>">manual</a>.

1998)     </p>
1999)     <p>

2000)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a

2001) 
2002) href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2"
2003) >2

2004)     letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example <tt>{de}</tt>),

2005)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node
2006)     nickname. Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the
2007)     list items.

2008)     </p>
2009)     <p>

2010)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks
2011) interface

2012)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an

2013)     internal mapping in your configuration file using
2014) <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

2015)     See the manual page for details.
2016)     </p>

2017) 

2018)     <hr>

2019) 

2020) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

2021) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a
2022) few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

2023) 
2024) <p>
2025) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only

2026) use the ports that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1"
2027) to

2028) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

2029) configuration file</a>, or by clicking "My firewall only lets me connect
2030) to certain ports" in Vidalia's Network Settings window.
2031) </p>
2032) 
2033) <p>
2034) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
2035) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
2036) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
2037) </p>
2038) 
2039) <p>
2040) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
2041) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
2042) </p>
2043) 
2044) <pre>
2045)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
2046)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
2047) </pre>
2048) 
2049) <hr>

2050) 

2051)     <a id="DefaultExitPorts"></a>

2052)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit

2053)     ports?</a></h3>

2054)     <p>

2055) The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or
2056) ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or
2057) modifying the source code. But the default according to src/or/policies.c
2058) from the source code release tor-0.2.4.16-rc is:

2059)     </p>
2060)     <pre>
2061)   reject 0.0.0.0/8
2062)   reject 169.254.0.0/16
2063)   reject 127.0.0.0/8
2064)   reject 192.168.0.0/16
2065)   reject 10.0.0.0/8
2066)   reject 172.16.0.0/12
2067)   reject *:25
2068)   reject *:119
2069)   reject *:135-139
2070)   reject *:445
2071)   reject *:563
2072)   reject *:1214
2073)   reject *:4661-4666
2074)   reject *:6346-6429
2075)   reject *:6699
2076)   reject *:6881-6999
2077)   accept *:*
2078)     </pre>
2079)     <p>

2080)     A relay will block access to its own IP address, as well local network
2081)     IP addresses. A relay always blocks itself by default. This prevents
2082)     Tor users from accidentally accessing any of the exit operator's local
2083)     services.

2084)     </p>
2085) 
2086)     <hr>
2087) 

2088)     <a id="WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks"></a>

2089)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I
2090)     keep seeing these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks.

2091)     Should I worry?</a></h3>
2092)     <p>

2093)     The warning is:

2094)     </p>
2095)     <p>

2096)     Your application (using socks5 on port %d) is giving Tor only an IP
2097)     address. Applications that do DNS resolves themselves may leak
2098)     information. Consider using Socks4A (e.g. via Polipo or socat) instead.

2099)     </p>
2100)     <p>

2101)     If you are running Tor to get anonymity, and you are worried about an
2102)     attacker who is even slightly clever, then yes, you should worry. Here's why.

2103)     </p>
2104)     <p>

2105)     <b>The Problem.</b> When your applications connect to servers on the
2106)     Internet, they need to resolve hostnames that you can read (like
2107)     www.torproject.org) into IP addresses that the Internet can use (like
2108)     209.237.230.66). To do this, your application sends a request to a DNS
2109)     server, telling it the hostname it wants to resolve. The DNS server
2110)     replies by telling your application the IP address.

2111)     </p>
2112)     <p>

2113)     Clearly, this is a bad idea if you plan to connect to the remote host
2114)     anonymously: when your application sends the request to the DNS server,
2115)     the DNS server (and anybody else who might be watching) can see what
2116)     hostname you are asking for. Even if your application then uses Tor to
2117)     connect to the IP anonymously, it will be pretty obvious that the user
2118)     making the anonymous connection is probably the same person who made
2119)     the DNS request.

2120)     </p>
2121)     <p>

2122)     <b>Where SOCKS comes in.</b> Your application uses the SOCKS protocol
2123)     to connect to your local Tor client. There are 3 versions of SOCKS you
2124)     are likely to run into: SOCKS 4 (which only uses IP addresses), SOCKS 5
2125)     (which usually uses IP addresses in practice), and SOCKS 4a (which uses
2126)     hostnames).

2127)     </p>
2128)     <p>

2129)     When your application uses SOCKS 4 or SOCKS 5 to give Tor an IP address,
2130)     Tor guesses that it 'probably' got the IP address non-anonymously from a
2131)     DNS server. That's why it gives you a warning message: you probably aren't
2132)     as anonymous as you think.

2133)     </p>
2134)     <p>

2135)     <b>So what can I do?</b> We describe a few solutions below.

2136)     </p>
2137)     <ul>
2138)     <li>If your application speaks SOCKS 4a, use it. </li>

2139)     <li>If you only need one or two hosts, or you are good at programming,
2140)     you may be able to get a socks-based port-forwarder like socat to work
2141)     for you; see <a
2142)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO">the

2143)     Torify HOWTO</a> for examples. </li>

2144)     <li>Tor ships with a program called tor-resolve that can use the Tor
2145)     network to look up hostnames remotely; if you resolve hostnames to IPs
2146)     with tor-resolve, then pass the IPs to your applications, you'll be fine.

2147)     (Tor will still give the warning, but now you know what it means.) </li>
2148) <!-- I'm not sure if this project is still maintained or not
2149) 
2150) <li>You can use TorDNS as a local DNS server to rectify the DNS leakage. See the Torify HOWTO for info on how to run particular applications anonymously. </li>
2151) !-->
2152)     </ul>

2153)     <p>If you think that you applied one of the solutions properly but still
2154)     experience DNS leaks please verify there is no third-party application
2155)     using DNS independently of Tor. Please see <a
2156)     href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">the FAQ entry on whether you're really
2157)     absolutely anonymous using Tor</a> for some examples.

2158)     </p>
2159) 
2160)     <hr>
2161) 

2162)     <a id="SocksAndDNS"></a>

2163)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

2164)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></h3>
2165) 
2166)     <p>

2167)     These are two steps you need to take here. The first is to make sure
2168)     that it's using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, and the
2169)     second is to make sure that there aren't other leaks.

2170)     </p>
2171) 
2172)     <p>

2173)     Step one: add "TestSocks 1" to your torrc file, and then watch your
2174)     logs as you use your application. Tor will then log, for each SOCKS
2175)     connection, whether it was using a 'good' variant or a 'bad' one.
2176)     (If you want to automatically disable all 'bad' variants, set
2177)     "SafeSocks 1" in your <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> file.)