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5) #include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: FAQ" CHARSET="UTF-8"
6) <div id="content" class="clearfix">
7)   <div id="breadcrumbs">

8)     <a href="<page index>">Home &raquo; </a>

9)     <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation &raquo; </a>
10)     <a href="<page docs/faq>">FAQ</a>
11)   </div>
12)   <div id="maincol">
13)     <!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
14)     <h1>Tor FAQ</h1>

15)     <hr>

16) 

17)     <a id="general"></a>
18)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#general">General questions:</a></h4>

19)     <ul>
20)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>

21)     <li><a href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other
22) proxies?</a></li>

23)     <li><a href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can I use with
24)     Tor?</a></li>
25)     <li><a href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></li>
26)     <li><a href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></li>

27)     <li><a href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor?</a></li>

28)     <li><a href="#SupportMail">How can I get support?</a></li>

29)     <li><a href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></li>

30)     <li><a href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></li>

31)     <li><a href="#FileSharing">How can I share files anonymously through Tor?
32)     </a></li>

33)     <li><a href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with more
34)     funding?</a></li>

35)     <li><a href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is working, and that my

36)     connections really are anonymized?</a></li>

37)     <li><a href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile device?</a></li>

38)     <li><a href="#OutboundPorts">Which outbound ports must be open when
39)     using Tor as a client?</a></li>

40)     <li><a href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?</a></li>

41)     <li><a href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal information

42)     from the data my application sends?</a></li>

43)     <li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or
44)     exit nodes are there?</a></li>

45)     </ul>

46) 

47)     <a id="comp-install"></a>
48)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#comp-install">Compilation and Installation:</a></h4>

49) 

50)     <ul>
51)     <li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
52)     <li><a href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the download
53)     page?</a></li>

54)     <li><a href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my country. How
55)     do I download Tor?</a></li>

56)     <li><a href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor executable appear to

57)     have a virus or spyware?</a></li>

58)     <li><a href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz or .tar.xz file?</a></li>

59)     <li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
60) includes Tor?</a></li>

61)     </ul>

62) 

63)     <a id="tbb"></a>
64)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#tbb">Tor Browser (general):</a></h4>

65)     <ul>

66) 

67)     <li><a href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on YouTube and other
68)     Flash-based sites?</a></li>

69)     <li><a href="#Ubuntu">I'm using Ubuntu, and I can't start Tor Browser.

70)     </a></li>

71)     <li><a href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus

72)     software on my Mac, and Tor starts but I can't browse anywhere.</a></li>

73)     <li><a href="#XPCOMError">When I start Tor Browser I get an 
74) error message: "Cannot load XPCOM".</a></li>

75)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other Firefox

76)     extensions? Which extensions should I avoid using?</a></li>

77)     <li><a href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript configured to

78) allow JavaScript by default in Tor Browser?  Isn't that

79) unsafe?</a></li>

80)     <li><a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use Chrome/IE/Opera/etc
81)     with Tor.</a></li>

82)     <li><a href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a CAPTCHA or tells

83)     me I have spyware installed.</a></li>

84)     <li><a href="#ForeignLanguages">Why does Google show up in foreign

85)     languages?</a></li>

86)     <li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
87)     been compromised.</a></li>

88)     <li><a href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection requires an HTTP

89)     or SOCKS Proxy</a></li>

90)     <li><a href="#TBBSocksPort">I want to
91)     run another application through Tor.</a></li>

92)     <li><a href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't set a proxy

93)     with my application?</a></li>

94)     </ul>
95) 

96)     <a id="tbb-3plus"></a>
97)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#tbb-3plus">Tor Browser (3.x and later):</a></h4>

98) 
99)     <ul>

100)     <li><a href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a></li>

101)     <li><a href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download

102)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></li>

103)     <li><a href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New Identity" close

104)     all my open tabs?</a></li>

105)     <li><a href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay

106)     or bridge?</a></li>
107)     <li><a href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps from 2000?</a></li>

108)     <li><a href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for Tor Browser?

109)     How do I verify a build?</a></li>

110)     </ul>
111) 

112)     <a id="advanced"></a>
113)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#advanced">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h4>

114) 

115)     <ul>
116)     <li><a href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc". What does
117)     that mean?</a></li>

118)     <li><a href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's

119)     logs?</a></li>

120)     <li><a href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></li>

121)     <li><a href="#DoesntWork">Tor is running, but it's not working
122)     correctly.</a></li>

123)     <li><a href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></li>

124)     <li><a href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country)

125)     are used for entry/exit?</a></li>

126)     <li><a href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a few outgoing
127)     ports.</a></li>

128)     <li><a href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit ports?</a></li>

129)     <li><a href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I keep seeing
130)     these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I

131)     worry?</a></li>

132)     <li><a href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

133)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></li>

134)     <li><a href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I want to run my Tor client on a
135)     different computer than my applications.</a></li>
136)     <li><a href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a central server, and
137)     have my clients connect to it?</a></li>

138)     <li><a href="#IPv6">How do I use Tor from an IPv6 only host/computer?</a></li>

139)     </ul>

140) 

141)     <a id="relay"></a>
142)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#relay">Running a Tor relay:</a></h4>

143)     <ul>

144) 
145)     <li><a href="#HowDoIDecide">How do I decide if I should run a relay?
146)     </a></li>

147)     <li><a href="#MostNeededRelayType">What type of relays are most needed?</a></li>

148)     <li><a href="#WhyIsntMyRelayBeingUsedMore">Why isn't my relay being

149)     used more?</a></li>

150)     <li><a href="#IDontHaveAStaticIP">Can I run a Tor relay using a dynamic IP address?</a></li>

151)     <li><a href="#IPv6Relay">Can I use IPv6 on my relay?</a></li>

152)     <li><a href="#PortscannedMore">Why do I get portscanned more often

153)     when I run a Tor relay?</a></li>

154)     <li><a href="#HighCapacityConnection">How can I get Tor to fully

155)     make use of my high capacity connection?</a></li>

156)     <li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to
157) be?</a></li>

158)     <li><a href="#BandwidthShaping">What bandwidth shaping options are

159)     available to Tor relays?</a></li>

160)     <li><a href="#LimitTotalBandwidth">How can I limit the total amount

161)     of bandwidth used by my Tor relay?</a></li>

162)     <li><a href="#RelayWritesMoreThanItReads">Why does my relay write

163)     more bytes onto the network than it reads?</a></li>

164)     <li><a href="#Hibernation">Why can I not browse anymore after

165)     limiting bandwidth on my Tor relay?</a></li>

166)     <li><a href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't want to deal

167)     with abuse issues.</a></li>

168)     <li><a href="#PackagedTor">Should I install Tor from my package manager,

169)     or build from source?</a></li>

170)     <li><a href="#WhatIsTheBadExitFlag">What is the BadExit flag?</a></li>

171)     <li><a href="#IGotTheBadExitFlagWhyDidThatHappen">I got the BadExit flag.

172)     Why did that happen?</a></li>

173)     <li><a href="#MyRelayRecentlyGotTheGuardFlagAndTrafficDroppedByHalf">My

174)     relay recently got the Guard flag and traffic dropped by half.</a></li>

175)     <li><a href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay or bridge
176)     relay?</a></li>

177)     <li><a href="#UpgradeOrMove">I want to upgrade/move my relay. How do I

178)     keep the same key?</a></li>

179)     <li><a href="#OfflineED25519">How do offline ed25519 identity keys work?
180)     What do I need to know?</a></li>

181)     <li><a href="#MultipleRelays">I want to run more than one
182) relay.</a></li>

183)     <li><a href="#NTService">How do I run my Tor relay as an NT service?
184)     </a></li>

185)     <li><a href="#VirtualServer">Can I run a Tor relay from my virtual server

186)     account?</a></li>

187)     <li><a href="#WrongIP">My relay is picking the wrong IP address.</a></li>
188)     <li><a href="#BehindANAT">I'm behind a NAT/Firewall</a></li>

189)     <li><a href="#OutgoingFirewall">How should I configure the outgoing filters on my relay?</a></li>

190)     <li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?
191)     </a></li>
192)     <li><a href="#BetterAnonymity">Do I get better anonymity if I run a relay?
193)     </a></li>

194)     <li><a href="#FacingLegalTrouble">I'm facing legal trouble. How do I

195)     prove that my server was a Tor relay at a given time?</a></li>

196)     <li><a href="#RelayDonations">Can I donate for a relay rather than
197)     run my own?</a></li>

198)     </ul>

199) 

200)     <a id="onion-services"></a>
201)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#onion-services">Tor onion services:</a></h4>

202) 

203)     <ul>

204)     <li><a href="#AccessOnionServices">How do I access onion services?</a></li>
205)     <li><a href="#ProvideAnOnionService">How do I provide an onion service?</a></li>

206)     </ul>

207) 

208)     <a id="dev"></a>
209)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#dev">Development:</a></h4>

210) 

211)     <ul>

212)     <li><a href="#VersionNumbers">What do these weird version numbers

213)     mean?</a></li>
214)     <li><a href="#PrivateTorNetwork">How do I set up my own private
215)     Tor network?</a></li>

216)     <li><a href="#UseTorWithJava">How can I make my Java program use the

217)     Tor network?</a></li>
218)     <li><a href="#WhatIsLibevent">What is Libevent?</a></li>

219)     <li><a href="#MyNewFeature">What do I need to do to get a new feature

220)     into Tor?</a></li>
221)     </ul>
222) 

223)     <a id="anonsec"></a>
224)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#anonsec">Anonymity and Security:</a></h4>

225)     <ul>

226)     <li><a href="#WhatProtectionsDoesTorProvide">What protections does Tor

227)     provide?</a></li>

228)     <li><a href="#CanExitNodesEavesdrop">Can exit nodes eavesdrop on

229)     communications? Isn't that bad? </a></li>

230)     <li><a href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">So I'm totally anonymous if I use

231)     Tor?</a></li>

232)     <li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor
233) uses.</a></li>

234)     <li><a href="#EntryGuards">What are Entry Guards?</a></li>

235)     <li><a href="#ChangePaths">How often does Tor change its paths?</a></li>

236)     <li><a href="#CellSize">Tor uses hundreds of bytes for every IRC line. I

237)     can't afford that!</a></li>

238)     <li><a href="#OutboundConnections">Why does netstat show these outbound

239)     connections?</a></li>
240)     <li><a href="#PowerfulBlockers">What about powerful blocking mechanisms
241)     </a></li>

242)     <li><a href="#RemotePhysicalDeviceFingerprinting">Does Tor resist

243)     "remote physical device fingerprinting"?</a></li>

244)     <li><a href="#IsTorLikeAVPN">Is Tor like a VPN?</a></li>

245)     <li><a href="#Proxychains">Aren't 10 proxies (proxychains) better than

246)     Tor with only 3 hops?</a></li>

247)     <li><a href="#AttacksOnOnionRouting">What attacks remain against onion

248)     routing?</a></li>

249)     <li><a href="#LearnMoreAboutAnonymity">Where can I learn more about anonymity?</a></li>

250)     </ul>

251) 

252)     <a id="altdesigns"></a>
253)     <h4 style="margin-bottom: 18px"><a class="anchor" href="#altdesigns">Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</a></h4>

254) 

255)     <ul>
256)     <li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
257)     relay.</a></li>

258)     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP
259) packets,

260)     not just TCP packets.</a></li>

261)     <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
262)     so people can't block the exits.</a></li>

263)     <li><a href="#ChoosePathLength">You should let people choose their path

264)     length.</a></li>

265)     <li><a href="#SplitEachConnection">You should split each connection over

266)     many paths.</a></li>

267)     <li><a href="#MigrateApplicationStreamsAcrossCircuits">You should migrate

268)     application streams across circuits.</a></li>

269)     <li><a href="#LetTheNetworkPickThePath">You should let the network pick

270)     the path, not the client.</a></li>

271)     <li><a href="#UnallocatedNetBlocks">Your default exit policy should block

272)     unallocated net blocks too.</a></li>

273)     <li><a href="#BlockWebsites">Exit policies should be able to block

274)     websites, not just IP addresses.</a></li>

275)     <li><a href="#BlockContent">You should change Tor to prevent users from

276)     posting certain content.</a></li>

277)     <li><a href="#SendPadding">You should send padding so it's more secure.
278)     </a></li>

279)     <li><a href="#Steganography">You should use steganography to hide Tor

280)     traffic.</a></li>

281)     </ul>

282) 

283)     <p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the
284) <a

285)     href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>

286) 

287)     <hr>

288) 

289)     <a id="General"></a>

290)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#General">General:</a></h2>

291) 

292)     <a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
293)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>

294) 

295)     <p>
296)     The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
297)     </p>

298) 

299)     <p>

300)     Tor is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
301)     you safe on the Internet. It protects you by bouncing your communications

302)     around a distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around

303)     the world: it prevents somebody watching your Internet connection from

304)     learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the sites you visit

305)     from learning your physical location.
306)     This set of volunteer relays is called the <b>Tor network</b>.
307)     The way most people use Tor is with <b>Tor Browser</b>,
308)     which is a version of Firefox that fixes many privacy issues.
309)     You can read more about how Tor works on the <a href="<page
310)     about/overview>">overview page</a>.

311)     </p>

312) 

313)     <p>

314)     The <b>Tor Project</b> is a non-profit (charity) organization that
315)     maintains and develops the Tor software.

316)     </p>

317) 

318)     <hr>

319) 

320)     <a id="Torisdifferent"></a>

321)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different
322) from other proxies?</a></h3>
323)     <p>
324)     A typical proxy provider sets up a server somewhere on the Internet
325) and
326) allows you to use it to relay your traffic.  This creates a simple, easy
327) to
328) maintain architecture.  The users all enter and leave through the same
329) server.
330) The provider may charge for use of the proxy, or fund their costs
331) through
332) advertisements on the server.  In the simplest configuration, you don't
333) have to
334) install anything.  You just have to point your browser at their proxy
335) server.
336) Simple proxy providers are fine solutions if you do not want protections
337) for

338) your privacy and anonymity online and you trust the provider to not do

339) bad
340) things.  Some simple proxy providers use SSL to secure your connection

341) to them, which protects you against local eavesdroppers, such as those at a
342) cafe with free wifi Internet.

343)     </p>
344)     <p>

345)     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The
346) provider

347) knows both who you are and what you browse on the Internet.  They can see

348) your
349) traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even
350) see

351) inside your

352) encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce
353) stores.

354) You have to trust the provider isn't

355) watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your
356) traffic

357) stream, or recording your personal details.

358)     </p>
359)     <p>

360)     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before
361) sending
362) it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption
363) for

364) each of the three relays, somebody watching your Internet connection
365) can't modify, or read, what you are
366) sending into the Tor network. Your traffic is encrypted between the Tor
367) client (on your computer) and where it pops out somewhere else in the
368) world.
369) </p>

370)     <p>
371)     <dl>

372)     <dt>Doesn't the first server see who I am?</dt><dd>Possibly. A bad
373) first of
374) three servers can see encrypted Tor traffic coming from your computer.
375) It
376) still doesn't know who you are and what you are doing over Tor.  It
377) merely sees
378) "This IP address is using Tor".  Tor is not illegal anywhere in the
379) world, so
380) using Tor by itself is fine.  You are still protected from this node
381) figuring

382) out both who you are and where you are going on the Internet.</dd>

383)     <dt>Can't the third server see my traffic?</dt><dd>Possibly.  A bad
384) third
385) of three servers can see the traffic you sent into Tor.  It won't know
386) who sent

387) this traffic.  If you're using encryption (like
388) HTTPS), it will only know the destination. See <a
389) href="https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https">this visualization of
390) Tor and HTTPS</a> to understand how Tor and HTTPS interact.
391) </dd>

392)     </dl>
393)     </p>

394) 

395)     <hr>

396) 

397) 

398)     <a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>

399)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs
400) can I use with Tor?</a></h3>

401) 

402)     <p>

403)     Most people use Tor Browser,

404)     which includes everything you need to browse the web safely using

405)     Tor. Using other browsers is <a href="#TBBOtherBrowser">dangerous
406)     and not recommended</a>.

407)     </p>
408)     <p>
409)     There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
410)     but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity

411)     issues on all of them well enough to be able to recommend a safe

412)     configuration. Our wiki has a community-maintained list of
413)     instructions for <a

414)     href="<wiki>doc/TorifyHOWTO">Torifying

415)     specific applications</a>.

416)     Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
417)     </p>

418) 

419)     <hr>

420) 

421)     <a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>

422)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called
423) Tor?</a></h3>

424) 

425)     <p>
426)     Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
427)     new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
428)     2001-2002, we would tell people we were working on onion routing,
429)     and they would say "Neat. Which one?" Even if onion routing has
430)     become a standard household term, Tor was born out of the actual <a
431)     href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
432)     the Naval Research Lab.
433)     </p>

434) 

435)     <p>
436)     (It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
437)     </p>

438) 

439)     <p>

440)     Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not
441) spelled

442)     "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually

443)     spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead
444) learned
445)     everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that
446) they

447)     spell it wrong.
448)     </p>

449) 

450)     <hr>

451) 

452)     <a id="Backdoor"></a>

453)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in
454) Tor?</a></h3>

455) 

456)     <p>

457)     There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor.  We know some smart lawyers
458)     who say that it's unlikely that anybody will try to make us add one
459)     in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do ask us, we will fight them,
460)     and (the lawyers say) probably win.

461)     </p>

462) 

463)     <p>

464)     We will <a
465)     href="https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6251_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412301400_-_state_of_the_onion_-_jacob_-_arma">never</a>
466)     put a backdoor in Tor.

467)     We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously

468)     irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security

469)     software in general. If we ever put a deliberate backdoor in our
470)     security software, it would ruin our professional reputations.
471)     Nobody would trust our software ever again — for excellent
472)     reason!

473)     </p>

474) 

475)     <p>
476)     But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
477)     people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our

478)     computers, or something like that. Tor is open source, and you

479)     should always check the source (or at least the diffs since the last
480)     release) for suspicious things. If we (or the distributors) don't
481)     give you source, that's a sure sign something funny might be going
482)     on. You should also check the <a href="<page
483)     docs/verifying-signatures>">PGP signatures</a> on the releases, to
484)     make sure nobody messed with the distribution sites.

485)     </p>

486) 

487)     <p>
488)     Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your

489)     anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so

490)     make sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.

491)     </p>

492) 

493)     <hr>

494) 

495)     <a id="DistributingTor"></a>

496)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute
497) Tor?</a></h3>

498) 

499)     <p>
500)     Yes.
501)     </p>

502) 

503)     <p>

504)     The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
505)     means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
506)     modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to

507)     ask us for specific permission.
508)     </p>

509) 

510)     <p>

511)     However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our

512)     <a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.

513)     Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along

514)     with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
515)     </p>

516) 

517)     <p>

518)     Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the

519)     Tor software, though. They want to distribute the <a

520)     href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>. This includes <a

521)     href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/">Firefox

522)     Extended Support Release</a>, and the NoScript and HTTPS-Everywhere
523)     extensions. You will need to follow the license for those programs as
524)     well. Both of those Firefox extensions are distributed under

525)     the <a href="https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html">GNU General

526)     Public License</a>, while Firefox ESR is released under the Mozilla Public
527)     License. The simplest way to obey their licenses is to include the source
528)     code for these programs everywhere you include the bundles themselves.

529)     </p>

530) 

531)     <p>

532)     Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
533)     who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
534)     our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.

535)     </p>

536) 

537)     <hr>

538) 

539)     <a id="SupportMail"></a>

540)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get
541) support?</a></h3>

542) 

543)     <p>See the <a href="<page about/contact>#support">Support section
544)     on the contact page</a>.

545) 

546)     <hr>

547) 

548)     <a id="Forum"></a>
549)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Forum">Is there a Tor forum?</a></h3>
550) 

551)     <p>We have a <a href="https://tor.stackexchange.com/">StackExchange

552)     page</a> that is currently in public beta.

553)     </p>
554) 
555)     <hr>
556) 

557)     <a id="WhySlow"></a>
558)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>

559) 

560)     <p>
561)     There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
562)     </p>

563) 

564)     <p>

565)     Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going
566) to
567)     be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers'
568) computers
569)     in various parts of the world, and some bottlenecks and network
570) latency

571)     will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
572)     bandwidth through Tor.
573)     </p>

574) 

575)     <p>

576)     But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor
577) network
578)     is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it,
579) and
580)     many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't
581) currently

582)     handle file-sharing traffic load.
583)     </p>

584) 

585)     <p>
586)     For the much more in-depth answer, see <a

587)     href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog

588)     post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a
589) video

590)     to go with it.
591)     </p>

592) 

593)     <p>
594)     What can you do to help?
595)     </p>

596) 

597)     <ul>

598) 

599)     <li>

600)     <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay
601) traffic
602)     for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can
603) handle

604)     all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
605)     </li>

606) 

607)     <li>

608)     Help us make Tor more usable. We

609)     especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
610)     as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
611)     walk people through setting it up.
612)     </li>

613) 

614)     <li>

615)     There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us
616) design
617)     experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are,
618) and

619)     then we can focus better on fixing them.
620)     </li>

621) 

622)     <li>
623)     Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to

624)     start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people
625) who
626)     relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if
627) we

628)     get to spend more time on it.
629)     </li>

630) 

631)     <li>

632)     Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a
633) moment
634)     to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a
635) href="<page

636)     getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
637)     </li>

638) 

639)     <li>

640)     Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government
641) agency

642)     that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the

643)     competition's websites discreetly, or to connect back to the home
644) servers
645)     when on the road without revealing affiliations? If your
646) organization has
647)     an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them
648) about
649)     supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even
650) slower.

651)     </li>

652) 

653)     <li>
654)     If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out

655)     individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of
656) money to the

657)     cause</a>. It adds up!
658)     </li>

659) 

660)     </ul>

661) 

662)     <hr>

663) 

664)     <a id="FileSharing"></a>

665)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FileSharing">How can I share files

666)     anonymously through Tor?</a></h3>

667) 
668)     <p>

669)     File sharing (peer-to-peer/P2P) is widely unwanted in the Tor network,
670)     and exit nodes are configured to block file sharing traffic by default.
671)     Tor is not really designed for it, and file sharing through Tor slows
672)     down everyone's browsing. Also, Bittorrent over Tor <a

673)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea">
674)     is not anonymous</a>!

675)     </p>
676) 
677)     <hr>
678) 

679)     <a id="Funding"></a>

680)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do
681) with more funding?</a></h3>

682) 

683)     <p>

684)     The Tor network's <a

685) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html">several thousand</a>

686)     relays push <a
687) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html">around 100 Gbps on
688) average</a>. We have <a
689) href="https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html">millions of
690)     daily users</a>. But the Tor network is not yet self-sustaining.

691)     </p>

692) 

693)     <p>

694)     There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need
695) attention:

696)     </p>

697) 

698)     <ul>

699) 

700)     <li>
701)     Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
702)     architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of

703)     users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but
704) there's

705)     lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
706)     </li>

707) 

708)     <li>

709)     User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking
710) questions
711)     all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need
712) good
713)     clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating
714) volunteers.

715)     </li>

716) 

717)     <li>

718)     Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still
719) need

720)     attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,

721)     reminders to upgrade, and so on. The network itself is a commons,
722) and
723)     somebody needs to spend some energy making sure the relay operators
724) stay
725)     happy. We also need to work on stability on some platforms —
726) e.g.,

727)     Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.

728)     </li>

729) 

730)     <li>

731)     Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability
732) of the
733)     software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy
734) configuration
735)     to interface with other applications, and generally automating all
736) of

737)     the difficult and confusing steps inside Tor.
738)     Usability for privacy software has never been easy.

739)     </li>

740) 

741)     <li>
742)     Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
743)     their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.

744)     <a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a
745) relay,

746)     and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
747)     </li>

748) 

749)     <li>
750)     Research: The anonymous communications field is full
751)     of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
752)     also help run top anonymity and privacy conferences like <a
753)     href="http://petsymposium.org/">PETS</a>. We've identified a set of

754)     critical <a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">Tor
755) research questions</a>
756)     that will help us figure out how to make Tor secure against the
757) variety of
758)     attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions
759) waiting

760)     behind these.
761)     </li>

762) 

763)     </ul>

764) 

765)     <p>
766)     We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate

767)     <a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the
768) developers

769)     can keep up</a>.

770)     Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the
771) effort

772)     so we can continue to grow the network.
773)     </p>

774) 

775)     <p>
776)     We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
777)     censorship-resistance.
778)     </p>

779) 

780)     <p>

781)     We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and
782) support</a>
783)     from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau,
784) Bell
785)     Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several
786) government

787)     agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
788)     </p>

789) 

790)     <p>

791)     However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes
792) in the
793)     Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page
794) donate/donate>">donate</a>
795)     to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our
796) executive

797)     director for information on making grants or major donations.
798)     </p>

799) 

800)     <hr>
801) 
802) 
803)     <a id="Mobile"></a>

804)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Mobile">Can I use Tor on my phone or mobile

805)     device?</a></h3>
806) 
807)     <p>

808)     Tor on Android devices is maintained by the <a
809)     href="https://guardianproject.info">Guardian Project</a>. Currently, there
810)     is no supported way of using Tor on iOS; the Guardian Project is

811)     working to make this a reality in the future.
812)     </p>
813) 

814)     <hr>
815) 

816)     <a id="OutboundPorts"></a>
817)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#OutboundPorts">Which outbound ports must be open when
818)     using Tor as a client?</a></h3>

819)     <p>

820)     Tor may attempt to connect to any port that is advertised in the
821)     directory as an ORPort (for making Tor connections) or a DirPort (for

822)     fetching updates to the directory). There are a variety of these ports:
823)     many of them are running on 80, 443, 9001, and 9030, but many use other
824)     ports too.

825)     </p>
826)     <p>

827)     When using Tor as a client, you could probably get away with opening only those four

828)     ports. Since Tor does all its connections in the background, it will retry
829)     ones that fail, and hopefully you'll never have to know that it failed, as
830)     long as it finds a working one often enough. However, to get the most

831)     diversity in your entry nodes — and thus the most security
832)     — as well as the most robustness in your connectivity, you'll
833)     want to let it connect to all of them.
834)     See the FAQ entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled ports</a> if
835)     you want to explicitly tell your Tor client which ports are reachable
836)     for you.
837)     </p>

838) 

839)     <hr>

840) 

841)     <a id="IsItWorking"></a>

842)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#IsItWorking">How can I tell if Tor is

843)     working, and that my connections really are anonymized?</a></h3>

844) 
845)     <p>

846)     There are sites you can visit that will tell you if you appear to be

847)     coming through the Tor network. Try the <a href="https://check.torproject.org">
848)     Tor Check</a> site and see whether it thinks you are using Tor or not.

849)     </p>

850) 

851)     <hr>

852) 

853)     <a id="FTP"></a>
854)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FTP">How do I use my browser for ftp with Tor?
855)     </a></h3>
856) 

857)     <p>

858)     Use <a href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html">Tor
859)     Browser</a>. If you want a separate application for an

860)     ftp client, we've heard good things about  FileZilla for Windows. You can
861)     configure it to point to Tor as a "socks4a" proxy on "localhost" port
862)     "9050".

863)     </p>

864) 

865)     <hr>

866) 

867)     <a id="NoDataScrubbing"></a>

868)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NoDataScrubbing">Does Tor remove personal

869)     information from the data my application sends?</a></h3>
870) 

871)     <p>No, it doesn't. You need to use a separate program that understands
872)     your application and protocol and knows how to clean or "scrub" the data

873)     it sends. Tor Browser tries to keep application-level data,
874)     like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. Tor Browser can't

875)     do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a

876)     href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be

877)     careful and be smart.</a>
878)     </p>
879) 
880)     <hr>
881) 

882)     <a id="Metrics"></a>

883)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How

884)     many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>

885) 

886)     <p>
887)     All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a

888)     href="https://metrics.torproject.org/">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>

889)     <hr>

890) 

891)     <a id="CompilationAndInstallation"></a>

892)     <h2><a class="anchor" href="#CompilationAndInstallation">Compilation And Installation:</a></h2>

893) 

894)     <a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>

895)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
896) Tor?</a></h3>
897) 
898)     <p>
899)     Tor Browser does not install itself in the classic sense of
900) applications. You just simply delete the folder or directory named "Tor
901) Browser" and it is removed from your system.
902)     </p>

903) 

904)     <p>

905)     If this is not related to Tor Browser, uninstallation depends
906) entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
907)     have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a
908) way to

909)     uninstall itself. The Windows packages include uninstallers.

910)     </p>

911) 

912)     <p>
913)     For Mac OS X, follow the <a
914)     href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
915)     </p>

916) 

917)     <p>

918)     If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall
919) method. But
920)     on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and
921) it should

922)     be pretty easy to notice things there.
923)     </p>

924) 

925)     <hr>

926) 

927)     <a id="PGPSigs"></a>

928)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on
929) the download page?</a></h3>

930) 

931)     <p>

932)     These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've
933) downloaded is

934)     exactly the one that we intended you to get.
935)     </p>

936) 

937)     <p>
938)     Please read the <a

939)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a>
940) page for details.

941)     </p>

942) 

943) <hr>
944) 
945) <a id="GetTor"></a>
946) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GetTor">Your website is blocked in my
947) country. How do I download Tor?</a></h3>
948) 
949) <p>
950) Some government or corporate firewalls censor connections to Tor's
951) website. In those cases, you have three options. First, get it from

952) a friend &mdash; <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>

953) fits nicely on a USB key. Second, find the <a

954) href="https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=tor+mirrors">google
955) cache</a>

956) for the <a href="<page getinvolved/mirrors>">Tor mirrors</a> page
957) and see if any of those copies of our website work for you. Third,

958) you can download Tor Browser via email: log in to your email account
959) and send an email to '<tt>gettor@torproject.org</tt>' with one of the
960) following words in the body of the message: <tt>windows</tt>,
961) <tt>osx</tt> or <tt>linux</tt> (case insensitive).
962) You will receive a reply with links from popular cloud services to

963) download Tor Browser for Windows, Mac OS X or Linux, depending on the

964) option you chose. Currently, the only cloud service supported is

965) Dropbox. If you send a blank message or anything different from the
966) options mentioned, you will receive a help message with detailed

967) instructions to ask for Tor Browser via email. Please note that you
968) can use this service from any email address: gmail, yahoo, hotmail,
969) riseup, etc. The only restriction is that you can do a maximum of
970) three requests in a row, after that you'll have to wait 20 minutes to
971) use it again. See the <a href="../projects/gettor.html">GetTor</a>
972) section for more information.

973) </p>
974) 
975) <p>

976) Be sure to <a href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verify the
977) signature</a>

978) of any package you download, especially when you get it from somewhere
979) other than our official HTTPS website.

980) </p>
981) 

982)     <hr>

983) 

984)     <a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>

985)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my
986)     Tor executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>

987)     <p>

988)     Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on
989)     some parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are
990)     false positives — after all, the anti-virus and anti-spyware business is
991)     just a guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain
992)     that you have a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or

993)     pick a better vendor.
994)     </p>

995)     <p>In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for it.
996)     Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do

997)     recompile it yourself.</p>
998) 
999)     <hr>
1000) 

1001)     <a id="tarballs"></a>

1002)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#tarballs">How do I open a .tar.gz

1003)     or .tar.xz file?</a></h3>

1004) 
1005)     <p>
1006)     Tar is a common archive utility for Unix and Linux systems. If your

1007)     system has a mouse, you can usually open them by double clicking.
1008)     Otherwise open a command prompt and execute</p>

1009)     <pre>tar xzf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.gz</pre> or <pre>tar xJf &lt;FILENAME&gt;.tar.xz</pre>

1010)     <p>

1011)     as documented on tar's man page.

1012)     </p>
1013) 
1014)     <hr>
1015) 

1016)     <a id="LiveCD"></a>

1017)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other
1018) bundle that includes Tor?</a></h3>

1019) 

1020)     <p>

1021)     Yes.  Use <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito

1022)     Live System</a> or <a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser</a>.

1023)     </p>

1024) 
1025) <hr>
1026) 

1027) <a id="TBBGeneral"></a>

1028) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#TBBGeneral">Tor Browser (general):</a></h2>

1029) 

1030) <a id="TBBFlash"></a>

1031) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBFlash">Why can't I view videos on

1032) some Flash-based sites?</a></h3>

1033) 
1034) <p>

1035) Some sites require third party browser plugins such as Flash.

1036) Plugins operate independently from Firefox and can perform
1037) activity on your computer that ruins your anonymity. This includes

1038) but is not limited to: completely disregarding
1039) proxy settings, querying your <a

1040) href="http://forums.sun.com/thread.jspa?threadID=5162138&messageID=9618376">
1041) local IP address</a>, and <a

1042) href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html">storing their own
1043) cookies</a>. It is possible to use a LiveCD solution such as

1044) or <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">The Amnesic Incognito Live System</a>
1045) that creates a secure, transparent proxy to protect you from proxy bypass,
1046) however issues with local IP address discovery and Flash cookies still remain.

1047) </p>

1048) 

1049) <hr>
1050) 

1051) <a id="Ubuntu"></a>
1052) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Ubuntu">

1053) I'm using Ubuntu and I can't start Tor Browser.</a></h3>

1054) <p>

1055) You'll need to tell Ubuntu that you want the ability to execute shell scripts
1056) from the graphical interface. Open "Files" (Unity's explorer), open
1057) Preferences-> Behavior Tab -> Set "Run executable text files when they are

1058) opened" to "Ask every time", then OK.

1059) </p>

1060) <p>You can also start Tor Browser from the command line by running </p>

1061) <pre>./start-tor-browser</pre>

1062) <p>
1063) from inside the Tor Browser directory.
1064) </p>
1065) 

1066) <hr>
1067) 

1068) <a id="SophosOnMac"></a>
1069) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SophosOnMac">I'm using the Sophos anti-virus

1070)     software on my Mac, and Tor starts but I can't browse anywhere.</a></h3>

1071) <p>

1072) You'll need to modify Sophos anti-virus so that Tor can connect to the
1073) internet. Go to Preferences -> Web Protection -> General, and turn off

1074) the protections for "Malicious websites" and "Malicious downloads".
1075) </p>

1076) <p>

1077) We encourage affected Sophos users to contact Sophos support about

1078) this issue.
1079) </p>

1080) 

1081) <hr>
1082) 

1083) <a id="XPCOMError"></a>

1084) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#XPCOMError">When I start Tor Browser I get an 
1085) error message: "Cannot load XPCOM".</a></h3>

1086) 
1087) <p>

1088) This <a 
1089) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10789">problem</a> is 
1090) specifically caused by the Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus software. 
1091) From the Webroot control panel, go to Identity Protection &rarr; Application 
1092) Protection, and set all the files in your Tor Browser folder to 'Allow'. 
1093) We encourage affected Webroot users to contact Webroot support about this 
1094) issue.

1095) </p>

1096) 
1097) <hr>
1098) 

1099) <a id="TBBOtherExtensions"></a>
1100) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherExtensions">Can I install other
1101) Firefox extensions?</a></h3>
1102) 
1103) <p>

1104) Tor Browser is free software, so there is nothing preventing you from

1105) modifying it any way you like. However, we do not recommend installing any

1106) additional Firefox add-ons with Tor Browser. Add-ons can break

1107) your anonymity in a number of ways, including browser fingerprinting and

1108) bypassing proxy settings.

1109) </p>

1110) <p>

1111) Some people have suggested we include ad-blocking software or

1112) anti-tracking software with Tor Browser. Right now, we do not

1113) think that's such a good idea. Tor Browser aims to provide

1114) sufficient privacy that additional add-ons to stop ads and trackers are
1115) not necessary. Using add-ons like these may cause some sites to break, which

1116) <a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy">

1117) we don't want to do</a>. Additionally, maintaining a list of "bad" sites that
1118) should be black-listed provides another opportunity to uniquely fingerprint
1119) users.

1120) </p>

1121) 

1122) <hr>
1123) 

1124) <a id="TBBJavaScriptEnabled"></a>

1125) <a id="TBBCanIBlockJS"></a>

1126) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">Why is NoScript

1127) configured to allow JavaScript by default in Tor Browser?

1128) Isn't that unsafe?</a></h3>

1129) 
1130) <p>

1131) We configure NoScript to allow JavaScript by default in Tor
1132) Browser because many websites will not work with JavaScript

1133) disabled.  Most users would give up on Tor entirely if a website
1134) they want to use requires JavaScript, because they would not know
1135) how to allow a website to use JavaScript (or that enabling
1136) JavaScript might make a website work).
1137) </p>
1138) 

1139) <p>
1140) There's a tradeoff here. On the one hand, we should leave
1141) JavaScript enabled by default so websites work the way
1142) users expect. On the other hand, we should disable JavaScript
1143) by default to better protect against browser vulnerabilities (<a

1144) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-old-tor-browser-bundles-vulnerable">
1145) not just a theoretical concern!</a>). But there's a third issue: websites

1146) can easily determine whether you have allowed JavaScript for them,
1147) and if you disable JavaScript by default but then allow a few websites
1148) to run scripts (the way most people use NoScript), then your choice of
1149) whitelisted websites acts as a sort of cookie that makes you recognizable
1150) (and distinguishable), thus harming your anonymity.
1151) </p>

1152) 
1153) <p>

1154) Ultimately, we want the default Tor bundles to use
1155) a combination of firewalls (like the iptables rules
1156) in <a href="https://tails.boum.org/">Tails</a>) and <a
1157) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7680">sandboxes</a>
1158) to make JavaScript not so scary. In
1159) the shorter term, TBB 3.0 will hopefully <a
1160) href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9387">allow users
1161) to choose their JavaScript settings more easily</a> &mdash; but the
1162) partitioning concern will remain.

1163) </p>
1164) 
1165) <p>

1166) Until we get there, feel free to leave JavaScript on or off depending
1167) on your security, anonymity, and usability priorities.

1168) </p>
1169) 
1170) <hr>
1171) 

1172) <a id="TBBOtherBrowser"></a>
1173) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBOtherBrowser">I want to use
1174) Chrome/IE/Opera/etc with Tor.</a></h3>
1175) 
1176) <p>

1177) In short, using any browser besides Tor Browser with Tor is a

1178) really bad idea.
1179) </p>
1180) 
1181) <p>

1182) Our efforts to work with the Chrome team to <a
1183) href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/google-chrome-incognito-mode-tor-and-fingerprinting">add
1184) missing APIs</a> were unsuccessful, unfortunately. Currently, it is impossible

1185) to use other browsers and get the same level of protections as when using

1186) Tor Browser.

1187) </p>
1188) 
1189) <hr>
1190) 

1191) <a id="GoogleCAPTCHA"></a>
1192) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GoogleCAPTCHA">Google makes me solve a
1193) CAPTCHA or tells me I have spyware installed.</a></h3>

1194) 
1195) <p>
1196) This is a known and intermittent problem; it does not mean that Google
1197) considers Tor to be spyware.
1198) </p>
1199) 
1200) <p>

1201) When you use Tor, you are sending queries through exit relays that are

1202) also shared by thousands of other users. Tor users typically see this
1203) message when many Tor users are querying Google in a short period of time.
1204) Google interprets the high volume of traffic from a single IP address
1205) (the exit relay you happened to pick) as somebody trying to "crawl" their
1206) website, so it slows down traffic from that IP address for a short time.

1207) </p>
1208) <p>
1209) An alternate explanation is that Google tries to detect certain
1210) kinds of spyware or viruses that send distinctive queries to Google
1211) Search. It notes the IP addresses from which those queries are received
1212) (not realizing that they are Tor exit relays), and tries to warn any
1213) connections coming from those IP addresses that recent queries indicate
1214) an infection.
1215) </p>
1216) 
1217) <p>

1218) To our knowledge, Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically

1219) to deter or block Tor use. The error message about an infected machine
1220) should clear up again after a short time.
1221) </p>
1222) 
1223) <hr />
1224) 

1225) <a id="ForeignLanguages"></a>
1226) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ForeignLanguages">
1227) Why does Google show up in foreign languages?</a></h3>
1228) 
1229) <p>

1230)  Google uses "geolocation" to determine where in the world you are, so it
1231)  can give you a personalized experience. This includes using the language
1232)  it thinks you prefer, and it also includes giving you different results

1233)  on your queries.

1234) </p>
1235) <p>

1236) If you really want to see Google in English you can click the link that
1237) provides that. But we consider this a feature with Tor, not a bug --- the
1238) Internet is not flat, and it in fact does look different depending on

1239) where you are. This feature reminds people of this fact.

1240) </p>
1241) <p>

1242) Note that Google search URLs take name/value pairs as arguments and one
1243) of those names is "hl". If you set "hl" to "en" then Google will return
1244) search results in English regardless of what Google server you have been
1245) sent to. On a query this looks like:

1246) </p>

1247) <pre>https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=online%20anonymity&hl=en</pre>

1248) <p>

1249) Another method is to simply use your country code for accessing Google.
1250) This can be google.be, google.de, google.us and so on.

1251) </p>
1252) <hr />

1253) <a id="GmailWarning"></a>

1254) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my

1255) account may have been compromised.</a></h3>

1256) 
1257) <p>
1258) Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
1259) pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
1260) The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
1261) throughout the world recently used to access your account.
1262) </p>
1263) 
1264) <p>
1265) In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from

1266) different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and
1267) decided

1268) it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
1269) rightful owner.
1270) </p>
1271) 
1272) <p>
1273) Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
1274) that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
1275) <i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
1276) possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
1277) </p>
1278) 
1279) <p>
1280) Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
1281) or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
1282) should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
1283) should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a

1284) href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-
1285) hijacking">

1286) way more complex than that</a>.
1287) </p>
1288) 
1289) <p>
1290) And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
1291) up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
1292) not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security
1293) measure that Google uses isn't so useful for you, because it's full of
1294) false positives. You'll have to use other approaches, like seeing if
1295) anything looks weird on the account, or looking at the timestamps for
1296) recent logins and wondering if you actually logged in at those times.
1297) </p>
1298) 
1299) <hr>
1300) 

1301) <a id="NeedToUseAProxy"></a>

1302) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NeedToUseAProxy">My internet connection

1303) requires an HTTP or SOCKS Proxy</a></h3>

1304) 
1305) <p>

1306) You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
1307) Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
1308) out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a

1309) href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,

1310) and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
1311) doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
1312) HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
1313) if they're the same proxy.) Tor also recognizes the torrc options
1314) Socks4Proxy and Socks5Proxy.

1315) </p>
1316) <p>

1317) Also read up on the HTTPProxyAuthenticator and HTTPSProxyAuthenticator
1318) options if your proxy requires auth. We only support basic auth currently,
1319) but if you need NTLM authentication, you may find <a
1320) href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jun-2005/msg00223.html">this post
1321) in the archives</a> useful.

1322) </p>
1323) <p>

1324) If your proxies only allow you to connect to certain ports, look at the
1325) entry on <a href="#FirewallPorts">Firewalled clients</a> for how
1326) to restrict what ports your Tor will try to access.

1327) </p>
1328) 
1329) <hr>
1330) 

1331) 
1332) <a id="TBBSocksPort"></a>
1333) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSocksPort">
1334) I want to run another application through Tor.</a></h3>
1335) 
1336) <p>
1337) If you are trying to use some external application with Tor, step zero
1338) should be to <a href="<page download/download>#warning">reread the set
1339) of warnings</a> for ways you can screw up. Step one should be to try
1340) to use a SOCKS proxy rather than an HTTP proxy.
1341) Typically Tor listens for SOCKS connections on port 9050. Tor Browser listens
1342) on port 9150.
1343) </p>
1344) 
1345) <p>
1346) If your application doesn't support SOCKS proxies, feel free to install <a
1347) href="http://www.privoxy.org/">privoxy</a>.
1348) However, please realize that this approach is not recommended for novice
1349) users. Privoxy has an <a
1350) href="http://www.privoxy.org/faq/misc.html#TOR">example
1351) configuration</a> of Tor and Privoxy.
1352) </p>
1353) 
1354) <p>

1355) If you're unable to use the application's native proxy settings, all hope is

1356) not lost. See <a href="#CantSetProxy">below</a>.
1357) </p>
1358) 
1359) <hr>
1360) 

1361) <a id="CantSetProxy"></a>

1362) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#CantSetProxy">What should I do if I can't

1363) set a proxy with my application?</a></h3>
1364) 
1365) <p>

1366) On Unix, we recommend you give <a
1367) href="https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/">torsocks</a> a try.
1368) Alternative proxifying tools like <a
1369) href="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/">socat</a> and <a
1370) href="http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/">proxychains</a> are also

1371) available.</p>

1372) <p>
1373) The Windows way to force applications through Tor is less clear. <a
1374) href="http://freecap.ru/eng/">Some</a> <a
1375) href="http://www.freehaven.net/~aphex/torcap/">tools</a> have been <a

1376) href="http://www.crowdstrike.com/community-tools/index.html#tool-79">proposed

1377) </a>, but we'd also like to see further testing done here.

1378) </p>
1379) 
1380) <hr>
1381) 

1382) <a id="TBB3.x"></a>

1383) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#TBB3.x">Tor Browser (3.x and later):</a></h2>

1384)     <a id="WhereDidVidaliaGo"></a>

1385)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhereDidVidaliaGo">Where did the world map

1386)     (Vidalia) go?</a></h3>
1387) 

1388)     <p>Vidalia has been replaced with Tor Launcher, which is a Firefox

1389)     extension that provides similar functionality.</p>

1390) 
1391)     <hr>
1392) 
1393)     <a id="DisableJS"></a>
1394)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DisableJS">How do I disable JavaScript?</a>
1395)     </h3>
1396) 

1397)     <p>Alas, Mozilla decided to get rid of the config checkbox for JavaScript
1398)     from earlier Firefox versions. And since TBB 3.5 is based on Firefox 24
1399)     (FF17 is unmaintained), that means TBB 3.5 doesn't have the config

1400)     checkbox anymore either, which is unfortunate.</p>
1401) 

1402)     <p>The simplest way to disable JavaScript in TBB 3.5 is to click on the
1403)     Noscript "S" (between the green onion and the address bar), and select
1404)     "Forbid scripts globally". Note that vanilla NoScript actually whitelists
1405)     several domains even when you try to disable scripts globally, whereas

1406)     Tor Browser's NoScript configuration disables all of them. </p>
1407) 

1408)     <p>The more klunky way to disable JavaScript is to go to about:config,

1409)     find javascript.enabled, and set it to false.</p>
1410) 
1411)     <p>There is also a very simple addon available at addons.mozilla.org
1412)     called QuickJS, which provides a toolbar toggle for the javascript.enabled

1413)     about:config control. There are no configuration options for the addon,
1414)     it just switches the javascript.enabled entry between true and false and

1415)     provides a button for it. </p>
1416) 

1417)     <p>If you want to be extra safe, use both the about:config setting and

1418)     NoScript. </p>
1419) 

1420)     <p>As for whether you should disable it or leave it enabled, that's <a

1421)     href="#TBBJavaScriptEnabled">a tradeoff we leave to you</a>.</p>

1422) 
1423)     <hr>
1424) 
1425)     <a id="VerifyDownload"></a>
1426)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#VerifyDownload">How do I verify the download
1427)     (sha256sums.txt)?</a></h3>
1428) 

1429)     <p>Instructions are on the <a
1430)     href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>#BuildVerification">verifying

1431)     signatures</a> page.</p>

1432) 
1433)     <hr>

1434) 

1435)     <a id="NewIdentityClosingTabs"></a>

1436)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#NewIdentityClosingTabs">Why does "New

1437)     Identity" close all my open tabs?</a></h3>
1438) 
1439)     <p>

1440)     That's actually a feature, since it's discarding your application-level

1441)     browser data too.

1442)     </p>
1443) 
1444)     <p>

1445)     We're working on ways to make the behavior less surprising, e.g. a popup
1446)     warning or auto restoring tabs. See ticket <a
1447)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9906">#9906</a> and
1448)     ticket <a
1449)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10400">#10400</a>
1450)     to follow progress there.

1451)     </p>
1452) 
1453)     <hr>
1454) 
1455)     <a id="ConfigureRelayOrBridge"></a>
1456)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ConfigureRelayOrBridge">How do I configure Tor as a relay or bridge?</a></h3>
1457) 
1458)     <p>

1459)     You've got three options.

1460)     </p>
1461) 
1462)     <p>

1463)     First (best option), if you're on Linux, you can install the system
1464)     Tor package (e.g. apt-get install tor) and then set it up to be a relay
1465)     (<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian">instructions</a>).

1466)     You can then use TBB independent of that.
1467)     </p>
1468) 
1469) 
1470)     <p>

1471)     Second (complex option), you can edit your torrc file (in Data/Tor/torrc)

1472)     directly to add the following lines:

1473)     </p>
1474)     <pre>
1475)     ORPort 443
1476)     Exitpolicy reject *:*
1477)     BridgeRelay 1  # only add this line if you want to be a bridge
1478)     </pre>
1479) 
1480)     <hr>
1481) 
1482)     <a id="Timestamps"></a>

1483)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Timestamps">Why are the file timestamps

1484)     from 2000?</a></h3>
1485) 

1486)     <p>One of the huge new features in TBB 3.x is the "deterministic build"

1487)     process, which allows many people to build Tor Browser and

1488)     verify that they all make exactly the same package. See Mike's <a
1489)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and-global-compromise">first
1490)     blog</a> post for the motivation, and his <a

1491)     href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-two-technical-details">second

1492)     blog post</a> for the technical details of how we do it.

1493)     </p>
1494) 

1495)     <p>Part of creating identical builds is having everybody use the same
1496)     timestamp. Mike picked the beginning of 2000 for that time. The reason

1497)     you might see 7pm in 1999 is because of time zones. </p>
1498) 
1499)     <hr>
1500) 

1501)     <a id="TBBSourceCode"></a>

1502)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TBBSourceCode">Where is the source code for

1503)     Tor Browser? How do I verify a build?</a></h3>

1504) 
1505)     <p>

1506)     Tor Browser is built from the <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-build.git/">tor-browser-build.git git repository</a>. You can have a look at the <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-build.git/tree/README">README file</a> for the build instructions. There is also some informations in the <a href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking">Tor Browser Hacking Guide</a>.

1507)     </p>
1508) 
1509) 

1510) <hr>
1511) 

1512) <a id="AdvancedTorUsage"></a>

1513) <h2><a class="anchor" href="#AdvancedTorUsage">Advanced Tor usage:</a></h2>

1514) 

1515) <a id="torrc"></a>

1516) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#torrc">I'm supposed to "edit my torrc".
1517) What does that mean?</a></h3>

1518) 
1519) <p>

1520) Tor uses a text file called torrc that contains configuration

1521) instructions for how your Tor program should behave. The default

1522) configuration should work fine for most Tor users.

1523) </p>

1524) <p>

1525) If you installed Tor Browser on Windows or Linux, look for

1526) <code>Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc</code> inside your Tor Browser
1527) directory.

1528) If you're on macOS, the torrc is in <code>~/Library/Application Support/TorBrowser-Data/Tor</code> .
1529) To get to it, press cmd-shift-g while in Finder and copy/paste that directory
1530) into the box that appears.

1531) </p>
1532) <p>

1533) Otherwise, if you are using Tor without Tor Browser, it looks for the
1534) torrc file in <code>/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc</code> if you compiled tor
1535) from source, and <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> or <code>/etc/torrc</code>
1536) if you installed a pre-built package.
1537) </p>

1538) 
1539) <p>

1540) Once you've created or changed your torrc file, you will need to restart
1541) tor for the changes to take effect. (For advanced users, note that

1542) you actually only need to send Tor a HUP signal, not actually restart
1543) it.)

1544) </p>
1545) 
1546) <p>

1547) For other configuration options you can use, see the <a href="<page

1548) docs/tor-manual>">Tor manual page</a>. Have a look at <a

1549) href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/config/torrc.sample.in">

1550) the sample torrc file</a> for hints on common configurations. Remember, all
1551) lines beginning with # in torrc are treated as comments and have no effect

1552) on Tor's configuration.

1553) </p>
1554) 
1555) <hr>
1556) 

1557) <a id="Logs"></a>

1558) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Logs">How do I set up logging, or see Tor's
1559) logs?</a></h3>

1560) 
1561) <p>

1562) You'll have to go find the log files by

1563) hand. Here are some likely places for your logs to be:

1564) </p>
1565) 
1566) <ul>
1567) <li>On OS X, Debian, Red Hat, etc, the logs are in /var/log/tor/
1568) </li>

1569) <li>On Windows, there are no default log files currently. If you enable
1570) logs in your torrc file, they default to <code>\username\Application
1571) Data\tor\log\</code> or <code>\Application Data\tor\log\</code>
1572) </li>
1573) <li>If you compiled Tor from source, by default your Tor logs to <a
1574) href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_streams">"stdout"</a>
1575) at log-level notice. If you enable logs in your torrc file, they
1576) default to <code>/usr/local/var/log/tor/</code>.

1577) </li>
1578) </ul>
1579) 
1580) <p>

1581) To change your logging setup by hand, <a href="#torrc">edit your
1582) torrc</a>

1583) and find the section (near the top of the file) which contains the
1584) following line:

1585) </p>
1586) 
1587) <pre>

1588) \## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
1589) \## else, like one of the below lines.

1590) </pre>

1591) 
1592) <p>

1593) For example, if you want Tor to send complete debug, info, notice, warn,

1594) and err level messages to a file, append the following line to the end
1595) of the section:
1596) </p>
1597) 
1598) <pre>
1599) Log debug file c:/program files/tor/debug.log
1600) </pre>
1601) 
1602) <p>

1603) Replace <code>c:/program files/tor/debug.log</code> with a directory
1604) and filename for your Tor log.

1605) </p>
1606) 
1607) <hr>
1608) 

1609) 
1610) <a id="LogLevel"></a>
1611) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#LogLevel">What log level should I use?</a></h3>
1612) 
1613) <p>

1614) There are five log levels (also called "log severities") you might see in

1615) Tor's logs:

1616) </p>
1617) 
1618) <ul>

1619)     <li>"err": something bad just happened, and we can't recover. Tor will

1620)     exit.</li>

1621)     <li>"warn": something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad
1622)     thing might be a bug in the code, some other Tor process doing something
1623)     unexpected, etc. The operator should examine the message and try to

1624)     correct the problem.</li>

1625)     <li>"notice": something the operator will want to know about.</li>

1626)     <li>"info": something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's

1627)     nothing you need to (or can) do about it.</li>

1628)     <li>"debug": for everything louder than info. It is quite loud indeed.</li>

1629) </ul>
1630) 
1631) <p>

1632) Alas, some of the warn messages are hard for ordinary users to correct -- the
1633) developers are slowly making progress at making Tor automatically react

1634) correctly for each situation.

1635) </p>
1636) 
1637) <p>

1638) We recommend running at the default, which is "notice". You will hear about

1639) important things, and you won't hear about unimportant things.

1640) </p>
1641) 
1642) <p>

1643) Tor relays in particular should avoid logging at info or debug in normal
1644) operation, since they might end up recording sensitive information in
1645) their logs.

1646) </p>
1647) 

1648) <hr>
1649) 

1650) <a id="DoesntWork"></a>

1651) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor but it's not
1652) working.</a></h3>

1653) 
1654) <p>

1655) Once you've got Tor Browser up and running, the first question to

1656) ask is whether your Tor client is able to establish a circuit.

1657) </p>
1658) 

1659) <p>If Tor can establish a circuit, Tor Browser will
1660) automatically launch the browser for you. You can also check in the
1661) <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a> for

1662) a line saying that Tor "has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like
1663) client functionality is working."
1664) </p>
1665) 
1666) <p>
1667) If Tor can't establish a circuit, here are some hints:
1668) </p>
1669) 
1670) <ol>
1671) <li>Check your system clock. If it's more than a few hours off, Tor will

1672) refuse to build circuits. For Microsoft Windows users, synchronize your
1673) clock under the clock -> Internet time tab. In addition, correct the

1674) day and date under the 'Date & Time' Tab. Also make sure your time
1675) zone is correct.</li>

1676) <li>Is your Internet connection <a href="#FirewallPorts">firewalled
1677) by port</a>, or do you normally need to use a <a

1678) href="<#NeedToUseAProxy">proxy</a>?

1679) </li>

1680) <li>Are you running programs like Norton Internet Security or SELinux
1681) that

1682) block certain connections, even though you don't realize they do? They
1683) could be preventing Tor from making network connections.</li>
1684) <li>Are you in China, or behind a restrictive corporate network firewall
1685) that blocks the public Tor relays? If so, you should learn about <a

1686) href="<page docs/bridges>">Tor bridges</a>.</li>

1687) <li>Check your <a href="#Logs">Tor logs</a>. Do they give you any hints
1688) about what's going wrong?</li>

1689) </ol>
1690) 
1691) <hr />
1692) 

1693) <a id="TorCrash"></a>
1694) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorCrash">My Tor keeps crashing.</a></h3>
1695) <p>

1696)  We want to hear from you! There are supposed to be zero crash bugs in Tor.
1697)  This FAQ entry describes the best way for you to be helpful to us. But even
1698)  if you can't work out all the details, we still want to hear about it, so
1699)  we can help you track it down.

1700) </p>
1701) <p>

1702) First, make sure you're using the latest version of Tor (either the latest
1703) stable or the latest development version).

1704) </p>
1705) <p>

1706) Second, make sure your version of libevent is new enough. We recommend at
1707) least libevent 1.3a.

1708) </p>
1709) <p>

1710) Third, see if there's already an entry for your bug in the <a
1711) href="https://bugs.torproject.org/">Tor bugtracker</a>. If so,
1712) check if there are any new details that you can add.

1713) </p>
1714) <p>

1715) Fourth, is the crash repeatable? Can you cause the crash? Can
1716) you isolate some of the circumstances or config options that
1717) make it happen? How quickly or often does the bug show up?
1718) Can you check if it happens with other versions of Tor, for
1719) example the latest stable release?

1720) </p>
1721) <p>

1722) Fifth, what sort of crash do you get?

1723) </p>
1724) <ul>
1725) <li>

1726) Does your Tor log include an "assert failure"? If so, please
1727) tell us that line, since it helps us figure out what's going on.
1728) Tell us the previous couple of log messages as well, especially
1729) if they seem important.

1730) </li>
1731) <li>

1732) If it says "Segmentation fault - core dumped" then you need to
1733) do a bit more to track it down. Look for a file like "core" or
1734) "tor.core" or "core.12345" in your current directory, or in your
1735) Data Directory. If it's there, run "gdb tor core" and then "bt",
1736) and include the output. If you can't find a core, run "ulimit -c
1737) unlimited", restart Tor, and try to make it crash again. (This core
1738) thing will only work on Unix -- alas, tracking down bugs on Windows
1739) is harder. If you're on Windows, can you get somebody to duplicate

1740) your bug on Unix?)
1741) </li>
1742) <li>

1743) If Tor simply vanishes mysteriously, it probably is a segmentation
1744) fault but you're running Tor in the background (as a daemon) so you
1745) won't notice. Go look at the end of your log file, and look for a
1746) core file as above. If you don't find any good hints, you should
1747) consider running Tor in the foreground (from a shell) so you can
1748) see how it dies. Warning: if you switch to running Tor in the foreground,
1749) you might start using a different torrc file, with a different default
1750) Data Directory; see the <a href="#UpgradeOrMove">relay-upgrade FAQ entry</a>
1751) for details.

1752) </li>
1753) <li>

1754) If it's still vanishing mysteriously, perhaps something else is killing it?
1755) Do you have resource limits (ulimits) configured that kill off processes

1756) sometimes? On Linux, try running

1757) "dmesg" to see if the out-of-memory killer removed your process. (Tor will
1758) exit cleanly if it notices that it's run out of memory, but in some cases
1759) it might not have time to notice.) In very rare circumstances, hardware
1760) problems could also be the culprit.

1761) </li>
1762) </ul>
1763) <p>

1764) Sixth, if the above ideas don't point out the bug, consider increasing your
1765) log level to "loglevel debug". You can look at the log-configuration FAQ
1766) entry for instructions on what to put in your torrc file. If it usually
1767) takes a long time for the crash to show up, you will want to reserve a whole
1768) lot of disk space for the debug log. Alternatively, you could just send
1769) debug-level logs to the screen (it's called "stdout" in the torrc), and then
1770) when it crashes you'll see the last couple of log lines it had printed.
1771) (Note that running with verbose logging like this will slow Tor down
1772) considerably, and note also that it's generally not a good idea security-wise
1773) to keep logs like this sitting around.)

1774) </p>
1775) 
1776) <hr />
1777) 

1778)     <a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>

1779)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which
1780) nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>

1781) 

1782)     <p>

1783)     Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
1784)     inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.

1785)     The following options can be added to your config file <a
1786)     href="#torrc">"torrc"</a> or specified on the command line:

1787)     </p>
1788)     <dl>
1789)       <dt><tt>EntryNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1790)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the
1791) circuit, if possible.

1792)         </dd>
1793)       <dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1794)         <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the
1795) circuit, if possible.

1796)         </dd>
1797)       <dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1798)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.

1799)         </dd>
1800)       <dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>

1801)         <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.

1802)             Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in
1803) this list.

1804)         </dd>
1805)     </dl>
1806)     <p>

1807)     <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>

1808)     — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future
1809) versions.

1810)     You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
1811)     route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
1812)     up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.

1813)     </p>
1814)     <p>

1815)     Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
1816)     the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those

1817)     used to connect to onion services, those that do directory fetches,

1818)     those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at
1819)     a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see
1820)     <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> and <tt>StrictNodes</tt> in the

1821)     <a href="<page docs/tor-manual>">manual</a>.

1822)     </p>
1823)     <p>

1824)     Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a <a

1825) 
1826) href="https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2"
1827) >2

1828)     letter ISO3166 country code</a> in curly braces (for example <tt>{de}</tt>),

1829)     or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8).
1830)     Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the

1831)     list items.

1832)     </p>
1833)     <p>

1834)     If you want to access a service directly through Tor's Socks
1835) interface

1836)     (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an

1837)     internal mapping in your configuration file using
1838) <tt>MapAddress</tt>.

1839)     See the manual page for details.
1840)     </p>

1841) 

1842)     <hr>

1843) 

1844) <a id="FirewallPorts"></a>

1845) <h3><a class="anchor" href="#FirewallPorts">My firewall only allows a
1846) few outgoing ports.</a></h3>

1847) 
1848) <p>
1849) If your firewall works by blocking ports, then you can tell Tor to only

1850) use the ports when you start your Tor Browser. Or you can add the ports
1851) that your firewall permits by adding "FascistFirewall 1"

1852) to

1853) your <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">torrc

1854) configuration file</a>.

1855) By default, when you set this Tor assumes that your firewall allows only
1856) port 80 and port 443 (HTTP and HTTPS respectively). You can select a
1857) different set of ports with the FirewallPorts torrc option.
1858) </p>
1859) 
1860) <p>
1861) If you want to be more fine-grained with your controls, you can also
1862) use the ReachableAddresses config options, e.g.:
1863) </p>
1864) 
1865) <pre>
1866)   ReachableDirAddresses *:80
1867)   ReachableORAddresses *:443
1868) </pre>
1869) 
1870) <hr>

1871) 

1872)     <a id="DefaultExitPorts"></a>

1873)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#DefaultExitPorts">Is there a list of default exit

1874)     ports?</a></h3>

1875)     <p>

1876) The default open ports are listed below but keep in mind that, any port or
1877) ports can be opened by the relay operator by configuring it in torrc or
1878) modifying the source code. But the default according to src/or/policies.c
1879) from the source code release tor-0.2.4.16-rc is:

1880)     </p>
1881)     <pre>
1882)   reject 0.0.0.0/8
1883)   reject 169.254.0.0/16
1884)   reject 127.0.0.0/8
1885)   reject 192.168.0.0/16
1886)   reject 10.0.0.0/8
1887)   reject 172.16.0.0/12
1888)   reject *:25
1889)   reject *:119
1890)   reject *:135-139
1891)   reject *:445
1892)   reject *:563
1893)   reject *:1214
1894)   reject *:4661-4666
1895)   reject *:6346-6429
1896)   reject *:6699
1897)   reject *:6881-6999
1898)   accept *:*
1899)     </pre>
1900)     <p>

1901)     A relay will block access to its own IP address, as well local network
1902)     IP addresses. A relay always blocks itself by default. This prevents
1903)     Tor users from accidentally accessing any of the exit operator's local
1904)     services.

1905)     </p>
1906) 
1907)     <hr>
1908) 

1909)     <a id="WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks"></a>

1910)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">I
1911)     keep seeing these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks.

1912)     Should I worry?</a></h3>
1913)     <p>

1914)     The warning is:

1915)     </p>
1916)     <p>

1917)     Your application (using socks5 on port %d) is giving Tor only an IP
1918)     address. Applications that do DNS resolves themselves may leak
1919)     information. Consider using Socks4A (e.g. via Polipo or socat) instead.

1920)     </p>
1921)     <p>

1922)     If you are running Tor to get anonymity, and you are worried about an
1923)     attacker who is even slightly clever, then yes, you should worry. Here's why.

1924)     </p>
1925)     <p>

1926)     <b>The Problem.</b> When your applications connect to servers on the
1927)     Internet, they need to resolve hostnames that you can read (like
1928)     www.torproject.org) into IP addresses that the Internet can use (like
1929)     209.237.230.66). To do this, your application sends a request to a DNS
1930)     server, telling it the hostname it wants to resolve. The DNS server
1931)     replies by telling your application the IP address.

1932)     </p>
1933)     <p>

1934)     Clearly, this is a bad idea if you plan to connect to the remote host
1935)     anonymously: when your application sends the request to the DNS server,
1936)     the DNS server (and anybody else who might be watching) can see what
1937)     hostname you are asking for. Even if your application then uses Tor to
1938)     connect to the IP anonymously, it will be pretty obvious that the user
1939)     making the anonymous connection is probably the same person who made
1940)     the DNS request.

1941)     </p>
1942)     <p>

1943)     <b>Where SOCKS comes in.</b> Your application uses the SOCKS protocol
1944)     to connect to your local Tor client. There are 3 versions of SOCKS you
1945)     are likely to run into: SOCKS 4 (which only uses IP addresses), SOCKS 5
1946)     (which usually uses IP addresses in practice), and SOCKS 4a (which uses
1947)     hostnames).

1948)     </p>
1949)     <p>

1950)     When your application uses SOCKS 4 or SOCKS 5 to give Tor an IP address,
1951)     Tor guesses that it 'probably' got the IP address non-anonymously from a
1952)     DNS server. That's why it gives you a warning message: you probably aren't
1953)     as anonymous as you think.

1954)     </p>
1955)     <p>

1956)     <b>So what can I do?</b> We describe a few solutions below.

1957)     </p>
1958)     <ul>
1959)     <li>If your application speaks SOCKS 4a, use it. </li>

1960)     <li>If you only need one or two hosts, or you are good at programming,
1961)     you may be able to get a socks-based port-forwarder like socat to work
1962)     for you; see <a
1963)     href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO">the

1964)     Torify HOWTO</a> for examples. </li>

1965)     <li>Tor ships with a program called tor-resolve that can use the Tor
1966)     network to look up hostnames remotely; if you resolve hostnames to IPs
1967)     with tor-resolve, then pass the IPs to your applications, you'll be fine.

1968)     (Tor will still give the warning, but now you know what it means.) </li>
1969) <!-- I'm not sure if this project is still maintained or not
1970) 
1971) <li>You can use TorDNS as a local DNS server to rectify the DNS leakage. See the Torify HOWTO for info on how to run particular applications anonymously. </li>
1972) !-->
1973)     </ul>

1974)     <p>If you think that you applied one of the solutions properly but still
1975)     experience DNS leaks please verify there is no third-party application
1976)     using DNS independently of Tor. Please see <a
1977)     href="#AmITotallyAnonymous">the FAQ entry on whether you're really
1978)     absolutely anonymous using Tor</a> for some examples.

1979)     </p>
1980) 
1981)     <hr>
1982) 

1983)     <a id="SocksAndDNS"></a>

1984)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#SocksAndDNS">How do I check if my application that uses

1985)     SOCKS is leaking DNS requests?</a></h3>
1986) 
1987)     <p>

1988)     These are two steps you need to take here. The first is to make sure
1989)     that it's using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, and the
1990)     second is to make sure that there aren't other leaks.

1991)     </p>
1992) 
1993)     <p>

1994)     Step one: add "TestSocks 1" to your torrc file, and then watch your
1995)     logs as you use your application. Tor will then log, for each SOCKS
1996)     connection, whether it was using a 'good' variant or a 'bad' one.
1997)     (If you want to automatically disable all 'bad' variants, set
1998)     "SafeSocks 1" in your <a href="#torrc">torrc</a> file.)

1999)     </p>
2000) 
2001)     <p>

2002)     Step two: even if your application is using the correct variant of
2003)     the SOCKS protocol, there is still a risk that it could be leaking
2004)     DNS queries. This problem happens in Firefox extensions that resolve
2005)     the destination hostname themselves, for example to show you its IP
2006)     address, what country it's in, etc. These applications may use a safe
2007)     SOCKS variant when actually making connections, but they still do DNS
2008)     resolves locally. If you suspect your application might behave like
2009)     this, you should use a network sniffer like <a
2010)     href="https://www.wireshark.org/">Wireshark</a> and look for
2011)     suspicious outbound DNS requests. I'm afraid the details of how to look
2012)     for these problems are beyond the scope of a FAQ entry though -- find
2013)     a friend to help if you have problems.

2014)     </p>
2015) 
2016)     <hr>
2017) 

2018)     <a id="TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications"></a>
2019)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#TorClientOnADifferentComputerThanMyApplications">I
2020)     want to run my Tor client on a different computer than my applications.
2021)     </a></h3>
2022)     <p>
2023)     By default, your Tor client only listens for applications that
2024)     connect from localhost. Connections from other computers are
2025)     refused. If you want to torify applications on different computers
2026)     than the Tor client, you should edit your torrc to define
2027)     SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0 and then restart (or hup) Tor. If you
2028)     want to get more advanced, you can configure your Tor client on a
2029)     firewall to bind to your internal IP but not your external IP.
2030)     </p>
2031) 
2032)     <hr>
2033) 
2034)     <a id="ServerClient"></a>
2035)     <h3><a class="anchor" href="#ServerClient">Can I install Tor on a
2036)     central server, and have my clients connect to it?</a></h3>
2037)     <p>
2038)      Yes. Tor can be configured as a client or a relay on another
2039)      machine, and allow other machines to be able to connect to it
2040)      for anonymity. This is most useful in an environment where many
2041)      computers want a gateway of anonymity to the rest of the world.
2042)      However, be forwarned that with this configuration, anyone within
2043)      your private network (existing between you and the Tor
2044)      client/relay) can see what traffic you are sending in clear text.
2045)      The anonymity doesn't start until you get to the Tor relay.
2046)      Because of this, if you are the controller of your domain and you
2047)      know everything's locked down, you will be OK, but this configuration
2048)      may not be suitable for large private networks where security is
2049)      key all around.
2050)     </p>
2051)     <p>
2052) Configuration is simple, editing your torrc file's SocksListenAddress
2053) according to the following examples:
2054)     </p>
2055)     <pre>
2056) 
2057)   #This provides local interface access only,
2058)   #needs SocksPort to be greater than 0
2059)   SocksListenAddress 127.0.0.1
2060) 
2061)   #This provides access to Tor on a specified interface
2062)   SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100
2063) 
2064)   #Accept from all interfaces
2065)   SocksListenAddress 0.0.0.0:9100
2066)    </pre>
2067)     <p>
2068) You can state multiple listen addresses, in the case that you are
2069) part of several networks or subnets.
2070)     </p>
2071)     <pre>
2072)   SocksListenAddress 192.168.x.x:9100 #eth0
2073)   SocksListenAddress 10.x.x.x:9100 #eth1
2074)     </pre>
2075)     <p>
2076) After this, your clients on their respective networks/subnets would specify
2077) a socks proxy with the address and port you specified SocksListenAddress
2078) to be.
2079)     </p>
2080)     <p>
2081) Please note that the SocksPort configuration option gives the port ONLY for
2082) localhost (127.0.0.1). When setting up your SocksListenAddress(es), you need
2083) to give the port with the address, as shown above.
2084)     <p>
2085) If you are interested in forcing all outgoing data through the central Tor
2086) client/relay, instead of the server only being an optional proxy, you may find
2087) the program iptables (for *nix) useful.
2088)     </p>
2089)